UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON LIBRARIES
Estate of Solomon Katz
CAPITAL AND FINANCE IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSA.'
CAPITAL AND FINANCE IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE
CAPITAL P FINANCE
IN THE AGE OF THE
RENAISSANCE
A STUDY OF THE FUGGERS
AND THEIR CONNECTIONS
by
RICHARD EHRENBERG
Translated from the German by
H. M. LUCAS
NEW YORK
HARCOURT, BRACE & COMPANY
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
BUTLER Sf TANNER LTD
FROME
CONTENTS
PAGE
PUBLISHERS' NOTE ' n
EDITOR'S PREFACE 13
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE 15
NOTE ON THE CURRENCIES 17
BOOK I
INTRODUCTION
MONEY CAPITAL AND PUBLIC CREDIT TOWARDS THE END OF THE
MIDDLE AGES 21
Different Views as to Money Capital 21
The Need of Capital for War 25
The Means of satisfying the Need of Capital for War 29
Beginnings and Foundations of Public Credit 32
Loans of Princes 35
The practical importance of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine of
Usury. Interest and Kent 42
Loans of the Cities 44
The Lenders of Money Capital 48
The Beginnings of Stock Exchanges 54 .
Review as to the conditions in regard to Public Credit at the
close of the Middle Ages 58
CHAPTER 1
THE FUGGER
I. THE PERIOD OF THE RISE OF THE FUGGER UNTIL THE DEATH
OF JAKOB n (1525) 64
Origin and Beginnings 64
Jakob II 65
New Ways of Business 65
Dealings with the Emperor Maximilian I 67
The Fugger and the Reformation 72
The Fugger and the Election of Charles V as Emperor 74
Charles V and Jakob Fugger 79
Spain 81
Naples 82
Jakob Fugger's End and his Importance 83
H. THE GREAT PERIOD OF THE FUGGER UNDER ANTON FUGGER 86
Anton's Caution in the Early Years 86
6 CONTENTS
PAGE
Conservative Attitude of the Tagger till 1530 89
The Hapsburgs and the Fugger in 1530 90
The Fugger Balance Sheets of 1533 and 1536 94
The Following Period till 1546 95
The Period of the War of Schmalkalden 97
Wish of the Fugger to retire from Business 101
State of the Business in 1546 101
New Business. Seeds of decay 105
Charles V and Anton Fugger, 1552 106
Anton Fugger and the Antwerp Bourse 109
The Fugger and the Financial Crisis of 1557 114
Anton Fugger's End and his Importance 117
The Story of the Burning of the Promissory Notes of Charles V 118
m. THE PERIOD OP DECAY FROM THE DEATH OP ANTON PUGGEB TO
THE END OF THE FUGGER BUSINESS 119
The Third Generation. Hans Jakob Fugger 119
State of the Business in 1563 120
Marx Fugger and Brothers 124
The Fugger and the Spanish Financial Crisis of 1575 125
The Balance Sheet of 1577 128
Final Period of the Fugger's Business Activities 129
CHAPTER 2
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS
THE SOUTH GERMAN BUSINESS HOUSES IN GENERAL 133
The Meuting 133
Mining and Smelting 134
The Emperor Maximilian I and the South German Merchants 134
The Welser 137
Beginnings 137
Development up to the Year 1517 138
The Nuremberg Welser 140
The Welser of Augsburg under Bartholomew Welser 142
The Time of the War of Schmalkalden 144
Later Period until the Crisis of 1557 147
Decay and Final Catastrophe 149
The Hochstetter 151
The Herwart 156
Hieronymus Seiler 158
Sebastian Neidhart and his Heirs 158
CONTENTS 7
The Manlich 161
The Adler 162
The Hem 162
The Hang and their Kinsmen 163
Jakob Herbrot 166
The Tucher 167
The Imhof 168
Other South German Business Houses 172
The Great South German Financiers in Antwerp and Lyons 174
Wolff Haller von HaUerstein 175
Lazarus Tucher 177
Other Antwerp Financiers of South German Origin 183
Hans Kleberg, 'the Good German' in Lyons 184
Financiers of South Germany in Lyons at a later time 187
North German Capitalists 189
CHAPTER 3
THE FLOEENTINES AND OTHER TUSCAN FINANCIERS
I. THE FLORENTINES 193
General Survey 193
The Florentines in Rome and Naples 194
The Final Period of the Medici in the Netherlands and England 196
The Frescobaldi and the Gualterotti 198
The End of Florentine Financial Business in the Netherlands
and England 201
The Florentines in France 202
The Period 1494-1512 204
Jacopo Salviati and Filippo Strozzi, 1512-1527 206
The Period 1527-1530 208
The Strozzi after 1530 212
Other Developments of Florentine Business in France until the
Death of Henry II (1559) 216
The Period of Charles IX and Henry III 218
II. OTHER TUSCAN FINANCIERS 220
Agostini Chigi of Siena 220
Gaspar Ducci of Pistoia 222
The Bonvisi of Lucca 226
Other Merchants from Lucca 227
The Affaitadi of Cremona 229
The Last Italian Financiers in France 230
THE INTERNATIONAL BOURSES OF THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY
ANTWEEP
PAGE
The Rise of Antwerp 233
The Importance of Antwerp: General Survey 234
Antwerp Fairs and Bourse 236
Speculation in Antwerp 239
The Beginnings of Forward Dealing 243
Bill Transactions in Antwerp 244
Antwerp Deposit Business 246
General Survey of Antwerp: Financial Business 248
Financial Agents of the Court of the Netherlands and the
Princely Agents in Antwerp. 250
Sir Thomas Gresham 252
Chronicle of the Antwerp Finance Business until the Year
1542 255
The Period 1542 to 1551 266
The Period 1551 to 1557 272
CHAPTER 2
LYONS
The Rise of Lyons 281
The Importance of Lyons: General Survey 282
Fairs and Bourse in Lyons 284
Forms of Capital Transactions in Lyons 287
The Beginnings of the Loans of the French Crown 288
The Work of the Cardinal de Tournon 291
The Period 1542 to 1547 292
The Period 1547 to 1551 297
The Period 1551 to 1557 300
CHAPTER 3
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
External Development of Antwerp and Lyons 307
Fairs and Bourses 308
CONTENTS 9
PAGE
The Forms of Commercial Transactions in Capital 311
The Importance of the Public Credit of the World Bourses 312
The Commonalty of the Bourse and Bourse Opinion 315
Bourse Opinion and Commercial Transactions in Capital 318
The 'ditta di borsa' 318
Bourse Opinion and Public Credit 319
Bourse Prices and Bourse Kate of Interest 322
Speculation and Arbitrage in Capital Transactions 325
The Mobilization of Capital on Loan 328
Final Conclusions 332
CONCLUSION
FROM THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK TO THE PRESENT
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEBTS 334
Spain 334
France 337
England in the Seventeenth Century 345
The Netherlands 349
England in the Eighteenth Century 352
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STOCK EXCHANGE 357
Amsterdam 357
Paris in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century 362
London until the Revolution of 1688 364
London after the Revolution of 1688 364
Paris in the Eighteenth Century 368
The German Stock Exchanges 370
III. RETROSPECT 375
PUBLISHERS' NOTE
npHE rapidly growing interest in economic and social history has
J. produced a general desire to know more of the manner in which
the economic development of Europe has been interpreted by scholars
of other nations. The aim of the Publishers is to meet that de-
mand. With this object, translations of works on economic and social
history by distinguished foreign authorities, which are likely to be of
interest to English students, will from time to time be produced. The
opening volumes of the series are The Industrial Revolution in the
Eighteenth Century, by Professor Paul Mantoux, and Capital and Finance
in the Age of the Renaissance. A Study of the luggers and their Con-
nections, by Dr. Richard Ehrenberg. The books of Professor Mantoux
and Dr. Ehrenberg hold a deservedly high place in economic and his-
torical literature, and it is believed that the appearance of English
versions of them will be generally welcomed. They will be followed in
due course by translations of other foreign works, throwing light on
different aspects of economic and social history.
PREFACE
'-pHE book of Dr. Richard Ehrenberg, Das Zeitalter der Fugger,
J. has long been known and valued by English, students, and all
who are interested in a critical period in the economic history of
Europe will be glad that it has been made more accessible in the
excellent translation of Mrs. Lucas. Certain chapters, of somewhat
less general interest than the remainder, have been omitted. But the
reader will find in the following pages a fuller study than is elsewhere
available in English of the financial developments which were the pre-
lude to the industrial expansion of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.
Much attention has been devoted in recent years by continental
scholars to the investigation of the earlier phases of capitalist enter-
prise. The subject has been approached along several different paths
and with varying conclusions. It is clear, however, that the mobiliz-
ation of financial resources on a greater scale than in the past, which
took place in the age of the Renaissance, is a phenomenon which lies
near the centre of it, and it is this aspect of the problem which forms
the theme of Dr. Ehrenberg's book. Though he selects for special
examination the business of the Fugger, who were the greatest finan-
ciers of the period, his work is much more than a study of the activities
of a single firm, however important. It is an attempt to show the
causes which produced the increased demand for capital in the six-
teenth century, the sources from which capital was drawn, and the
financial machinery through which it was made available for com-
mercial ventures, for industry and for the needs of States.
The Public Finance of the sixteenth century is a study which is
largely pathological. There were degrees in the incompetence and
immorality of Governments, but the practice of all was bad; and, if
Elizabeth, with the aid of Gresham, had achieved by the middle of her
reign a reputation which stood her in good stead as a borrower, it was
due, it may be suspected, less to the virtue of the English Government
than to the vices of its neighbours. The causes of the impasse lay
deeper than the personal shortcomings of statesmen and their advisers.
The essence of the difficulty consisted in the fact that an antiquated
engine was being used to draw a load for which it had not been designed.
The incompatibility of mediaeval systems of finance with the new
military and administrative methods was making itself increasingly
felt. The interest of Dr. Ehrenberg's introductory pages consists partly
in the account which they give of the financial aspects of the recurrent
political breakdowns, and of the attempts of Governments to draw
upon the resources of the money-market in order to avert them.
14 PREFACE
The part played by the financier in the commercial and industrial
life of the age was more fruitful and constructive. A steady flow of
capital was needed to finance the movement of the produce handled
on the world-market, such as the eastern spice-crop, copper, alum, the
precious metals, and the cloth shipped by the English Merchant Adven-
turers. The supply of it came from productive enterprises, such as the
silver and copper mines of the Fugger in the Tyrol and Hungary, the
profits of trading ventures, successful investments and speculations
on the part of the merchants themselves, and to a less extent -
since the habit of lending money at call had already gone some way
on the continent - from savings invested by the general public.
Dr. Ehrenberg's account of the personnel and organization of the
Antwerp money-market shows the machinery through which the finan-
cial resources of the age were mobilized. Its essence, as his description
shows, was internationalism, freedom for every capitalist to undertake
every transaction within his means, a unity which had as its symptom
the movement of all the principal markets in sympathy with each
other, and as its effect the mobilization of large resources at the strate-
gic points of commerce.
The world of international finance described by Dr. Ehrenberg
stood in intonate relation, therefore, both with the political and with
the economic problems of the period. Its significance for the future
was profound. Dr. Ehrenberg's concluding pages describe shortly the
principal landmarks in the financial history of the seventeenth century.
The story of English banking in the century before the foundation
of the Bank of England contains several phases which are still obscure,
and not every one will agree with his interpretation of it. But if the
causes that produced the sensational changes which took place after
the Revolution are to be understood, it is necessary that the English
developments should be set in relation to their continental background.
It ia not the least of the merits of Dr. Ehrenberg's book that it assists
the English reader to see the economic evolution of his own country as
part of a general European movement.
TBANSLATOB'S NOTE
y'-lERTAIN sections of Dr. Bichard Ehrenberg's book have been
V>4omitted in translation. They are :
Vol I. Chapter IV (The Geonese Spaniards and Netherlanders).
Chapter V (The Importance of the Financiers of the Sixteenth
Century).
Vol II. Section III, entitled : The Time of the International Financial
Crises.
The references contained in Dr. Ehrenberg's copious notes have
been given. A note has been added on the Currencies mentioned in
the text.
H. M. L.
NOTE ON THE CUREENCIES
The gulden, according to the Imperial edict of 1524, contained 37|
English grains of fine gold (Del Mar, p. 339). The revolutionary
government in Holland coined 'guilders' or florins of 160J grains fine
silver (/&., p. 369).
The Lime Tournois in 1200 designated 98 grammes of fine silver, by
1600 it had fallen to 11 grammes (D'Avenel, Vol. I, p. 62). In the
middle of the sixteenth century it was equal to of the Livre d' Artois
or Cayolus gulden.
The Flemish Pound or Livre de gros de Flandres contained 20 scheUing
=240 grooten.
The Carolus gulden, also called the Livre d' Artois or florin de Brabant,
was a Netherlands silver coin established by the law of February 22,
1542 (Shaw, p. 345). It was equal to 40 gr. or 20 stivers. Hence 1
pound Flemish=6 Carolus gulden.
The ducat was equal to 42 or 43 stivers and thus was rather more than
2 Carolus Gulden and rather less than J of a pound Flemish.
The Spanish ducat was worth 375 maravedi.
The Rhenish florin was a gold gulden. 7 fl. Eh. =10 Carolus gulden ==
about 5 ducats.
The Crown or Sew was about $ of a ducat and in the middle of the six-
teenth century was worth rather more than 5 shillings English.
BOOK 7
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
MONEY CAPITAL AND PUBLIC CREDIT TOWARDS THE END OF THE
MIDDLE AGES
T/1EWS on Money Capital. Pecunia pecuniam non parere potest.
* Money is essentially unproductive. Anyone, therefore, who de-
mands fruits from it, sins not only against positive commandments of
divine and secular law, but also against the nature of things. A man
profoundly learned in this commercial law of the Middle Ages formu-
lates in these words the first principle which for many centuries ruled
undisputed in theory and even attempted to bring practice under its
sway. 1
This ecclesiastical view of money capital had its origin in the leading
idea of Christianity directed against the materialism of antiquity - the
idea that earthly things were only valuable in so far as they served as
preparation for the life to come. It was based on a moral precept from
the Bible, and a saying of Aristotle, which apparently was only the state-
ment of an ideal, but which interpreted as a principle, appeared to deny
productivity to money.
As the two highest spiritual authorities of the Middle Ages had both
pronounced in the same sense, it was practically impossible to contradict
the theory. On the other hand, the circumstances of ordinary hie could
not be made to harmonize with this view. So long as money was not
yet used on a large scale as a medium of exchange, but served chiefly as
a measure of value and so long as payments were chiefly made in kind,
interest on money capital was comparatively rare. As soon, however,
as the economic life of the European peoples outgrew this early stage of
cultural development, especially since the time of the Crusades, the
ecclesiastical ideal was thrust more and more into the background until
finally even the doctrine changed.
The new doctrine no longer made moral claims, but for the first time
since the classical period tried to treat economic facts from an economic
point of view. Since Adam Smith it has borne the name of the 'mer-
cantile' system. Like every other theory which has proved important in
practice, it is the product of various interests and tendencies. Public
opinion in the mass was chiefly influenced by the enormous production
of precious metals in Spanish America. The news of these fabulous
treasures which was spread abroad, not without the help of Spanish
financiers, had a deep and lasting influence on the imagination of the
masses; the more so as for some considerable time the power of Spain
was actually strengthened by the American silver. It also influenced
i Endenmnn, Studien in tier romanischrtomonist. WirOuchaftt-und Xechtslekre,
1874-83, H. 11.
22 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
many of the second- or third-rate writers, who after the devastating wars
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tried more or less systematic-
ally to develop their views of the State and economics. They spread the
exaggerations of the mercantile doctrine, the over-estimation of the
power of money, which Adam Smith fought against.
On the other hand, genuine mercantilism, important alike on the
practical and scientific side, had arisen much earlier. It was chiefly the
result of the experience in economic matters collected throughout many
centuries by the mediaeval cities. Since the end of the Middle Ages,
this experience had been utilized by princes and statesmen in order
to extend and establish their power and to form real States. It had
also been used by writers of the first rank in order to support the
princes at their work by advice which already bore the stamp of true
science.
With seeming suddenness one principle becomes prominent at this
time which expresses a new view of the essence and significance of money
capital. This principle runs Tecunia nervus belli' (money is the sinews
of war).
It is no theory but a principle based on experience. It was not
framed in conscious opposition to the mediaeval doctrine, and it holds
no logical contradiction of it. It contents itself with a brief statement of
an often observed fact. But it brings before us one of the most import-
ant consequences of the great spiritual revolution we call the 'Benais-
sance.'
The Eenaissance means everywhere, but more especially in regard to
social and civic life, a return in this last resort to Nature, to what is
actually before us, here in this instance to human nature, which is once
again regarded as a datum.
The Catholic Church of the Middle Ages with its effort to bring up
men by its doctrine to the highest morality had itself long sunk to an
outer hypocrisy and an inner moral corruption, without, however, re-
nouncing its ideal claims on human nature. The Eenaissance, on the
other hand, gave up the idea of making men more noble and therefore
directed its efforts all the more to bridling and ruling them.
The statecraft of the Eenaissance did not, like the Ecclesiastical
doctrine of the Middle Ages, erect a powerful structure of dogma
clamped together with iron logic but resting on feet of clay. It preferred
to embody its observations in short sentences. It turned to Classical
times originally, not from a fondness to philosophy or archaeology, but
because it needed the classics. Where else could the young science of
experience find authority to rival the wisdom of the schoolmen sancti-
fied as it was by age and faith? Hence at first the passionate search for
the remains of a vanished civilization, a search which degenerated all
INTRODUCTION 23
too soon with a meaningless heaping up of dead authorities and a learned
pedantry.
The Renaissance, properly speaking, was only the high-water mark of
the development, which had begun long before and which rose with
increasing speed in the last centuries of the Middle Ages. So the old
principle Tecunia nervus belli' did not reappear so suddenly after all. 1
Originating in this form in Aceio, it appears occasionally in mediaeval
literature. When, however, thousands of fresh experiences had demon-
strated its truth, the statecraft of the Renaissance made it the central
point of its economic discussion, and this came to pass first of all in
that country and that city, where such experiences were the most abun-
dantly forthcoming.
The Italians, and more especially the Florentines, towards the end of
the Middle Ages could look back on a practice in handling money capital
extending over more than three hundred years. They knew that money
had become an indispensable weapon for the attainment of political
power. They had had this fact perpetually before their eyes for hun-
dreds of years, and each generation had handed it down with a steadily
growing store of practical experience. Masters of language now gave it
the stamp of universality, and with the help of the newly rediscovered
classical learning made it the common property of the upper classes
throughout Europe.
Both for theory and for legislation, however, the ban against interest
on capital remained for a timeunattacked and left to a gradualand spon-
taneous dissolution. It progressively lost influence on practical life, the
experiencesof which wereelsewhere formulated into a scientific clearness.
Among Florentine statesmen and learned men of the fifteenth cen-
tury the saying Tecunia nervus belli' had certainly long been current,
before Machiavelli took it for his subject of a short but important
polemic. 2 In opposition to the general view he there lays it down that
money is not the sinews of war, that it is not sufficient of itself to obtain
good soldiers; that, on the other hand, with soldiers money can often be
procured.
1 Davanzati, Lezione deUe monete in der Auag. bei Argelotua IV. 164, Note 1;
Lipsius, PoW. *. do. doctr. (1596) IV. 9. V. 6; Biiohmann, GeflugeUe Worte. 16.
Aufl. (1889) p. 339 ff. Sansovino, Concetti politic* (No. 388): D nutrimento dell'
esaercito senz' alcun dubbio e il danaro. Qnesto da misura ad ogni oosa e si con-
verte in ogni cosa. Perd disse quel savio antioo, ch'i capitani, i soldati, I'arme, i
cavaffl e gli stromenti, 1'artiglierie, ma non i danari, erano simili, ad un corpo,
che havesse testa, braocia, collo, petto, gambe e piedi, ma non ventre; perohe si
come il ventre da nutrimento al corpo, eosi i danari danno sostanza all' esseroito,
e quel Be di Sparta gli chiamd nerro della guerra; perohe si come i nervi danno il
moto al corpo, cosi lo danno i danari all' esseroito.
Dtscorw sopra le deche di Tito Livio IL 10.
24 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
The fact that this principle was accepted in Machiavelli's circle as an
axiom was sufficient to rouse opposition in his inventive mind, but this
opposition had a much deeper root. Machiavelli hated the mercenaries
and was enthusiastic for a militia system with extensive liability for
service. He introduced this into Florence, without, however, much
success. His friend, the great historian Francesco Guicciardini, who,
though far from his equal in intellect, dialectic and political farsighted-
ness, was far superior to him in practical insight into immediate political
necessity, contradicted him here as he did elsewhere. 1 At present, he
says, it is easier to get soldiers with money than money with soldiers.
On this head Guicciardini knew his own times better than Machiavelli
did. The saying Tecunia nervus belli' had in the time of the Kenais-
sance already received the popular form which two hundred years later
was usually ascribed to Montecuccoli. A trustworthy authority gives
the story as follows: a
When King Louis XII, in the year 1499, formed the project of taking
the Dukedom of Milan, to which he thought he had a claim, he one day
asked in the State Council of the Condottiere Gian Giacomo do
Trivulzio, a Milanese who had entered his service, what preparations
were necessary for this great enterprise - Trivulzio, who as a Condottiere
had the most exact information on this head, answered him, 'Most
Gracious King, three things must be ready: money, money, and once
again, money.' Here this saying has the character of a jest springing
spontaneously from past experience. Montecuccoli, on the other hand,
two hundred years later, in his memoirs, 3 joins this saying rather
heavily to the well-known apothegms of the ancients, and calls money
'the tool of tools' and continues, 'What wonder hath brought forth the
marvellous effects of which history is full? Hereon a certain man, being
asked what were the things necessary for making war, replied that there
were three: Money, Money, Money.' Here the empirical doctrine is
turned once more into a kind of dogma with a claim to a universal appli-
cation. On the other hand, a well-known military writer of the present
states it in a strictly limited form - 'A full war chest may be worth an
army corps, financial talent on the part of a leader in the field may be
worth a good general.' *
The first great statesmen and publicists of the Eenaissance did not
wish to pursue either economics or finance. They spoke of money as the
sinews of war, because money was more important for war than for any
1 Opere inedite L 61.
'Lodovico Guicciardini, L'hore de recreafome, in the German translation of
Daniel Federmann von Memmingen, Basel, 1575.
Monteoucooli, Lib. 1, cap. 2, tit. 5: del danaro.
Von der Goltz, Das FoMr in Waffen, p. 465.
INTRODUCTION 25
other process that came within their purview. Within a few generations,
however, their observations were generalized. Botero designates war as
the most important eventuality for which a prince must keep money in
reserve; and Bodinus Besold, Ammirato, and other publicists of the
same epoch, use the same language. They are followed by the mer-
cantilists proper.
The necessity of raising ready money for war first set the stone rolling,
which - if we may adopt the saying of a modern Pope - shattered the
Colossus of the scholastic teaching as to usury. The saying 'Pecunia
nervus belli' has become a chief root of modern economic doctrine. Only
one chief root, however. The other is found in Machiavelli's saying which
attributes more importance in war to man-power than to money.
The controversy between Machiavelli and Guicciardini lasted long in
literature without being decided. Even in mercantilism a tendency
friendly to labour is often observable alongside of a tendency friendly to
capital. The latter, however, prevailed. The significance of capital,
under-estimated by the teaching of the Middle Ages, over-estimated by
mercantilism, was first put in its right place by Adam Smith. This has
not prevented his followers, however, from falling once again into both
extremes. We are, therefore, justified in saying that the controversy
between Machiavelli and Guicciardini already contains the germ of the
latest problems of social science.
The Need of Capital for War. The system of dealing in kind prevalent
in the early Middle Ages had been turning by degrees into a monetary
and credit system, but this transformation went on with feverish
rapidity at the time of the Renaissance. One chief symptom was the
greed for the possession of money. Never since the time of the Roman
Empire had everything been so easily bought with money: the highest
ecclesiastical and worldly dignities, the blood of men, the honour of the
greatest ladies, and eternal salvation itself. Gold and spices, but chiefly
gold, was the goal of the Portuguese explorers, the goal of Columbus, his
exalted patrons and his followers. Machiavelli was justified in speaking
of the 'vileness' of human nature. The same age also produced charac-
ters of heroic self-abnegation, which shed their radiance across the cen-
turies. These, however, did not occur among the great ones of the world,
and the same great movement which showed the strength of faith and of
conviction as opposed to the prevailing egoism was only made palatable
to many rulers by the fact that it increased their revenues.
The general greed for money which seized on the upper classes in the
epoch of the Renaissance concealed other and more far-reaching motive
forces. The money so passionately desired by princes, high ecclesiastics
and nobles, was used in the first place to satisfy the ever-growing
general ostentation, the luxury in food, and other sensual gratifications;
26 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
but it also farthered the progress of art and science and the many
passions they embrace, among which the most distinguished and the
most costly was a gigantic love of building. In the case of princes other
large forms of expenditure grew up which, unlike those already men-
tioned, had a non-personal character. First of all, those called forth by
the transformation of the mediaeval feudal state into the modern
bureaucracy. The ever-increasing expenses of the state in administra-
tion, justice and diplomacy entailed claims on the princes which, as we
have seen, they tried for a long time to pass on at least in part to others,
but which nevertheless necessitated the payment of a growing number of
professional officials. What the princes managed to save by allowing the
officials to help themselves in other more or less legal ways, they must
have had to pay out again in bribes to the officials of other princes.
War, however, with its extraordinary demands ate up more money than
all these other claims taken together. The same boundless ambition
which expressed itself in the less powerful princes by gigantic building
schemes, led the more powerful and a progressive foreign policy which
could only be carried out by means of perpetual wars. Wars and arma-
ments were the department among the princes' activities where the
transformation of a system of dealing in kind into a money and credit
system went forward most speedily.
The feudal system of defence had undoubtedly constituted an
advance on the original German system where all free men were liable
to bear arms. It had its origin in the increase of the claims, both techni-
cal and economic, which were made on the men under arms, and under
the feudal system these claims were satisfied by distribution of labour.
A special military caste was formed among the feudatories. But like all
human institutions the feudal military system had from the beginning a
fatal weakness. It recognized only a contractual obligation to bear arms.
If the feudal lord failed to fulfil his duty to his vassal or asked more of
him than his feudal due, the vassal could leave his lord. We know that
this often happened and we know too that this fact largely helped the
development of the mercenaries.
These developed at first chiefly in the cities, for here the general
obligation of all citizens to serve under arms early proved incompatible
with increasing economic development, and the feudal system in the
nature of things could not be of importance in the organization of
defence. Here too the use of money made such strides that it was soon
possible to hand over the conduct of wars without the city wall to
mercenaries. For a long time the princes could not do this owing to the
smallness of their monetary revenue. It was only when the technique
of war had been completely revolutionized by the successes of the cities
and the Swiss Confederacy and the knightly armies had sustained re-
INTRODUCTION 27
peated defeats that the princes saw themselves obliged to reorganize
their military system. Service in arms, which under the feudal system
had become a profession, developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, through the fact of payment into a form of manual labour; and
finally in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, through the use of
muskets and cannon it became an industry, requiring skilful direction
and large capital. The princes were not yet capable to satisfying their
claims on the technical side because they had no standing armies; and on
the economic side, because their monetary revenues were insufficient.
Under these circumstances the conduct of war fell into the hands of
professional private undertakers, the Condottieri, and they for the first
time since the classical epoch created an art of war, a highly organized
technique. Italy was the classic country of these general undertakers
of war, and it was here too that the renaissance of the monetary system
first made itself evident. The Condottieri themselves were at the
beginning chiefly German or Spanish, and even when the leaders' posts
had mostly been filled by Italians, the rank and file still remained
chiefly Germans, Swiss, and Spaniards.
The Condottieri relieved the princes of the training and generalship
of the armies, not, however, of their maintenance during the war. The
economic difficulties connected with the size of the armies and their
equipment continually increased and were at first a source of far worse
evils than those of the mediaeval system.
Like the feudal liability to service, the hire system only rested on
contracts which the war lord made with leader of mercenaries, and the
leader -usually through the agency of the captains - made with the
soldiers. While, however, the feudal contract was largely based upon the
public code, under the new system the contracts were only based on the
civil code, and in particular on the rights of property - Blood for money;
no money, no Swiss!
This relation, inherent in the system, gave the wars of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries their particular character. It explained the
unseemly and fatal influence which the badly paid troops brought to
bear on the course of the world's history because they could not be
trusted. How often the French Kings, or even more the German
Emperors, have been left in the lurch by their mercenaries, or hindered
in carrying out their war plans by the threat of mutiny and desertion.'
Think of such events as the storming of Rome by Charles V's unruly
Germans, or the sack of Antwerp by the Spanish soldateska. The
'Ribauds' of the thirteenth century are reproduced in the 'Routiers,'
'Ecorcheurs' and 'Retondeurs' of the fifteenth, and the mercenary
armies of the Thirty Years War were no better. This war would never
have lasted so long if at every opportunity for peace there had not been
28 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
ambitious and greedy commanders and troops ready to fight against
anybody for the money of any power which had a mind to fish in
troubled waters.
The degradation of military service into a mere trade would not have
led to the worst, had not the bad financial position of most of the war
lords and the faulty organization of the monetary system in the
princes' budgets led of necessity to forced 'deliveries in kind,' that is to
say to robbery, murder, and arson. During the war the mercenaries
were often actually forced to rob friend and foe alike; and when it was
over they were not infrequently driven to maintain themselves by
highway robbery till they found a new employer. This told adversely
not only on the peoples, but also on the princes, who always had it
before them that they would be ruined by the cruel maxim of the
mercenary leaders that 'War must feed war.'
Machiavelli, who certainly had no tender feeling for the Bufferings of
the peoples, hated the mercenaries from the standpoint of the princes
and their power. 1 The princes on their side, however, always sacrificed
everything to the attempt to satisfy the indispensable mercenaries,
because only so could they be prevented from deserting and committing
In the fifteenth century Charles VII of France formed a small stand-
ing army. While, however, the first consequence of this measure was
the transformation of the Taille into a permanent tax, yet for many cen-
turies longer the further carrying out of this beneficent reform was pre-
vented by the princes' insufficient money revenues. The foreign policy
of the Great Powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could
not yet rely to any large extent on standing armies. 8
The meaning of this is best shown by a few figures. In the year 1532
Dr. Christopher Scheuerl calculated the cost of an average war equip-
ment inclusive of pay for six months, but exclusive of provisions,
baggage and other smaller costs, at 560,000 fl. A Spanish army corps
which in the second half of the sixteenth century was sent to Southern
Italy and had to be kept there half a year cost on an average 1 J million
ducats. The expenditure of the Spanish Crown in putting down the
rebellion in the Netherlands averaged two to three million gold crowns
a year, i.e. more than the yearly revenue of the Netherlands Govern-
ment during the most flourishing trade period. Now let us consider
that in the sixteenth century there were only twenty-five years, in the
seventeenth century only twenty-one years, in which there were no
1 Of. Machiavelli, Scrilti inediti ed. Can^trini pref. xxiv, & 281 fi. Canestrini,
'Document! per servire alia storia d. milizia italiana ed. Canestrini' (Arch. star.
Hat. XV), p. cviii ff. oxxiii ff.
'dement, Jacquet Ccewr et Charles 711, voL I, 76 ft., 83, 107 ff.
INTRODUCTION 29
war-like operations on a large scale. These facts should suffice to give
some idea of the effect of the enormous demand for capital for war pur-
poses on the financial arrangements of princes, more especially as in the
absence of a regular army the irregular and incalculable nature of these
requirements made impossible any orderly system of finance.
The capital needed for war belonged from its nature to extraordinary
expenditure. Moreover, this very often occurred suddenly and de-
manded immediate satisfaction. Finally, it usually had to be met not in
the places where revenue was raised, but in far distant countries. The
principle that war must feed war often could not be acted upon, not
only if the troops were on home territory, but even in the enemies'
country, either from political considerations or because there was
nothing further to fight. The armies needed reinforcements and fresh
equipment. All this required money, and, as we see from the wars of
Charles V and Philip II, often hundreds of miles from the place where it
was to be found, and months or even years before the time when the
revenues from the domains and taxes and other dues accumulating very
slowly in the princes' coffers should have reached the required amount.
Finally we must bear in mind the dangers of the roads, the lack of
transport and its extreme slowness and the great difficulties of moving
large sums of money for any distance. It is only when all this has been
brought before us that we can have a true picture of the anxiety with
which the princes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even those
who were financially the best situated, must have remembered in war-
time the old saying, Tecunia nervus belli.'
Means of Meeting the Demand for Capital for War. The foreign policy
of the European Great Powers in the period from the middle of the
fifteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century was only to be
successfully carried out if there were large supplies of ready money in
an accessible form. This, however, was not by any means always the
case. Though the princes recognized that money was the sinews of war,
they were unable to act on this maxim. Their revenues were still
mostly revenues in kind, and where they did consist of ready money,
they were usually not found at the time or place when they could have
been used for war. Above all, they were often quite insufficient to meet
the war expenditure.
Neither the revenues from the princes' own domains, nor the old
feudal dues which were mostly quite unproductive, could be increased
to any considerable extent. Permanent taxes and taxes on transactions
of the modem type were only just beginning and as yet amounted to
very little. They only came into consideration for war purposes in' so
far as they could be farmed out or mortgaged. The customs were
gradually increased, but inasmuch as they were too numerous and their
30 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
aims were not economic, but fiscal, the attempts to increase them raised
so much ill-feeling that they could not be carried far, when the home
industry was insufficient for the requirements of the country or where
trade was the most important source of income. England alone at this
time enjoyed a highly productive tariff which was adapted to the
furtherance of national economic ends.
The publicists of the Renaissance never failed to urge the princes to
collect a war chest, but only in a few instances was their advice fol-
lowed. The Emperor Frederic III, King Henry VII of England, Pope
Julius II, the Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan, and Alfonso I of
Ferrara, had some of them kid in large stores of ready money and some
large treasures in jewels and gold and silver plate, and in the case of the
Italian princes we have mentioned how their policy profited to the full
from their forethought. The same cannot be said of the more important
princes outside Italy. If they were good managers they did not pursue
an active foreign policy, and if they did so, they were not good managers.
A careful prince always had for his successor a spendthrift who did not
understand how to utilize his predecessor's financial policy. Thus
Frederick III was succeeded by Maximilian I and Henry VII by Henry
VIII. King Louis XI and Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand and
Isabella of Spain held their property together with a firm hand, but did
not go so far as to form a war chest. When such a treasure was collected
in other countries it was never sufficient to carry on years of European
war. diaries V and Philip II, who had enormous national treasures in
gold and silver in their territories, used these to carry out their world-
wide plans. All the treasures of Peru and Mexico proved inadequate in
the long run, and in any case they were not easily accessible in Italy,
Picardy, Flanders, or Germany.
The possibility of raising extraordinary war taxes depended in the
first place on the power of the prince over his subjects. This power was
of very different degrees in different countries, Germany and France
being the two extreme points. In Germany the Emperor, when the
Empire was in extremity, usually obtained little or no help from the
Diet of the Empire, while in France the Grown was often able on occa-
sions of far less urgency to obtain the grant of millions. But in France
itself, the long wars could not be carried on by means of such taxes;
they were insufficient and came in much too slowly. No European prince
was as yet able to impose taxes in kind or grants, 1 and the prosperity
of the agricultural mass of the people had not yet reached such a point
that it was possible to get anything by turning the tax screw. The
1 Philippe de Commines, Memoirea, V. 19: 'Y a il roy ne seigneur sur terre qui
ait povoir, oultre son demaine, de mettre un denier BUT sea subjects sans octroy
et consentement de ceubc qui le doibvent payer, simon par tyrannic ou viollence.'
INTRODUCTION 31
nobility and the Church, who were the greatest landowners, submitted
themselves to taxation with a particularly ill-grace; the tax-paying
capacity of the nobles, who themselves suffered from a chronic deficit,
was usually not large; while the Church, which could have paid more,
only did so when this served its own interest. The cities were able to
pay and usually disposed to tax, or in case of necessity they could be
compelled to do so. In fact they were heavily taxed, but the princes
had to take care not to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. In the
case of a sudden urgent need of capital even in the cities it was as a
general rule only possible to obtain the necessary sums as a loan.
Among financial prerogatives the Mint was far the most productive and
it was also the only one whose yield could be increased at short notice.
Many princes, both in the Middle Ages and later in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, did a roaring business in currency depreciation.
Trade, however, learned to guard itself against bad coining on the part
of the authorities, both by having its own particular trade currencies
and by the development of money surrogates. This considerably
diminished the profit to be made out of currency depreciation. The
princes themselves also began to perceive that this barbaric financial
expedient was in the last resort ruinous for themselves; and in the large
states, at any rate, it was only adopted in the case of extreme necessity.
Its place was taken by another method of raising money still more
objectionable from the political and economic point of view. This was
the sale of offices. The growth in the number of officials led to the same
step as the development of the army. The princes left the fulfilment of
the new duties to private undertakers. We shall see this phenomenon
more especially in the domain of financial administration, when in the
Eenaissance period the system of fsvrmmg out the taxes came into exten-
sive use. The sale of offices extended also to other branches of the
administration and even to the judicature. It was the most prevalent in
the French and the Papal administrative systems. In both instance
new offices were created on a large scale, only in order to be sold. This
process could, however, not be repeated sufficiently often, and on the
whole was not productive enough to be of much weight in view of the
continued increase of war expenditure. 1
The most rough and ready of all financial expedients, the sale of the
Crown lands, had even in the feudal state outrun the bounds of ex-
pediency. The enf eoffing of Crown lands had in most cases constituted
a permanent alienation. It had been carried so far in Germany that
towards the end of the Middle Ages there was no Imperial domain land
properly speaking. The efforts of the German Emperors to get it back
1 Of. Woker, Das fcfrcWtcAe Finanzieesen der Papste, p. 6. For France cf . B.
Kcot, Hiatoire des Etati gdn&raux, I, 434 ft., n, 117 ft.
32 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
were for long brought to nought by their pressing need of money and
were turned in the contrary direction. On the other hand, the domains
of the House of Hapsburg had increased largely; the same was true of
the other states where the feudal system had produced the same conse-
quences, the feudal lords had for a long time striven with growing
success to get back the lost Crown domains. It was on this account
that towards the end of the Middle Ages the sale of parts of the domains
or their revenues was everywhere regarded as a desperate financial ex-
pedient. The mortgaging of portions of the domain lands (i.e. the
sources of revenue) was rightly regarded as equivalent to sale, while
the pledging of the revenues was a favourite and general expedient.
These methods of covering extraordinary monetary requirements
were either no longer or not yet applicable. They were all more or less
objectionable from a political or economic point of view. Moreover,
even when they were sufficient for the requirements of war, they could
not be applied with sufficient speed to meet the case, nor sufficient ease
to meet the wishes of the princes, who accordingly were as a rule reduced
to the use of credit.
The Beginnings and Bases of Public Credit. Public credit exists as
soon as there is any public authority. The chief, who in return for ser-
vices expected or received promised his subject or follower a service in
return, was bringing public credit into play. If this return was to be
periodic or annual, it assumed the character of a funded debt, this was
also the case when one prince became liable to pay tribute to another.
Every purchase, on the other hand, which a prince undertook without
cash payment constituted a floating debt. The distinguishing sign of
public credit is already present. The debtor who cannot, or will not, pay
cannot be constrained by law (though he may be compelled by force) to
fulfil his obligation, because the authority which is his as lord can pre-
vent the compulsory application of the law.
A Nuremberg merchant of the sixteenth century, on an occasion when
it was feared that the French Grown would cease to pay its debts, de-
clared that 'Great lords do as they will.' The essence of public credit is
already recognized here. It means that of the three conditions for
any credit - the belief that the debtor can, will and must pay - the
third condition is usually absent unless the creditor can assert his claim
by the use of force. The growth of the general feeling for justice
exercised a certain pressure on the debtor and made him keep his
engagements even in the case of public credit, and the increase of
economic insight told in the same direction. But even at the present
day we often see that these motives are insufficient to prevent gross
violations of public credit. In earlier times matters were even worse.
Anyone who gave credit to a prince knew that the repayment of the
INTRODUCTION 33
debt depended only on Ms debtor's capacity and will to pay.* The case
was very different for the cities, who had power as overlords but were
also corporations, associations of individuals held in a common bond
According to the generally accepted law each individual burgher was"
liable for the debts of the city both with his person and his property.
Should the city fail in its engagements the creditor was entitled to re-
course against the person and property of any burgher who fell into his
power. The cities, even as late as the sixteenth century, expressly gave
this rightto their creditors, who on occasion knewhowto take advantage
of it. It constituted an effective means of compulsion, for the burghers
were often forced by their trade to remain outside the protection of their
city with a considerable amount of their property. From an economic
point of view this motive was of great importance. The general principle
that the holder of public authority could not have the law he had
broken enforced against him, was not infringed but confirmed by this
right of the creditors of cities. 2
Connected with this is a still more far-reaching and fundamental
difference between the debts of princes and cities. The fact that all
burghers were liable for the debts of their cities, while this was certainly
not the case without more in regard to the subjects of princes was de-
cisive for the chief basis of any credit, the ability to pay. The princes'
capacity to pay depended first of all on the amount of the revenues
from their domains. As these were never sufficient to pay the interest on
large debts, or even to repay the capital, the most important con-
sideration in a prince's capacity to pay was his power over the purses of
his subjects. This power, as we saw, had various degrees, but never
*rent so far that the subjects were liable without more to meet the
primee's debts.
Towards the end of the Middle Ages in some countries princes had
the right of raising forced loans from their subjects. They could also, as
we shajl see, use the credit of the cities for loans for their own expendi-
ture. For the loans, however, which they themselves raised the sole
guarantee besides their domains was the taxes expressly granted by
their subjects. If the subjects were themselves to be liable for such
debts, a, special grant by Parliament was needful; and in order to obtain
this the princes usually had to make some concession in return, e.g. to
1 Too much importance is attached to primal rights in regard to public credit.
This is true, ag. of the otherwise excellent work of A. v. Kostaneoki, Dor offentt.
Credit im Mittdalter (Schmollere Staats- tmd sooialwissenschaftL Porachungen
1889, IX. 1). P. u g. especially do not sufficiently distinguish between public
and private credit.
Gierke (Deuteches Qenoaaenschaftsrecht, U, 383 ff. 770), of. Kostaneoki I. c.
P- 12. (fiemembrancia 1579-1664, Analyt. Index. London, 1878, p. 189ft. and
JfvggerArchiv.48,6.)
34 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEE
make over some definite revenues of their own for the Interest and re-
payments of the debt. This was usually the condition imposed before
the princes were allowed to avail themselves of the credit of the cities.
The princes, however, strove with increasing success to convert the
voluntary contractual liability for certain of the princes' debts on the
part of their subjects into a general and compulsory liability arising
from the authority of the princes. Long and violent struggles were
necessary to attain this end. Meanwhile loans at high interest were
greatly hated by the people, and this naturally hampered the princes in
their financial operations. In the case of the debts of princes there was
never any question of unlimited solidarity, as in the case of the city
debts.
Even in the cities the burghers often forbade the council to burden the
city with debt without their consent. While therefore the princes after
centuries of straggle extended their power, which had been strictly
limited by contract, the authorities in the towns had their previously
unlimited powers restricted in this way. Even at this later time, how-
ever, there were hardly any city loans for which the whole community
was not liable, while even at the time when the princes' power had
reached its highest there were always some princes' loans for which the
subjects were not responsible.
Even when the subjects had to meet the debts of their princes, this
did not result in such a large increase of capacity to pay as that which
the cities enjoyed through the personal liability of their burghers. The
burghers were the ckss of the population economically the soundest
and possessed of the most capital, while among the princes' subjects
there were very few of this type.
In regard to the will to pay, also, conditions were not usually very
favourable in the case of princes. Lending at interest continued to be
strictly forbidden both by ecclesiastical and secular law, and though
certain princes in the sixteenth century transformed the ban on interest
into a interest tax, the doctrine of usury offered them a most useful
handle for breaking the most solemn promises to pay, if their ceaseless
money difficulties became specially pressing. The princes and their
advisers seldom had sufficient economic foresight and insight to be
deterred by higher considerations from the momentarily desirable
state bankruptcy. Such considerations weighed the less with them as
the creditors were very often not of the country, but foreign merchants
or bankers; and also because princes were less affected by the economic
weal or woe of their subjects than they now are.
In the cities ruled by merchants, whose creditors were as a rule
their own citizens or those of a friendly city, the situation was entirely
different.
INTRODUCTION 35
If a prince died, his successor as such was not bound to take over his
predecessor's debts.
Though as a matter of fact they were mostly taken over in the six-
teenth century, this was less due to a sense of justice than because the
successor in his monetary requirements was usually dependent on his
predecessor's creditors.
Even in the second half of the eighteenth century the jurists were by
no means agreed on this point whether a prince was bound to recognize
the debts of his predecessor; and examples are not wanting to show that
this was not invariably the case. 1 In any change of government the
creditors of the Crown were in great anxiety on account of their claims,
if they had lacked the foresight to get the heir as a co-signatory.
While the legal principle that 'le roi est mort, vive le roi' was not
applied automatically to the prince's debts, the cities were perpetual
persons in the present legal sense that though the holders of public
authority might change it remained unaffected thereby.
We see accordingly that the three first principles of all credit -the
belief that the debtor can, will and must pay - were weak in earlier
times in the credit given to princes, but strong in the case of that given
to cities. The cities accordingly enjoyed much better credit than the
princes. In fact, even towards the end of the Middle Ages the latter
had, properly speaking, no credit, that is no personal credit at all.
About the middle of the eighteenth century it was considered necessary
to remind the capitalists of the old saying, 'Lend not to him who is
mightier than thou; or if thou lendest, look upon thy loan as lost.' *
This held good of all loans the repayment of which the prince pro-
mised 'in verbo principis' without other security than his princely word.
As Cardinal Granvella was credited by his contemporaries with the pro-
verb in regard to such financial obligations that 'There is a time to pro-
mise and a time to keep,' so in Germany in the previous century the
saying went, 'The noble makes promises and the peasant keeps them.' 3
Loans of Princes. As the princes, as such, had very little personal
credit, they had regularly to give security for their loans. Only one kind
of loan formed an exception, the forced loan, and this played an import-
ant part. Since the thirteenth century the princes more and more con-
tracted the habit of obtaining forced loans from those among their sub-
jects who relied on their protection or were in some other way dependent
on them, and who also had liquid capital at their disposal. These, how-
1 Cf. e.g. Job. Frd. Kobii, Commentatio juris praesertim germanici - de pe&mia
mutuatida tuto coUocanda (Gottingen 1761), 37.
'Noli foenerari fortiori te, quod si foeneraveris, quasi perditum babe,' Ecde-
eiastieus viii, 15, quoted in Kobina Lo. 36).
1 Granvella's saying ia quoted by a representative of tbe Welser in 1547 (Ztsckr.
d. hittor. Ver. f. Schwaben 1875, p. 131). Tbe second cf. Kobius Le. 24.
36 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
ever, were regarded by the princes themselves, still more by their sub-
jects, not as real loans, but as a kind of tax, and actually they were for
the most part indirect taxes.
The princes anticipated taxes which had been already passed, but
which did not come in sufficiently fast, by the method of forcing their
rich subjects to advance the amount of the tax according to an arbitrary
estimate. No special charge on the tax was given for the most part, and
there was no interest. 1 Such forced loans were often imposed before the
taxes from which they were to be repaid had been granted. The object
was then clearly to render illusory the right of the States General to
grant the taxes. In any case, forced loans were most in favour with
princes of absolutist tendencies, chiefly with Louis XI and his successors
on the French throne, until from the time of Richelieu the Crown no
longer sought to cover itself by the device of the forced loan, but could
levy direct taxes of every kind without calling the States. In England,
on the other hand, under Henry VIII, Elisabeth, and James I, the
forced loan had at times been very common, but in 1628 the Crown was
forced, owing to the growing resistance of Parliament, to renounce a
financial expedient which the people had always bitterly hated.
In other countries, also, the subjects did all they could to ward off
forced loans; and even in France the Crown was not sufficiently power-
ful in the sixteenth century for it to be able to cover all its extraordinary
monetary requirements by such loans. In view of the crushing burden
of interest due to the undue extension of credit through voluntary loans
in the second half of the sixteenth century, a writer like Botero * with
absolutist tendencies might be disposed to praise forced loans without
interest; and the princes themselves found it advisable in time of great
monetary requirements to make use as far as possible of voluntary
loans. These moreover often contained an indirect compulsion, e.g. the
creditors were induced to lend again by the fear of losing their old
claims, and foreign merchants were threatened with the withdrawal of
their privileges if they declined to help the King with advances - and
other terrorism of the same kind.
There were, on the other hand, some forced loans which, from the
fact that they were called for at a moment of general patriotic emotion,
had the character of semi-voluntary loans - e.g. in France after the
battle of St. Quentin in 1557, or in England in 1588 when the country
had to be defended against the Spanish Armada. When the French
1 Royal appeals foi forced loans: Louis XH of France (1513) (in Registry des
deliberations du Bwreau de la ViOe de Paris I, 201 if.); and James I of England
in 1625 (Rushwortk, Hutor. CoU. 1, 124).
Ragion di Stato, H, 7. Of., on the other hand, Diomede Ourafa (about 1470),
in Fornari, Tear, econom. n. Prov. napoKt., p. 59.
INTRODUCTION 37
Crown demanded loans from the cities, and the citizens had their shares
compulsorily allotted to them, this was not a forced loan proper, since
capital and interest were secured on certain definite revenues. In the
case of the true variety, the creditors regularly ran the risk of losing
their capital, without getting high interest as a compensation for the
risk incurred. Owners of capital had usually to be brought to make
loans of this kind by compulsion.
In voluntary loans, on the other hand, they demanded not only high
interest, but also security in the form of a guarantee or pledge.
We have already spoken of the guarantee of the heir apparent. Next
to this stood that of the highest officials and dignitaries, which was very
general in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. The Diet of a pro-
vince sometimes guaranteed the loan contracted by the prince, but
much the most general form was the guarantee of a respected city, e.g.
London in the case of the loans of the English Crown, or Antwerp in
the case of the loans of the Court of the Netherlands.
If the prince promised himself to defray the interest and repayment,
the surety was only liable if he was in default. In many cases, however,
the loan was not contracted by the prince, but in the name of the
official, noble, Diet or city on the prince's account. This was a different
relation from a legal point of view, but from an economic standpoint it
came to the same thing. It is not the credit of the prince, but that of the
high official, or city, which was the decisive factor. The most important
of the intermediaries who gave their credit for the prince were the finan-
cial officials and the cities.
The chief difference between the financial administration of the
modern state and the older system is the prevalence under the latter of
the system of farming out the revenues. The cities as well as the princes
farmed out their revenues, and the system extended as the increased use
of money made the financial administration a special art. The princes
had not the necessary staff of officials, and it would have been the height
of foolishness to have the many small monetary revenues collected by
poorly paid venal officials. It was very important for the princes to
have their revenues at their disposal in large sums at the place and time
when they needed them. They accordingly made over the collection of
many revenues to private undertakers, who were able to make advances
on them. In the case of the cities, the first reason was not equally
cogent. If nevertheless they employed the system, it must hare corre-
sponded to some general need.
The entire revenues, however, were not farmed out, and the princes
and cities accordingly needed their own financial officials. The same
causes, however, which made it necessary to employ tax farmers caused
the officials to be chosen from the class which alone was technically
38 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
and economically qualified for the duties of their position, that is the
merchant class. There was no radical distinction between financial
officials and tax fanners. The fanners were for the most part the agents
and the sleeping partners of the officials. They formed one class which
we will consider in detail later. 1
These financiers who administered the princes' revenues enjoyed good
credit, both from their position and because in general they were rich
merchants. They employed this for a consideration - for the princes,
either making advances themselves or obtaining them in their own
names from other capitalists. Their credit was therefore the most im-
portant of the various elements from which the state credit was after-
The princes, as we see, could only cover their extraordinary monetary
requirements through voluntary loans by availing themselves of the
credit of their magnates and high officials, diets, cities.lor financiers. This
was only done by their giving a security to those who allowed them to
use their credit, as the lenders proper greatly preferred this to the mere
guarantee. The security might be a pledge as was the case when it con-
sisted of jewels or other valuables. Only loans of small amount could be
raised on pledges of this description, and therefore since the end of the
Middle Ages they ceased to be important. The same holds good of the
mortgaging of individual Grown lands, a process which the princes held
to be equivalent to sale and therefore disliked. The most usual form of
security was the mortgaging definite revenues. Not only in the case of
loans, but in all the prince's debts, even in the case of small purchases of
commodities on credit or pensions to servants, as well as for periodic
payments to foreign princes, the creditor expected to have his claim
secured on a definite branch of the prince's revenue. By means of such
warrants (assignations, consignations, librauzas, tallies) the creditor
received a legal title to the payment of his claim, and this often con-
tained the authority in case of necessity to satisfy himself directly from
the revenue upon which he had been given security.
This authority, however, only constituted a sufficient security when
the income accrued direct to the creditor without the agency of the
prince's officials. This was often expressly stipulated, especially in the
case of larger loans, either in connection with the leasing of the revenue
in question; or by collecting the yield of the revenue without taking
over the lease until the creditor had obtained satisfaction both for
capital and interest; or finally by a formal purchase of the princely
revenues, which then became the property of the lender.
1 Lettree et mbnoirea de Colbert erf. Cttment II, p. cxcix. Colbert enunciated the
principle that 'Un financier doit estre attpres d'un surintendant ee qui est un soldat
aupres de son oapitaine; il ne doit 1'abandonner qu'aveo la vie.'
INTRODUCTION 39
The necessity for giving security on definite revenues, or for pledging
or selling them to creditors is a chief cause of endless subdivisions,
which, along with the system of fanning out the revenues, was a
characteristic of the old financial system of the princes as opposed to the
modern system. This necessity it was which brought to naught the
attempts of princes to reorganize and unify their finances, so long as
there was a load of debt which could be lightened by farming the taxes
or splitting them up. 1
The system exemplifies a vicious circle. Excessive indebtedness on
the part of the princes was made necessary by the conditions we have
seen. It could not be borne without the system of farming out the taxes
or the pledging of individual branches of revenue. This led to a fright-
ful degeneration of the financial system, which was unavoidable while
the circumstances lasted, which led to the repeated heaping up of debts.
Incurable financial disorganization, corruption of the whole of public
life, dependence of the Government on the financiers, exhaustion of the
people - these ills, which proved the ruin of many states, sprang im-
mediately from the farming out and splitting up of the finances of the
princes. They would have been impossible without an undue extension
of credit. They were, however, rooted most deeply, on the one hand
in the princes' passion for war and glory, and on the other in the pro-
gress, especially the irregular progress of an economic system based on
the use of money.
The loans of princes were usually at first 'anticipations,' floating
debts. These could never be entirely avoided, and we can prove that
they existed already in the earliest Middle Ages. Nevertheless French
publicists, from Bodin to Boisguillebert, are not wrong when they put
the real beginning of the regular large anticipations in the last years of
the reign of Francis I and the time of Henry II of France. 2 For it was
at this epoch that the interest-bearing floating debt became a necessary
part of the princes' budgets. These could not have existed without the
debt, which, however, proved their ruin.
The floating debt had a fatal effect in the first place because of the
enormous interest, and secondly because in the excessive subdivision
of the whole financial system; the individual parts of the princes'
revenue were often burdened with charges far in excess of the total
An extensive system of mortgages without a register gives only
1 Adler, Die Organisation der Centralverwattung unter Kaiser Maximilian I.
Ct e.g. for IVance: B. Brown, Calendar of State papers, VI, 956, 1557; for Spain:
Brit. Mus. Cott. MSS. Vespasian CL VI, foL 133 ff., 1575.
Bodin, Lee six limes de la republique. Paris 1583, VI, 2. Boisguillebert,
Factom de la France en Da're, p. 297 fi.
40 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
a weak analogy foi the state of confusion and fraudulent over-
indebtedness which perpetually characterized the finances of most
Funded loans at the end of the Middle Ages were still relatively un-
important for the princes in comparison with the floating debt. Most
princes did not raise any funded debt, and we shall see that even those
who apparently did so, really concluded transactions of a rather differ-
ent kind. Here we must distinguish between funded debts in the wider
and funded loans in the narrower sense, between the loans raised by the
princes themselves and those which their parliaments and cities raised
for them or took over from them. From early times the princes had
secured on separate parts of their income both non-recurrent expendi-
ture and also recurrent expenses such as official salaries, pensions,
donations, annual payments to the Church. To the extent of this
burden these portions were pledged during the lives of the officials, pen-
sioners, etc., or permanently alienated; for quite apart from the per-
manent payments made to the Church, it early came about that persons
who were granted payment or pensions as an act of grace were given the
right of handing them on to their heirs. 1 These grants already approxi-
mated closely to our state 'rentes' or annuities, except for the fact that
they were always 'situated' on some definite branch of the princes'
revenues and also they originated, not because the recipients had
handed over capital in return for the annuity, but because they had
served or were about to be serviceable to the prince in some other
way.
The conception of the 'perpetual debt" had therefore been introduced
in practice with the financial system of the princes long before a per-
petual authority of the state was recognized in principle. The separate
branches of the princes' revenues were regarded as real property which
could be burdened with perpetual rent charges in the same way as
land.
Probably the princes had always known how to obtain, not only other
services, but also capital by securing life or perpetual annuities; for the
cities had done so from very early times. The first certain instance of
such a transaction, however, in the case of a prince, occurs only in the
second half of the fifteenth century, and then only in the case of the
Kings of Castile. Even the Popes, whose property and income were cer-
tainly well established, did not begin till the year 1526 to get money for
themselves by funded loans ('monti') on the model of the Italian city
1 For such changes in revenues of Counts of Champagne see de Joubainville,
Histoire des Dues el Dea Gomtes de Champagne, V, 849. For the burden on the
revenues of the French Crown 'tarn ad vitam quam perpetuo' in 1316 of . Vuitry.
Mtudes mr le Regime Financier de la France, New Series, I, 4,
INTRODUCTION 41
states. 1 In France the first rentes began to be issued by the cities in
1522, especially by the city of Paris on behalf of the Crown, and it was
long before the Crown could dispense with the cities as intermediaries.
The English funded debt starts with the revolution of 1689. In the
Middle Ages the rulers of the Netherlands frequently adopted the ex-
pedient of the sale of annuities. But in this case also they employed as
intermediaries the diets or the individual cities which 'lent their seal'
to the prince. The diets or cities concluded the arrangements for the
loan and the princes pledged themselves to pay the annuities for them.
Later as the power of the rulers increased, they ceased to ask the diets
or cities for their consent and issued annuities on their own account.
They then funded them on the individual provinces or cities, transferring
revenues to them for the payment of the annuities. During the six-
teenth century many annuities on a large scale were issued in this form.
The next step forward was that revenues were no longer assigned.
But even in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century there is no instance
of a prince selling annuities without charging them on a province or a
city. 2
A prince, as such, had not the power of raising large funded loans, if
he had not at his disposition the credit of the corporately organized
diets or cities. It is characteristic that the funded debt of the Spanish
Crown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries increased chiefly
through the repeated state bankruptcies. These always ended by the
Crown undertaking a compulsory funding operation of its gigantic
floating debt, i.e. it reduced the interest by 100-200 per cent, and did
away with the obligation to repay the capital. 3 The Crown could not
obtain the enormous sums it required directly by funded loans. It
therefore first contracted floating debts at a high rate of interest and
every twenty or thirty years converted this compulsorily into funded
loans. These, however, were only saleable at a large discount, as
though they were always charged on definite revenues. This was only
a nominal security as each head of the revenue had long been over
charged, and moreover was almost as a regular thing withdrawn from
the creditors in case of need. In this the Church lent ready aid to the
Crown by means of the ban of usury.
1 Codigos Espanoles, VI, 446; VH, 275. Mem. de la Seal Aead. de la hist. VI,
141 ff. M 1m*,Deju*tit.etjv r e,lI,Di*p.38a,No.l5. Cf.Coppi, Finance dtUoStoto
Ponteficio, Roma, 1866, p. 3 ff.; Ranke, Fvrsten und Vollser von Sudeuropa, IV,
10 ff.; Viihrer, Histoire deladette publiyue en France, 1, 16 ff.; Sinclair, History of the
Public Revenue of ike British Empire, II, 67.
Of. Blok in den Bijdragen vow vaderl. geschied. 3, part, 124; and for
later times the State Archives at Brussels, Chambre des Corn-pies, No. 434.
Peri, II Negofante, about 1640, calls the Juros 'Una. gorte di pagamento date e
ricevuto da qualoh' anni in qua per necessita.'
42 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
We must now shortly discuss the practical significance of the
ecclesiastical ban against interest on loans, towards the end of the
Middle Ages. We most here make clear a point which has given
rise to many errors, namely the relation between interest and
The Practical Importance of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine of Usury. In
spite of the ban of the Church interest-bearing loans had at the end of
the Middle Ages been for centuries an everyday legal transaction. It
was nevertheless regarded as a gross sin. In the Papal indulgences
money gained through usury was put on a level with stolen goods.
Jurisprudence also held strictly to this view. 1 Whether the 'usurers'
themselves, that is the whole body of merchants, had uneasy consciences
when they received interest, is not easy to say; but certainly this was
true of not a few of them. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries mer-
chants often, or perhaps regularly, directed in their wills that their heirs
should restore their gains from usury or should employ them for the
salvation of the testator's soul. 8 By the end of the Middle Ages this was
no longer a general custom. Even in the sixteenth century, however, it
often happened that merchants took a legal opinion as to whether this
or that undertaking was permissible under canon law. In the year 1577
an agent of the Fugger in Spain writes of a Genoese Lazaro Doria re-
cently dead: 'He was of so ticklish a conscience that he dealt not in bills
or commerce against which the preachers and theologians here write and
rage.' He had added in his will, where mention was made of the restora-
tion of forbidden profits, that he had no load upon his conscience, for he
had never had his own capital nor yet paid it into a business partnership,
but had borrowed on bills all the money he had used for such dealings.
The hair-splittings of the doctrine of usury had had such a distorting
effect on the feeling of merchants, reputed conscientious, that they
regarded it as a sin to 'commit usury' with their own but not with
borrowed money. Nevertheless a f eeling of this kind did still exist, and
even when the voice of conscience was silent people knew that the loan
at interest was forbidden both by the ecclesiastical and the secular law,
and that therefore law could not be invoked on behalf of the creditor.
The doctrine, however, excepted from its ban the loans of princes and
cities, declaring that such loans served the common weal. This, how-
ever, was an uncertain reservation, and all 'usurers' moved, if not by
fear of eternal punishment, then by the dread of losing their capital, tried
to find a cloak for their operations. It was this that gave rise to the
* Woker, Das HrM. Finanzwesen d. PSpste, p. 105. Endemann, Studien in der
romaniach-kananiat. WirOuchafis- und RechtsleAre, H, 378 ff.
Maiideffi,/f commune di VerceUHnelmedioevo, II, 135. A will of this kind occurs,
e.g. Histor. pair, monvm. VI (Chart II), 829.
INTRODUCTION 43
many fine phrases used from ancient times down to the sixteenth, or
even seventeenth, century in place of the objectionable word. 1
Commerce of course found many ways of getting round the ban on
interest. The interest was added directly to the capital, or in what
appeared as a bill transaction the interest was smuggled into the price
of the bills; or commodities were lent in place of ready money and then
charged at a high rate; or the loan was made in the form of a deposit,
which was permissible, and so forth. The Church and the Law recog-
nized many of these forms, thus opening the door for the evasion of their
own bans. The distinctions which were made were, however, so numer-
ous and fine-drawn, and the views of the ecclesiastical and legal experts
differed so widely as to what was permissible, that in the centuries be-
tween the first lightening of the ban on usury and its removal by legis-
lation commerce was never free from uncertainty. Owners of capital
were always learning afresh from experience that this ban on usury
would be involved by any debtor who could not pay, but more especially
by bankrupt princes, not only to get out of their financial obligations
with greater ease, but to give an air of legality to the proceeding. They
knew moreover that this was passionately desired by all the prince's
subjects who were not his creditors, and that the fact that a princely
bankruptcy was a popular act made it so much the easier.
These circumstances all combined to raise still further the interest en
the princes' loans, which was in any case not low. This again increased
the princes' financial difficulties and the popular hatred against the
' usurers'. There was no escape from this vicious circle. This situation
lasted in most countries throughout the sixteenth century.
There was only one permissible form of credit business, and this was
permissible because it was not considered as credit - the purchase of
annuities. In the times when dealing in kind was lie prevalent system
this custom originated from the necessity of finding a form for the
alienation of rights to revenue in Mud, and with the development of the
use of money the purchase of rentes became the most usual form for
the investment of capital. At this stage it was not the need of capital,
but the need of investment which was most powerful in making
general the purchase of annuities. This can be proved from facts,
but is quite obvious if we compare the purchase of an annuity with
a loan.
In the case where credit is sought and obtained, this is usually in the
form of a loan where the lender reserves the right to demand the return
1 A selection of these phrases: Latin: Luorum, flctum, damntun, interesse, don-
tun, guiderdonum, remuneratio, premium, costamenta. Italian: Dono, prode,
bene, guadagno, gracie, civanza. French: Don, frais, finance. English: Reward,
interest, consideration, gratuity. German. Abnutzung, Verehrnng, Pension, etc.
44 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
of his capital. In the case of a purchase of annuities, however, the
lender expressly renounces this right. He buys an annual sum, and if he
wants his capital back, he cannot apply to the recipient of the purchase
money, but must resell the annuity to a third party. This important
distinction made it possible for the Church to justify the principle of the
purchase of annuities -a fact which strengthened its general popu-
larity. 1 This could only come about because the need for investment
was general and continually increasing among circles which were not
accustomed, like the merchants, to lend and borrow at interest. Owners
of capital who were not merchants only occasionally felt the need to
raise capital and were usually concerned to find a profitable investment
for it. What they wanted was not a' temporary investment like the
merchants, but something permanent. This they found in the purchase
of annuities.
The chief sellers of annuities in the Middle Ages were the cities, whose
credit, from the reasons we know, was so good that any owner of capital
was glad to buy an annuity from them. Hence it arose that the annuity
was at a lower rate of interest in the purchase price than the interest on
loans, even when the loan was secured on real property and the annuity
was not; for we shall see that the annuity loans of the cities as a rule
were not secured on any particular property.
The sale of annuities became very early for the cities, and later for the
princes, a means of procuring capital for any special requirements.
Annuity loans of this kind approximated, in fact, to ordinary loans; but
in form they remained sales of annuities. The annuity was the return
for a permanent and irrevocable transfer of capital, interest for a tem-
porary and revocable one. The conceptions of interest and annuity were
therefore distinct. 2 We shall discuss later how they were related in
practice.
Loans of the Cities. Towards the end of the Middle Ages an increasing
indebtedness descended on the cities as well as on the princes. The
independent cities had not only to carry on many wars as they had done
before, but had to put forth all their strength to resist the attacks of the
princes on their liberty. The citizens had long ceased to take the field
themselves, and the mercenary system was nowhere more fully developed
than in the cities. The growth of the use of fire-arms had forced them
to surround themselves with stronger fortifications, and their regular
revenues, often very large, were never sufficient to produce the enormous
* Endemann, La, H, 125, does not sufficiently stress this distinction. Of. for
the opposite Bodin, Leg Six Livru de la Republiqw (1583), VI, 2.
' This distinction TOM dra-wn even in the seventeenth century, and the commer-
cial world. Of. Van Neulighem in his Boeckhouden (1630) distinguishes: 1. Geld
op renten geven op huysen oft lant; 2. Geld op deposito oft interest geven.
sums needed. The credit of the cities therefore was accordingly their
most powerful weapon in the struggle for their freedom.
Those cities, moreover, which had either lost their freedom or had never
been free were forced by their lord to strain their credit ever increas-
ingly for his benefit. It was, however, as we have seen, so good, and the
need of an investment in the cities themselves so great, that they usually
had little difficulty in satisfying their credit requirements. Only when
the demand was very sudden and large, the cities also had to resort to
forced loans, which were quite differently conditioned from those of the
princes. They were assessed on the citizens like taxes; interest was paid
and the public revenues were given as security. Nevertheless there was
in later times an increasing disinclination to resort to forced loans, e.g.
in Florence, where there had been frequent forced loans since the be-
ginning of the fourteenth century, the historian Guicciardini at the be-
ginning of the sixteenth century advised their discontinuance on the
ground that they were tiresome and intricate and disturbed the city as
much as new taxes. In place of 'them he recommended floating loans,
anticipations, which cost more, especially if they lasted some time so
that they had to be renewed several times. The fact, however, that the
community had to raise a few thousand ducats was less' important than
the discontent caused by taxes or forced loans. 1
We must regard this as the view prevailing among those responsible
for the cities' financial policy, for as a matter of fact forced loans lost
their importance in the cities towards the end of the Middle Ages. The
republic of Florence, if we keep to one chosen example, returned to them
in the exigencies of its kst struggle. After the fall of the republic the
Medici used them on a large scale, though now no interest was paid nor
definite revenues given as security.*
Apart from sudden demands for capital on an unusually large scale
the cities were easily able to raise the capital they required by means of
voluntary loans and sales of annuities. Indeed, so great was the dis-
position to invest money with them that they often carried on a regular
banking business. At the beginning of the seventeenth century George
Obrecht writes: 'In our times certain cities borrow large sums of money
at 5 per cent, and lend them out again at 8 per cent.' s
The oldest city loans were everywhere floating loans, anticipations of
Guicoiardini, Opere inedite, X, 351. He calls forced loans * Accatti universal! da'
ricchi.' Originally every 'accatto' was a forced loan.
1 Varohi, Stor. fiorent. ad. a. 1530. Alberi, Bdaz. d. ambasc. venet. H, 32 ff., 346.
Reumont, Oesch. Tosbanas, 1, 114.
' Obrecht, Polit. Bedencken und Discurs von. Verbesserung Land und Leut.
1617, p. 128. For the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries cf. Schonberg, Finanz-
wrhaltoiase der Stadt Basel, p. 102 ff . Kostaneeki, Der offend. Credit im MittdaUer,
p. 41 ff.
46 THE AGE OF SHE FUGGER
definite revenues. It had been the custom from early times that should
these revenues prove insufficient, the whole city with all its citizens
should be liable for the debt. 1 A development took place in two direc-
tions: On the one hand, the floating debts were to an increasing extent
replaced by funded loans; and on the other, the charge on definite
revenues was abandoned and replaced by the primary liability of the
Towards the end of the Middle Ages the sale of annuities in its various
forms was the most usual method for the cities to raise capital. The
annuities were mostly sold, to use the apt phrase of the Netherlands,
'Opt corpus der stadt.' * Besides this, however, there were frequent
cases of mortgaging definite revenues and real property belonging to the
cities, even in the case of funded loans. This was even more frequent in
the case of the floating debts which no city could entirely dispense with.
Even Venice in the beginning of the sixteenth century had to resort to
the pawning of jewels. At the end of the Middle Ages as a general
rule princes raised money by anticipations and cities by the sale of
annuities.
The organization of the debts of the cities was naturally most highly
developed in Italy. Great attention has therefore been paid to the
Italian Monti of the Middle Ages, without, however, arriving at a satis-
factory conclusion. An attempt has been made to import modern con-
ceptions and classify the Monti accordingly. Were they state loans or
banks, syndicates of state creditors and tax-farmers, or limited liability
companies? The truth is that they contained the germs of all these
modern arrangements, which developed from them at a later time. 3
We cannot look for the chief root of the Monti in the tax-fanning
system, which since Roman times had never really died out in Italy. It
was already very general in the cities at an extraordinarily early date. 4
The lease of the taxes was designated as a 'sale,' though the cities origin-
ally never intended permanently to alienate their revenues. This came
For example, Vercelli, Hist. patr. monum. VI (Chart II), No. 1516. Maneffi,
'
, . . , .
n commune di Vercdlind media evo, H, 104. Troves in Champagne. D'Arbois de
Joubainville, Hietoire des Dues et des Oomtes de Champagne, IV, 729.
'Optlichaemderstadf or 'op heure ende op alle heure ingesetene goeden,' or
pour le corps de la ville et pour chacune maniere de gens non labourans et labour-
ana,' GifflodtB, Inventaire, I, 389, Antw. Arck. Bl. 1, 36 fl.
o, La critica etorica e gli studi intorno atte instituz. finanz. 1877.
fc, Universalgesch. d. Handekrechts, p. 291 ff. Endemann, Stodien in d.
roman. kanonist. Wirthsch.- u. SedUsleJwe, I. 431 S. Rezasco, Dizionario d. ling,
italetor.ed amminiatr. s. v. monte, luogho, compera. Ceoohetti, La vita d. Venetian
finoailZOO.p.nS. C^eo,Mem.sopral'anticodtibtiop^J>licodiOenoea. Lobero,
Mem. utor. d. Banca di 8. Giorgio,' Lib. jur Oenuens. 1, 171, 176, 177 ff.
For this farming-out system of the city of Genoa, see Liber, jur. Gen. I, 77,
139, 141, 144, 159ff.
INTRODUCTION 47
about in the course of things. 1 The extraordinary requirements of the
cities necessitated anticipations of the farmed revenues, which were
regularly asked and granted at the time of the contract. Need of money
once again brought about a renewal of the connection and the grant of
further advances. Finally there was a definite funding of the floating
debt. This also happened many times in the case of forced loans which
it was not possible -or more usually, was not held expedient - to
repay; a for the need of a means of investing capital, which we have
already emphasized, made itself increasingly felt in the Italian cities.
Originally the lease of the city revenues and the making of advances
upon them was a commercial undertaking, which, however, could not be
carried on by individual merchants on account of the large amount of
capital required. It was accordingly necessary to form companies for
this purpose. So, for example, the first voluntary loan we hear of for the
Venetian Republic was taken up in the year 1164 by a company con-
stituted as follows: two persons with two shares apiece, two with one,
one with a half-share and two with a quarter-share; and it is possible
that other unnamed persons may have been interested under the names
of these chief partners. At any rate, this was so in later loans of a similar
character. This method of participation was a favourite means of find-
ing a safe and interest-bearing investment for the capital of the citizens,
their widows and orphans, the Church, etc., which was not employed in
trade. 8
Meanwhile the Italian city states had consolidated their many float-
ing loans into great Monti, either, as in Genoa, selling to the Monti for its
own administration a portion of the state revenue, or, as in the case of
most other republics, keeping the revenues themselves and giving the
Monti a charge on some or all of them. The right to the repayment of
the loans was reserved, but could no longer be demanded. The interest
was for the most part reduced. 4 The persons who before had held sub-
sidiary shares in the tax-farming companies were given equal rights with
the rest, and became accordingly immediate creditors of the state.
Their shares (Luoghi) were entered in great registers (Cartularies),
could be inherited or sold and were subject to fluctuations of value in
i Vgl Kezasoo, Dizionario d. ling. Ml star, ed amministr. v. comperare, vendere.
1 The development prior to the fourteenth century is not clear. No consistent
account exists of the origin of the Camera degli Imprestidi and the Monte veoohio
in Venice and the Qfficium assignations mutuorum and the first consolidated
oomperae in Genoa. Cf. the first monti in Florence.
* In 1646 the Republic of Genoa reduced the rate of interest on the debt and
deferred payment. It sought the sanction of the Pope for this because many
Luoghi were in the hands of the Church (Cuneo, pp. 120, 298 ff.; Lobero, p. 159).
For Genoa see Cuneo, pp. 26, 77, 124 ff.; Lobero, pp. 16, 93 ff. For Florence,
>, p. 650. For Pisa, Morpurgo, p. 156 ff.
48 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
accordance with the state's credit or the money market and the pre-
valence of war or peace. In the case of the Monti carrying on their own
business for profit the value of the shares also varied with the amount
of the dividend.
In Genoa there was the most highly developed system of partial
obligations and shares. Here the Luoghi were always expressed in the
same round figure, were a perfect fungible commodity like money and
were often used, in fact, as a means of payment. 1
Finally in later times the Monti were used, not only for permanent,
but for temporary investment. Owing to the use of their shares as
currency their character approximated to that of the Giro and Deposit
banks with which they have often been confused. 2 The feature which
distinguished from all other similar institutions of the Middle Ages was
the stable organization which they placed at the disposal of the towns
for the satisfaction of any extraordinary call for money and at the ser-
vice of the capitalists for the investment of their free capital.
Lenders of Money Capital. It came about early in the Middle Ages
that rich monasteries, or even, in exceptional cases, secular loads and
gentlemen, were able to lend money; 8 but the class which was first able
to do this on a large scale was the merchant class. Long before this was
necessary for tradesmen or landowners, merchants had had to keep at
tkeir disposal money capital on a larger or smaller scale. This meant
tkat they were disposed to lend this capital for other purposes if they
could get a larger profit than in their own business, or obtained advan-
tages which they required for their business. Hence the money loans
wliiidk3feeity burghers made, not only to their own overlords, but also
to tierulerfi-<rf the countries where they carried on business as foreigners
for the sake ef obtaining rights and privileges, without which it was im-
possible to live -seearely or to carry on an undisturbed and profitable
trade. Originally be foeeigners had no rights, and the burghers, who in
the first place were not *tl freemen, had even in their birthplace to
struggle for centuries for their rights - the freedom of the city, the rights
.of merchants.*
In the Middle Ages only a part of the European merchant class en-
gaged in moneylending as a trade. This was early taken up by certain
classes of merchants, first of all the Jews. So long as they lived among
Germanic races, the Jews had from early times always occupied them-
selves first and foremost with trade. This they were forced to do, for
Chiefly within the territory of the city. Of . Liber, fur. Gen. II. 471 , 498, 1076.
Even Italians did this in the sixteenth century. Cf. Capmany Mem. I, 214;
Narino Banuto Diarii, II, 377, 391.
'Lamprecht, Deutsches Wirttechafaleben, I, 1446. Von Inama-Sternegg,
Deutsehe WirOuchafttgeaMskte, II, 444 ff.
Goldchmidt, Univeraalgeachictee des Banddsrechte 8. 112 ff.
INTRODUCTION 49
though for centuries they were allowed to buy land, yet in actual fact
there was little room for them either in the old District Associations
(Markgenossenschaft) nor among the great landowners, who were the
ruling class in Carlovingian times. In the few towns of the early Middle
Ages, on the other hand, the Jews occupied a highly privileged position.
Their trade was indispensable to the German peoples, who had little of
their own. 1
Meanwhile, however, the Romans and the Germans had given rise to
new peoples whose trade activities began to gather force from the ninth
century onwards, especially since the epoch of the Crusades. The trade
of South Germany developed in connection with this Eomanic move-
ment, while in the north a further independent trading area was created
by the Frisians and Saxons. The Jews ceased to be indispensable as
merchants, while at the same time the Church let loose popular fury
against them. They lost their privileged position, or rather they became
dependent on the pleasure of the overlord, who could protect them or
leave them in the lurch as suited his interest. They now first began to
to occupy themselves with dealing in money. 2
Here they occupied at first a position similar to that they had before
in the trade in commodities. They were at first indispensable both to
the people and more especially to the princes, whose need of money had
increased greatly since the time of the Crusades. They were the first
professional moneylenders of the Middle Ages. The princes often chose
a shorter and cheaper way of using the Jews' capital: they confiscated
their property. Other people who needed money could not use this
method so frequently. On the occasions when this method was em-
ployed, it was on a grand scale, the Jews were killed, their houses were
plundered and burnt. Religious hatred here combined with the natural
hatred of the oppressed debtor for his creditor. Persecution forced the
Jews to buy the ruler's protection with new loans of money, in which
they paid themselves for the great risk of loss by charging correspond-
ingly high interest.
The Jews were gradually driven from this position by the progress of
the Christian merchants. The ban of the Church on usury had at first
made professional money-lending difficult for Christians, while in prac-
tice, if not in law, the Church had left the Jews a free hand for a long
time, all the while, in fact, that it could not do without them. In the
'Stobbe, Die Juden in Deutschland wahrend dee Mittelalters, S. 65. Gold-
sehmidt, l.c. p. 108 ft Heyd, Geschichte d. Lewntehandds, French later Edition,
I,125fi.
The first general persecution of the Jews began in 1096. The first mention
of their moneylending is in the year [1096. Vita s. Annonis (ca. 1100) Mon.
Germ. S. S. XI, 602. Cf. v. Ihama-Sternegg, l.o. p. 445. Stobbe, p. 103 fi.
BO THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
course of the thirteenth century the Church learnt that it was more
profitable in all money affairs to employ the Italian merchants who
could serve them in recovering the ecclesiastical dues. The Papal col-
lectors were the first professional Christian moneylenders.
The inhabitants of the cities of Piacenza and Asti in North Italy, and
of Cahors in Southern France, were the first who began to drive the
Jews out of dealing in money in the regions north of the Alps. In the
course of the thirteenth century they in their turn were replaced by the
Tuscans, then by the people of Bologna and Siena, and later by the
Florentines; but the name of Lombards or Caorsins still cling to all pro-
fessional moneylenders who were Christians.
The process by which the Jews were driven from the higher kind of
money-lending - which alone concerns us here - took a very different
course in different countries. In Italyitmust have been over so early that
there is no historical tradition of it; perhaps there the Jews never played
a leading part as moneylenders. In England, France and the Nether-
lands they were driven out of the larger money business before the end
of the thirteenth century. Throughout the larger part of North Ger-
many in the Middle Ages they do not seem to have been tolerated.
Their expulsion in South Germany and Spain was not completed till the
end of the Middle Ages. At this time, however, the Jews in all the chief
countries in Europe had sunk to be pawnbrokers and money-brokers.
All the higher branches of the money business, especially financial deal-
ings with princes, were in the hands of Christian capitalists.
Among these the Florentines held the first place since the fourteenth
century. Their inland situation put them at a disadvantage for dealing
in commodities as compared with the cities on the sea. It was only in
1421 that they obtained in Leghorn a serviceable port of their own, and
they had hardly had time to make use of it when the Mediterranean
trade began to decay. Therefore, besides silk and wool manufactures,
their chief trade was dealing in money. They soon drove out of large
international finance the inhabitants of the Lombard cities, and after
them those of rival Tuscan cities (Siena, Lucca, Pisa). Their importance
as financiers reached its first high-water mark in the first half of the
fourteenth century under Philippe le Bel of France, and his three sons
and Edward III of England. In both countries they were then econo-
mically supreme. They overstrained their strength, however, and at the
same time incurred popular hatred.
A series of catastrophes overtook them. In 1339 King Edward III
of England ceased to pay his creditors, among whom far the most im-
portant were the Florentines, Bardi and Peruzzi. They in their turn
suspended payments and brought down with them in their fall most of
INTRODUCTION 51
the other Florentine banking houses. 1 In Florence itself a rising of the
Guilds in 1343 overturned the rule of rich patrician families, who were
exiled and their property confiscated. This misfortune overtook them
again two years later in France; and in England the resistance of the
people against the Italian moneylenders grew in strength.
In the subsequent long period of continued exhaustion on the part of
Florentine finance, the Kings of England and France helped them-
selves as best they might, mostly by means of forced loans from their
subjects.
The discontent thus evoked necessitated the return to voluntary loans
at high interest, and now native merchants came forward as lenders of
money in the grand style: William de;la Pole in England, and later,
in France, Jacques Coeur. This was, however, only an episode. The
native merchants were not nearly powerful enough financially, and the
Florentines, who had now regained strength, once more had the upper
hand.
The second great period of Florentine finance is associated with the
name of the Medici. Three generations of this family had to collect
capital and lend it out before they succeeded in getting the first place in
their native country; and it was only in the fifth generation that their
influence became powerful in the other countries of Europe. Averardo,
called Bicci de Medici, who lived in the second half of the fourteenth
century, had as yet no considerable property. His son, Giovanni, was
always regarded by his descendants themselves as the founder of the
family fortunes.
Giovanni de Medici stood in close relation with Pope John XXII of
infamous memory, whose money affairs he managed. Giovanni's son,
Cosimo, accompanied the Pope to the Council of Constance. When Pope
John was a prisoner in Germany Giovanni de Medici had him ransomed
with 38,500 florins, gave him shelter in Florence, and when he died had
him buried with great pomp.
The often repeated assertion that the Medici owed their riches to the
treasures left by this Pope has been disproved. When John, now merely
Balthasar Cossa, died he left a considerable burden of debt, and the
mitre which he had pledged to the Medici was demanded back from
them under threat of excommunication by Pope Martin V. It goes
without saying that Giovanni de Medici made a great deal of money out
of his large dealings with the Curia, not only under John XXII, but
also under his successor, Martin V, for the Medici seemed to have
remained the chief bankers of the Curia till the year 1476.
When Giovanni died in 1428 he left property amounting to 178,221
1 Of. especially Anunirato, lator. for. 1, 496: '1'ultimo feUiaento de Bardi
che quasi assorbi tutte le riochezze de private'
62 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
golden. According to the tax lists there was only one citizen who had a
larger income - Palla Strozzi. 1
Under Giovanni's sons, Cosimo and Lorenzo, the riches of the family
reached their highest point, for Lorenzo in 1440 left 225, 136 fl.; and
Piero, Cosimo's son, left 237,988 fl. in 1469, so that their total fortune,
about the middle of the fifteenth century, can be put at half a million
gulden. Cosimo (Pater Patrise) had already begun to give effective sup-
port to his struggle for political power by means of well-calculated muni-
ficence. (This may even have begun in the time of Giovanni.) The
family spent on public buildings, taxes and works of charity, between
1391 and 1434, 36,000 fl.; between 1434 and 1464, 400,000 fl.; between
1464 and 1471, 263,000 fl. Lorenzo the Magnificent, Cosimo's grandson,
finally treated the state finances as his own and his own as the state
finances. Because in this case the idea of making profit had become
entirely subordinate, he could use his capital and the state credit all the
more energetically for the attainment of political power. The Medici
hardly ever had more influence over the course of the world's history
than that which they exercised in the time of the struggles between
Louis XI of France, Edward IV of England, and Charles the Bold of
Burgundy.
In Europe, towards the end of the Middle Ages, there were no
financiers to compare with the Medici in international importance.
Some other Florentine families like the Portinari, the Sassetti and the
Guidetti were closely connected with the Medici both in business and
in politics. Two families, the Pazzi and the Strozzi, who were repeatedly
at variance with the Medici, played a considerable independent role as
moneylenders; but outside Italy they were scarcely mentioned in large
undertakings, and at this period only came in contact with credit-
brokers of more or less local importance.
This is also true of most of the banks in the proper sense of the word.
Banking business had developed from money changing in Italy itself
in the thirteenth century, and in many centres outside Italy in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. There were business men who made it
their business to receive deposits either with or without interest, and
acted as agents for payments in the market by giro transfers and for
local payments through bills of exchange. These business houses, called
'tabulae, tavole, banchi, bancherii,' from the pay tables indispensable in
their occupation, used the capital entrusted to them in active credit
operations; in addition, they usually traded in commodities on a more or
1 Canestrini, La scienza e I'arte di stato, p. 153. Income tax paid 1427-32:
Palla Strozzi, 507 fl., Giovanni de' Medici, 397 fl., Gabrielo Fanciatici, 391 fl.
INTRODUCTION 53
less large scale. Their credit business usually served the needs of their
own market. The Florentines, whose banking had international impor-
tance, were exceptional. Even they, however, carried on a considerable
business in commodities, a sure sign that there was not yet enough
money business to keep employed the capital - either their own or other
people's -which they held. The demand for money capital had, how-
ever, begun to grow rapidly, and the same is true of the holdings of
money. Both, however, were spread over an enormous district with bad
means of communication; and the few branches which the Florentines
had outside Florence were insufficient to link together supply and de-
mand. We see, accordingly, that the princes and cities everywhere, in
the event of a call for money, put themselves into communication with
any capitalists who happened to be at hand, or with agents of merely
local importance, and borrowed capital from nobles, charitable or re-
ligious foundations, clerics, officials, and burghers, the princes also
borrowing on occasions from other princes, and a great deal from the
cities. This borrowing was often in very small sums, and frequently on
hard terms which did not always consist in the promise of interest in
The princes, if they had money to lend - which was rare - the
nobles, the charitable institutions, and the monasteries, gladly used
opportunities of this kind to buy knd, which was mortgaged to
them as a rule and redeemed; the cities, on the other hand, pre-
ferred customs, the Mint, highways, and other royal prerogatives as
But the clerics and, to a greater extent still, the burghers knew how
to appreciate the advantage of interest in money, which came in as a
sure regular income with no exertion on their part, whether called
interest or annual payment, and whether the process by which it was
obtained was called a loan or purchase of annuity.
The rentier, towards the end of the Middle Ages, was a not infrequent
phenomenon in the cities. Besides the corporations and foundations
there were everywhere widows and orphans whose incomes consisted
solely of annuities. It seems that in many of the cities of the Nether-
lands, as early as the fourteenth century, the manual workers (Am-
bachts-Luyde) nicknamed the rentiers as a class apart, Ledichganghers
or 'the idlers.' 1 The chief families, apart from trade, lived on annuities.
We know that the cities carried on a kind of banking business for this
purpose, and we can easily see how they in this way collected capital,
1 Annaka de to Sotitte d'emulation de Bruges, 1873, XXI. A Netherlands Mint
order |of 1489 distinguishes Prelats, nobles, BENDERS, bons marchans. Of.
Giffiodts van Severen, Invent, des archives de Bruges, VI, 495 (Verzeichniss von
Leibrenten 1264-1332).
54 THE JLGB OF THE PDGGER
not only from their own citizens, but also from those of neighbouring
and friendly towns. 1
Such an organization for dealing in capital soon showed its effect in a
low and stable rate of interest. But even this organization was as yet
very imperfect. It only served to bring together the monetary require-
ments of the city community with the need of its citizens for an invest-
ment.
There is to-day an economic institution which is used to organize both
national and international credit, and puts all the many credit agents of
the second and third rank into communication with one another. Such
an institution, the capital exchange, was only present in the Middle
Ages in a very rudimentary form.
The Beginnings of the Capital Exchange. A bourse or exchange is an
assembly meeting at frequent intervals, usually daily, consisting of the
merchants and otter persons, who meet for the purpose of dealing with-
out exhibiting, delivering and paying for their goods at the same time.
Bourses or exchanges arose from a tendency inherent in trade from the
outset to concentrate as far as possible, from the necessity of bringing
supply and demand as far as possible together. This requirement had
long before called into being markets and fairs. They, however, satisfied
it far less perfectly than the exchanges, from which they were distin-
guished in two important particulars. Markets and fairs - especially
the latter, which are, practically speaking, alone important for trade
on a large scale - occur at longer intervals than the assemblies of the
exchange or bourse. Secondly, in these cases the commodities must
regularly be taken to the place where the business is concluded and
tested as to its quantity and quality, and finally transported to the dis-
tricts where they are to be disposed of. It is evident that this procedure
is a great hindrance to trade concentration, while the long intervals at
which markets and fairs recur, though it calls forth trade concentra-
tion, is at the same time a sign of a poor trade development.
It is accordingly obvious that exchanges are a product of a higher
stage of economic culture, and that they do not arise except under
1 Of. for Bade, Schonberg, Finamverhaltnisse der Stadt Basel im 14. u. 15. Jahrh.
p. 102 fi.; Mainz: Deutsche Stadtechroniken, Bd. XVII, p. 93 ff.; Hamburg: Kopp-
mann, Hamb. Kammereirechnunffen; Ghent: Gaillard, Archives du conseil de
, . ,
Flandre, p. 92, Rekeningen der Stad Gent, 1336-49, ed. de Fauw u. Vuylsteke;
Bruges: Gilliodts l.c. Bd. I-VI, passim. Cf. Bibl. de I'Ecole des Charles, 1884, p.
269 fi., Gaillard I.e., Gilliodts, 1, 5, 32, 67, V, 520, VI, 493. Geneva paid in 1480:
10 Soudi 'duobus mercatoribus corrateriis (brokers) pro ipsorum laboribus et
expends perquirendi in Argentina (Strasburg) pecunias mutuo secundum oonsue-
tndinem patrie illus ad racionem de quinque pro centenario per annum, de undecim
millibus ecutis tune ad solvendum restantibus quas reperierunt, eciam ad soiendum
si peounie erant ad aliquid minus de quinque pro centum.' (Mem. delasoc. d'hit-
toire de Qintoe, VDI, 430.)
INTRODUCTION 55
certain conditions. First, the wholesale trade must be so considerable
that two or four fairs a year cannot deal with it. Next, the commodities
must be so far standardized that they do not have to be seen at the time
of the transaction. There is also a third factor. Exchanges and fairs
presuppose a high degree of commercial liberty. Where these are only
not a daily exchange can be formed.
This already tells us that for the wholesale trade of the Middle Ages
the fair was the characteristic form of business concentration, as the
exchange is for the wholesale trade of modern times. There were, how-
ever, exchanges in the Middle Ages, but they were not used for dealing
in commodities, but in bills of exchange. Exchange of coins could never
be the object of exchange (bourse) business in the proper sense.
In order to conclude a bill transaction both parties needed an accur-
ate knowledge of the currency conditions involved, and the bill buyer
needed to be sure that the seller was a person of sound credit. All the
other requirements of ordinary dealing in commodities are absent. The
bill does not have to be transported, warehoused and inspected. At the
beginning it was necessary after the preliminary agreement to register
bill transactions before a notary. The trade in bills could accordingly be
carried on in the fairs of the Middle Ages in the manner characteristic of
exchange business; and in the markets where there was enough of it for
the trade to be regular and continuous, real exchanges then arose.
These fall into two classes in accordance with their origin, with per-
haps an intermediate class. In the markets with a considerable home
trade, especially in the trading cities of Italy, they arose from the
business which developed at the banks of the money-changers native to
the city, when the notaries likewise had stalls in the open air. Here
there arose, on the one hand, money-changing to facilitate the local
payments of the giro and deposit business; and, on the other, in order to
facilitate payments between places near the traffic in bills of exchange.
The latter, in the important markets, had the characteristics of ex-
change business as early as the fourteenth century.
The development was somewhat different in the markets without
much home trade, where foreigners controlled most of the business and
where, above all, the Italians had dealing in bills entirely in their hands.
The fact that this form of business was introduced by them does not
need further proof. In the countries north of the Alps bill business,
therefore, developed in the closest connection with the factories of the
Italians. The streets and market places where they lived, and more
especially where they had their consular houses or Loggias, were the
localities where bourse business first developed. Hence the bourse itself
was often called Loggia or Loge. The present term 'Bourse' is taken
56 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
from the square in Bruges, the greatest mediaeval foreign market, where
the Florentines, Genoese and Venetians had their consular houses.
In the markets of Southern Prance and Northern Spain, which al-
ready had bourses in mediaeval times, these seem to have arisen partly
from the concourse round the tables of the money-changers and partly
to have been connected with the factories of the Italians.
Like ordinary commodities and bills of exchange, capital to be lent
can be an object of exchange, dealings in which always tend to have
the character of bourse business. A bourse develops when the traffic
is sufficiently important and when the capital to be lent takes on certain
standardized forms. Neither of these factors were fully present in the
Middle Ages, and therefore bourses, where capital was dealt in, were not
then very important. Nevertheless, this form of business existed and
took its rise from the bourse dealings in bills of exchange.
The bill of exchange originally only served as currency, but it soon
developed into a credit instrument. In fact the use of the bill as cur-
rency is indissolubly connected with the credit given to its drawer; for
if the drawer needed in market A money which perhaps was already in
a distant market B, but could not be brought quickly and safely to A
because of the bad communications and the dangers of the roads - a
frequent case in the Middle Ages; or if the money was only ready at B
one, two or three months later - as was the rule when the drawer of the
bill had taken the initiative in the transaction - it is obvious that busi-
ness of this kind is really a credit transaction.
Transactions of the following sort were very common. In 1266 the
Governor of Saint Louis of France in Palestine found himself in mone-
tary difficulties. The King thereupon empowered him by a kind of letter
of credit to borrow money and promised anyone who lent him this
money, and presented the letter in Paris, to pay him the equivalent
fifteen days afterwards, 'apud templum.' The governor then concluded
with the Western merchants, or their agents in the Levant, a bill tran-
saction, which was also a loan.
Similar operations are also reported of Eichard Coaur de Lion and
John Lackland in the twelfth century. 1 Quite at the end of the Middle
Ages, ordinary credit business began to take on the form of bills in order
to tree itself from the character of 'usury.'
In short, wherever there was a bourse for bills of exchange, there
*Btbl. de I' Me des ehartes, XIX, p. 116 ff. Papa d'Amico, / titoli di credito
p. 69 ff. Bond in Archceologia, XXVIII, p. 216 fi. Cf. also Hufflard-Brfholles,
Hist, docum. Fred. II. V. 385, 456, 471, 498, 549, 603, 605 3. Cecchetti, Vita
dei Veneziani fino dl 1200, p. 72. Blancard, Docum. inedits, I, 403 fi., Arch. star,
ital, Sec. 3. t. in, parte 1, p. 118. Scdta di curiositd letterarie, No. 116, p. 15.
INTRODUCTION 57
must have been a bourse for capital without our being informed of this
in all instances. Reliable information in the absence of business docu-
ments is extremely scanty. It is, however, established that in th& thir-
teenth century the merchants had to maintain in many markets a sort
of bourse for loan capital, both to meet their own requirements and on
account of the needs of princes and cities. Prom this something similar
to a 'market rate of interest' seems to have developed here and there.
So in the year 1260 the Sienese trading company of the Tolomei writes
to their agent, who was at the Champagne fairs, that they have sold bills
in Siena for the next fair because in this way they could raise most
cheaply the money they needed for prosecuting the war against Flor-
ence. The letter adds that it was not so profitable to borrow in Siena,
for the rate of interest for merchants to each other (da uno mercatante
ad altro) was 5 or 6 pf . a pound (probably for two months, making an
annual rate of about 12J per cent, to 15 per cent, a year); for people
other than merchants, twice this rate; also that the sale of bills on
England was not so good as bills on the Champagne fairs. At the same
time the lords of the country, the Counts of Champagne, borrowed at
the fairs, and the interest on these loans - which was high - was calcu-
lated like commercial debts from fair to fair. An agent of Edward I
reports that he had borrowed money for his master, in 1274, from a
Lucca merchant in the Champagne fairs. Philippe le Bel borrowed from
the Florentines, who themselves obtained capital on loan at the same
fairs, He allowed the interest to be deducted on the loans contracted at
the Champagne fairs 50 sous on 100 livres per fair (two months) the
equivalent of 15 per cent, a year; and in the case of the other loans
1 denier from each pound per week, 4 denier per month, 4 sous per
year, or 20 per cent, per annum. All this already makes the impression
of a fairly regular business in lending capital; as we are told that in the
Champagne fairs there were special places for the money-changers, we
must suppose that it was here that the business in capital was chiefly
concentrated. 1
We gather from Giovanni da Uzzano that the Florentines, in the
middle of the fifteenth century, knew accurately when to expect the
recurrent periods of tight and easy money in the various markets. Here
it was not only trade conditions which came into play, but also govern-
ment requirements, especially the pay of the soldiers. We get the im-
pression of regular dealings in capital, which, however, were chiefly in
the form of bill transactions or very closely connected with them. On
1 Soelta di Curiosita Letterarie Lc. Arbois de Joubainvffle, Historie des Dw*
de Champagne, IV, 840 ff. Bond, Archaxdogia, XXVHI, 273. Vuitry Etudes aw
k Regime Financier de la. France, New Series, 1, 179. Bourquelot, Etudes swr k
Foires de Champagne, II, 13, 129 fi.
58 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
this account, therefore, it most have had the character of bourse
We know also that the shares of the Italian monti were dealt in in the
manner of bourse business. The fluctuations in the quotations were
already considerable in the fourteenth century, and the larger extent of
the transactions caused the introduction, both in Florence and Genoa,
of a special turnover tax. Theologians and jurists disputed whether it
was permissible to buy such shares below their face value, the Domini-
cans in Florence declaring in favour of this proceeding, while the
Minorites asserted the contrary. We must also remember that at any
rate the Public Debt Office was in the market, the Kialto; and Luca
Pacioli, in 1494, speaks expressly of the daily transactions which took
place in the Rialto in shares of this Camera d'Imprestidi. 2
Finally, from Bruges we have an example of a bourse transaction of
the fiscal kind. It is not large and is not a loan proper, but a bill transac-
tion. In 1475 the city of Bruges lent 908 10s. to 'Te Wissele Jegens
Diversche Cooplieden ter Buerze.' 8 There cannot, however, have been
regular direct dealing in capital on account of the city in the Bruges
Bourse itself, or we should have record of more transactions of this kind.
If we consider this scanty information, one fact is fairly clear. In the
Middle Ages princes and cities - if we exclude Italian cities - could not
cover their own requirements directly on the bourse, but needed mer-
chants at any rate as agents. They, on their side, took advantage of the
low market rate, but charged their debtors a far higher rate than those
of the market or bourse. Only a small proportion of the loans of princes
or cities had any relation to a money market. Most of them were trans-
acted on their own, so to speak, from house to house.
The capital bourses of the Middle Ages were only important for
merchants. They were a convenience both to native and foreign mer-
chants in certain markets in concentrating their trade in bills and the
business in lending capital, which was closely connected with it.
The far-reaching and international importance of the bourse is a
modern product.
Review of the State of Public Credit at the end of the, Middk Ages. At
the Renaissance European culture turned from unattainable ideals to
Nature and reality. The precept of the Church, 'Take ye not interest
from loans," had proved impracticable, and experience had given the
1 Uzzano in (Fagnini), Delia Decima, IV, cap. 47 u. 48.
Luoa Paoioli, Trattato de' computi e delle scritture ed. Gitti, p. 77. Rezasoo,
Dizionario Art. Monti. Cuneo, Banco di 8. Giorgio, p. 107 fi., 127, 180, 307.
Canestrini, La scienza e I'arte di Stato, p. 424 fi. Fabronius, Magni Cosmi Medici
Vita Adnot. 35. Villani, Star. for. lib. 3, cap. 106. Ammirato, Star. lib. 14. Ende-
mann, Stodien, I, 434, 441 fi.
* Gilliodts van Severen, Inventaires, VI, 82.
INTRODUCTION 59
principle, 'Money is the sinews of -wax,' such importance that finally a
new political system, 'Mercantilism,' took its rise from it.
In the last centuries of the Middle Ages the system of dealing in kind
among the European peoples broke down in some places, remaining
untouched in others. The public budgets of princes and cities showed an
increasingly monetary character on the expenditure side, especially in
regard to the largest item, the cost of the army. The receipts, on the
other hand, in the case of the prince at any rate, continued to be chiefly
in kind. General experience showed that it was impossible to increase
receipts of this sort proportionately to the increase of the expenditure.
They were, moreover, not generally available at the time and place
where the expenditure had to be met. Hence the necessity for a large
and increasing amount of credit, though this also presented considerable
In many places, it is true, there were small amounts of monetary
capital which the owners wished to invest. The sale of annuities by the
cities also gave an opportunity of this kind without conflicting with the
ban on usury. On the other hand, it was very difficult for princes in
need of money to avail themselves of credit: first, because they had
little or no personal credit, and also because the bad state of their
revenue organization greatly restricted the use of real credit -i.e. the
mortgaging of revenues -a disorder which at the same time had a
ruinous effect upon their budgets.
Ajbove all, the credit organization was, on the whole, very poorly
developed. Commerce had made a system for itself, and in Italy there
was already an elaborate system for satisfying the credit requirements
of the cities and the need of investment on the part of their citizens.
The princes, on the other hand, concluded their loans like private
individuals with any owners of capital who presented themselves, with-
out any systematic agency. To measure the advance of modern times
in this respect we will state briefly how, towards the end of the Middle
Ages, the individual princes of the more important states acted. It is,
however, important to get rid of the idea that there is any definite line
of division between the Middle Ages and modern times. Then, as al-
ways, the different degrees of development co-existed, but the process
whereby the more backward conditions gave place to others was then
comparatively rapid. This is the characteristic of an age of transition.
The simplest method of raising money for war, which is also the
crudest and the most ruinous, was still employed towards the end of the
Middle Ages by the chief secular lord of Christendom, the Emperor.
Frederick III was a careful manager, but in this respect, as in all others,
so limited and pettifogging that his economy was no good to him. In
any case, hisTevenues as a feudal lord were inadequate, and as Emperor
60 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
quite insignificant. He might have been able to increase his receipts
from his own country by the use of greater energy and foresight. In-
stead of this he believed, like the kings of the Old Testament, in the
collection of gold and silver plate as a provision for the future. In the
course of his long reign he must often have experienced the inadequacy
of this method, for at every large call for money he had to resort to sell-
ing or pledging offices, estates, annuities, etc., and, since he was never
able to redeem his pledges, they became permanent alienations. He was
perpetually in debt, not only to his own Diet, but to every kind of
individual, clerics, merchants, Italians, and Jews, and he owed numer-
ous sums, often quite small ones, to his own counsellors, court servants,
and mercenaries, so that he was driven from one scandalous situation
to another. 1 Under his son, Maximilian, matters were even worse.
Whereas Frederick was a miser, his son was prodigal to the verge of
madness. A contemporary Augsburg chronicler has left us a picture of
the finances of the knightly Maximilian: 2 'He was pious, not of great wit,
and was always poor. In his knd he had mortgaged many cities and
castles, rents and rights (Giilten) so that he kept little for himself. He
had knavish counsellors who ruled him in all things. They all became
rich and the Emperor poor. If a man desired aught from the Emperor,
he must give gifts to his counsellors, who thereupon brought it to pass. If
later his opponent came they took gifts from him also, giving in return
letters which said the contrary to the former ones. The Emperor suf-
fered this to be so. He would always make wars and yet had no money.
At times when he wished to set forth to war, his servants were so poor
that they together with the Emperor could not pay their reckoning at
the inn.' We shall learn later other details of this shameful form of
finance.
Maximilian, in all his monetary difficulties, kept the collection of gold
and silver plate which he had inherited, and even increased it by ex-
pensive additions. Since, however, it was for the most part never out of
pawn, he cannot have had much pleasure from it. He had, on the con-
trary, to pay interest at usurious rates for the possession of this dead
capital. Against this we must set off the progress in the goldsmiths' art
which may have resulted from the Emperor's patronage. This primitive
method of raising money ceased under Charles V-a few exceptions
apart - chiefly because the loans to be raised on valuables were insigni-
ficant in proportion to the enormous amounts of money now required.
Cf. Chmel, OeschiMe. Kaiser Friedrichs IV, z. B. I, 403 ff., II, 106 ff., 173.
Archiv f. Kund. osterr. GescMftsgvdlen, X, 183 ff., 370 ff.
< Greiff in den Anmerkimgen zu dem Tagebwhe des Lucas Bern, p. 100. Cf. z.
B. Brewer, The reign of Henry VIII, vol. I, p. 132 ff. Negoc. dipl. de la France
avec la Toscane, II, 429, 513.
INTRODUCTION 61
Maximilian was as backward in his financial management as in all
other respects, so that for him, as it had been for his father before him, it
was a matter of insuperable difficulty to obtain financial grants from his
parliaments, either the Imperial Diet or the diets of the separate states.
Nobles and clergy contributed practically nothing to the regular state
taxes. The city of Vienna brought in almost as much to the Emperor
Frederick III as the whole of Styria.
If, on the other hand, the diets were asked to grant extraordinary
taxes, they haggled over every gulden, and in the end only granted
the barest minimum in return for ruinous concessions on the side of the
Crown. The Emperor could not dream of raising forced loans. Maxi-
milian once attempted to raise one from the great trading companies,
but had to give it up.
The financial system of the kings of France was a very different story.
There is a well-known saying of Maximilian's that he was a King of
kings, for no man felt bound to obey him; the King of Spain was a king
of men, for though people reproached him, they yet did his bidding.
But the King of France was a king of beasts, for no man dared to refuse
to do his bidding. 1
Translate this into financial language. The French Crown had levied
on its subjects, and the clergy also since 1438, a regular direct tax, the
taille; it also regularly raised heavy dues from its feudatories, and even
the greatest vassals were not quite tax free. The indirect taxes, though
very, oppressive, produced an increasing yield. In the interests of defence
or some other pressing call, it was not very difficult to obtain the grant
of extraordinary taxation from the states general. Above all, towards
the end of the Middle Ages the forced loan was a favourite expedient,
especially a forced loan on the well-to-do. They grumbled, butwere com-
pelled to pay, the methods employed being mediaeval, as we shall see.
In U73 Louis XI, wishing to raise money in haste, demanded from
Lyons - as well as from other cities - a forced loan of 20,000 livres, to
be raised from the richest inhabitants, to whom the King sent a letter.
The citizens thereupon met and recognized the King's need and the
reasonableness of his demand, for it was in his power to take every-
thing. 2 The sum, however, was too high. The city had already on
several occasions made large advances to the King, whereof nothing had
been repaid. Bargaining then began between the King's commissioners
and the citizens. Finally they agreed on 8,000 livres, from which the
commissioners, apparently without having powers so to do, remitted a
further 2,500 livres. The King gave himself no further trouble as to the
1 Ranke, Franz. Oeschichte, I, 125.
"... que de son auctorit6 il pourroit prandre de fait, quant son bon plaiair
seroit ainsi le fere' (Bibl. de I'ecole tea Charles XLHI, p. 462).
62 THE AGE OF THE FT7GGEB
manner of raising the money, he caied only about getting it as soon as
possible. This all happened under the economical Louis XI.
No interest was paid on forced loans, and they were often not re-
paid. It was only in 1522 that the cities began to receive definite royal
revenues for the interest on their compulsory advances. They, in their
turn, sold perpetual annuities on these, and this was the beginning of the
present French 'rentes.'
In the case of voluntary loans at interest, to which the Crown only
resorted in cases of extreme urgency, and which were, as a rule, on a
very small scale, the financial officials at the King's direction put them-
selves in communication with a business house, pledged revenues, and
on occasion also jewels, or became personally liable both for capital and
interest. In short, these transactions were still of a mediaeval type, and
the French Crown at the end of the Middle Ages often had its policy
checked from the want of a little ready money.
The case was very similar with the loans of the English Kings.
Forced loans played a chief part when Parliament was not sitting. In
the letters under the Privy Seal which the King, in the event of a special
call for money, sent to certain, or even many, capital owners, it is stated
that the regular thing was in such cases for the Crown to demand from
Parliament, should it be sitting, the grant of a general tax, that other-
wise the Crown must be assisted by loans from individuals. This must
be the case in the present instance, as the financial necessity brooked no
delay. The King doubted not that the person named would show his
loyalty by the advance of the sum demanded of him. 1
Besides, there were also in England voluntary loans of Italians and
others, but since the end of the Civil Wars these had been unimportant.
Henry VII got together a large treasure which enabled his son to lend
money not only to other princes, but even to merchants.
Among the larger European countries, Castile was the one whose
rulers at the end of the Middle Ages had far the best developed system
of loans. The Crown there had actual annuity loans, as yet, however,
funded on separate branches of revenue, not on the whole country.
They were regularly used and were regularly dealt in. In 1438 the Par-
liament demanded that the full amount should not be paid to persons
buying up the royal annuities at much below par. In 1480 Queen
Isabella revoked a part of the sales of annuities of her predecessor,
Henry IV. She distinguished between the annuities bought at low prices
and those bought at the right price, i.e. between those bought direct
from the King and those obtained from third persons.*
Of. Stnbbs, Constitut. History, m, 01, 253.
. Cvlmeiro, HM. dela econom. polit.enEspana,!,
INTRODUCTION 63
There were also, of course, floating loans - those which Guicciardini,
in an ambassador's report of 1513, called 'permute,' i.e. bills: though at
that moment they were of subordinate importance in Castile. In 1489,
when Ferdinand and Isabella were in pressing need of money for the war
against the Moors, they sent invitations to all cities and also to numer-
ous individuals, asking them to make advances. These were similar to
those sent by the Kings of England and France, except that Ferdinand
and Isabella granted 10 per cent, annuities for the sums so obtained.
When this was no longer enough, the Queen pawned her jewels. 1
In her last will, Queen Isabella advised her successors never to sell
perpetual annuities, and ordered that all the free revenues of the king-
dom of Granada should be applied before anything else to the repay-
ment of the loans. These orders, however, were not carried out. Spain
in the sixteenth century fell into a state of the most hopeless in-
debtedness.
The Netherlands finance accounts give us a clear account of how
floating loans were contracted at the end of the Middle Ages. 8 The
Brussels Court, if any one, should have been able to get the advantage
of bourse dealings for its loans. Instead of this, however, it borrowed,
usually from the same Florentine merchants - mostly the Frescobaldi
and Gualterotti, first in Bruges and then in Antwerp - larger or smaller
sums, as required. It paid high interest and gave its creditors a charge
for the repayment on available revenues. It took all possible guarantees
from officials and citizens, and even pledged jewels. In urgent cases it
did not HTirinlr from selling large parts of the domains to cities, nobles,
churches, monasteries and private persons, though it would have been
able to give instead annuities on the domain, or to have such annuities
sold through the towns - a financial expedient which was actually used
at the same time as the sale of the domains.
In short, though the loan system of many princes towards the end of
the Middle Ages had developed many new features, yet, even at its
highest point of development, the system still showed a preponderantly
mediaeval character.
1 Colmeiro, II, 678.
Gomptes de la recette gSnertde des linances (Archives departementales de Lille).
CHAPTER 1
THE FUGGER 1
i
THE EISE OP THE FUGGER TILL THE DEATH OF JAKOB II (1526)
ORIGIN and Beginnings. The Fugger did not belong, as did the
Welser, the Herwart, the Langenmantel, and others, to the 'old'
families of Augsburg. Their ancestor, Hans Fugger, came to Augsburg
from the village of Graben in the year 1367. He was a weaver, but he
also traded, and he left, what was a considerable fortune for those days,
3,000 florins.
A year after he came to Augsburg the Guilds obtained a share in the
management of the city, which hitherto had been exclusively in the
hands of the old families. The most distinguished Guilds were the
Weavers and Merchants, and they accordingly profited the most by the
change. Hans Fugger's sons were already respected members of both
guilds, and one of them, Jakob, was Master of the Guild of Weavers,
though he himself had ceased to weave. Other families, however, were
rising in the world, and there is nothing to show that the Fugger were
already specially prominent. Like most of the Augsburg merchants they
still dealt exclusively in 'spices, silk and woollen materials,' a trade
where long established relations with Venice as yet played the chief part.
Andreas was the richest and most respected of Hans Fugger's sons.
He married a daughter of one of the old families and was the ancestor
of the Fugger vom Eeh, so called from the doe in their coat of arms.
Some of his sons largely increased the scope of the business, and had
relations with the Netherlands, with Leipzig, even, it is said, with Den-
mark. Incautious giving of credit, however, proved their ruin,and when
Lucas, the last son of Andreas, died in 1494, he left behind nun more
1 There have been several attempts to write a history of the Fugger.
1. A member of the family, Hans Jakob Fugger, composed in 1546 the Gehaim
Srenbuch dea Fuggerischen, GescMechtes, of which the MS. [is in the German
National Museum in Nuremberg.
2. A MS. from the end of the sixteenth century, 'Cronica des Gantzen Fugger-
ischen Geschlechtes.'
3. A printed work, Fuggerorum el Fuggerarum Imagines, Aug. 1618.
4. Pinacotheca Fuggerorum, Oct. 17,1154. Later works. Dr. Dobel, the Archivist
of the Fugger Family Archives, published two treatises: 'Uber den Bergbau und
Handel der Fugger in Karnten und Tyrol' and 'Der Fugger Bergbau und Handel
in Ungarn' in Ztachr. d. hiator. Vereinesf. Schwatenu. Neuburg, VI, 33 ff., IX, 103
ft. Cp. also Wenzel, A Fuggerek jdentosege Magyarorszag tarteneteben, Budapest,
1882; Habler, 'Die Fugger und der spanische Gewttrahandel' in Ztechr. d. histor.
Ver. f. Sdwaben, XIX, 25 ft.; and 'Die Finanzdekrete Philipps II und die Fugger,'
Deutsche Zeitschr. f. Geschichteunssensdi, XI, H. 2, p. 276 ff. Aloys Geiger, Jakob
Fugger, Regensburg, 1896.
THE FUGGER 65
debts than assets. The branch of the Fugger vom Reh continued to sink,
BO that many of them became handicraftsmen, or had to enter the
service of their more fortunate cousins, the Fugger of the Lilies (Gilgen)
as clerks.
This chief branch of the Fugger von der Gilgen sprang from another
son of the original ancestor, Jakob I, a modest man, who was, as we
have seen, master of the Weavers Guild, but who was looked down on
by his proud brother Andreas. He married a daughter of the master of
the Augsburg Mint. This man, Basinger, had 'great business with every
kind of merchant,' and in 1444, when his debts amounted to 24,000
florins, had to cease payment. His son-in-law went surety for him and he
compounded with his creditors, who got 75 per cent, of their claims.
He then went to Tyrol and once again became a mint master, this
time in Hall, the centre of the growing Tyrolese mining district. Appar-
ently it was through him that the Fugger had their first connections
with the Tyrolese mining industry. 1
Jakob II. When 'Old' Jakob Fugger died, his sons, Ulrich, George,
and Peter, carried on the business. Two other sons had died before their
father, and two more, Marcus and Jakob, were intended for the Church.
In 1473 Peter also died, and on the request of Ulrich and George, Jakob
abandoned his clerical career and became a merchant. The family came
rightly to consider this a great stroke of luck; for Jakob 'the second'
showed a real genius for business, and it is almost entirely to him that
the Fugger owe their importance in the world's history.
Jakob Fugger was just fourteen when he became a merchant in 1473.
He learned his business, like many other young South Germans of that
day, in the great business house of the Germans in Venice, the Fondaco
dei Tedeschi, where his elder brothers had a permanent warehouse.
When he became a partner and the three had carried on the business
together for some time, they made an agreement that their male heirs
and descendants should leave their property in common in the business,
but that the daughters should be given money down in dowries 'so that
the Fugger business may remain in every wise undivided.'
This principle was observed as far as possible as long as the house
prospered, and it was only given up after the war of Schmalkalden. Of
the three brothers, George died first in 1506, and Ulrich followed him
four years later. Jakob, who had no children of his own, then took his
nephews, Hieronymus, Ulrich, Eaymund, and Anton, into partnership.
He managed the business, which was now styled 'Jakob Fugger and
Nephews,' till his death.
Neu> Business Methods. When Jakob II entered the business the
1 Cf. for BiUingen Die Chroniken d. devtscben Stddte; Augsburg, II, 99 fi., D.
Archiv. f. Gesch. u. AUerth.-Kunde TiroU, V, 50.
66 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Fugger's trade had not yet struck out into new paths. It is true that as
early as 1473 Ulrich Fugger had done business with the Hapsburgs, but
this transaction was still on the old lines. In the year 1473 the Emperor
Frederick III was preparing to go to Trier to make an agreement with
Charles the Bold of Burgundy as to the marriage of his son Maximilian
with Charles's daughter Maria. For this expedition the Emperor
wished his train 'to be habited in plain coloured cloth and furnished
forth right merrily, and Ulrich Fugger was commended to him by the
Chancellor, Hans Bebwein, as an honest and sound man to furnish His
Majesty with good cloth and silks.' Ulrich Fugger lived up to this de-
scription, 'whereon the Emperor made him as a free gift without pay-
ment his coat of arms of the lilies, and this' - Hans Jakob Fugger says
in conclusion - 'was the first Trade and Businesse which the Lords of
Austria had with the House of Fugger.' 1 This transaction did not,
however, lead to a continued connection. This began first at the time
when the silver mines of the Tyrol were becoming increasingly impor-
tant, and under Maximilian I the Hapsburgs' struggle to obtain the
position of a world power made itself openly felt. The Fugger, who knew
how to forward this effort, then entered on their period of importance in
the world's history.
It was not, however, Ulrich Fugger who brought new undertakings of
such wide scope into the business. It was, as the oldest family records
show, Jakob who had left the trade in spices, silks and woollens,and had
'betaken himself to various undertakings of greater profit, such as bills
of exchange and mines.' The first beginning of this kind had been made
as we have seen by 'Old' Jakob in the middle of the fifteenth century.
The first decisive movement in this direction, however, was in 1487,
when Jakob Fugger the Second - we do not hear of any one else - to-
gether with the Genoese Antonio de Cavallis, advanced the sum of
23,627 florins to Siegmund, Archduke of Tyrol, who in spite of his rich
silver mines was always in dire straits for money. They received as
security a mortgage on the best of the Schwatz silver mines and the
whole province of Tyrol, under which, if the money were not punctually
repaid, the silver due from the mines to the Archduke should be handed
over. The next year, 1488, saw business on a still grander scale. The
brothers, Ulrich, George, and Jakob Fugger, advanced to the Archduke
150,000 florins, and till this debt was paid the whole silver production
of the Schwatz mines had to be handed over to the Fugger at a very
low price.
i This tale is told in the greatest detail by Hans Jakob Fugger in an MS. of
1566, in Kgl. Staatsbibl. in Munich (I, 319), and more concisely in the Gehaim
Erenbuch dea Puggeri*-ken Qeactteckta.
THE FUGGER 67
It was through transactions of this kind that the mines which the
Fugger themselves owned in Tyrol and Carinthia 1 became increasingly
important.
Similarly in Hungary the trade in copper, which the Fugger had
begun in 1495, was soon extended by working the large copper mines in
Neuflohl and elsewhere. In this case the Fugger were helped by the
influential Austrian family of Thurzo, with whom they often inter-
married. In the years 1498 and 1499, they, together with other business
houses in Augsburg, formed powerful syndicates to get control of the
copper market in Venice, while at the same time they shipped Hun-
garian copper through Danzig to the Netherlands. As early at any rate
as 1494 they had a connection with Antwerp.
Business wtih. the Emperor MaxmiUm I. When in 1490 Archduke
Siegmund handed over the government of Tyrol to Maximilian I, the
latter, who was the worst manager of all the Hapsburgs, immediately
approached the Fugger for a loan. This happened for the first time in
1492, a year when Maximilian was so hard pressed, owing to the cessa-
tion of the English subsidies, that he could not pay Duke Albert of
Saxony the sums promised to him for the military service he had ren-
dered. It is uncertain whether the Fugger did as Maximilian wished
and made fresh advances on the Tyrolese silver production. In any case,
in 1494 they had still a claim of 40,000 florins on the silver. Nevertheless
Maximilian tried to pledge the Tyrolese silver production yet again to a
Nuremberg consortium under Heinrich Wolff. The Fugger meanwhile
declined to release their mortgage, and the Nurembergers had to content
themselves with a bad security. 8
The Fugger at this time were still remarkably cautious about satisfy-
ing Maximilian's perpetual claims. When, however, his need was most
acute, they gave in. In 1496, when there was no money for the expedi-
tion to Italy and even the loyal cities of the Empire, in spite of the most
urgent entreaties, would lend nothing to the King on the security of the
Poll tax, 'Gemeine Pfennig,' the Fugger lent 121,600 florins on the
security of the output of the Tyrolese copper mines. They deducted
from this almost half to satisfy their remaining claim on the silver, and
as the State Government kept back a further large sum for its own use,
the warlike Maximilian was to find himself left with only 13,000 florins.
Finally, however, the Fugger agreed once again to lend him 27,000
florins on the silver. 8
The war with Switzerland in 1499 once again rendered acute Maxi-
Of. for the Fugger business in Carinthia, the Tyrol and Hungary, Dobel and
WenzeL
Of. Chmel, Urk. e. Gesch. Maximilians, L p. 41 ff.
Chmel Lo. p. 96. Ulmann, Kaiser Maximilian I, vol I, p, 438 fi.
8 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
milian's chronic money troubles. After ceaseless efforts on the part of
the Emperor's trusted servant George Gossembrot (whom we shall hear
more of), the Fugger declared themselves ready to make a fresh advance
on the Tyrolese copper. Shortly afterwards Gossembrot came into
violent collision with the Fugger, who wanted to have sole control of the
copper market, and the syndicate in which he was interested had to
dissolve.
Trade in silver and copper was in these years certainly the Fugger's
chief occupation since the feudal lord's share of the copper and silver
production had always been the best security the needy Hapsburgs
could offer. This it was too that made the Fugger, who could not tear
themselves away from the profitable copper and silver trade, more and
more the most important helpers of Maximilian in his money difficul-
ties. This became apparent during the Ten Years War in Italy (1508-
1517).
When in the summer and autumn of 1507 Maximilian asked the
Imperial Diet at Constance for the grant of a general tax of the Empire
for the Eoman expedition, the States at last declared themselves ready
to give him 12,000 men and to raise 120,000 florins by taxation. For
the moment, however, this was no good to the King, for the Imperial
taxes came in slowly, while cash was immediately necessary to pay the
Swiss 'Die Freien Knechte der Eidgenossen,' who otherwise would have
gone over to France. 1
The Diet at Constance recommended Maximilian to raise a loan from
the great business houses. This came to nothing, as did the attempt to
get prepayment of subsidies from the Italian cities which were expect-
ing armed help. The King's credit was nil, and even the Fugger would
lend nothing except on a mortgage of the Crown lands; for he had no
other security to give. In July, 1507, Maximilian had to bring himself
to mortgage his revenues as Count of Kirchberg and Lord of Weissen-
horn to the Fugger for 50,000 florins. The mortgage was never redeemed,
and these lands, apart from a few older parcels of land in Graben and
Augsburg, form the beginning of the Fugger's afterwards very extensive
possessions in real property. 8
This money was a drop on a hot stone. In his extremity the Em-
peror bethought him of turning to account the growing feeling against
the great business houses. He attempted, against the advice of the Diet,
to raise a forced loan from the business houses in Augsburg, Nuremberg,
i Maximilian wrote to his daughter Margaretha about the Swiss: 'II sount
medians, villains, prest pour traire France on Allemaignes.' Cf. Janssen, Frank-
furter Beichscorrespondenz, II, 712 &., 741, 745.
> Cf. Report of the Venetian envoy Quirino from Augsburg (Alberi, Bdaz. d.
ambasc. venet, XIV, 28 ft.).
THE FUGGEB 69
Memmingen, and Ratisbon. All the firms resisted to the uttermost.
They made use of Dr. Conrad Peutinger as their agent with Maximilian,
and after months of fruitless negotiations, the companies advanced 'a
mighty sum,' apparently 150,000 florins, but once again on the Crown
land. The King, moreover, had to bear witness that this was a volun-
tary act and to promise never again to try to impose a forced loan.
The Fugger bore a large share of this loan. 1
The year 1508 saw further advances made by the Fugger; a small
advance of 8,000 florins on the right to farm salt ('Salt Meieramt') at
Hall in Tyrol in January, later another of unknown amount on a large
and valuable collar, and yet a third of 128,750 florins on the security of
the copper and silver production. 2
The League of Cambrai gave the Emperor -he attained this title in
1508 - the promise of large subsidies from his allies, 170,000 ducats in
all. The payment had moreover to be made at the most widely distant
place, Eome, Florence, and Antwerp, and was very slow, while Maxi-
milian as usual required money immediately and the whole amount in
Germany. Jakob Fugger was able to get the money to Augsburg, some
in a fortnight and the rest within six weeks, by means of bills of ex-
change. A bill transaction on such a scale between such distant locali-
ties, carried through in such a relatively short space of time, was
regarded in those days as a great feat. The fame of the Fugger grew
mainly through business of this kind, which they carried on later on
an even larger scale. Without running any great risks they were able
to make a large profit from a skilful use of the price of bills - 'arbitrage'
as it is called now, 'cambric arbitrio' in the language of that time. 3
In 1511 the Emperor conceived the crazy notion of making himself
Pope. The idea itself and the plan for its execution are very characteris-
His agent Paul von Lichtenstein was to borrow 300,000 ducats to
bribe the Cardinals from Jakob Fugger. He was to pledge as security
'the four best caskets with Our jewels together with Our robes of state.'
1 Cf. for the negotiations about the Forced Loan cf. Jager, Vim im MtitdaUer,
p. 677, Herberger im Jakresber. d. hisfor. Ver. f. Schwaben, Neuburg, 1849-50.
1 Le Glay, Corresp. de Maximilien et de Marguerite d'Autriche, 1, 177, and also
Dobel, Zwschr. d. histor ver. /. Schwaben, IX, 199.
Cf. Hans Jakob Fugger's Spiegel der ehren de* Ententes Osterreich in der
Ausg-des Sigm. v. Birken. 1668, 12, S. 9, and the rather different version of
v. Stetten, Geschichte der Augsbg. GeseMechter, p. 202. In 1609 the 'marchans alle-
mans nommez les Fouekers, demourans en la ville d'Anvers' (Comptes de la Tre-
eorerie de la guerre 1306-11 und Camples de la Recette generale des Finance* 1510,
Archives de la Chambre des oomptes in Lille) make a first appearance in the
accounts of the Court of the Netherlands.
4 Cf. Goldast, Polit. ReUhsMndel, XII, 4, p. 428, and Geiger, p. 22 ff .
70 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The interest was to be 100,000 ducats for which Jakob Fugger was to be
given a lien on:
(1) The Imperial subsidy 'the which we will obtain in the next Diet
from the States of the Realm.'
(2) On subsidies and taxes in the future on the Austrian Crown lands.
(3) On the annual Spanish subsidies.
(4) Should all this prove insufficient the Emperor will assign a third
of all the revenues he will draw from the Holy See in order to pay the
debt. Further, he undertakes to appoint any one whom Jakob Fugger
shall designate as the keeper of the Imperial treasures. The Fugger
bank in Rome is to pay over the loan to the Emperor's envoys, so that
they can use it as they want it. Lichtenstein is to spare no pains to
bring about the loan, 'and though the Fugger deny tb.ee more than once,
still shalt thou trye yet again.'
The whole business throws light on the adventurous fancy and un-
scrupulous policy of Maximilian's oddly compounded character; and it
is also an important piece of contributory evidence as to the election of
Charles V. Needless to say, it all remained a pious wish.
In spite of these unbusinesslike attempts to bleed them, the Fugger
apparently lent the Emperor money in the years following, but we have
no further information till 1514. In that year Jakob Fugger lent the
Emperor 12,000 florins on the revenues of Tyrol, and 32,000 florins on
the security of the lordship of Biberbach. When in October, 1515,
Maximilian pressed him for a new loan Jakob Fugger replied that 'in
past time and in this very year he had advanced great sums, close upon
300,000 florins to His Majesty on silver and copper, whereof the greater
part had not been repaid.' After the loan which as a loyal subject he had
at great pains to himself made to His Majesty but lately on his journey
from Vienna to Augsburg, he had not thought hi so soon to be en-
treated for a new loan. The King's silver was pledged already for seven
and eight years to come and the copper for four years. The getting of
silver had sunk to the half, whereby the repayment of the debt was
mightily delayed. He knew not how long he had to live now, nor how
he should stand by reason of the wars a few years hence. He had be-
sides much business and such increased unto him daily, wherefore
those came to him at home whom in years past he had gladly ridden to
seek. Nevertheless he quit himself of them, for he was now of a good
age and had no child. He would therefore content himself with his busi-
ness as it was and undertake nothing new.
Only after much persuasion Jakob Fugger consented once more to
advance in conjunction with the Hochstetter 40,000 florins on the
security of the Schwatz copper for the years 1520-1523 at 4J florins the
hundredweight; and in addition as 'a favour' on each hundredweight
THE FUGGER 71
of silver 5 marks of silver at the price of 8 florins 27 crowns the mark.
Finally Jakob Fugger consented to a further loan of 10,000 florins on
the security of silver and the grant of customs privileges. 1 All this
shows two things, first that the Fugger remained in close connection
with the Emperor, and secondly that their position was now very
important.*
At this point we begin to hear of fairly large financial transactions on
the Fugger's part in Antwerp. Hitherto the factory there (which first
had a house to itself in 1508) had really only been used for dealing in
commodities, a business where pepper figured alongside of copper and
silver. In 1505 the Fugger had shared in a large undertaking of German
and Italian merchants in the East Indies, but this does not seem to have
been repeated. Nevertheless they kept their own agent in Lisbon, and
he made at regular intervals large shipments of pepper to Antwerp,
where the Fugger played a leading part in the pepper market for several
decades. 4
In 1515 the Emperor was granted a lump sum of 100,000 florins in
return for releasing his grandson from his tutelage and thereby ceased to
interfere in the government of the Netherlands. The Fugger agency in
Antwerp was commissioned to receive this money. Soon after they acted
In this matter the Florentine Frescobaldi had played the chief part at
first, but as they proved unequal to the task the Fugger had to step in.
In April, 1516, they advanced 20,000 florins to the Emperor through the
Cardinal von Sitten, and in May the Frescobaldi, who had failed to send
the money punctually to Trent where the Emperor lay with his army,
were themselves driven to borrow 60,000 florins from the Fugger.
Maximilian's credit, whether financial or political, had now fallen so
low through the failure of the English subsidies and his own heedless-
ness that the English envoy could write home that the Emperor be-
haved like a boy in his nonage. It was this very envoy whom Maxi-
milian asked to assure Jakob Fugger that the friendship between the
Emperor and the King of England was as firm as ever and that the
Bong would continue to support the Emperor. 5
In the summer of 1516 the Court of the Netherlands borrowed from
Bernhard Stecher, the Fugger's agent in Antwerp, for the period of one
1 Dobel,Lc. IX,200ff.
'Augsburger StadtarcMv, Herwartiana Suppl. HI.
1 Factory is used in the eighteenth century sense of a depot.
For details of the Fugger factory of. Thys, Histor. d. stratum v. Antwerpen 2.
Aufi. (1893), p. 548 ff. Antwerp f actors of the Fngger were: 1507 Conrad Meuting
(Mutinck), 1610-13 Felix Hanolt, 1513-20 Bernhard Stecher, 1517-22 Wolff
Haller, 1521 Anton Hanolt u. s. f.
Brewer, Calendar of State Papers, voL H, No. 2310, 1231, 1384.
72 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
year under the guarantee of the city of Antwerp, 27,000 pounds at 40
pfennigs of Flemish money (i.e. 27,000 Carolus gulden).
For this the Fugger received 3,000 pounds in interest, about 11 per
cent., no means a high rate for those times. The agent received in
addition 100 pounds for his trouble and expenses. At the end of the
year the repayment of capital and interest was found impossible on
account of the large expenditure for Charles' projected journey to take
over the government of Spain, the war in Friesland and so forth.
The loan, which now with accrued interest amounted to 30,000 pounds,
was prolonged from Midsummer Day, 1517, till Christmas in the follow-
ing year. The Fugger meanwhile had other outstanding claims on the
Emperor for 42,000 pounds, making a total of 72,000 pounds. When
the loan was extended, the Antwerp agent, Stecher, received a further
100 pounds from the Finance Ministry of the Netherlands. Finally to
end the story of the Antwerp business we should mention that the
Fugger in 1518 lent 38,000 pounds in order to pay the Frisian garrisons
for three months and to meet other pressing needs. For this loan several
receivers-general of provinces and cities had to make themselves per-
sonally responsible. The interest was 4,000 pounds for thirteen months,
or not quite 10 per cent. 1
The Finger and the Reformation. The next great dealings of the
Fugger with the House of Austria refer to the time of Charles' election
as Emperor. Before we enter on these, we must turn to the connection
between the Fugger and the Boman Church.
They had a factory in Eome which Dr. Christopher Scheuerl speaks
of as early as 1500 as 'the Fugger Bank,' and by its means they had large
financial dealings, not only with the Papal Curia, but with individual
princes of the Church. They were interested in the lease of the Papal
Mint, and when a prominent cardinal died in 1505, it was said that Jakob
Fugger had large claims against him. In 1507 Pope Julius II had de-
posited 100,000 ducats in their bank in Borne and in 1509 he had the
monies produced by the Year of Jubilee paid in to them.
In the year 1510 they sold to this Pope at the price of 18,000 ducats
a diamond which they had had to take over at 20,000 ducats from the
liquidator of the Venetian banking firm of Agostini. The Fugger were
the first and with the Welser the only German firm which f ell into the
old category of merchants called in the Middle Ages 'Campsores
Bomanan curiam sequentes.' 2
1 LiUe, Camples de la Becette Generate dee Finances. Of. Brewer Lc. No. 2721,
2866 and -passim.
'Pauli, Mb. Zustdnde im Mittdalter, H, 106. Reumont, Gesckichte der Stadt
JRoro.ma, 441,IHb, 398, 423. Marino Sanuto, Diarii, VI. 231, VII, 197, VIH.
11, 87, X, 283. Janssen, Frankfurter Reichscarrespmdem, II, 762,
THE FUGGEE 73
In this way the Fugger became connected with Albrecht of Branden-
burg when he was made Archbishop of Mainz. At least since the be-
ginning of the fourteenth century the Archbishops had had to pay the
Curia in hard cash for their confirmation and the sending of the episcopal
pallium. Albrecht had to pay 30,000 ducats, most of which he first had
to borrow. On the day following his consecration, the 15th May, he
wrote an acknowledgment of indebtedness in which he acknowledged
that Jakob Fugger had lent him 21,000 ducats for defraying these ex-
penses and had paid them over to the new Archbishop's representative
in Borne through his agent there. Albrecht promised to repay this loan
at the term in good Flemish gulden at the rate of 140 gold gulden for
100 ducats as well as 500 Flemish gold gulden for 'Trouble, Danger and
Expense. 9 1 The usual periphrasis for interest.
From his regular revenue the Archbishop would never have been able
to pay back such a sum. He therefore obtained from Pope Leo X, on
payment of another 10,000 ducats, the right of being General Commis-
sioner for Saxony and other parts of Germany of the new Jubilee Indul-
gence which the Pope had just declared. It seems that the Fugger helped
in this arrangement, which for them was merely a means of getting their
money more quickly. At any rate there is no ground to transfer the
indignation against the traffic in indulgences to the Fugger. The whole
business had been quite usual with bankers in Italy for centuries and
the trafficking which appeared so markedly in Germany at the time of
the Indulgence had been described, for example in Florence, as early as
the fourteenth century. Then, too, honest men had denounced it with
righteous indignation. The only novelty was that the man who now
roused the whole people against the Indulgence should call forth a
general response.
The Pardoner Tetzel was accompanied everywhere by an agent of the
Fugger, who kept in his hands a key of the Indulgence chest. , When the
chest was full, it was opened in the presence of the Fugger's agent and
its entire contents were then paid over to him and sent to Andreas
Mattstedt, the Fugger's agent in Leipzig. Finally half the proceeds
were paid over to the Curia by Engelbert Schauer, the Fugger's agent
in Home, and the other half was used to pay the instalment of interest
and capital due on the money lent to Archbishop Albrecht. Such was
the business which led to the Reformation.*
The Fugger's fortunes were now climbing faster and faster towards
i Hennes, Albrecht von Brandenburg, 8. S B. Korner, Te*d der Abktssprediger,
S. 44 S., 61 S. CL Woker, DM kirchliche Finanzwxen der Papete, S. 99 ff.
For Engelbert Schauer cf. Loose, Anton Tuckers HaiuhaUungabueh, S. 124,
150, S. 24; Both, Geschichte dee Nurnbg. Handels, I, 369 ft, He is here called
Angelus Saur.
74 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
the zenith. The moment approached when they threw their gold into
the scales in the straggle for the first place between the Houses of the
Hapsburgs and the Valois and thereby gave the Hapsburgs the crown of
King of the Romans.
The Fugger and the Election of Charles V as Emperor. The election of
Charles of Spain to be King of the Romans is the event of this age which
most clearly illustrates the power of money and is sufficient in itself to
justify the phrase 'the Age of the Fugger.' The German Electoral
princes would never have chosen Charles had not the Fugger helped his
cause with their cash, and still more their powerful credit. This is evi-
dent throughout the whole transaction.
The Emperor Maximilian spent his last years in indescribable straits
for money. In 1518 Jakob Fugger had to lend him 2,000 florins, and
again, as the result of ceaseless pressure, another 1,000 florins, because
otherwise His Majesty would literally have had 'nothing to eat.' This,
however, did not prevent the Emperor at this very time from helping
his grandson's election as Emperor by every means in his power and
especially by large promises of money. He could not, of course, engage
money of his own, nor yet directly money belonging to his grandson, but
he could offer the promises of the Fugger, who in their turn lent their
signature, not to Maximilian, but to his far more solvent grandson.
The Fuggei had already had many money dealings with Charles when
he ruled only the Netherlands. The Fugger's Antwerp agent, Wolff
Haller, must even then have been in high favour with the young Prince
and his counsellors, for Charles declared afterwards that when he took
over the government of Spain (in 1517) he had received most important
services from Haller and also at the time of the election as King of the
As Haller, we know, made a journey in 1519 from Antwerp to Spain
to carry out some large monetary transaction between the King and the
Fugger in connection with the election, it is probable that he had acted
for the Fugger in these dealings, a fact which would explain the great
affection with which Charles continued to remember him in later years -
in 1526 he speaks of him as 'Our Counsellor from Our youth up.'
Of these first negotiations we know no details, only the result. In
August, 1517, when Charles was setting out to Spain, he gave his envoy
Courteville and the Imperial Treasurer Villinger bills on the Fugger for
94,000 florins in order to bring the electors to elect him. This, however,
was no use, for the money was to be paid after the election. The old
Emperor knew better. He wrote to Charles that there must be immedi-
ate payment in cash and not 94,000 florins, but 450,000 florins in addi-
tion. Then began a bargaining which lasted for years with each separate
elector, a proceeding made all the more scandalous by the fact that the
THE FUGGER 75
electors kept raising their terms owing to the French King's candida-
ture. 1
When Charles declared that he wished to become King of the Romans,
cost what it might, Francis let it be known that he was prepared to
spend on it half his year's income, which was thought to be three million
livres. Francis was no despicable rival, though less dangerous than his
own skilful boasting made him appear to his contemporaries. His
situation with regard to ready money was far less brilliant than his
envoys and friends boasted, and he would have had great difficulty in
paying his engagements, had he intended to pay them, which he did not.
The German electors, however, had no use for such promises, they
wanted money down, or else the guarantee of first-rate German mer-
chants.
King Francis first approached the Republic of Genoa for a loan of
80,000 scudi. In view of Genoa's wavering position between the two
great camps in Europe, we cannot wonder that this was refused. He
had no greater luck with an attempt to raise a large loan in Lyons.
The money of the Florentines who set the tone for Lyons was not then
as it was afterwards at the disposal of the French Crown. Indeed some
of the most important Florentines who had their main business in
Antwerp even supported Charles. It was only from his mother, the rich
Duchess of Angouleme, that Francis received any considerable sum of
money, but this was not nearly enough to decide the election. 8
Charles meanwhile discovered even richer sources of money. As a
result of Maximilian's advice he looked out for fresh means, and as the
Fugger's terms proved too hard, he entered into relations with other
merchants.
In September, 1518, negotiations were carried through in Antwerp
with the great Florentine banker Filippo Gualterotti. At the same
time or shortly after relations were established with the most important
Genoese merchants and with the next largest firm to the Fugger, the
South German house of Anton Welser and Company, who sent to Spain
two special representatives for this purpose, Heinrich Ehinger and
Sebastian Schopel. 8
These negotiations were concluded at the beginning of January, 1519.
The Welser contributed 110,000 florins as well as 25,000 crowns.
Filippo Gualterotti, 55,000 florins, the Genoese Benedetto and
Agostino Fornari, 55,000 florins ; and another Geonese firm Agostino
and Nicolo de Grimaldi and Company (who were represented by
Gachard, Kapport sur Us Archives de LiOe, p. 149, 162; De Quinsonas, Mar-
guerite, d'Awtriche, H, 256.
Marino Sanuto, Dion*, Vols. XXVI and XXVH passim. Casoni, AwaaK di
Genava, p. 66. Brewer, Calendar, HI, 84 and 116.
Of. Brewer, Calendar, H, No. 4440.
76 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
Lorenzo Vivaldi), 55,000 florins. They all gave the Spanish Government
bills on Augsburg and Frankfurt am Main pledging themselves to pay
over the amount of the bills during April either to Charles' new special
representative Paul von Armstorffer, or according to Armstorffer 's direc-
tions to the German electors, only, however, in the case that Charles
should be elected King of the Romans. Paul von Armstorffer himself
took the bills to Germany and handed them over to Jakob Fugger to
keep for the time being.*
Meanwhile negotiations with the German electors continued. They
were going favourably for Charles, but were by no means concluded
when on 12th January, 1519, the Emperor Maximilian died.
King Francis now redoubled his promises, causing the electors and
their counsellors (who also had to be bribed) to increase their demands
on Charles. These to his sorrow he was forced to concede, for as we see
from his letters the crown of King of the Romans grew in importance in
his eyes as its price rose.
At this point the extent to which the Fugger backed the House of
Austria becomes evident. Charles' representative reported over and
over again that the electors would only sell their votes for cash or the
Fugger's promises to pay. 8 Francis, therefore, tried at first to bring
them over to his side. He had the Fugger asked to accept a bill of
300,000 ecus for him, and as Jakob Fugger told one of the Spanish
representatives at the end of February he could have been able to make
30,000 florins over this transaction. But the Fugger wished, as the
Dutch Finance Minister Hoochstraten said in their praise, to remain
'good and loyal subjects of Our Lord the King.' Probably also the
security offered by Francis did not seem good enough. In any case the
result of their reflections was unfavourable to the French. 3
In February, 1519, the Hapsburg party in the Empire was very
nervous lest the South German merchants should transfer their good
offices to the King of France.
The Swabian League then wrote on 16th February to the Council of
Augsburg that it had learnt that certain foreign Kings, the King of
France amongst others, had sought to obtain bills from the companies
and merchants. As this was in the interests of the opponents of the
Alliance, the Council were to forbid the merchants to undertake such
business on pain of death. The merchants moreover were to declare on
oath what had already taken place in the matter. The Council imparted
the contents of the letter to the merchants, who answered that of late
* See Jakob Fugger to Paul v. Armntorffer, Feb. 11, 1519 (Archives of German
Nat. Museum).
Letter of the Envoy to Charles in the State Archives in Lille.
Mone, Ameiger, 1836, Sp. 36. Le Glay, Corresp. de Marguerite d'Autriche, H,
THE FUGGEB 77
they had done no business of this kind with the King of France; certain
of them moreover, both shortly before and after the Emperor's death,
had refused the request of the French King to accept bills for him. 1
Nevertheless the merchants were still not considered perfectly safe.
They were, therefore, expressly forbidden to undertake business in bills
for the French, whereupon one of Charles' election agents wrote home
that now through the help of the Fugger and the Swabian League the
French Court could get neither credit nor bilk. A few days later, how-
ever, the Statthalterin Margaretha wrote from Brussels to Charles that
some merchants wished to pay only after the election and reserve them-
selves the possibility of using the money in certain eventualities for the
King of France. It is expressly stated of the Welser that they seemed
to wish to withdraw from the business on the plea that war had broken
out between Nuremberg, where they had an important branch, and the
Margrave of Brandenburg. 2
Even though it proved possible to keep the merchants to their pro-
mise, French competition continued to drive up the price of the crown.
In the beginning of March this was only a little over 500,000 florins,
and of this amount only a very little remained to be raised. A few weeks
later, however, Charles' agents had to report that a further sum of
220,000 florins was necessary. Charles at first was very unwilling, the
whole business seemed to be getting too expensive. Finally he gave in
and again applied to the Fugger for new loans. 3
Jakob Fugger moreover was not by any means always ready to
satisfy requirements on this increasingly gigantic scale. He found at the
same time that he was asked to lend hundreds and thousands of fresh
money, comparatively small old payments due to him remained in
arrear.
He repeatedly complained of this as well as of many other wrongs he
suffered. He was so indispensable that it was necessary to meet his
wishes. Finally the Fugger lent the whole sum on bill acceptances and
notes of hand given by Charles, who wished at all costs to become King
of the Eomans. 4 As all this did not satisfy the greed of the electors and
one of them, Joachim of Brandenburg, really did go over to the French
at the eleventh hour, the total loan now rose to over 860,000 florins, of
which the Fugger lent 543,000 florins, the Welser 143,000 florins, the
Genoese and the Florentines together 165,000 florins. The merchants'
acceptances were handed over by Charles' representative piecemeal in
lAugsburger Stadtarchiv, Litieralien. (Le Glay, Nfgoc. diplomat. II, 244, 322.
vgl. damitauch, II,302ff.).
1 Mone, Anzeiger, 1836, Sp. 36. Le Glay, Negoc. dipl. II, 316 fi., 322.
Mone,l.c. 1835, Sp. 286, and imprinted letter in Lille Archive* Sannto(2?taw,
XXVH, 252). Le Glay, Ntgoc. dipt. II, 288.
Le Glay, Negoc. dipl. 1, 220, II, 264, 437, 445. Mone, Anzeiger, 1836, Sp. 27-32.
78 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
return for the votes. This with many other curious details appears
from an account bearing the title 'Expenses incurred by the Emperor
Charles V for his election as King of the Romans.' It is neatly drawn up
with entries for the electors with their counsellors and servants and
their many other princes, counts, and other nobility. A considerable sum
is spent for the upkeep of the Spanish Commissioner and his train, and
for the Wiirttemberg War, the Swabian League, Franz von Sickingen,
etc., this entry amounts to 171,360 florins. Then come the previous
advances that year of Jakob Fugger and Hans Paumgartner with the
addition of 30,000 florins for interest, then the monies paid to the cities
of the Empire, officials of the Court and so forth, 29,000 florins for pay-
ment of the Swiss mercenaries, and finally 17,500 florins difference in
exchange to the Fugger and the Welser. Charles' envoys dealt so open-
handedly with money that they scarcely noticed that while repayment
was demanded from them in effective gold gulden, the merchants had
only engaged in Flemish gulden, so that there was an agio of 2 kreuzer on
each gulden. 1 The whole bill was paid in an honest and honourable
way, Charles covering a small deficit from his own resources. He was
now King of the Romans. The electoral act itself with its ceremonious
speeches was only a comedy meant for the people.
In the last hour before the decision a very characteristic difficulty had
arisen. The German princes refused the acceptances of the Italian
merchants, who on their side would not deposit cash with the
Fugger, on the ground that the Fugger had tried to spoil their business.
Finally the matter was settled by the Welser going surety for the
Italians.*
When the news of the election reached Augsburg, some of the most
prominent citizens, Jakob Fugger among them, wanted to light bonfires.
As this had never hitherto been the custom, the Council preferred to do
it at the expense of the city.
'There were many hidden charges therein,' says the chronicler, 'that
shot of! in the fire. It was right fairly done and cost much money.'
This might have been said of the election itself. Charles had reached his
goal, but was it worth such a heavy sacrifice? One of his most active
agents had written to him at the last moment that it was true the votes
cost much money; on the other hand, they would give great security and
quietness to Charles' rule in all his states. There has never been a
greater political mistake. The Roman crown proved itself in every
direction a fatal gift to its wearer.
Charles' election brought considerable expense for the splendours of
'Graff An Jahresberichte d. histor. Vereins f. Schuabm und Neubnrg 1868,
' Le Glay, Negoc. dipL H, 336 fi.
THE FUGGEB 79
his coronation progress to Aix and the coronation itself. 1 This, how-
ever, was a small thing in comparison. It was far more serious that the
people of Spain showed no inclination to pay the price of the Crown, and
when Charles' ministers tried to exact payment immediately after
Charles' departure the fearful revolution of the citizens broke out, one of
its main causes being the large export of money. * The worst effect, how-
ever, of Charles' election was that it brought -him the undying hatred of
the French King, and with it a series of wars which, though they brought
Italy under Hapsburg influence, led to the loss of Metz, Toul, and
Verdun, cost Charles' subjects streams of blood, and made Charles him-
self even more incurably bankrupt. Immediately after the election his
finances were so exhausted that he could not meet a great part of his
engagements and could still less arm against his defeated rival who was
pushing on to war. Francis outbid him for the Swiss mercenaries, and
also drew over to his side a mass of German troops. 3
Some German princes who had contented themselves with the guar-
antee of the cities of Antwerp and Mechlin for the payments promised
them by the Emperor, had to come upon their guarantors, who did not
pay. Hereupon the princely creditors sent challenges to the cities with
threats against their lives and property. The cities in their turn com-
plained to the Emperor and he, having great need on his own account of
Antwerp's powerful help, took some time to raise the money to satisfy
the claims of the most influential of the German princes, the Archbishop
. of Mainz.
The Count Palatine, on the other hand, could not obtain payment,
and other German princes fared no better, a fact which loosened their
dependence on the Emperor and in many cases helped on open re-
bellion.*
Charks V and Jakob Fugger. The business houses which had helped
Charles' election and had promptly discharged the engagements it had
entailed were to find that the Emperor broke his solemn promises to
pay. In the beginning of the year 1521, in the Diet of Worms, he made
an agreement with Fugger under which their claim was transferred in
part to Tyrol and in part to Spain. At that time he received a large new
loan from the Welser. A few months later, in order to raise money for
the French war, there were large sales of Crown property both in Naples
and in the Netherlands which he had lately occupied. It was the Welser
who bought the largest share. Next year also, though large amounts of
money were raised in the Netherlands, Spain and Germany and sent to
i Lille Ghambre dcs Comptes, B. 2294.
1 HSMer, Die unrthschaffliche Blithe Spaniens in 16. Jahrhundert, S. S3, An m. 13.
Baumgarten, Qeschickte KarU 7, t. II, 28 ff. (Lanz, AktenstScke, S. 453).
Lanz, Correspondent Karle V, 1. 1, 123, 129 fi., 453.
80 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
Italy fox tlie maintenance of the Imperial forces, these proved insuffici-
ent, and the payments to the merchants fell increasingly into arrears. 1
The Emperor's credit was so bad in 1522 that Lucas Bern, who was
interested in Jakob Fugger's large advances to the Emperor to the ex-
tent of 18,310 ft., would have been glad to sell his share at half price.
The Fugger in March, 1523, had received very little of the claim of
415,000 fl., for which they had been given a charge on Tyrol; and, more-
over, nothing had been paid on the claims transferred to Spain amount-
ing to 152,000 ducats, which, including interest and new advances,
leached the total of 198,121 ducats at 375 maravedis to the ducat.
At last Jakob Pugger lost patience, and he wrote a letter to the
Emperor which will be noteworthy for all time as evidence of the tone
in which a merchant - the foremost of his time, of course - dared to
adopt towards the most powerful monarch of his day: 2
'Your Imperial Majesty doubtless knows how I and my kinsmen have
ever hitherto been disposed to serve the House of Austria in all loyalty
to the furtherance of its well-being and prosperity; wherefore, in order to
be pleasing to Your Majesty's Grandsire, the late Emperor Maximilian,
and to gain for Your Majesty the Roman Crown, we have held ourselves
bounden to engage ourselves towards divers princes who placed their
Trust and Reliance upon myself and perchance on No Man besides. We
have, moreover, advanced to Your Majesty's Agents for the same end a
Great Sum of Money, of which we ourselves have had to raise a large
part from our Friends. It is well known that Your Imperial Majesty
could not have gained the Roman Crown save with mine aid, and I can
prove the same by the writings of Your Majesty's Agents given by their
own hands. In this matter I have not studied mine own Profit. For had
I left the House of Austria and had been minded to further France, I had
obtained much money and property, such as was then offered to me.
How grave a Disadvantage had in this case accrued to Your Majesty
and the House of Austria, Your Majesty's Royal Mind well knoweth.'
We do not hear how Charles took this letter, which was delivered to
him in Valladolid on 24th April, 1523. At any rate, it did the Fugger no
lasting harm. In the subsequent years the repayment of these loans
made more progress, though in 1530 there were still 112,200 fl. owing on
the 415,000 fl. charged on Tyrol. In the meantime the Fugger had
Tendered many new services to the House of Austria.
The year 1524 brought great vicissitudes in the state of the Emperor's
1 Spinelli in Brewer, Calendar III, App. 22. For 1622 of. Lanz, Correspondent
Karla V, t. I, 70 ff.
* For Lucas Bern of. T. Greiff in Jahresber. d. histor. Ver. f. Schwaben 1860, p.
73. For Jacob Fugger's letter see also von Greiff, Lc. 1868, p. 49.
THE FUGGER 61
finances. At the beginning of the year his lack of money and credit
reached such a pitch that even in the Netherlands he could raise no new
loans.
In the spring there was a distinct improvement for no very obvious
reason. The complaints of the princes whose payments were in arrear
were, it is true, particularly loud, but the armies in Italy and the South
of France - Bourbon was besieging Marseilles - had plenty of money as
late as August. Probably the Fugger had already provided money under
the Spanish agreements, which we shall discuss later. At the end of
August, however, means gave out altogether, and the army before Mar-
seilles was in great straits. 1
The position was identical with that of Maximilian before Milan in
1516. Now, as on the former occasion, negotiations were carried on with
Henry VIII of England about the payment of subsidies. Now, again,
the fact that the subsidies came too late caused the hasty withdrawal of
the Emperor's forces. Thereupon King Francis descended suddenly on
Italy and took Milan.
In February, 1525, the famous event occurred which appeared so
brilliantly to justify Machiavelli's dictum that it is easier to get money
with soldiers than soldiers with money. The Emperor had in Northern
Italy a splendid army, but it had received no pay for three months, and
was in such straits that it must either be disbanded or attack. The
Emperor's marshals chose the latter alternative, and their success
equalled their hopes. The battle of Pavia was fought, King Francis was
taken prisoner, and money poured in from all sides. The King of Eng-
land, the Republics of Genoa and Venice, the Pope and the Duke of
Milan paid rich subsidies to the Emperor who had so suddenly risen to
power. 2
Throughout this period the Fugger are rarely mentioned in connec-
tion with the Imperial finances, and in the succeeding years the
Emperor's policy, which was entirely centred on Italy, seems to have
drawn Mm to the Genoese rather than the South German merchants.
The point, however, which we have now reached is most important
for the relations of the Fugger with the Hapsburgs, for now began
their lasting connection with Spain and Naples.
/Spain. In the year 1524 the Fugger for the first time took a lease, for
the three years 1525-7, of the revenues of the Spanish Crown from the
three great ecclesiastical Orders of Knights - those of Sant Jago, Cala-
Baumgarten, GeaMMe KarU V, vol. II, p. 236 ff., 269. Brewer, Calendar IV,
421, 463, 610, 589, 607, 761, etc. (Betgenroth, Calendar II, 651, 662).
' ' See Brewer, Calendar IV, Nos. 1064-1237. Cf. also ViUa, Italia desde la
bataUa de Pavia hasta el saw de jRbmo.pp.29, 73. Lanz, Coirespondenz, I, 162.
G. de Leva, Star, doeum. di Carlo V, t. II, 238 ff. Baumgarten, Geschiekte KarU V,
n, P . 29iff.
82 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
trava and Alcantara - whose Grand Master was the King of Spain.
With a few interruptions the famous lease of the Maestrazgos was in the
Fugger's hands for more than a century. It formed the basis of their
enormous Spanish business.
The leased revenues consisted chiefly in dues in money and kind from
the lands of the orders. Later, the products of the quicksilver mines of
Almaden and the silver mines of Guadalcanal were added. The Fugger
had temporarily to take over the management of the mines as well as of
many of the farms. In order to collect and manage revenues and pro-
perties - both extraordinarily various and scattered profits and pro-
perties - the Fugger kept representatives in the different districts under
a chief agent at Almagro. Later on there was also at the Court a per-
manent agent, who was chief director of all the Fugger business in
Spain. A particularly experienced man was always put in this post,
which was both difficult and of cardinal importance for the fortunes
of his employers.
It has been asserted that the Emperor intentionally drew the Genoese
and the Fugger into Spanish affairs in order to chain them indissolubly
to the fortunes of his house. This is not impossible, and in any case cir-
cumstances always tended to make the Fugger increasingly dependent
on the state of their Spanish business.
The annual rent which the Fugger paid for the Maestrazgos was at
first 135,000 ducats, or about 50 million maravedis. At the end of the
first three years their total profit for the period was put at 2,200,000
maravedis, which, if correctly stated, was scarcely sufficient to pay in-
terest on the capital. Nevertheless, the Genoese made a bid of 10,000
ducats more for the annual lease. This time, however, the newly dis-
covered quicksilver mines were included.
The Genoese accordingly obtained the lease for five years, during
which the rent amounted to about 54 million maravedis. The Maes-
trazgos then returned to the Fugger, who held the lease until 1634, with
the intermission of the years 1557 to 1562, and perhaps also of the years
1615 to 1624. The rent for the period 1538-42 was 57 million maravedis;
for 1547-50, 61 million; for 1663-72, 93 million; for 1573-S2, 98 million;
for 1583-94, 101 million; from 1595 onwards, 110J million. The lessees
always had to prepay the rent often for several years ahead. Perhaps
this was what happened in 1524 when the Fugger first took over the
Maestrazgos, a fact which would explain the sudden, though tem-
porary, cessation of the Emperor's money troubles. The Maestrazgos
certainly served at that time to pay off the part of the old election debt
which had been transferred to Spain.
Naples. The same time saw the beginning of the Fugger's lasting con-
nection in Naples. It was, however, not the Emperor's finances, but
THE FUGGER 83
those of his brother Ferdinand that gave the first impulse to this exten-
sion of the Fugger's business relations.
In 1521 the Emperor had transferred to Ferdinand the rule over the
German dominions and with it a heavy load of debt dating back to the
time of the Emperor Maximilian and the election of Charles. The
revenues of this most important domain, Tyrol, had been in great part
mortgaged to the Fugger for years ahead. Ferdinand, nevertheless, had
to raise money for his brother for the war with the Turks, the suppres-
sion of the peasants' rising and many other pressing needs. He tried
on all hands to raise money. His brother supported him by handing
over important revenues in Naples which he could mortgage to the
Fugger. They lent him accordingly, in 1524, 25,000 fl. and 20,000
ducats, and the next year 59,562 ducats. 1 Later, they had engagements
in Naples for large amounts, sometimes as much as 400,000 ducats.
The delays in repayment in Naples, however, always caused them great
annoyance, so that in 1546 they cut their losses, and their rivals the
Genoese held the field.
Jakob lugger's Death. His Importance. About 1525 the Fugger were,
beyond dispute, the most influential financiers of their time. Their bus-
ness relations reached from Hungary and Poland to Spain, from Ant-
werp to Naples. In the words of the contemporary chronicler of Augs-
burg, Clemens Sender, 'The names of Jakob Fugger and his nephews
are known in all kingdoms and lands; yea, among the heathen also.
Emperors, Kings, Princes and Lords have sent to treat with him, the
Pope has greeted him as his well beloved son and embraced him, and the
Cardinals have risen up before him. All the merchants of the world have
called him an enlightened man, and all the heathen have wondered
because of him. He is the glory of all Germany.'
At this high-water mark of their development the Fugger were to learn
the constant peril of their position. In June, 1525, the machinations
of their enemies caused them to be accused of delivering basemetaltothe
Royal Mint; and at the order of King Ludwig their mines, their stores
and other property were seized, and their people put in prison. Though
Anton Fugger was able to disprove these charges and toannultheconfis-
cation, the Fugger lost over this affair more than 200,000 gulden.*
It is undeniable, moreover, that the Fugger in many countries were
hated by the people. Envy and misunderstanding contributed not a
little to their unpopularity. In popular language their name was used as
Oberleitner im Archiv. f. Kunde dOerr. GeschicTUsyieUm XXII, 19, 22 of.
Augsberger Stadtarchive Herwarth. Collect. Suppl. Band II, 414.
' Of. Dobel, Bergbau und Handel der Fugger in Ungarn (Ztschr. d. histor. Ver.
f. &sft*6e u. Neuburg, Bd. VI) S. 42. Wenzd, A luggerek jdentostge Magyarors-
zag torteneleben, p. 28 ff., 138 ff., 1476., 166.
84: THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
a generic term for a great monopolist. The Fucker, Fokker, Fucar, and
so forth, have ever since become in many different countries the name
for the financiers which the people held responsible for every evil.
Jakob Fugger, the man to whom the Fugger owe their greatness, died
on the 30th January, 1526. 1 He is depicted as a handsome man, clean-
shaven, wearing, as in his portraits, a cap of cloth of gold. He was of a
merry disposition, pleasant to every one. Though modest in his bearing,
he was on occasion a plain speaker, even to the most highly placed. He
himself had few wants, but was hospitable in the grand style of his age
and position. He gave many mummings, skating parties and dances to
the most select society of Augsburg, the Herrentrinkstube. He would
have rebuilt this clubhouse if he had been allowed to add the Fugger
coat of arms. He was a true son of his time in his love of building. He
had one of the existing Fugger houses in the Winemarket built and
decorated with the utmost splendour. He had the church of St. Ann
enriched with splendid statues and erected a wonderful family tomb.
When, however, this church came into the hands of the Lutherans, he
asked his nephews to have him buried elsewhere, for he was a good true
Christian and quite against Lutheranism. He also contributed largely
to the building of other churches and founded them on his own account.
The best known of his many charitable works is the Fuggerei alms-
houses. A significant trait is his proposal to the Augsburg City Council
that it should make an arrangement (no details of which are given)
whereby the sheaf of rye should never cost the poor man more than a
gulden. This proposal, as the Ehrenbuch says, went no further, owing
to the counsels of the goddess Avarice.
The most interesting for us, however, is the little that is known about
Jakob Fugger's personal relation to his business. He was a financier of
the first rank 'of high understanding.' Even to the last he was a very
keen man of business. When his nephew, Georg Thurso, urged him to
give up the risky Hungarian business, he rejected such timorous coun-
sels, saying that he 'would win so long as he was able.' Yet, when the
catastrophe came, his cautious generalship was strikingly evident. In
spite of the distant aims and enormous extent of a business scattered
over Europe, he suffered so little from nerves that, as he often told his
nephews, he never had 'any hindrance to sleep, but laid from him all care
and stress of business with his shirt.'
We see the effect of Jakob Fugger's work if we compare the balance
in the Fugger archives (2-1-22) for the year 1527 with the state of the
property in 1511.
* The best source is the MS. copy of the Chronicle of Clemens Sender in the
Augsburg City Archives. For his buildings and charities of. Aloys Geiger, Jakob
Fugger, p. 68.
THE FUGGER 85
On the 14th February, 1511, the Fugger property in land,
houses furniture and plate amounted to 70,884
Of this the male line received a third in advance 23,628
This left for the joint account of Jakob and the heirs of
Ulrica and Georg in the business 47,256
To this were to be added various assets (goods, book debts,
money, or its equivalents) 213,207
Total 245,463
This was distributed as follows:
Jakob Fugger 80,999
Heirs of Ulrich 87,583
Heirs of Georg 76,881
Total 245,463
Different members of the family received from this 48,672
Total 196,791
The remainder formed the capital with which the firm recommenced
At" the end of 1527 the firm owned in -
Land, houses, etc. 127,902
Goods, book debts, etc. 1,904,750
Total 2,032,652
Of this a deduction was made for a charitable foundation 11,450
Total 2,021,202
If we deduct the capital of 1511 196,791
we get the profit for 17 years 1,824,411
i.e. 927 per cent., or an average of 54J per cent, for each year.
Jakob Fugger died childless, and the Fugger business passed to the
nephews, who had been his partners since 1510. Jakob's second will,
executed a few weeks before his death (on the 22nd December), con-
tained the following provisions: 'As the eldest nephew, Hieronymus,
had not hitherto shown himself useful in the business and had not shared
in the management, and as Jakob opined that this state would not alter,
bis two surviving nephews, Raymund and Anton, who had helped in his
86 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
lifetime, were, on his death, to take over the management of the busi-
ness. As, moreover, Raymond was not strong enough to undertake
business journeys and much other work, Anton was to be empowered to
manage the business at his own will and pleasure as Jakob had done.
Thus the monarchical principle in force since the death of Jakob's
brothers was confirmed for the next generation. The family history
turned a new leaf, inscribed Anton Fugger.
II
HEYDAY UNDER ANTON FUOOEB (1525-1560)
Anton's Cautious Policy in the Early Years. When Anton took over
the direction of the business he was thirty-two - young enough, it might
be supposed, to wish to launch out on his own rather than to maintain
what his uncle had won. At first, however, he showed no great enter-
prise and was, on the whole, more intent on liquidating his present
undertakings than in entering on new ones. This fact is the more re-
markable in view of the extraordinary opportunities which immediately
came his way. The financial position of the Hapsburgs was desperate.
What this meant in politics is best illustrated by reference to two events:
the defeat of Hungary by the Turks at Mohacs and its consequent need
of protection by the Hapsburgs; and, secondly, the formation of the
'Holy Alliance' of Cognac, in which Pope Clement VII forged the hatred
and revenge of the French King and the riches of the English into a
weapon with which to break the power of the Emperor.
We can understand that Anton Fugger was none too ready to give
unlimited credit to Ludwig, the Kong of Hungary, who had robbed him
with violence a year before. Nevertheless, he helped hi in his extremity
with 50,000 fl., which, however, proved insufficient. After the battle
the Fugger' s agent said to the English agent, John Racket, that King
Ludwig would not have been defeated if he had had 150,000 ducats more
in cash. 1 The King lost his life in the battle, and in the consequent
struggle for the Hungarian crown, Ferdinand of Austria won a victory
over the national candidate Zapolya. This proved an expensive busi-
ness, and there was once more danger from the Turks. The Emperor,
moreover, asked Ms brother to raise troops for Italy, but sent no money
to pay them as he himself was in great straits.*
The Emperor's Italian army left unprovided laid waste Northern
Italy. His credit in Venice and Genoa was ruined, because the Nea-
politan Government did not pay the bills which the Emperor's com-
* Wenzel, Lc. p. 156. Brewer, Calendar IV, No. 2485.
* Lanz, Correspondent, I, 218, 238. Villa, Italia desde la bataOa de Pavia hanta
deacode BOOM, pp. 110, 116, 126. Gayangos, Calendar HI, 1, 509.
THE FUGGER 87
mandery bad drawn on them and because the Italians generally began
to hate the Emperor's rule. In short, the world power policy of the
House oi Hapsburg was once again irreconcilably at variance with the
sorry state of its finances.
The Fugger helped over and over again, but they demanded adequate
security, which was not forthcoming in the summer of 1526. In August
Ferdinand sent a trusted agent to Augsburg to raise money, which
neither the city nor the merchants disposed to lend. The latter, not only
the Fugger, but the Hochstetter, Paumgartner, Pimel, etc., declared
that their money was tied up in the Tyrolese mines, that they had
incurred severe losses in Hungary and had had their business greatly
hampered elsewhere, and that therefore they could raise no ready
money themselves. Attempts were made to raise loans in Strasburg,
Ulm and the Netherlands. At length, by pledging the Crown jewels,
Georg Frundsberg was able to raise some money and hire some mer-
cenaries whom he marched to Italy, though there was no more money
for their pay. The following year, 1527, the Emperor had to resort to
the shadiest methods in order to keep his mutinous army. Ferdinand's
situation in Hungary was no better. 1
In Italy this chapter was closed by the sack of Rome by the Em-
peror's troops, who paid themselves by this means. In order to ward of!
the peril from the East, the necessary money was always raised at the
last moment. The Fugger took a leading part in this again in 1527, and
their claims on King Ferdinand reached a large total. 8
The Fugger Balance Sheet in 1527. In order to get a better insight
into the extent and nature of the Fugger business at this time, we will
examine their balance sheet for 1527, stated in round numbers. The
assets amounted to 3 million gulden. This was distributed as follows:
Florins
Mines and mining shares 270,000
Other real estate 150,000
Goods 380,000
Cash 50,000
Book debts 1,650,000
Private accounts of the partners for sums taken from
them since 1511 430,000
Unconcluded business 70,000
3,000,000
i Villa, Lo. pp. 126, 166, 187, 190-91. Oberleitner, pp. 30, 121. Thorech,
MatenaKen. z. einer Gesch. d. dsterr. StaatsafaMai, p. 24.
1 Guicciardini (C. III). Ferdinand's loans with the Fugger in 1527, of. Ober-
leitner, p. 33, 45; Thorach, p. 25-26.
88 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The mines were apportioned 60,000 fl. to Tyrol and 210,000 fl. to
Hungary; the real property was 57,000 fl. plots of land in and around
Augsburg, 70,000 fl. oi farms, 15,000 fl. for the house in Antwerp and
its appurtenances, 6,000 fl. for the house in Borne.
The goods consisted chiefly of copper (of which there was a store worth
200,000 gulden in Antwerp alone), silver, tin, and a small amount of
cloth, damask, and other textiles.
The ready money is distributed between the chief office in Augsburg
and fourteen factories. In the whole of Spain the Spanish agents held
only 1,541 fl., in Augsburg 7,262 fl. (as against 10,376 fl. in Nuremberg
and 12,844 fl. in Breslau), but this has no significance.
Among the book debts the largest items are those in the 'Courtbook'
the amounts he had drawn on Naples. The total was 651,000 fl. We
note the following items:
161,840 fl. remainder of the 415,000 fl. charged on Tyrol from the sums
due on the Emperor's election.
156,000 fl. bond on Naples, 7th January, 1526 = 108,662 ducats to be
paid off before 1530.
86,090 fl. = 60,063 ducats repayable in instalments, also transferred to
Naples.
40,000 fl. on the salt pans at Hall at interest at 8 per cent., etc.
Xipg Ferdinand also owed 60,619 fl. over and above the 'Courtbook.'
The Spanish book debts amounted to 507,000 fl., but these were set off
against liabilities amounting to 337,000 fl., so that capital in Spain
amounted only to 170,000 fl. These Spanish transactions were mostly
connected with the lease of the Maestrazgos.
A considerable number of doubtful claims were written off as bad
debts, e.g.:
206,741 fl., claim on King Ferdinand for losses for robbery of the
Fugger business in Hungary by King Ludwig.
113,122 fl., divers claims on Alexi Thurzo.
20,938 fl., claim on the Pope, arising under Pope Leo, for insufficient
security (jewels).
The liabilities amount only to 870,000 fl., distributed as follows:
florins
Spain (already mentioned) 340,000
Bills 290,000
Hungary 54,000
Various 186,000
870,000
THE FUGGER 89
The bills ('Billbook') were numerous entries, mostly belonging to
friends or kinsmen. They were interest-bearing deposits, which the
Fugger took partly out of kindness, partly to increase their liquid
capital against acceptances or bills with one name. The interest varied
very much, large items being as little as 2-3 per cent., rising to 30 per
cent, or more for small entries. (The latter, apparently, are instances of
benevolence.)
The factories and other branches besides the head office were as
Mows:
(1) Bozen: A small depot for goods.
(2) Hall in Tyrol: Real estate, reserves of copper, silver, as well as
26,000 fl. of outstanding debts and 3,134 fl. in cash.
(3) Schwatz: Mine 74,000 fl. worth of ore, 45,000 fl. of outstanding
(4) Fuggerau; Mining shares and 31,706 fl. of outstanding debts.
(7) Smelting works : Hochkirch in Silesia.
(8) Breslau: House and mine on the Beichenstein.
(9) Neusohl in Hungary: Mine and houses, stock of silver.
(10) Nuremberg: Factory with 34,000 fl. of outstanding debts.
(11) Frankfort-on-Main: Small factory for the fairs, only some furniture
and some unfinished business.
(12) Cologne: Quite unimportant.
(13) Antwerp: Large factory with house, bams, garden, stabling much
furniture and important stocks of goods.
(14) Amsterdam: Unimportant.
(15) Denmark: Only business connected with forwarding Hungarian
copper from the Baltic to Antwerp.
(16) Venice: Chambers and magazines with much furniture and stocks
of copper and tin.
(17) Rome: House, some furniture, 26,000 fl. of outstanding debts.
(18) Spain: A considerable number of factories (already described).
Such was the state of the Fugger business after two years of Anton's
management. It was extensive, and the number of outstanding liabili-
ties was very large; but, on the other hand, the securities were good and
the whole business situation was sound. The liabilities counted for very
little.
Cautious Policy of the lugger till 1530. Anton Fugger still did not
allow himself to be lured away from his cautious principles. In the
autumn of 1527, however, he undertook to get by various methods
100,000 crowns for the Emperor from Spain to Germany, where the
90 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
money was used to procure new troops for Italy. 1 There was, however,
little risk involved. At the same time, the lease of the Maestrazgos was
to be renewed, and Anton Fugger let himself be outbidden by the
Genoese. The last named became at that time increasingly important in
supplying the Emperor with money, and the Antwerp money market
proved so good a source of supply that it was not necessary to apply to
the Fugger, who had not yet begun to use the Antwerp Bourse for their
large financial operations. A little earlier the condition of the Imperial
troops in Italy was much what it had been before Pavia. But in the
summer and early autumn of 1528 so much money flowed in from all
sides that the Emperor was able to bring over the great Andrea Doria,
whose claims Francis had left unsettled. We shall see later the details of
this affair, where finance played the chief part. All we know of the
Fugger at this time is the fact drawn from Dr. Christopher ScheuerPs
letterbooks, that they had paid the half of the 90,000 ducats which the
King of Portugal had advanced to the Emperor. The Welser had paid
the rest. King Ferdinand, too, received from the Fugger only small
amounts, less than from the Herwarts and Pimels. 2
In the beginning of the year 1529 the Emperor found himself once
again in such straits that he announced that he would not shrink from
selling Toledo to raise money. He failed to understand why no one now
would lend to him. In May Andrea Doria echoed the same plaint, and
by August things were no better. There was nothing to do but to make
peace, for King Francis was no better situated. The money question
played an important part in the case of both parties at the Peace of
Cambrai. Throughout this whole year there is no mention of the Fugger.
The Hapsburgs and the Fugger in 1530. The Emperor now enjoyed a
long period of peace with France, but this did not mean rest for him. He
immediately betook himself to other tasks, entailing considerable ex-
penditure. The chief motive of his leaving Spain in 1529 was to reduce
Italy to order, that is, by the subjugation of Florence to obtain grants of
money from the Medici Pop Clement VII. This last step was necessary
in order to obtain the election of his brother Ferdinand as King of Home
and to give him help against the Turks; lastly, too, the German heretics
had to be chastised. 8
All this meant troops and ready money; the first was forthcoming, but
not the second. The Emperor, however, at the Peace of Cambrai had
stipulated enormous ransoms for the French princes amounting to
1,200,000 gold crowns. This sum, however, was not paid till 1530 and
Brewer, Calendar IV, Nos. 3597, 3886, Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Oran-
vdle, I, 347.
'Thorach,p. 28.
'Lanz, Correspondent, I, 360 ff. Cokccion de documented ineditos, voL XIV.
and Heine, Briefs an Karl V. Gayangos, Cakndar, Tola, m and IV.
THE FUGGER 91
1531, and the Emperor reserved the greater part of it for some undis-
closed purpose, probably for the various eventualities entailed by his
policy. 1
The Cortes, at the end of 1528, had granted him extraordinary
taxation, and we shall see later how skifully he used this to raise ready
money in Genoa. But, as he wrote to his brother, the Spaniards de-
tested all expenditure for Italy, and accordingly he could take very little
money with him from Spain, and even at times could not have it sent
after him for fear of rousing Spanish discontent.
The Netherlands granted new 'aides,' on which the Statthalterin
Margaretha borrowed large sums, part of which were transferred
through the Genoese to Italy, part through the agency of the Fugger,
Welser and Herwarts to Germany, in order to recruit new troops for
Italy.* This money, however, did not last long. Though the Genoese
helped once again in the summer of 1530, in October the pay of the
troops was again 70,000 ducats in arrear, so that looting and mutiny set
in once more. 8
The Emperor not only kept his army together, but increased it, there-
by furthering the Pope's dearest wish -the overthrow of Florence.
Charles, however, always kept before the Pope the necessity of defend-
ing Hungary against the Turks, which he considered the common duty
of all Christendom, and so was not willing to bear the sole cost. His
envoys also hinted at the possible chastisement of the German heretics.
By these means it was hoped to induce the Pope to make large grants
from his well-filled treasury.
The Emperor before coming to Italy had obtained from Clement an
important grant, the Cruzada. This was the name for the Crusade bulls
which the Popes had granted in earlier times to the Kings of Castile to
cover the cost of the war with the Moors. Under it any one could buy
indulgences. When the struggle against the unbelievers ceased in Spain
only the traffic in indulgences remained. The Cruzada was meanwhile
seldom granted by the Popes. 4
Since 1522 the Emperor had often applied first to Pope Adrian and
then to Clement for the grant of a Cruzada General en Toda la Christiani-
dad for a great war against the Turks. It had been granted him in 1523,
but only for his own dominions and for one year, because the Pope was
1 Gayangos, IV, 1, 840,' IV, 2, 83. Le Glay, Negoc. dipl. entre fa France et
I'Autnche, precis histar. CCVH.
1 Lille, B. 2351 (1529): 'Deniere paiez es mains de Temperem- par mandemens:
41,000 fl. d'or aux Fockers, Velser et Herwarders.'
* Heine, Lc. pp. 12, 24. Col. de docum. ined. XIV, 85, 92 ff.
4 Habler, p. 113. Philippson in Sybel's Hiator. Ztscbr., voL 39, p. 281. Gaohard,
Corresp. de Charles V et d'Adrien VI, pref. CH, CX, 2, 61, 170, 181, 190, 199, 221.
Gayangos, in, 1. 240, 302, 325, 419, 456, 529.
92 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
afraid of competition for the jubilee year 1525. On Adrian's death a
ehort time after, Clement refused to grant the Bull, and, as open enmity
then broke out between the Emperor and the Pope, there could be no
further question of it. It is probable that the Emperor's desire for the
Cruzada was an important motive for his making peace with the Pope,
who on his side demanded as his price the restoration of the Medici in
Florence. The Cruzada became once again a burning question, and in
February, 1529, the Emperor's envoys managed to obtain the grant.
Difficulties ensued, however, and it was still some time before the Bull
could be published. The Emperor failed to obtain further grants till
after Florence had fallen.*
When Charles came back from Italy to Germany in the spring of 1530,
for the purpose of settling its religious confusion and obtaining his
brother's election as King of Home, he was at any rate sure of the
Cruzada and was about to get in the French ransoms. All the same, he
had to remain some time in Innsbrook as he had no money for continu-
ing his journey. He had to bring himself to touch a small part of the
French ransoms, and as he needed money at once he applied to the
South German merchants, who gave Tn'm the help he needed. 8
He had sent from Spain 200,000 crowns of the French ransoms and
150,000 ducats from the subsidy previously granted him by the Cortes.
The equivalent of these amounts was in part paid over by the Fugger
and Welser to the Emperor himself, and in part used by them for the
election of Ferdinand as King. The money was brought secretly to
Fuentarabbia on the Spanish frontier and there received by an agent of
the Fugger. The Fugger had been promised that the export of the
money from Spain should be made as easy as possible for them; it had
to be carried out secretly, however, because otherwise the Spaniards
would not have let it go.
This, however, was not all that the Fugger and Welser lent the
Emperor. We know that together they advanced large sums on the
Cruzada, but we know no details of the transaction. 8 We are, however,
exactly informed as to the sums lent by the Fugger to Ferdinand for his
election as King of Borne by a contract in the Fugger Archives, dated
25th October, 1530, between the King on the one part and Raymund,
Anton and Hieronymus Fugger on the other, 'on account of a sum of
1 Gayangos,m,2,893;(III,2, 975). Bulletin de la commission ffhistoire 3, ser.
VII,33. <7ompfe-rendtt4,Ber.XVI,p.261ff, (IV,I,117). Heine, p. 36, Gayangos,
IV, 1, p. 146.
1 Heine, Lc. p. 10. Gayangos, IV, 1, 478, 492, 742-43, 746 fi., 776, 783 ft., 840
(also IV, 1, 183), IV, 2, 83. Lanz, Corresponded, I (6.-12, 1531).
'Lucas Bern, Tagebuch, p. 75. Virck, Polit. Corresp. d. Stadt Strassburg I,
No. 762.
THE FUGGER 93
money, should Your Majesty need it, for His election as King of Rome.'
According to this agreement, the Fugger had to pay out on Ferdi-
nand's account 275,333 fl. 20 kr. (20,000 fl. gold to the Archbishop
of Mainz on the spot, 32,000 fl. to him in 1531, 16,000 fl. to the Elector of
Brandenburg, 100,000 fl. in two yearly instalments to the Count Pala-
tine, and the remainder, 98,000 fl., direct to the King's treasurer, Pfen-
nigmeister). The whole bore interest at 10 per cent. As, moreover, the
Fugger 'in the present heavie courses' had had themselves to borrow
part of the money from their friends and other merchants at extremely
high rates of interest, while their other business had had to suffer the
lack thereof (in return both for their great trouble and the risk that the
Fugger had incurred by raising the money in so short a time and because
they had had to send it to their loss by bills from the most various
places). On all these grounds and of his special favour the King assured
a special 'refreshment and token of honour of 40,000 fl.' Including this
high extra charge and the interest Ferdinand's whole liability upon his
election amounted to 356,845 fl. 37 kr. Of this amount 100,000 fl. were
to be repaid in the Netherlands in five yearly instalments of 20,000 fl.;
173,333 fl. 20 kr. were secured on a Neapolitan annuity of Ferdinand's,
amounting to 160,000 ducats a year, so that this part would be paid of!
(with 120,930 ducats) in seven or eight years' time; 73,512 fl. were to be
repaid from the Schwatz silver. For the remaining 10,000 fl. the Fugger
were to be allowed to take over the Mark of Burgau for the sum at
which the Bishop of Augsburg then held it. Further, they had to pay
an annuity of 7,000 fl. to the Archbishop of Mainz, and repay themselves
for this from the revenues of the Joachimsthal mines and the salt pans
at Hall.
Perhaps, in view of these extensive repayments, the extra charge of
40,000 fl. is not really excessive.
A balance sheet of 1530 shows that Xing Ferdinand owed the Fugger
not less than a million gulden, inter alia:
112,200 still due on Charles' election as Emperor.
249,000 fl. on the income in Naples.
258,400 fl. old Hungarian debt.
The hist named item, however, is perhaps the sum which had been
written off as irrecoverable by the Fugger in 1527. They now added
interest to the total without much hope of getting anything. It con-
tinued to figure in later balance sheets under ' doubtful debts outstand-
ing.' 1 In spite of these enormous loans, the Fugger made others in the
same year. Italian affairs were now settled. The Germans had, at any
rate, come to a provisional settlement with the Diet of Augsburg and
the election of Ferdinand as King of Borne.
Oberleitner, Lo. p. 45., also p. 48 ; Thorsch, p. 32.
94 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The retreat of Soliman from Vienna had made the Turkish danger less
pressing for the moment. The Emperor could therefore allow himself
leisure to settle his finances. He set up a commission to investigate the
titles of the old claims, some dating back to his grandfather, which
encumbered him, and he used the French ransoms, the grants from the
Pope and other sources to pay off his debts in grand style. King Ferdi-
nand made an attempt at any rate to consolidate his burden of debt. 1
On 14th November, 1530, the Emperor ennobled Raymund, Anton
and Hieronymus Fugger, gave them great immunities, and allowed them
to choose whether and when they wished to take the title of Count or
Freiherr. They did not, however, do so at this time. 2
The Balance Sheets of the Fugger in 1533 and 1536. At this period the
business capital of the Fugger did not increase so rapidly as under
Jakob. In 1527 it had amounted to 2 million gulden, of which, however,
400,000 fl. had been taken out by the partners, so that only 1,600,000 fl.
remained. New balance sheets were drawn up in 1533 and 1536, and the
latter shows 1,800,000 fl. as business capital. We can state the profit
only for the period 1534-6. It amounted to 120,000 fl. - i.e. only 2* per
cent, per annum.
The assets in 1536 amount to 3,811,000 gulden. The liabilities had
nearly doubled between 1527 and 1536. They now amounted to
1 ,770,000 gulden. In other words, the increase of the business since 1527
had only been made possible by outside capital. The bill engagements
had risen from 290,000 fl. to 703,000 fl. The 'Billbook' now contains a
large number of large and small entries, interest-bearing deposits
mostly in the names of friends and kinsmen, though other names occur,
showing that these were in part real loans. Most items are under
10,000 fl., the largest single item being 34,000 fl.; the average rate of
interest is 4-5 per cent.
In Spain, too, the Fugger owed large sums, which appear to have been
closely connected with the outstanding debts due to them.
We may mention:
Million
Maravedis
New lease of the Maestrazgos 25
Sebastian Neidhart 12&
Christopher Herwart 3|
Jakob Welser & Sons, Nuremberg 8J
In Antwerp we may note as large creditors Lazarus Tucher with
*I*Dz,Co r re3 1 xmdenzI, 421. Thorsch, p. 30. Brussels Archives (Papier* d'Etat
et de I' 'Audience No. 873).
Gei ge r,p.23.
THE FUGGER 95
21,000 fl. (against which are to set off 4,700 fl. owed by him) and
Erasmus Schetz with 5,000 fl.
Taking it all in all, while the state of the business was not so sound
as nine years before, there was yet no cause for anxiety.
Subsequent Period till, 1546. We have little information as to the
Fugger's financial dealings in the following decade.
In 1536, when the Emperor again entered on war with Prance,
the Fugger instantly took a leading part in raising the necessary
money. On the 14th April they granted the Emperor a loan of
100,000 ducats, payable in two instalments in May and June, to be
repaid at the end of the year with 14 per cent, interest from the first
gold or silver from India. For still greater security they were granted
a privilege, whereby they received an annuity of 26,526 ducats from
the revenues of the crown of Castile with the right to sell it, if the
debt had not been repaid before January, 1537. 1
The supply of gold and silver 'from India' was this year so plentiful
that the mints did not know how to deal with it. Nevertheless, the
Emperor's war-chest suffered from permanent emptiness, so that after
the unsuccessful expedition to the South of France, the Emperor's
counsellors recommended him to cease hostilities for want of money. 2
On 26th February, 1537, the Fugger again lent the Emperor 100,000
ducats, payable in two instalments in May and June, to be repaid
from the first Spanish revenues of the year 1538. For greater security
the Fugger were allowed to hold back the rent of the Maestrazgos.
The loan was to begin to bear interest at 14 per cent, two months
before the payment of the instalments, an increase of the interest
which was fairly usual. The reason adduced was the difficulty of rais-
ing money, which forced the lender to make arrangements some time
before paying over the loan, so that large sums were lying at home
without interest, or bearing no interest while on their way from other
countries.
Moreover, in 1537 the Turkish danger made new armaments neces-
sary and King Ferdinand had to borrow 83,000 florins from the
i the years 1538 and 1539 the Emperor continued to have large
amounts of money brought from Spain and the Netherlands to Ger-
many and Italy, though the war with France had long been over.
People puzzled over what this money was meant for. Was it for a
new expedition against the Barbary pirates, against the Turks, or
against the German Protestants? The kst named began to regard the
1 Fugger- Archiv. 44, 1.
Lanz, Carresp. H, 265, 656 ff. Schenerl's MS. letterbooks, June, 1534.
Thowch,p.33.
96 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Fugger, who were once again largely interested in these affairs, with
special distrust. 1
We have again a Fugger balance sheet for the year 1539, though
only a rough profit and loss account. Once again the extensions of the
Spanish business is noteworthy.
The book debts now amount to 1J millions, against which the lia-
bilities are 542,000 fl.
Among the debts due we note:
His Imperial Majesty
Million
Maravedis
Bill of 30,000 ducats 10-8
50,000 6-7
70,000 32-2
65,000 17-2
150,000 46-6
476,000 105-0
Maestrazgos % 75-2
This is more than 780,000 ducats.
Among the Spanish liabilities may be instanced:
Alonso de Santa Gadea 11
Hans Welser and Brothers 29
Sebastian Neidhart 8-2
% of 476,000 ducats 21-5
various % 9
These 79 million maravedis of over 200,000 ducats are apparently
shares in the Fugger's large transactions with the Emperor.
At Antwerp, also, the book debts had grown, and now amount to
202,000 fl. The King of Portugal owes 22,100 fl., the Statthalterin
Maria 7,000 fl.
The 'Courtbook' is considerably reduced and only amounts to
417,000 fl. This reduction is to some extent only apparent, as the Nea-
politan engagements are kept in a separate account, amounting to
i Scheuerl's letterbook, Match, 1538. Letter of Anton Welser in Auj, .
LienhardTucher in Nurnberg. 7 April, 1539 (Tncher-Arohiv). State papers,
Henry Vm, voL I, 608, 16 April, 1539. Lanz, Carres?. H, 307.
THE FUGGE& 9?
S62.000 fl. There is nevertheless a slight fall in the outstanding claims,
inconsiderable, however, in comparison with the increase of the Spanish
The bill liabilities have increased still further to 804,000 florins.
For the years 1540 and 1541 we know only of two rather unimportant
loans granted to King Ferdinand by the Fugger; these were followed
at the beginning of 1542 by business on a larger scale. 1 A new period
of large financial operations began, but unfortunately our information
is very imperfect.
The progress of the Turks in alliance with France forced the Haps-
burg brothers to war on two fronts and to extraordinary financial
efforts. With the help of the international money-market of Antwerp,
they raised loans on a larger scale than ever before. In this the
Fugger played the leading part. We shall see later how these loans
were raised in Antwerp. Unhappily the Netherlands finance accounts,
in other respects very instructive, do not give the names of the in-
dividual lenders, but only those of the financiers who acted as agents
for the court of Brussels.
Accordingly the Fugger's exact share is not clear. From another
source we learn only that the Queen Statthalterin Maria in 1542
borrowed from the Fugger and Welser 250,000 crowns within six weeks
for the Emperor, while he himself borrowed 600,000 crowns in Spam,
and that he raised a loan from the Fugger for Italy amounting to
100,000 ducats. In 1544 King Ferdinand received 109,105 ducats and
108,645 fl. from Queen Maria. We do not know who lent her the
money. 2
Period of the War of SdimalkaUen. The period we now enter is
fateful for the Fugger. At this time their business reached its highest
point, but the seed of corruption was now sown and was shortly after
to show itself.
The firm had already undergone an important change. Kaymund
Fugger had died in 1535, and Hieronymus in 1538. In this year Anton
had taken his nephews, Hans, Jakob, George, Christopher and Eay-
mund, into the business which henceforth bore the name of 'Anton
Fugger and Nephews.' Anton retained complete control of the concern.
He had to give no account of profits and losses to his nephews, and they
on their side had to render unquestioning obedience to him. 8 It is
doubtful whether he used this absolute power invariably for the good
of the family. The business, however, which proved the most unlucky
Thorsoh, p. 34. Gairdner, Gal XVIII, No. 292.
1 Lanz, Correspondent, January, 1542. Thorsoh, p. 39.
Cf. the GesellBchafts-Vertrag of 1538 in the Fogger-Archives, 2, 1, 14, fol.
98 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
was not undertaken till the last years of Anton's life when his hold
on the reins was somewhat loosened.
The force of money in determining the coarse of the world's his-
tory meets us at every turn at this period. Up to 1546 we have been
able to trace it very imperfectly from lack of detailed information,
but from the outbreak of the war of Schmalkalden we can follow more
closely again.
In April, 1546, when the Emperor's decision to make war on the
Protestants was not yet known, he sent orders to his son Philip in
Spain to raise the money for the war. 1
The first step was to be the raising of a loan of 150,000 to 200,000
ducats at the lowest possible interest from the Fugger or the Welser
on the pretext that it was for the maintenance of the Imperial Court.
Next, a message was to be sent to Genoa to the Imperial envoy
Figueroa ordering him to raise as best he could a further 150,000
ducats by means of a charge in the Papal grants and on the rent of
the Maestrazgos. Finally, 200,000 ducats were to be raised in Antwerp,
if possible on 'finance,' i.e. by short-term borrowing on the bourse,
which the Emperor thought more advantageous and easier than bill
transactions. This was perfectly true, for we know from other sources
that in Antwerp bills on South Germany were only taken with difficulty,
the uncertainty of the political situation having made the merchants
nervous. The attempts to raise money must be distributed in this way,
the Emperor said, because it would be impossible to raise so large a
sum in any one place, and because by so doing it was easier to conceal
the aim of the operation. The letter gives further instructions for the
execution of the different financial undertakings and emphasizes the
necessity of having all the money ready for use in Germany at the
beginning of June.
These arrangements, however, proved in part impossible to carry
out, first because of the difficulty of getting the money so quickly
from Spain, then because the Pope left the Emperor in the lurch. He
withdrew the grants he had originally promised and in the end took
sides against Charles,* who accordingly could get no money in Italy.
He was therefore thrown upon the Catholic business houses of South
Germany, and on the Antwerp Bourse. At first, however, these par-
tially failed him, so that his state was for some time critical, and it
was only in July that he could raise sufficient troops. His opponents,
the Protestant princes, fared scarcely better.
'This important document is published in v. DoIIinger, Dokum. 2. Qeachichle
tfarfa 7, p. 44ff.
' Lanz, Correspond* Karls V, vol. n, 490. Maurenbrecher, Karl V und die
deutechm Protestanten, p. 120 ff., 128, and Appendix, p. 76.
THE FUGGER
party, under the Burgomaster Jakob Herbrot, who kept the city on
the side of the Schmalkaldian League. A middle party under another
Protestant Burgomaster, Hans Welser of the Nuremberg Welser,
strove in vain for neutrality, while the great Catholic patricians
mostly left the city because they were discontented with the present
rule and did not wish to be involved in the confusion. We shall see
later how some of these kept a wavering attitude between the parties.
The Fugger, however, once again proved faithful to the House of
Austria. 1
The support which the Emperor received from his great Catholic
merchants roused the greatest bitterness among the Schmalkaldians.
They, too, were ceaselessly embarrassed for money. Though the King
of France advanced 100,000 crowns and the cities belonging to the
League contributed, the Elector of Saxony, Johann, had still, after the
outbreak of the war, to try to raise money in small sums, 1,000 to
6,000 florins at a time, in order to pay his troops. The League in July
demanded accordingly that the Augsburg merchants, who had raised a
large sum to help the Emperor in this ruinous purpose, and had en-
couraged and even incited him to it, should now do the same for the
opposite party and cease to lend to the Emperor. They even demanded
that the Augsburg Council should force, its burghers to lend all their
ready money, jewels, and silver plate, for the League. When, in August
and Spetember, there was talk of new dealings of the Fugger with the
Emperor, the letters of the Catholic business houses, the Fugger,
Faumgartner, Neidhart, Herwart, Meuting, and of the companies of
Bartholomew Welser and Hans Herwart, were seized and opened.
The Fugger had promised the Augsburg Council to deliver the
wheat harvested on their lands at Augsburg. They were, however,
forced by the Schmalkaldians to send it to their head-quarters at
Ulm.
The Augsburg Council held it their duty to protect the interests of
their citizens against such demands. This they successfully did, and
Anton Fugger showed his gratitude later by interceding for his
native city with the Emperor. In September the bitterness of the
Schmalkaldians against the Fugger reached its climax. They told the
Augsburg envoy, Matthew Langemantel, that they knew that the
King of England was just about to repay 60,000 fl. to the Fugger and
Welser, who must lend this money to the League. Should they decline,
1 Cf . Hooker in d. Ztschr. d. histor. Vereina /. Schwaben, 1 , 34 ff. Also Litteralien
in the Augsburg Archives, and the correspondence of Sebastian Neidhart, Hieron.
Seller and Anton Fugger. For the finances of the League of Schmalkalden, cf.
Kins, Das Fincmzwesen ErnesKn. Htaues Sachsen im. 16 Jahrh, p. 75 ff.
100 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
in spite of having lent the Emperor another 200,000 fl., they must be
treated as open enemies, 'as those who by their loans and bills had
furthered the Emperor in this war, which else he had been unable to
bring to pass.' The Landgrave of Hesse threatened to destroy the
Fuggers' farmhouses. When the Augsburg Council informed Anton
Fugger, who was in Schwatz, offering him to take care of his interests,
he replied that he had no money which he could lend the Schmal-
kaldians and that he had to use the money repaid him by the King
of England (which was much less than had been alleged) for the pay-
ment of his debts and the maintenance of his family. He thanked the
Council for their offer and promised again to deserve it. Accordingly
the Council now decided to take definitely the side of its burghers
against the Protestant princes, and showed its solidarity by regretting
that it must bear the displeasure of the princes in common with
them.
This did not fail to happen. The Elector of Saxony said, 'How
comes it that the men of Augsburg wish to bite the nut with the
Fugger, when before they kept Baymund Fugger in prison, merely for
offending against a poor man?'
It appears that in the end the democratic party were able to obtain
forced loans from the Catholic merchants, but we are ignorant of the
details. In any case, the Schmalkaldians' complaints as to their financial
difficulties never ceased, while the Emperor now had plenty of money.
He accordingly played a waiting game, while the League tried to force
him to a battle. The invasion of Duke Maurice of Saxony into the
domain of the Elector forced the Elector Johann Friedrich to separate
himself from the League, and so the Emperor, at the end of 1546,
became master of South Germany.
The South German Protestants now had to entreat the Emperor for
mercy and buy it with enormous contributions. Anton Fugger under-
took to act as mediator for his native city with the Emperor, who had
then pitched his head-quarters at Ulm. By the gift of a golden drinking-
vessel valued at 3,000 kronen, Anton Fugger gained the favour of the
Duke of Alba, who helped in his turn to get a reduction of the Augs-
burg contribution. 1 In the whole negotiation, Anton Fugger appears
as the sole intermediary and as a great man who often had to deal
severely with the Augsburg Council, when they tried to cheat over
trifles.
The Welser, who at the same time also had a representative in the
Imperial camp (we shall see later what forced them to this), had to
be content with hard treatment, because their behaviour at the begin-
ning of the war had been very uncertain. Anton Fugger was held up
1 Ztschr. d. histor. Feretne /. Schwaben, I, 57, 294.
THE FUGGER 101
before them as a model. He, on his part, was not at all edified by the
violence and low cunning which were manifest both in the Emperor's
policy and in the conduct of these finances, as is shown by many
passages in his letters. He decided very unwillingly to help again with
ready money, which was needed for the upkeep of the army and
the coming campaign in Saxony, for the forced contributions were
not paid immediately. On the 27th January he lent the Emperor
122,477 fl. and on the 15th February a further 20,000 ducats. On
the 26th February, however, the Welser's representative, Christopher
Peutinger, reported to Augsburg that 'the Fugger were tired of
Imperial loans; they had already let themselves in so deep that
they had to wait a long time before they could get their money
again.'
In further surmising that they would have to come in again, he
was right. On 15th May, when Charles had conquered the Elector of
Saxony, he concluded negotiations with the Fugger for a loan of
60,000 fl. in the camp at Wittenberg. Anton Fugger, meanwhile, had
betaken himself from Ulm back to Schwatz, where he spent the greater
part of the year in low spirits and poor health.
We learn from his letters and his will that the Fugger had had serious
thoughts of giving up their business. Had they done so, it would have
been fortunate for them.
Wish of the Fugger to give up their Business - Its state in 1546. In
his will, dated the 22nd March, 1550, and also in the last codicil of
1560 which deals with the business, Anton Fugger says that he had
hoped that his nephews would follow in his footsteps and those of their
forbears and become merchants, but that he had seen that none of
them were disposed so to do. He had accordingly agreed with them to
bring the business 'to an end and retire.' This decision must have been
made in the year 1547 or the beginning of the next year, for the
general balance sheet drawn up for its execution was closed at the end
of the year 1546, and the first great distribution undertaken under this
was made on 31st July, 1548. We must next consider the balance
sheet for 31st December, 1546. It is perhaps the most important which
has remained for us. 1
Florins
The landed estate valued at 729,331
The other assets, after deducting liabilities 4,382,552
Total 5,111,883
1 In the Fugger-Archives, 2, 1, 22a, there are several copies of the balance
sheet of 1546. The differences are explained by the different methods of cal-
culation.
102 THE AGE OP THE FUGGEK
Florins
The capital in 1539 had been 2,197,740
The amount made in the seven years was therefore an
annual average of 19 per cent. 2,914,143
This profit was not, however, distributed in full. The money
used in improvements on the knded property was
written off at 210,443
The male line received on the remaining value of the landed
estate preferential payment of $ 169,346
Anton Fugger received for his management $ of the final
profit also as a preferential payment
Finally the receipts from certain old outstanding debts were
distributed separately 133,288
Total amount deducted 822,704
So that only 2,091,439 fl. was actually distributed.
It may be stated here parenthetically that the total, after allowing
for these deductions, was held as follows:
Florins
Anton Fugger, founder of the Fugger-Babenhausen branch 2,436,790
Raymund Fugger's heirs 1,526,251
Jakob and Hieronymus Fugger's heirs 758,202
Further, we must consider an 'Audit of the General Balance Sheet
of 1546,' which was meant to show the profit and loss of the different
branches of the business. According to this the gross profit for the
period 1539-46 was:
Florins
Spanish business 1,515,565
Hungarian business 1,258,744
Neapolitan revenue 259,378
Silver trade 144,914
The expenses were: In Augsburg, 81,193 fl.; in Spain, 54,050; in
Antwerp, 37,717; in Hungary, 85,350, and the interest paid on this,
as shown in the Bill-book, as 208,641 fl.
This statement shows the importance of the Spanish and Hungarian
business for the whole situation of the firm. If we deduct the expen-
diture from the gross profit, these two branches show a net profit of
2,634,000 fl., i.e. nearly 90 per cent, of the total profit.
The assets in round figures are as follows:
THE FUGGEB 103
Flaring
Landed property and mines 800,000
Stock-in-trade 1,250,000
Heady money 250,000
Book debts 3,900,000
Private accounts of the partners 400,000
Various 500,000
Total 7.100,000
Among the landed property Babenhausen, valued at 156,000 fl., is the
largest; Weissenhorn, with Maverstetten and Buch, are down for
61,000 fl. Eirchberg, 59,000 fl.; Biberbach, 44,000 fl.; Donauworth,
56,000 fl.; the Augsburg property, 63,000 fl.; and there are various
others. Copper and fustian are the only considerable stock. The stock
of fustian was valued at 125,000 fl., and more than a million gulden's
worth of copper, half of which was in Antwerp.
ment as to the Spanish debtors is far from clear. It is specially striking
that the two largest claims against the Emperor (447,429 ducats lease
of the latest revenues of the Maestrazgos and 219,159 fl. for bonds
(libranzas) on the Maestrazgos which the Fugger had paid) are not
included in the sum total of the Spanish debts. These, nevertheless,
amount to two million in round numbers, nearly all claims against
the Emperor. 1
The next large item among the book debts are the Antwerp debtors.
Among these we note:
Flemish
The city of Antwerp note 21,746
Caspar Ducci for (Flemish) bonds of the Eeceivers General 44,517
King of England 83,900
Queen Maria Statthalterin of the Netherlands 30,739
The King of Portugal 6,252
These large items amounted to 187,000 Flemish, or 790,000 fl.,
the total of the Spanish and Antwerp outstanding claims amounted to
2| million as compared with 1J million in the year 1539.
The 'Courtbook' which contains King Ferdinand's debt is closed
at 443,108 fl., only 26,000 fl. more than in the year 1539. The old
Neapolitan entries have disappeared. Ferdinand, however, had shortly
before sold to the Fugger a perpetual annuity of 11,000 ducats yearly
'Rymer, Feeder*, Ed. v. 1704r-27,XV, 101. (Fugger-Arohiv. 2, 1, 22a, Avigs-
burger Stadtarohiv (Litteralien) and Acts of the Privy Council, I, 488 ft.)
104 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
on his revenues from Calabria in return for a cash payment of 110,000
ducats. The Fugger drew this rent direct from the.collectors in twenty-
eight cities and estates. This business is entered in the books at
150,000 fl.
The liabilities amount to 2 million gulden, not specially much if we
consider how the earning assets had grown. The Spanish creditors in
fact are less than in 1539, 342,407 ducats or 490,000 fl. (as against
542,000 fl. in 1539). Of this sum 200,000 is only a book entry on the
Emperor's side, so that the actual liabilities of the Spanish business
are only 290,000 fl., shares in the Consortium held by the Nuremberg
Welser and some others. The Fugger's bill liabilities, too, have fallen
since 1539, they amount now to 694,000 fl. The Antwerp business,
on the other hand, is indebted to the extent of 110,234 Flemish, or
about 460,000 fl. in thirty-five different entries, mostly to other South
German houses. In order to carry on their large Antwerp business, and
to get money relatively cheap, the Fugger had begun to borrow on
the Antwerp Bourse from quarter to quarter, or for two quarters, of
the kind euphemistically called 'Deposits.' For these they paid 1|-2J
per cent, per quarter, 4f-5 per cent, per half-year, about 9 per cent,
a year, while they on their side made about 12-13 per cent, on their
money in Antwerp,
The 'Fugger bills' became at this time an article of current trade,
an innovation which was only to show its dangerous consequences
at a later time. At first the Fugger bonds were considered as safe as
gold.
The balance sheet of 1546 shows the following new factories: Krem-
nitz in Hungary, Teschen, Cracow, Danzig, Erfurt, London, and
Florence, mostly small branches for the dispatch and sale of copper
and fustian. The financial situation of the firm, as shown by this
balance sheet of 1546, must still be regarded as sound in spite of the
large increase of investments in Antwerp and Spain. In view of the
ever increasing difficulty of getting money from Spain these last con-
stituted a grave risk.
The firm of 'Anton Fugger and Nephews' held at this time a business
capital of about 5 million gulden, the largest it had ever held, and
certainly the largest ever held till then by one firm.
On the 31st July, 1548, as we have seen, a considerable part of the
business capital was distributed to the partners. It was hoped to share
out the rest before the end of the year 1550, and so the Fugger business
would have been brought to an end. But, as Anton Fugger says in his
will, 'On account of long wars, matters have gone right heavily, so
that not only were we unable to bring our own business to an end
and collect the monies owing to us, but we have been constrained, in
THE FUGGER 105
order to serve the Emperor and the King, to make fresh loans, our-
selves borrowing money and getting into debt.'
New Business -Seeds of Decay. During all the ensuing period, the
last years of Anton Fugger, it is quite clear that an effort was made to
liquidate the existing undertakings and begin no new ones. The fact
that new business was forced on him he seems at first to have taken
hard. As soon, however, as he started on the inclined plane, he seems
to have lacked energy to apply the brake with force. His Antwerp
agent, Matthew Oertel, was chiefly responsible for the gigantic increase
of the new financial undertakings. Anton Fugger himself, however,
cannot be exonerated for this and its evil consequences. Like his
Uncle Jakob, he seems not to have been free from the wish 'to "make"
money as long as he might.' This wish, fully justified in 1525, would
only have been justifiable a quarter of a century later had Anton
Fugger had a successor of his own pattern. The Fugger might then have
remained the first financiers of Europe. As it was, the third generation
lacked the business genius of the first and second, and had not only
to yield up the first place to the Genoese, but to see their credit, once
so unimpeachable, severely shaken.
The Fugger in the years when they were liquidating their affairs
undertook large new business which was not forced on them. This is
plain from the history of their relations with the English Crown, of
which we saw the beginning in the years 1545 and 1546. In 1547 the
Fugger were still owed on this amount 83,900 Flemish, 639,000 L.
on the money lent and 20,000 L. for copper. The first of the sums was
paid back, the second still further deferred. 1
In September, 1549, William Damsell, the financial agent of the Eng-
lish Crown in Antwerp, had tried for months in vain to raise a loan in
Antwerp, and the Fugger finally agreed to advance for a year 54,000 L.
= 328,800 Car. fl. At the end of the year the loan was prolonged at
12 per cent., and though a payment of 127,000 Caroms gulden was
made in February, 1551, the Fugger had had to make several other
large loans in this time.
In the beginning of the year 1552 Thomas Gresham, the new financial
agent of the English Crown, went to Antwerp to borrow money to pay
the Fugger. Their claims amounted to 123,047 L., of which 77,577 L.
was paid off in two instalments (63,577 L. and 14,000 L.) The rest,
45,470 L., was then prolonged, but appears to have been paid back
shortly afterwards, as the Fugger balance sheet for 1553 shows no claim
on the English Crown. They needed all their money for the Emperor.
In November and December, 1553, Christopher Dawntsey, a new
English agent, repeatedly approached the Fugger's Antwerp agent for a
1 Acts of the Privy CounoU, II, 80, 159.
106 THE AG1 OF THE FUGGEB
loan, which was refused on the ground that the Fugger had already lent
all they had to lend to the Emperor. 1 Their relations, however, with
the English Crown were not yet at an end. On 1st August, 1548, the
Fugger lent the Emperor 150,000 ducats in return for a charge on the
Neapolitan revenues, at 12 per cent, interest. We hear of no further
loans till 1551. This is connected with the increasing difficulty with
which they collected their outstanding debts. The three loans granted
at Ulm and Wittenberg during the war of Schmalkalden were still in
arrears in 1551. On the occasion of the grant of a new loan, apparently
they were formed into a consolidated debt, which, inclusive of interest
at 12 per cent., up to the end of February, 1552, amounted to 273,161
ducats. This was secured partly on Antwerp and partly on Spain.
In April, 1551, the Emperor at Augsburg demanded fresh loans from
the South German merchants. Probably for the sake of collecting their
old claims the better, the Fugger and the Welser agreed. They ad-
vanced no ready money, however, but issued bonds which were dis-
counted by Wolff Haller von Hallerstein in Antwerp at 11 per cent.
The Fugger's share amounted to 100,000 Caroms gulden or 70,000 fl.
Bh.
In October, 1551, the Emperor again borrowed in Augsburg 76,000
ducats at 12 per cent, in return for a charge on the gold and silver
expected from 'India.' The firm of Anton Fugger and Nephews was
interested in this to the extent of 33,000 ducats, and Anton Fugger
on his own account with 20,000 ducats. The large undertakings which
Anton Fugger repeatedly undertook for his private interest prove
clearly that the passion for money-making was not yet dead in him.
But at the moment we have now reached, it was not very great, if
we may judge from the comparatively small sums which he contributed
to the loans. Towards the end of the year 1551, when the Emperor
again needed money to pay his army before Magdeburg, the Augsburg
merchants declined to grant him any more loans, and it was only with
the greatest difficulty that he extracted 25,000 thalers from the city
of Nuremberg.*
Charles V and Anton Fugger in 1552. We have now reached the
important turning-point in the reign of Charles V, and we meet once
again a striking instance of the power of the Fugger's money. It is the
last time that they had the Emperor's fate in their hands. Both the
1 The English sources are not to be trnsted as to figures. Cf. Turnbull, Calendar
of State Papers, foreign series, Edward VI, No. 193, 198-99, 207; Queen Mary,
No. 69, 104. Acts of the Privy Council, m, 26, 33, 219, 605, IV, 27, 29, 40, 99.
Nares, Memoirs of BurgMey, p. 405 (caution). Butgou, Life and Times of Sir
Thomas Gresham, I, 80 et seq.
'Manunle der Heron Eltern in the Kreis Archive in Nuremburg, 1551,
Wednesday after Christmas.
THE FUGGER 107
beginning and the end of his reign leave the mark of their name. Next
to the election of Charles as Emperor the negotiations of Anton Fugger
with Charles in the sad days of Villaoh are the clearest proof of the
close ties of common interest which bound the Fugger to the Baps-
burgs. 1
In January, 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony had bought the
financial help of the French King by ha-nding over Metz, Toul, and
Verdun. In February he came out openly against the Emperor.
Charles was in Innsbruck without money and troops, and his first
attempts to raise money were fruitless. The merchants knew only too
well, as Charles himself stated in his letters, that the Emperor could
no longer give them security or safe revenues. Perhaps they feared
'those who have weapons in their hands,' or were affecting to do so,
as the Emperor suspected.
'It seems,' he says, 'as if the merchants were agreed together to
serve me no longer. I find neither in Augsburg nor elsewhere any
man who will lend to me, howsoever large a profit be offered to him.'
Such was the result of this violent financial policy of the time of the
war of Schmalkalden.
Nevertheless in March Queen Maria of the Netherlands succeeded
in getting from the Fugger's Antwerp agent a small amount of money.
But there was not much to be had in the Netherlands either. During
the early part of the year the Emperor was unable to oppose MB
enemies, who were actually masters of Germany, and his letters show
that his helplessness was entirely due to lack of money.
For a considerable time he had been negotiating with Anton Fugger
for a large loan and had even had it promised to him- The financier
delayed the fulfilment of his promise, alleging that the warlike disturb-
ances in South Germany, the failure of the Frankfort Easter Fair, and
the prevailing tightness of money, made it impossible for him to raise
the necessary large sum himself. In vain the Emperor urged that 'in
haste lies the use of this affair.' At the end of March Anton Fugger was
bidden by an autograph letter from the Emperor to come to Innsbruck
in all haste. 'This is what I now most greatly desire,' Charles wrote.
Anton Fugger in reply to this urgent appeal did not delay in setting
out. The negotiations in Innsbruck as to financial help on a large
scale were feverishly carried on between the Emperor's secretary
Erasso and Anton Fugger; but this time also they proved very difficult.
The small forces which the Emperor had already recruited, having
received no pay, were threatening to disband. The garrisons of the
1 Here, besides the Fugger Archives, I have only used Lanz, Correspondent
Kark V, voL IH, pp. 100 ssq.
108 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
fortresses which prevented the Elector Maurice from destroying the
Emperor altogether were insufficient in numbers and badly provisioned.
Accordingly Maurice reduced Emberg on the 19th May; and the Em-
peror and his Court, including Anton Fugger, had to flee in haste to
Villach. On the 23rd May, the Elector invested Innsbruck. Charles
tried in vain to play off the former Elector Johann Friedrich against
Maurice. Money was lacking for this as well as for munitions. Attempts
were made to raise money in Augsburg, Ulm, Nuremberg, Strasburg,
and even in Venice, but the South German merchants and their
Venetian agents were on the side of the Emperor's enemies. Anton
Fugger was the last hope of the Emperor, now old, ill, and hard pressed.
It is not too much to say that Anton Fugger saved him, for without
money and troops he would have had to agree to all the conditions
proposed by the German princes in the negotiations which opened at
Passau on 26th May. Charles expressly declared that he was raising
the money in all haste in order to negotiate with more authority at
Passau and in order to destroy the impression that he was powerless.
There is a striking and sudden change of tone in June when his arrange-
ments with Anton Fugger were concluded. He now took his time
examining the conditions of the intermediaries, and Maurice did not
get nearly all that he aimed at. 1
Anton Fugger lent the Emperor the enormous sum of 400,000 ducats.
Of this sum 100,000 ducats were to be paid over in Germany to the
Queen of Bohemia (60,000), the Cardinal of Trent, etc., and 50,000
ducats in Venice. The Emperor kept at his own disposition the remain-
ing 250,000 ducats. He owed the Genoese about this amount, and had
originally intended to pay it by drafts from Spain. He himself, how-
ever, was now in need of money, and Anton Fugger was to try to
induce the Genoese to extend the period of the loan for one or two
years longer, and if necessary himself to act as guarantor.
In telling his eldest nephew, Hans Jakob, of this contract, Anton
Fugger added that it was to be hoped that the business with the
Genoese would come to nothing. Never yet had a business been con-
cluded with so little hope of profit. The nephews were to consider
whether they would agree that it should be for the firm. Their agree-
ment was necessary because it had been settled to break up the firm.
In fact the nephews did not come in, so Anton Fugger took over the
business on his own account.
The Fugger's guarantee did not, however, prove to be necessary for
the Genoese. Meanwhile the Emperor was in need of money north of
the Alps in order to ward off an invasion by the King of France. He
was therefore easily able to use the 250,000 ducats which had not yet
* I*nz, Lo. HI, 237 <wd v. Dofflnger, Dokumente z, Qewhkhte Kark V, p. 20,
THE FUGGER 109
come into his disposition. The Queen-Regent of the Netherlands made
an agreement on the 8th August with Matthew Oertel, the Fugger's
agent in Antwerp, that the 250,000 ducats should be paid over then.
This payment, which constituted a remarkable achievement for that
time, was carried out on the 10th November. A short time before
unusually large cargoes of silver had arrived from America in Antwerp
and Genoa, and the Fuggers had also managed to extract a considerable
sum from Spain. Generally speaking, they remained determined to
liquidate their business, and were not at all displeased that at this
juncture the Genoese helped the Emperor with still larger advances.
The loan of Villach nevertheless constituted a large increase of their
investments and especially of the unpopular Spanish investments, for
the repayment was to take place exclusively in Spain. This, however,
was a source of extra profit, which was welcome in view of the very
moderate interest (12 per cent.), but it considerably increased the
difficulties of liquidation.
Anton Fugg&r and the Antwerp Bourse. The Emperor's war with
France, which needed financing on a scale hitherto unknown, threw
all the Fugger's good resolutions about retirement to the winds. From
the year 1553 we hear again of several large dealings with the Emperor.
Matthew Oertel lent the Court at Brussels sums of 195,000 and 18,000
ducats, and these, together with the Villach loan, were secured in
Spain, so that the Spanish revenues were mortgaged up to 1557. In
April, moreover, Anton Fugger bought for 300,000 Carolus gulden a
10 per cent, annuity on the revenues of Brabant and Flanders. In the
same year their further engagements are mentioned - one of 85,000
ducats, one of 164,926 Rh. fl. and one of 173 million Maravedis -all of
which seem to have been concluded in the Netherlands. Anton Fugger
repeatedly complained in his letters to Matthew Oertel that 'no Reso-
lution as to our debts will come from the Court. Verily in these heavy
times they have much else to do, but it is yet hazardous and these
affairs are tedious.' Anton Fugger had already had to borrow in Augs-
burg and Nuremberg in order to fulfil these large new engagements.
Towards the end of the year, when one of these payments matured, he
gave orders that it was to be prolonged even at 10 per cent., 'for if
I lay the money on finance (short term loans) it bears 12 per cent.'
In those times this was a dangerous principle. It shows Anton's
continual zeal for money-making that in this year 1553 he bought
from Duke Cosimo of Florence, for 100,000 ducats, an annual sum of
10,000 ducats from the Duke's Neapolitan revenues. The negotiations
were carried on between the Fugger's Venetian agent and a ducal
official according to the instructions of Anton Fugger. He seems to
have been unwilling, but to have been tempted by the large profit,
110 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEE
which overcame his dislike of the Neapolitan connection and his mis-
trust of his correspondent. He seems to have feared, not without
reason, that he was going to be cheated; and we get the impression
that the Venetian agent, who was himself interested in the affair,
promoted it on his own account and that Anton Fugger let himself be
over-persuaded. From the last months of 1553 and the beginning of the
next year letters of Anton Fugger to Matthew Oertel have been pre-
served which show that he already regarded the financial situation
with great anxiety.
He complained, above all, of the difficulty of obtaining money from
Spain. All would come right in the end, but the state revenues were
already pledged far ahead. If Erasso could still find people to deal
with him, it could only be on the most unfavourable conditions. 'It
is in truth a great harm to his Imperial Majesty that His Majesty will
make war and borrow money on finance. These great lords might well
lay aside their delight in wars.' Soon after he complains 'that in this
Court no man considers aught and the debts which have been agreed
with a binding promise are not paid. I hold that the Bishop of Arras
should be spoken to touching this matter. A gift of 1,000 fl. should be
made to Erasso, for thereby matters will be quickened. But to lend
yet three or perchance four times in addition, at 80 kreuzer to the
ducats, that is not to be done.' Then, again, he says: 'As to the nego-
tiations touching Spain, I hold that great profit is to be made, the
cause wherefore I withhold myself ye will have understood. I have no
desire for such dealings, therefore enough of this. As to Erasso, he has
so acted that I think not to deal with him and it is certain that he does
111 service to his master, who, however, will have it so.' But these new
good resolutions were once more to be thrown to the winds.
There are also plenty of expressions of disapproval as to the German
policy of the Emperor. 'It is not good that His Imperial Majesty
cometh not (to the Empire) and that the Diet falls into the water and
Germany becometh a bears' den where each man doeth what he
listeth.'
Matthew Oertel had raised much money at interest in Antwerp in
order to cover the large advances of the year 1553. Anton Fugger, too,
owed large sums in South Germany on his private account. In February
1554, 30,000 fl. fell due for payment, and we note with astonishment
that there is difficulty in raising the money for this. Anton Fugger
repeatedly ordered Oertel to raise the money to send to Augsburg at
any price 'for my credit stands thereon,' and, again, 'I think as much
on men's mockery as on the money itself.' This was a threatening symp-
tom of the coming ruin. There was no escape from debt except by
bringing money from Spain, which needed special arrangements. Be-
THE FUGGER 111
fore dealing with this we must briefly consider the whole situation of the
firm as shown in the balance sheet drawn up at the end of 1553. We
must bear in mind, however, that a part of the pending business was
undertaken on Anton Fugger's private account and does not appear
in the balance sheet of the firm.
According to the balance sheet of 1546 a capital of about 4J million
gulden was brought forward. Since this time, however, more than
2 millions had been paid out to the members of the firm, so that the
balance sheet of 1553 shows only 2,327,276 fl. as capital brought for-
ward. As the assets of the firm now amount to 3,248,794 fl., the profit
for seven years amounts to 921,518 fl., or about 5| per cent, per annum.
We note the following items under the heading 'Debtors':
Florins
The members of the firm 1,500,000
Spanish business 1,200,000
The Treasury of the Netherlands 400,000
Other outstanding claims:
In Antwerp 100,000
In Lisbon 300,000
King Ferdinand 270,000
The liabilities amounted only to 1,100,000 fl., distributed as follows:
Florins
Antwerp 360,000
Augsburg 200,000
Spain 320,000
These are all relatively small sums, and the whole situation of the
business appears accordingly in a very favourable light. Apart, how-
ever, from Anton Fugger's new private undertakings, the old arrears
were probably paid partly in kind, so that the actual state was not
nearly so good. However, the family might well have been thankful if
their property had remained at the 1553 level.
Anton Fugger's ceaseless efforts to get money out of Spain were
chiefly in respect of his private undertakings, which had grown to a
gigantic size since Villach. When Charles' son Philip was expected
from Spain in the Netherlands, Anton Fugger ordered that a great
quantity of silver should be sent secretly with him on his ships, and this
appears actually to have been done. At any rate, at the end of 1553,
200,000 ducats of silver arrived for the Fugger in Antwerp; and in the
following year it was hoped to extract a further sum of 300,000 ducats,
though it was extraordinarily difficult to obtain permission from Spain.
112 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
It was lucky for every one who had outstanding claims in Spain that
Philip was marrying Queen Mary of England. She needed money, and
Gresham, who was sent to Antwerp to raise it, found this extremely
difficult owing to the prevailing tightness. He was therefore overjoyed
when some Genoese and also the Fugger's agent, Oertel, promised him a
loan of 300,000 ducats, if provided with the Emperor's permit. He him-
self would collect the money in Spain. The business materialized be-
cause the Emperor wished to oblige Queen Mary. Anton Fugger was
interested to the extent of 12,750 ducats.
In 1554 the Fugger do not seem to have done much business. They
lent the Duke of Florence 75,000 scudi at 12 per cent., selling him at the
same time a jewel for 23,600 scudi, which the Duke continued to owe
them. They also helped King Ferdinand with 56,000 thalers. These
were undertakings when the money had to remain out several years, but
they are not of the unmanageable type of the Spanish and Netherlands
loans.
We shall see later, in 1555 and 1556, how fearfully the war increased
the debts of the Spanish Crown and the Netherlands. In 1555 Erasso
came from England, where King Philip then was, in order to borrow
money in Antwerp, which after much trouble he succeeded in doing.
The Fugger lent the largest sum -200,000 crowns. 1 We do not know
how Erasso managed to induce Oertel to undertake this business, and
whether the consent of Anton Fugger was obtained. Anyhow, this trans-
action opened for the Fugger an area of new large loans in which there
seems to have been no holding back. The Antwerp Bourse proved fatal
to them, as it had to many other merchants.
Antwerp had steadily grown in importance for the Fugger in the half -
century in which they had done business there. In the first few decades
they had mainly used it for selling spices and Hungarian and Tyrolese
copper. This, however, did not mean that financial transactions were
excluded, but for a long time these were confined to bills and certain
dealings with the Antwerp agent of the King of Portugal, mostly on a
basis of copper and pepper. It was only in the 'forties of the century
that the Fugger began regularly to borrow money on the Antwerp
Bourse on 'deposit,' and this method had become more and more indis-
pensable to them as a means of raising money. At the same time, there
is an increase of active credit business in Antwerp; since 1545 there had
been many such transactions with the Court of the Netherlands, the
city of Antwerp, and the English Crown. All the large loans which were
critical for the situation of the firm were at that time always managed in
South Germany by the head of the firm himself. This arrangement was
Ct R. Bnmn, Calendar VI, 48.
THE FUGGER 113
now first altered, the year 1552 being the first of this new phase.
Matthew Oertel is now repeatedly mentioned as the independent agent
for large loans to the Brussels Court; and when, after the Villach
loan, the 250,000 ducats promised by Anton Fugger to the Emperor
were to be used in the Netherlands and not in Italy, negotiations as to
the settlement of this business were carried on with Oertel. The large
undertakings of the year 1553 were all concluded in Antwerp, and this
remained the usual way for some considerable time.
Charles V made over the government of the Netherlands to his son,
in October, 1555, leaving him such severe financial difficulties that, as
Philip said later, it was impossible to fulfil his engagements, which he
would gladly have done, 'even with his own blood.' The war with
France, moreover, continued to require an ever increasing amount of
money. In the following two years, as we shall see, the debts of the
Netherlands rose to a crazy height. The Antwerp Bourse was seized with
a credit mania of the worst type, which did not leave Matthew Oertel
exempt. How far Anton Fugger himself was affected we have not suffi-
cient material to show. It is, however, scarcely conceivable that the
agent should have concluded loans on such a scale without the consent of
We have the German and French text of a deed, dated 1st February,
1556, under which Matthew Oertel, agent for Anton Fugger and
Nephews, undertook to pay King Philip in ready money a sum not
exceeding 400,000 ducats, payable in Spain, so that the King might pay
his Spanish soldiers and so prevent their excesses. Oertel had promised
this on condition that the King should give a bond on secure revenues
for everything he owed the Fugger, inclusive of interest at 12 per cent.
The highest officials of the Netherlands were guarantors in their own
persons for the repayment, and for greater security the first 'aide' which
the States General of the Netherlands should grant the King was
pledged to the Fugger.
In the beginning of April, 1556, the Fugger accordingly took over
more than 1J millions' worth in Caroms gulden of Netherlands bonds of
the Receivers General, for which the King did not give security in the
first place, but which bore the signatures of the Eeceivers General of
the different provinces, so that the creditors had recourse against the
Receivers, while the King's promise, which was not secured on any
definite revenues, was quite valueless.
These bonds had for some time been considered an unsafe invest-
ment, and the Fugger now staked on them 600,000 ducats, i.e. 50
per cent, more than Anton Fugger, after months of negotiation in
Villach, had lent the Emperor in his extremity on security of much
greater value.
114 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
This, however, was not yet all. The 400,000 ducats which Oertel had
advanced for payment in Spain proved to be not nearly sufficient.
They grew to 540,000 ducats. Besides this the Fugger had already lent
the King 112,000 ducats in the autumn of 1656; and in the year 1556
sums of 30,000 and 40,000 ducats were advanced in addition, the last
sum being secured on the rich silver mines of Guadalcanal, which were
then just discovered. In the beginning of 1557, Oertel, in the Nether-
lands, advanced 430,000 ducats for repayment 'from the first gold and
silver that shall come from India.'
So the thing went on. Instead of the Fugger having their old ad-
vances repaid, they had to lend the House of Austria, in a space of one
and a half years, more money than they had ever lent before in so short a
time. Erasso fairly pumped them dry; and they got no thanks for this
In April, 1557, Oertel wrote to Anton Fugger: 'I wot not how to bring
it about to make Erasso our friend, for I have never yet met his like, for
he speaks a man fair to his face and behind his back saith ever the con-
trary. He agreeth with no one in Summa save with his own agents whom
he hath created that they may do his pleasure in all things. Now that is
not your Honour's way, and from us he hath had little in gifts and the
like. This brings upon us more disfavour and weary running to and fro
than ought else; for he and his men say to all men that from no one do
they have so much trouble and so little profit as from us.' 1
As Erasso was already a rich man from the bribes he had taken for
fourteen years, he paid no attention to small 'gifts.' Oertel, neverthe-
less, tried to win him over; but Erasso accepted the services with
thanks and did exactly as he pleased. He could easily, Oertel writes,
make all quits again, 'though his nature seldom or never allows it to
him.'
The Fugger and the financial Crisis of 1557. In the spring of 1557 the
over expansion of credit in Antwerp had reached the danger-point. The
quarterly payments were deferred by the King's Order; and even the
city of Antwerp, which had strained its credit to the utmost, availed
itself of this means of escape, which was the equivalent of a moratorium.
We must deal next with the Fugger's share in the events which, in the
course of the years 1557-62, shook the finance and trade of Europe to its
foundations.
In the summer of 1557 "King Philip ordered that no further payments
were to be made to his creditors either in Spain or the Netherlands, and
he confiscated two Spanish cargoes of silver for Flanders, valued air
570,000 ducats, for the Fugger. The anger and anxiety of old Anton
1 Pa-piers d'Etat du Cardinal de GranveOa V, 683.
THE FUGGEE US
Fugger knew no bounds, and Oertel tried in vain to quiet him. When all
that was known was the delay in the King's payments he wrote to
Anton Fugger: 'As in South Germany people make so much ado and
hold our Krng for bankrupt and have served France again with 300,000
crowns, I would gladly hear what the evil speakers say now that the
Frenchman has met with a reverse of fortune before St. Quentin.'
Oertel had entreated the King to keep his engagements to the Fugger,
saying that he would undertake for his masters that they should again
serve the King if he needed money. Erasso had, however, replied that
Anton Fugger had already prayed the King to trouble him no further for
loans, because he would have peace.
To this Oertel made the rejoinder: 'That the Fugger had never de-
serted His Majesty in his need, but in the space of 1 years had served
him with 1$ million of gold.'
All this, however, availed nothing. The "King told the agent twice
that he did it with as great unwillingness as he had ever done anything
yet, but his great necessity forced him thereto, lest people took hurt
from the armies. Nevertheless, Oertel says in the same letter that the
whole thing was chiefly due to Erasso, who had never been willing that
the Fugger should be paid what was due to them in Spain. He added, it
was now too late to win Erasso with money, 'the matter had gone too
far.'
Anton Fugger bitterly reproached the agent for his arbitrary be-
haviour which had led to such great losses. He had written to him many
times that he was not to trust the Court. 'The devil thank you for this
agency.' In order 'to sleep in peace' he withdrew from Oertel his power
to lend money on his account or that of the firm, and soon after dis-
missed him from his service. Oertel, however, asserted that he had
always acted with his master's consent; but he is not to be exonerated of
an undue optimism, and his view must have determined that of Anton
Fugger, who was at a distance and getting old. If he had undertaken the
new large business only under the impression that he was securing the
Fugger's old claims, he might be less severely judged. It is, however,
probable that he was interested largely on his own account, for he left
the service of the Fugger a rich man, while his masters had suffered
enormous losses.
Anton Fugger wanted to come himself to Antwerp. Instead of doing
so, however, he sent his son Hans, who together with the agent, Se-
bastian Kurz, had the difficult task of saving what it was possible to
save, especially getting in the outstanding claims in order to pay off the
debts. 'The creditors are many,' Anton Fugger wrote in 1568. 'A man
might shudder to think of them.' At first, however, there was no possi-
bility of paying them off.
116 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
In the following years the Fugger had themselves to seek more credits.
They borrowed large sums in Antwerp, usually at 8-10 per cent, per
annum, and their credit was so good that in the general mistrust and the
absence of 'good borrowers' every one 'looked out for the Fugger Bonds.'
This state of things only changed with the death of Anton Fugger.
We have a general statement of the year 1558 of the Fugger claims
against King Philip in Spain only, that is exclusively the Netherlands
claims. These amounted to a total of 1,660,809 ducats. To this was to
be added the silver which had been taken from them, the value of which
on the 25th May, 1559, the King promised to pay. Inclusive of 14 per
cent, interest the amount was to be 762,262 crowns (100 crowns = about
94 Spanish ducats of 11 reals). There was, however, no prospect of
repayment. The credit of the Fugger remained good and they borrowed
considerable sums during the year 1560, both in Antwerp and Nurem-
berg, at the moderate rate for those days of 7-8 per cent.
As the promised repayment of the confiscated money did not take
place, the Fugger's Spanish claim, inclusive of interest at 12-14 per
cent., rose at the end of 1560 to almost 3 million ducats or 4 million
gulden.
As the Fugger's own capital only amounted to 2 million, the house
was already in a highly dangerous state. In addition it had outstanding
claims in the Netherlands amounting to about 1 million gulden. The
debt of the Netherlands Receivers General, amounting to 900,000
gulden, must, however, be regarded as practically worthless, as the
States General refused to be responsible for it.
The Court of Spain made the Fugger a proposal for a composition of
their Spanish claim. Under this arrangement the interest was to be
reduced to 5 per cent., and great losses of capital would have resulted in
addition. The Fugger accordingly did not agree, in the hope that their
help would again be needed and their original contracts would then have
to be confirmed. This hope, however, was not fulfilled, for - as the
Venetian envoy Tiepolo wrote in January, 1560, from Spain -the
Genoese were more resourceful and enterprising than the Fugger. They
had for the most part had their claims repaid during the war on the
occasion of new loans, while the Fugger meanwhile had had to stand
idly by while their claims grew with the added interest. Accordingly,
Anton's eldest nephew, Hans Jakob Fugger, was sent to Spain to make
an agreement, which, however, did not come about till two years later. 1
We note with astonishment that at this critical moment the Fugger
allowed themselves to begin new loan business. In February, 1559,
Hans Fugger in Antwerp lent Queen Elizabeth, through the agency of
Gresham, about 10,000 fl. for one year, this being the only financial
Brown, Calendar VII, 142.
THE FUGGER 117
dealings which the Fugger undertook with the heretic Queen. 1 In the
same year they advanced to the Duke of Alba 11,853 fl., and to the
Emperor Ferdinand in 1560 a loan of 40,000 fl. without interest, secured
on the salt offices of Vienna and Aussee; and to Ferdinand's son Maxi-
milian 30,000 fl. at 10 per cent.
The Fugger were so closely linked with the Hapsburgs that even at
such a time they could not escape from their demands for money. It is,
however, to be supposed that Anton Fugger himself no longer troubled
as to the details of the business, while his younger kinsmen viewed the
Anton Fugger' a End. His Importance. On llth July, 1560, Anton
Fugger, then old and in ill-health, added a codicil to his will made ten
years earlier making special dispositions as to the future management
of the Fugger business. He had spoken seriously to his eldest nephew
Hans Jakob, asking him to take over the direction of the business. He
had, however, declined on the ground that the business of the city and
his own affairs gave him so much to do that he could not act as head of
the business. Thereupon Anton had turned to Hans Jakob's brother,
George, and had received a blunt refusal. 'He could not do the work,' he
said, 'and would far rather live in peace.' Anton fared no better with his
third nephew, Christopher, though he represented to him very press-
ingly that in bis youth he had been most employed in trade in Tyrol,
Antwerp, and Spain. Anton Fugger, in his codicil, speaks with some
bitterness of these vain attempts. His fourth nephew Baymund had
bad health, and therefore was no use in business, and Anton's own sons
were too young to direct the business on their own account. He there-
fore laid it down that Hans Jakob must take up the burden together
with his (Anton's) eldest son Marx. They must bear in mind the liquida-
tion of the business as soon as possible; they must leave the name of the
firm unaltered for six years more; and after the business was brought to
a close they must carefully keep the most important business papers for
the good of our Posterity in case of need.' The directions for the pre-
servation of these papers and for all the circumstances connected with
the business are extraordinarily detailed. In another codicil he forbade
his successors to sell any of the landed estates. All this clearly shows
that at the time of his death, on 14th September, 1560, he was full of
anxiety for the future of his house.
His nephew, Hans Jakob, in the Secret Book of Honour of the family
which he composed in 1546, is not able to tell us much about Anton. He
1 The text of Elizabeth's promissory note in the Fugger archives (48/6). The
interest ia added to the capital and ia designated 'dicto Joanni (Fucker) in re-
muneratione et premium (sic!) laborum suorum ex nostra mera libeialitate et
favore donavimus.'
118 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
was 'as the eldest of the Fugger house right active and diligent in the
guidance thereof, soft of speech, great in counsel and apt knowledge-
ableness.'
We learn from another source that his motto was 'Silence is golden.'
These traits are insufficient for us to judge the character of the man who
worked in the Fugger business for almost half a century and was its sole
director for thirty years. It is a proof of his extraordinary intelligence
that he was able throughout this long period to keep his house, at least
to the outward eye, in the pre-eminent position to which Jakob Fugger
had raised it, so that the Florentine Guicciardini, in a description of the
Netherlands which appeared soon after Anton's death, describes him,
with reference to the respect paid him in Antwerp, as 'a real prince
among the other merchants.' Though he may have lacked the commer-
cial genius of Jakob Fugger, yet his 'knowledgeablenesa' proved a still
more precious quality in a far more difficult time and in the work of keep-
ing what had been already won. This quality only deserted him in his
last days, or, rather, the weariness which had seized on a nature in any
case not sufficiently energetic to deal with the difficulties of the situation,
deprived him of the power of withstanding the speculative tendencies of
his Antwerp agent, Matthew Oertel.
The Fugger had to pay dearly for the too intimate connection of
their fate with the over-speculation of the Antwerp Bourse.
The Atteged Burning of the Notes of Hand of Charles V. We may here
mention the anecdote of Anton Fugger' s burning one of Charles V's
notes of hand in his presence. This story is not mentioned either in the
Fugger business papers or in the 'Description of the Fugger 5 drawn up
from the family papers at the end of the sixteenth century. The ver-
sions of the story differ in time and place, and are also recounted of
many other rich merchants. For instance, the same story is told by
Gasoni of Centurione; and in the Netherlands, not only in connection
with Anton Fugger, but also with the Antwerp merchant Jan Daem,
and of the Florentine Gaspar Ducci. The story is first told of Anton
Fugger in a magazine called the Journal des Savons of the year 1685, and
the other versions also seem to have arisen in the seventeenth century,
a poverty-stricken time which was inclined to embellish the now legend-
ary riches of the financial princes of the sixteenth century with such
romantic tales.
In the Fugger archives I found a short statement drawn up by Dr.
Holtzapfel, an administrator of the Fugger property in Spain. This was
evidently meant as part of a memorandum setting forth the services of
the Fngger to the House of Austria in an attempt to get some payments
on enormous sums due from the Spanish Crown and thus to check the
further decline in the fortunes of the house. This statement says: 'As
THE FUGGER 119
Emperor Charles (after the taking of Ingolstadt in 1546) came again
and once more desired money of Master Anton, the same answered him
that lie had means in the Netherlands wherewith he would and could
serve His Majesty, which was most fortunate; but in Germany he had
no other means save certain bills of His Majesty, which he had torn up
or burnt in order that His Majesty might see that he was jealous to
serve him with all his substance.'
In this form the anecdote seems more probable, especially if we
suppose that it was a case of a clever coup de theatre. We know that
after the taking of Ingolstadt in September or October, 1546, Anton
Fugger advanced to the Emperor the necessary means for the overthrow
of the South German Protestants, bringing money from the Netherlands
for this purpose. The Emperor, on the other hand, may have demanded
immediate payment in South Germany. It may be that Anton Fugger
took this drastic step as a means of making more impressive his asser-
tion that payment in South Germany was impossible. The story would
be more credible, however, if it had been placed a year later, when he
was already 'weary.'
Ill
THE PERIOD OF DECLINE FROM THE DEATH OF ANTON FUGGEB TO
THE END OF THE FUGGEB BUSINESS
The Third Generation. Ems Jakob Fugger. The Fugger business had
now arrived at the critical third generation, which was to prove fatal in
this case also. Hans Jakob Fugger, the eldest nephew who under Anton's
will had to take over the direction of the business in conjunction with
Marx, Anton's eldest son, was by no means equal to his task. A patron
of art and learning and a passionate collector, he was much occupied
with such pursuits and his personal relations with princes, especially the
Dukes of Bavaria. These preoccupations and a more cavalier concep-
tion of the nature of business prevented him from devoting himself to
details, in the manner which, in view of the situation of the house, was
then doubly necessary. Anton's eldest son, Marx, later showed himself
at least a cautious man of business; but even when he was set free
from the unlucky influence of Hans Jakob, he did not understand
how to bring to bear sufficient caution nor yet sufficient brilliance and
energy in the introduction of new business. Moreover, even before
Anton Fugger's death the Genoese had known how to render them-
selves indispensable to the Spanish Court, while the Fugger, tied by their
past and their lack of enterprise, were kept to the Spanish business and
the old markets, and were prevented from making use of the fresh
centres of trade and finance which were then developing. The decline of
the house and its riches was therefore invevitable.
120 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The name of the firm 'Anton Fugger and Nephews' remained at first
unaltered, much longer indeed than the period laid down in Anton's
will; but their credit fell with striking rapidity. While in 1560 in Ant-
werp 'the Fugger Bond' was considered the safest of investments and
they had to pay less for their loans than any other firm, or even the city
of Antwerp itself, in the following year it was reported that the Fugger
were making continual efforts to remit money from Antwerp to South
Germany in order to pay their debts there, for they had previously
borrowed money wherever they could and paid off long-standing credi-
tors who were already pressing them. In the beginning of September,
1561, some South German merchants, who had lent the bankrupt
Courts of Spain, France and Portugal more than they themselves pos-
sessed, had to cease payment; and, as Sir Thomas Gresham reports from
Antwerp, anxiety was felt there on the Fugger's account. 1 Their credit
only improved again when in 1562 they came to an arrangement with the
Spanish Court as to the gradual paying off of the gigantic sums due to
them. Even then, in order to fulfil their obligations, they had to borrow
large amounts on unfavourable conditions. The most important and
characteristic transaction of this kind may be mentioned here.
In 1563 the Fugger borrowed from the Spanish usurer Juan de Curiel
della Torre 300,000 crowns at 10 per cent, per annum - not a very high
rate for those days of monetary shortage. Juan de Curiel gave the
Fugger 100,000 crowns of Spanish annuities, which were then worth only
half their normal value. The Fugger had accordingly to write off so
much, which made the real rate of interest much higher. It is not clear
for how long they continued to owe this money; if for two years, they
lost on the 250,000 crowns in each year 55,000 crowns, i.e. 22 per cent.
This was the more scandalous as the creditor had then, through Erasso's
agency, forced the Fugger out of the lease of the Maestrazgos. 2
The composition which the Fugger made with the Spanish financial
administration as to their outstanding claims on 26th August, 1562,
was considerably less favourable than the arrangements with the other
creditors, who had come to an agreement earlier. Their interest was
cut down and they were given a charge on Spanish annuities and landed
estates, on which they inevitably lost heavily. Moreover, they were
compelled to take over the lease of the Maestrazgos at an extremely high
price. The worst point, however, was the long time over which lie
repayment was distributed.
State of the Business in the year 1563. We have a balance sheet of
the Fugger of 1563.
1 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Rdat. polit. II, 618, III, 113.
FuggeivArohiv, 2, 1, 1 foL 260; 2, 5, 13, 21 January, 1576.
THE FUGGER
The assets are as follows:
I. (1) Spanish claims against the King
(2) Juros at 5 per cent, taken from Juan de Curiel
as part of the loan mentioned above
2,975,797
100,000
3,075,797
To be written off:
$ of the Juros (which, however, entailed
a greater loss)
J of the landed estate
Leaving
Interest to the end of 1563
Ducats
226,492
144,869
371,361
2,704,436
= fl. 3,605,913
Total fl. 4,445,135
II. Other Assets in Spain: Florins
(1) Cash 27,774
(2) Old arrears still regarded as good from the
lease of the Maestrazgos, 15/8/50 58,877
(3) Other good debts 97,933
Total 184,584
III. Antwerp Assets:
(1) (a) Seven cities in Flanders
(6) 'Must pay daily together all Interest, but
because we do not know the rate, we only
reckon by Rentas, 6J per cent. Easter
Market, 1560, to Pamas Market, 1563,'
therefore interest
(2) (a) Duke of Alba, 1559
(b) Duke of Alba, 1561
(3) King of Portugal of 1561
(4) City of Antwerp
(5) States of Brabant
(6) Hans Jakob Fugger
(7) King Philip
(8) Duke of Alba, once again
(9) Other Debtors
(10) Cash
Total fl.
fl.
29,583
= fl. 782,694
122 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
IV. Augsburg Assets: Fiorina
(1) Emperor Ferdinand, 1560, lent without interest 40,000
(2) King Maximilian 30,000
(3) Archduke Ferdinand 4,680
(4) Members of the Fugger family 24,700
(5) Various debtors 23,101
(6) Gash 41,435
fl. 163,816
Florins
V. Nuremberg and Vienna Assets 28,616
VI. Assets in the 'Chief Book':
(1) Landed property in Antwerp 15,000
Goods and stock 9,000
Goods in transit 32,548
fl. 56,548
Total Assets fl. 5,661,393
This total does not contain: (i) the amounts already written oft as
losses on the Spanish and other assets amounting to 613,000 fl.; (ii) the
Netherlands bonds of the Receivers General to the amount of 95,314 ft.
= 430,000 fl. It should be noted that a great part of the Exchequer
bonds had already been distributed to different members of the family.
The Liabilities fall into the following chief categories:
I. Shares in the business: Florins
(1) Anton Fugger's heirs 1,246,350
(2) Hans Jakob Fugger 562,065
(3) George Fugger 28,092
(4) Christopher Fugger 38,738
(5) Ulrich Fugger 66,981
(6) Raymund Fugger 77,998
II. Spanish Creditors:
(1) Christopher Fugger ducats 306,602
(2) Duke of Alba 24,000
(3) Juan de Curiel della Torre 335,250
(4) Various 29,698
THE FUGGER 123
in. Creditors in Antwerp:
Deposits repayable in the course of Florins
1563 1,967,805
IV. Creditors in Augsburg:
Schwatz trade fl. 59,158
Deposits 38,000
- = - 97,158
V. Creditors in the 'Chief Book':
Unsettled bills and deposits 301,000
VI. Other creditors 84,267
Total Liabilities fl. 5,399,188
The chief heads of the balance sheet are therefore:
Mil], fl. Mill fl.
ASSETS. | LIABILITIES.
King Philip in Spain 444 Business Capital 2-00
Other Spanish Assets -18 Deposits of members of the
Other claims on Princes and family -40
Cities -50 Deposits of strangers 2-70
Claims on members of the Other liabilities -30
Fugger family -37
Other assets -17
If we compare this balance sheet with those of 1546 and 1553 we first
miss the 'Landed Property,' then notice the absence of dealings in com-
modities. We notice, thirdly, the relative sroallness of the business
capital and the general unhealthy state of affairs, financially speaking.
Fourthly, we see that the Spanish business is now all important, only
Antwerp being at all considerable besides, all other business connections
having ceased or become quite unimportant.
The Netherlands Bonds of the Beceivers General held by the Fugger
had amounted in 1556 to the huge sum of 200,000 fl., or 600,000
ducats. In 1557 the Receivers General ceased payment, which was not
resumed, because the States General would not recognize the debt.
The bonds were therefore worthless. The Fugger allotted to Hans Jakob
Fugger 32,103 , to George and Raymund Fugger 45,877 , and so on,
while the firm only kept 95,314 , and these, as we have seen, were not
entered among the assets.
124 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Marx Fugger and Brothers. At this time there were dissensions among
the partners. Hans Jakob Fugger had borrowed enormous sums both
on his own account and that of the firm and had begun several risky
new undertakings. As a result, in 1563 he found himself in great diffi-
culties, so that on account of his debts he had to leave Augsburg for his
castle of Taufkkchen and afterwards to hand over to his creditors, not
only this castle, but all his other property. Among his property was his
interest in the Fugger business, amounting to 400,000 fl. The total of his
debts on his own account amounted to more than a million. After much
quarrelling an arrangement was made with the other partners under
which Hans Jakob left the firm, which in its turn took over his debts in
Augsburg. He had not enough left to bring up his large family properly,
so he entered the service of Duke Albert of Bavaria and removed to
Munich. He died in 1575, and his descendants never came back into the
business.
Hans Jakob's disappearance from the firm did not, however, mean
the healing of the breach between him and the other members of the
family: it even grew wider. His brothers George and Raymund died in
1569, while Christopher, the last brother, in 1572 took up Hans Jakob's
part and also left the firm after a quarrel. He owned a considerable
amount of capital which had in great part to be paid over to him. (At
his death, in 1579, he was regarded as the richest of the Fugger.) The
firm was, therefore, considerably weakened by hisleaving it. Anton's sons,
who remained as chief partners, were forced to bring in again a consider-
able part of the private fortune which their father had with-drawn from
the sole management, as his brothers refused to give him their support.
After the death and departure of the four nephews of Anton Fugger
his three sons, Marx, Hans, and Jakob, remained as the only partners,
and the firm assumed the style of Marx Fugger and Brothers. In 1591
Marx Fugger, on account of his advanced age, handed over the manage-
ment to his brother Hans, who handed it down to his son Marx in 1597.
The years 1597 and 1598 saw the deaths of Anton Fugger's three sons.
After this it is unimportant who directed the business, which continued
to decline. Even during the period when it was under Anton's sons it is
not necessary to follow the course of events in detail. We will only
mention a few outstanding facts.
In 1572 King Philip II asked the Fugger for a loan of a million ducats.
After a long resistance their Spanish factor said that his masters would
advance 300,000 ducats. The Genoese Tommaso Fiesco came to Augs-
burg from Antwerp as a representative of the King to try and induce the
Fugger to make further advances. He pressed them so hard that they
consented first to 50,000 fL, then to 80,000 fl., and finally to
THE FUGGER 125
100,000 fl., on condition that they were allowed to give in payment
the 19,244 of Netherlands bonds of the Beceivers General which be-
longed to them personally. The Genoese, however, wanted more. The
Fugger pointed to the great services they had rendered and the bad
treatment they had often received, but Fiesco rejoined that the King
was in great straits and must have more money. When he had finally
succeeded in bargaining for the 100,000 fl. he turned the screw and
demanded that the Fugger should give up their condition as to the bonds
of the Receivers General which had been already more or less agreed,
and that they should advance the 300,000 ducats at 12 per cent, uncon-
ditionally. This demand called forth from the Fugger the following
characteristic expression of opinion as to their Antwerp agent Jakob
Mair: 'He is a sly cat, but doing business with Germans has a different
sense from business with the English or Genoese, for at this time our
affairs and all other businesses make as much ado to serve with 100,000
crowns as with a million a few years since.'
This is a clear indication of the situation of the house and of that of all
the South German merchants. In Spain the Genoese had now taken the
place of the Fugger, who, however, made many fresh advances to the
King, though the Genoese produced incomparably larger sums. The
Spanish bankers, too, began once more to be important, though they
imposed harder conditions than the Fugger had done. The King ob-
tained money, however, while the Fugger abstained as far as possible
from fresh undertakings. Only by the threat that their old claims would
remain unpaid could any money be squeezed out of them. On the other
hand, the Fugger needed to bribe perpetually in order to obtain some of
the promised repayments. Finally, in the general mistrust, the Spanish
reserves of ready money, which could not be sent in natura, ceased to be
able to be remitted by means of bills to Antwerp, Italy, and South Ger-
many, so that the Fugger could not pay off their large burden of debt in
those places.
The Fugger and the Spanish Financial Crisis of 1575. We will deal
later with the bad state of affairs prevalent at this time in Spain which
resulted in the fearful catastrophe of the state bankruptcy of 1575.
In the greatest extremity, when the Spaniards and Genoese themselves
were bankrupt, the Fugger came once more to honour, for their credit
at this time was not really shaken. They served the King over and
over again with sums of from 100,000 to 150,000 crowns, which was
then an extraordinary feat. Their reward for this was that they were
better treated than the other creditors at the state bankruptcy -only,
however, from the hope of further advances. Moreover, this roused the
other creditors against the Fugger, so that they tried to do them at
Court all the harm they could.
126 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The King urgently required to send money to the Netherlands, to
satisfy the starving and mutinous troops. It was too dangerous to send
large sums in cash, and there was no solvent business house except the
Fugger who could do this through bills. They too were for long un-
willing, for they did not know how they were going to get the money
out of Spain or into the Netherlands. Finally their Spanish agent gave
a hint that if the King would take the risk the matter might be con-
sidered. This caused great joy, though only 100,000 crowns were in
question. The King said that he 'would take it as a great favour.'
The Fugger, however, ordered their agent, in order to keep up their
credit, neither to borrow in Spain nor to have borrowing undertaken
in Antwerp.
The agent was in a tight place. When, in accordance with his in-
structions, he refused to conclude the transaction, the King's Contador
Garnica, who was otherwise exceedingly well disposed towards him,
began to 'play a wild game and to say that the agent could not make
it plainer that the Fugger had no wish to serve the King, and like the
rest only sought for enormous profits.' Finally the agent had to agree
to send 70,000 crowns to the Netherlands 'for (as he said in his letter
to another agent) here a man may not conclude a bargain without
more and go care-free home again, but must bear ever in mind that
the masters have stuck fast almost 3 million of gold at the King's
back without counting the wheat and debts in the Maestrazgos.'
The money was packed in chests, sealed with the King's seal, and
sent through Lisbon to Antwerp.
Direct bill transactions between Spain and Antwerp were now abso-
lute; but the Fugger were very nervous about using the new markets,
especially the Genoese bill fairs, but also Lisbon, Lyons, and Florence.
In the case of the necessary remittances from Spain their attitude,
which was a cautiousness understandable at such a time, gave the
Spanish agent many sleepless nights. Finally he decided to act against his
instructions and make use of the new markets. In this way he managed,
between the winter of 1575 and the spring of 1578, to remit through bills
about 2 million crowns, which enabled the Fugger to pay off part of their
debts. In other ways as well the agent, Thomas Muller, showed him-
self a business man of exceptional ability. He was able to check those
who hated and envied the Fugger at Court and to keep the King's
favour for his masters. This, however, was only to be achieved by
means of fresh services, so that the Fugger perpetually reproached
In the beginning of August, 1576, dangerous mutinies of the Spanish
troops were reported from the Netherlands. The Contador Garnica
immediately asked Thomas Muller to send 200,000 crowns to the
THE PUGGER 127
Netherlands, for the Fugger should not desert the King in his hour of
need. If the tioops were not satisfied, the Netherlands provinces would
be lost and the Fugger would be responsible. In vain the agent declined,
Garnica pressed for immediate consent. As soon as the soldiers saw
the Fugger bills, he said, they would be quiet and wait till the money
was collected. He said he must have an answer next day, and he even
sent his agent the same night, saying that the Fugger must help or
they would know what to expect. When Muller announced that the
Fugger had always been faithful servants of the King and he did not
know, therefore, what should happen to them, the Spaniard made a
cross, kissed it, and cried out, 'I swear on the Holy Cross, if Flanders
is lost from lack of money, the blame will be yours.' The interview
continued for some time in this passionate tone, but the agent stood
his ground. Late at night he paid a visit to President Hopperus, 'an
upright, trusty man,' as he wrote to his masters, 'my kind master and
well affected towards your Honour.' The President, however, said the
same as the Contador and entreated the agent for Heaven's sake to
prove that the Fugger were true servants of the King. Not only he, but
the whole Netherlands would owe their eternal gratitude.
The same night the King wrote to the agent and said in full Council
that no one but the Fugger could help him in his extremity, and that
this would be the last service of the kind that he would require of
them.
Muller tried first and foremost to protect his masters against the
danger which threatened more and more, of being drawn into the
state bankruptcy, or 'Decree' as it was called. This danger was one
of the chief reasons, he said, why the Fugger should not commit them-
selves more deeply with the King, 'chiefly in view of the little money
at the disposition of the merchants of all nations, for though the
Fugger be great, yet can they not make money out of stone.' Finally,
however, 'in order not to spill the soup,' he had to say, without, how-
ever, giving a binding promise on account of the Decree, that he would
send 200,000 crowns to Flanders, which he was able to do in round-
about ways through skilful bill transactions.
The King was greatly pleased by this service; he wrote that he 'held
it a great matter.' But it did not suffice to stay the catastrophe then
threatening the Netherlands. On November the Spanish armies sacked
Antwerp, thereby ruining its commercial prosperity. Many merchants
had recently left the city. The Fugger's agent had to remain in order
to guard the money for the Spanish bills drawn for the King. When
the mutinous troops stormed the city, the Fugger house was surrounded
by Alvarez Juan Giron and his men. In order to guard against further
losses the agent had to pay him 11,000 crowns, his original demands
128 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
having been more. Moreover, the troops stole more than 2,000 out
of a larger sum of money committed to them for safe keeping by a
friendly firm. To crown all, the Colonel Carl Fugger, a kinsman, who
had brought there in 1573 a regiment recruited in Augsburg for the
Duke of Alba, came to the Fugger house threatening to plunder if he
were not bought off with 50,000 crowns. He was with difficulty got
rid of through the agency of a friendly member of the State Council.
The great services they had rendered in the face of danger and the
ceaseless efforts of their Spanish agent successfully kept the Fugger
out of the Decree in spite of the machinations of their enemies. Towards
other princes they held back as much as they could in the matter of
loans. So, for example, in 1577 they refused a loan to Duke William of
Bavaria on the ground that since the sack of Antwerp business was
ruined, many bankruptcies were expected at the approaching Frankfurt
Fair, and a great change in the general situation. They had, they said,
no spare cash, and were themselves in great difficulties owing to the
impossibility of getting in their outstanding claims, so that they had
to give their whole attention to maintaining their own credit. The
Duke was then owing them more than 100,000 fl. The Fugger also
soundly declined to make any further advances in Spain.
Sdlance Sheet of 1577
We give here the balance sheet for 1577, the last we shall quote.
The assets are as follows: Good Doubtful
Florins Florins
Spanish Debtors 5,026,000
Antwerp Debtors 120,128
Emperor Maxmilian II 220,674
Archduke Ferdinand 12,874
Archduke Albert in Bavaria 11,909
for his son William 1,116,611
Duchess Anna hi Bavaria, loan without interest 4,000
Sundry Debtors in Augsburg 270,767 40,239
Debtors in Nuremberg 29,204 2,222
Debtors in Vienna 9,094 18,444
Debtors in the Chief Book:
Emperor Ferdinand has owed since 1547 on
Kirchberg and Weissenhom 30,000
Interest on this sum, 1557-77, 20 years, at 5 % 30,000
Old arrears from the Maestrazgos 1,336 37,650
Various (mostly unsettled bill transactions) 494,380
Cash 241,082
Total fl. 6,558,059 fl. 1,244,906
THE FUGGER
Liabilities.
Shares in the business
Deposits by members of the family 3,398,000
Spanish creditors, to be taken in connection with the assets
(in round figures) 1,000,000
Other pending transactions 277,806
Deposits of friends, employes, etc. 591,150
Total fl. 6,537,355
This is a very different picture from the balance sheet of 1562.
Instead of having to pay interest on 3 million of borrowed money, the
members of the family had about this amount in outstanding claims.
The soundness of the house had been re-established, though at great
cost. Anton Pugger's heirs, besides their shares in the business, amount-
ing to more than a million gulden, had had to advance on loan
almost 2 million. The capital on deposit belonging to Christopher
Fugger, amounting to 700,000 fl., was soon after paid out for the
Spanish bills for the Netherlands, so that the frightful burden of the"
Spanish business fell entirely on Anton's sons. But the fact that 1J
million gulden must be classed as doubtful was still hidden in the
Last Phase of the Fugger Business. There is in existence a letter of
the year 1581 from the Fugger brothers to their brother-in-law Hans
Khevenhiiller, who owed them 45,000 fl. They warned him very
seriously about the repayment of this amount, saying that they had
soon to lend a large sum to the Emperor, but from lack of ready
money had themselves been compelled to borrow, and that they had to
repay the loan. Moreover, they had to pay out 100,000 fl. to Georg
Fugger's heirs. Money was as hard to come by in Augsburg as in other
places and could not be brought from Spain without great danger and
expense. In the years 1584 and 1585 the situation was the same. The
Genoese had won the first place as international financiers. The Fugger
complained that the Genoese 'everywhere brought the water all to
their own mill.' A different story, indeed, since the Genoese at the time
of the election of Charles V had complained of the harsh treatment
they received from the Fugger.
Nevertheless the Fugger did a considerable business till the end of
the century, e.g. in the period 1594 to 1600 the profit made amounted
to 575,397 fl.; in the next ten years, however, the loss amounted to
about the same sum. The Spanish claims refused to diminish. In the
year 1604 they amounted to about 5f million ducats, of which 5 million
were debts of the Spanish Crown - these were, however, set off against
130 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
liabilities amounting to almost 3 million, the King's account being
2 million.
In the year 1607 there was a Spanish State bankruptcy for the third
time, in which the Fugger were interested to the extent of 3J million
ducats. At this time they had paid out the greater part of the business
capital, and the deposits of the different partners had been repaid to
them. They owed 2 million to persons outside the firm, so that the
situation of 1562 recurred. As in the first quarter day in Spain after
the Decree there was 'a great run' of creditors, and there were even
'executions.' The King helped with a moratorium, and when the Fugger
represented to him that their whole capital was comprised in the claims
on the Spanish Crown and that their honour and credit were in the
greatest danger, if the charges on the state revenues, of which they
had been deprived, were not restored, they got off once again with
nothing worse than a fright. In the subsequent period, however, their
situation became the more unsafe, because they made new advances
to the Spanish Crown, and that for this purpose they themselves con-
tracted new loans; the most dangerous point of all being that these
loans were met by means of advances from their now all-powerful
rivals, the Genoese. Their assets in Spain amounted in 1622 to 5|
million ducats and their liabilities to 4J million, a most risky position,
which would prove fatal if the equilibrium so painfully maintained were
to be destroyed. This happened once more in the year 1626. The power-
ful minister Olivarez, who hated the Fugger, demanded of them that
they should take over the payments of 50,000 ducats a month for the
maintenance of the Court, the so-called Mesadas.
Andreas Hyrus, the Fugger's agent, made unavailing representations,
and was himself at last intimidated or captivated. Olivarez said, 'The
Asiento must come, even if the Fugger are ruined.' With great lack of
consideration he demanded the continued payment of the Mesadas,
although the assignments which had been given to the Fugger in
return had not, for the most part, been realized. The Fugger had,
moreover, to pay 200,000 ducats for annual interest on their debts in
Spain and Italy. This was a state of things which could not continue.
In the beginning of the year 1630, Octavio Centurione dared to say
of the Fugger that their supposed riches were pure imagination. A few
months later the Spanish agent had to write that he was in such dffii-
culties on account of a debt of 34,000 ducats which had fallen due that
he had thought that there would be 'a general break-up.' Finally, after
many entreaties and promises, he induced the Genoese, Bart. Spinola,
to take over the debt, so that the worst was staved off. Shortly after,
however, the agent could only realize a bill of 5,000 crowns if Spinola
added his signature. In the same year the agent Hyrus was removed.
THE FUGGER 131
Next year the "King again granted a moratorium in order to shield the
Fugger from their creditors, and this was further prolonged in 1632.
In 1637, however, the Fugger estate in Spain came under the adminis-
tration of the Genoese, among whom Bart. Spinola was chief creditor.
As this administration only made matters worse, in 1639 Hyrus was
sent back to Spain and remained there as liquidator till 1644, when
another representative was sent out. A statement of the year 1641,
which puts matters in too favourable a light, states the Spanish assets
of the Fugger at 2,100 million maravedis, the liabilities at 1,250
millions, a surplus of 850 millions. If we examine these figures, it is plain
that the assets, i.e. the claims on the Crown and on others, amount
to 1,327 million maravedis at most, or 3f million ducats, while the
liabilities amount to 4J million ducats, leaving a deficit of over half a
million ducats. This calculation assumes that all the outstanding claims
would be paid, which was far from being the case.
The Fugger business in Spain had reached this sad state through
acting as we have seen. It had already had claims on the Spanish
Crown amounting to over 3 million ducats, none of which was ever
repaid. The loss incurred, inching the sums already written off,
amounts to at least 4 million ducats. The Spanish line of the Hapsburgs
remained in debt to the Fugger for this amount. To this must be added
the Netherlands bonds of the Eeceivers General, the debt of the States
of Brabant, which also was in fact never repaid, the so-called Friesland
debt, an annual payment secured on the revenues of the Crown lands
in Friesland which was not paid after the separation of this province.
Other annual payments were continued by the provinces after their
liberation, but the Fugger's was discontinued owing to the support
which they were known to have afforded to the Spanish Crown. Many
efforts were made to re-establish it, and Article 24 of the Treaty of
Westphalia seemed to offer some hope of this, but this never materia-
lized. In 1673 the arrears of the payment with interest and expenses
amounted to 2 million gulden.
In conclusion the Fugger had still in 1650 a claim against the Imperial
line of the Hapsburgs amounting to 615,600 fl.- a debt which had
originated in the years 1574 to 1617. The original capital had only
been 144,000 fl., the rest being due to arrears of interest, though only
8 per cent, was charged up to 1603, and after that date only 5-6 per
cent. The total loss which the Fugger sustained on their claims against
the Hapsburgs up to the middle of the seventeenth century is certainly
not put too high at 8 million Rhenish gulden. We shall scarcely be
wrong in supposing that the greater part of the Fugger's earnings in
the course of a hundred years was lost in this way. At their most
brilliant period, i.e. about the middle of the sixteenth century, the
132 THE AG'E OF THE FUGGER
family had never owned more than 5 or 6 millions of the money of that
day, even including the private fortunes of their individual members.
In the Mowing half-century, in spite of the work of Anton Fugger and
his sons, the property had not really increased. Only its nominal value
another half-century was only some landed property which had been
laid waste in the wars and was heavily mortgaged. The family laws
as to inheritance, under which it descended in the male line and none
of it could be sold, kept the lands more or less together in spite of the
enormous families of many of the Fugger. (In 1619, for example, the
family numbered a hundred persons.)
CHAPTEK 2
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS
THE BUSINESS HOUSES OF SOUTH GERMANY
IT was the rapid development of the silver mines of Tyrol, about the
middle of the fifteenth century, which first induced the other South
German business houses like the Fugger gradually to leave the old track
of laborious but solid trade which centred in Venice. Perhaps it would
be more accurate to express this change as follows: The decline of the
profits of trade with Venice, etc., induced them to look for other means
of gain, so they went into finance and mining in Tyrol and by the capital
they put in brought the latter to a flourishing state. Further research is
needed to show which of these two views is the correct one.
The Meuting. As early as 1456 the Meutings of Augsburg lent 35,000 fl.
to Duke Sigmund of Tyrol, who was known as 'the Munzreich,' but, all
the same, was continually in need of money. Until it should be repaid
the Duke made over to them, at the price of 7f fl. per mark (Vienna
weight), all the silver produced from the works and delivered to him.
Thereupon the Meuting must have gone into the business of money
changers; for in 1475 the Bishop of Augsburg lodged a complaint to the
Council there 'of the exchange, which Ulrich Meuting is in the habit of
carrying on there, by reason whereof a master of the mint and his associ-
ates were impeded in their rights,' and in the next year, in addition to
Meuting, he named Ulrich Mayr and some others who had been guilty of
the same trespass. In this department the new power of capital was
already breaking through the barriers of the Middle Ages. 1
In 1474 Ludwig Meuting already had business relations with the
Emperor Frederick III, and as he soon afterwards got at variance with
the town of Augsburg he obtained a safe conduct from the Emperor.
This Ludwig Meuting is the first of the South German merchants to be
mentioned in Antwerp. As early as 1479 he had to get in some out-
standing debts there. Finally, George Meuting settled in Antwerp,
married there in 1516, and in company with the well-known Gillebert
van Schoonabeke went in for large speculation in real estate. Later, he
carried on important financial business with the Court of Brussels,
which appears to have brought nim down in 1537. The family, however,
lasted on in Antwerp till 1820.*
1 Ladurner ro Archiv. f. Geah. . AUerfkumskunde Tirole, voL V. Abo of.
Augsburger Stadtarchw, Qrosse Kathsdekret-Sammlung, VII, 30 n. 52, and von
Stetten, Gesch. d. avgsbutyer CteseMeckter, p. 186.
'Chmel, Aktenstucke z. Gesch. d. Houses Habsburg,ni, 540, 609; also Actes
scabinaux in Antwerp Stadtarchive, 1479, 25/10. Of. Annuaire de la noblesse de
Bdgique, 1883, p. 332 ff.; Bulletin de la Propriete, 1887, p. 92.
134 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
The Meuting who had remained behind in Augsburg played a not
insignificant part in international finance for some decades longer
than their relatives in Antwerp. Bemhard Meuting in 1543 took a
share of 29,000 pounds in the Antwerp loan to the Court of Brussels.
The Meuting were one of the Augsburg business houses who were
suspected of supporting the Emperor in the Schmalkaldian war. King
Ferdinand got a loan of 25,000 ft. from Jacob Meuting in 1549 and
another of 100,000 fl. in 1551. On the other hand, in 1553 Bernhard
and Philip Meuting took a share of 43,735 crowns in Lyons in the
great loan to the King of France. In this they appear as citizens of
Berne. Bernard Meuting was one of the first victims of the great credit
crisis of 1557-62. It appears, nevertheless, that other members of
the family carried on business after this, for in 1566 the Emperor
Maximilian II obtained a loan from the Meuting. 1
Mining, Smelting and Iron Works. The business houses of Nuremberg
and Augsburg took an early part in the silver mining of Saxony. From
the records in the Archives of the Imhof families we learn that by 1479
Cunz Imhof and Heinrich Wolff in Nuremberg, and Lucas Welser in
Augsburg, held some shares in the silver mining works at the Schnee-
berg. Soon after we come across the Nuremberg families of Fiihrer and
Schlusselfelder as undertakers of the copper mining works at Eisleben
with which was connected the important Saiger smelting works at
Armstedt in Thuringia. In 1511 there are mentioned as undertakers of
ironworks the Nuremberg merchants Hans Kress, Paul Heymer, and
Sebald Ketzel. Further, at that time Peter Riimmel carried on silver
mining in Tyrol, and Lucas Sender smelting works in Silesia; Mathias
Landaur and Hans and Gregory Schiitze also carried on smelting works.
In 1482 George Holzschuher and Ulrich Erkel of Nuremberg had the
monopoly of supplying silver to the town of Berne, whose mint Holz-
schuher managed through his people. 2 We shall see later that the
Welser, too, then already carried on similar businesses.
The Emperor Maximilian and the South German Merchants. There is
a certain homely romantic charm in the relations of Maximilian to the
burghers of the imperial towns of South Germany. It still gives us
pleasure to read how the Emperor lived among his true burghers and
danced with their wives and daughters at the town hall. But on both
sides the very real basis of _these beautiful relations was a monetary one.
A contemporary chronicler says: 'The Emperor was favourably disposed
towards the men of Augsburg. There were many merchants there who
1 Lille, B. 2436; Augsbg. St.-A. Litteralien 1546; Thorech, pp. 40, 41, 49; v.
Stettin, GesMshte v. Augsburg, I, 661.
' Akten derFmherrl. yon Imhofachen u. yon Scheuerlschen Familion Archive
in Nurembtug. Of. also v. Holler, Schwetzeruchee Mum u. Medaillen Cabinet, U,
88; Lohner, Mumen der Republik Bern, p. 257.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 135
did business with Mm. If he wanted money they lent hi a large quan-
tity on the silver and copper from Schwatz. These merchants got a lot of
profit out of him, for he was an honourable man and kept his promises.
So the merchants could fleece him. And if the Emperor carried on busi-
ness in copper and silver with them, the Emperor's councillors likewise
took part secretly under the names of merchants.' 1
But tiiis is by no means a correct description of their relations. The
Emperor Maximilian by no means always conducted himself so honour-
ably towards the burghers. We find, indeed, indications of a financial
behaviour which appear to justify the scorn with which the Italians in
particular judged these beggarly acts of the Emperor. Indeed, the Em-
peror was perhaps only personally responsible so far as he made a bad
choice of his financial officials. But in reference to this it is again very
noticeable that he preferred to make use of Augsburg and Nuremberg
merchants to manage his finances. The most celebrated of these men of
business were Heinrich Wolf! and his son Balthasar from Nuremberg,
and George Gossembrot, Lucas Gassner, Hans von Stetten, George
Ilsung, and Hans Paumgartner from Augsburg.
How the Wolffs came to serve the Emperor deserves to be told in
greater detail. In H94, Heinrich Wolff, who by that time 'was almost
his good friend,' agreed to lend to the Emperor 'a goodly sum of money'
on the silver from Schwatz. He paid this sum and obtained a written
promise from Maximilian that for four years all the Tyrol silver that
was to be delivered to the Mint at Hall should be handed over to him at
a definite price. But this silver was, as we know, already mortgaged to
the Fugger, and they naturally would not give up their security. The
Emperor was even prevailed upon to assign the silver to them for a longer
period. He relegated Henry Wolff to his claim against Lodovico il Moro,
Duke of Milan, who still owed him a part of his marriage portion. But
Wolff got nothing from him, and in order to save his outstanding debt
allowed himself to be drawn in to lend more and more to the Emperor
till at last the whole of his very considerable property had gone. To com-
pensate him Maximilian appointed him to his Council and then elevated
his son Balthasar to be royal chamberlain and head treasurer to the
patrimonial dominions, as well as ennobling him. But this son, when he
stood in such high favour with the Emperor, began to be ashamed of his
father who had been ruined. This broke his father's heart. 2
Gossembrot was the first burgher of Augsburg who entered into the
service of Maximilian. He had already done business with Duke Sig-
1 Of. Greiff m d. Anmerkungen zw Lucas Hems Tagdmche, p. 100, and v. Stetten,
OencMdOe Augsburgs, I, 245 ff.
> These details are from the ScheuerUnich of Dr. Christof SoheuerL For Bal-
thasar Wolff of. Adler, Die Organisation der CentralverwdUung wnter Kaiser
Maximilian, I, p. 83; Chmel, Urkunden z Geseh. Maximilians, 1, p. 180 09.
136 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEE
naund of Tyrol, with the result that in 1477 he was mortgagee of the
guardianship of Ernberg, and in the same year was appointed an unpaid
counsellor of the Duke. When Mn.Tnmi1ia.Ti took over the government of
Tyrol in 1490 he confirmed Gossembrot as guardian of Ernberg and
employed him then in his many financial affairs, in which Gossenbrot
appears on the one side as the Emperor's representative, but on the
other as his banker. Thus in 1492 he procured for him 35,000 fl. on a tax
granted by the province of Tyrol. In 1494 he tried to get money from
the Fugger for the Emperor. But in 1495 he personally lent him
29,000 fl. at his pressing request. These, however, are only particular
examples. Doubtless he developed a much more important business
activity. In particular, in conjunction with his brother Sigmund, he had
a large interest in the trade with Tyrolese copper, since in 1483 1,000
centners of copper were delivered to him as an instalment of a claim
against Duke Sigmund. His peculiar position is perhaps best character-
ized by the fact that in conjunction with his brother he had a large
interest in the big syndicate which in 1498 and 1499 wished to keep up
the price of copper in Venice. 1
Hans von Stetten, too, was in 1491 empowered by Maximilian to get
money by trading, exchange, and other ways, as should be necessary.
Later, he was appointed Counsellor and Chamberlain of Lower Austria.
In 1506 the Emperor informed him that he had served him truly for six-
teen years, that in this time of pressing occasions, wars, etc., he had
obtained for him or lent to him large sums of money by himself or his
relations at least 200,000 fl. in all, which had been very useful to him,
the Emperor, and had preserved him from harm. Further, for this he
had never charged 'interest, compensation, or anything else,' and had re-
ceived no pay, but into the bargain had neglected his own business and
had used up of his own property 3,000 fl. more than was shown in the
accounts. For this the Emperor now granted him once for all 10,000 fl.,
and mortgaged certain estates as security for the payment. 2
All we know of Lucas Gassner is that from 1502-4 he was active as
a financial official of Maximilian, 8 and we are not much better informed
about Hans Paumgartner, although he played a very important part.
Meanwhile, we will state here the little that we know of him and add a
few details of the further fortunes of his family.
The Pawmgartner. From early time the Nuremberg merchant Hans
Paumgartner must have had a considerable interest in Tyrol mining,
'For Gossembrot of. Ladumer in d. Ztschr. d. Ferdinandeums, 3, Folge, 15,
Heft, p. 105; Chroniken d. deuischen, Stadte: Augsburg, U, 394; v. Stetten,
Geschichte v. Augsburg, I, 246, 256; v. Beckh-Widmanstetter, Die dltere Art
der QeUbeschaffung im Kriege, p. 19, Amn. 24.
' von Stetten, Geschichte d. augsburger GeacUechter, pp. 413, 417.
Adler.Lo.p.ll6ff,
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 137
especially in copper mines. On this account lie lived for a considerable
time, at any rate from 1491 to 1499, at Kuffetein, and in the years
1498-9 with his partners, one of whom, Hans Knoll, was a conspicuous
member of the copper syndicate. On the death of George Gossembrot in
1502, he, together with Lucas Gassner, for some years on behalf of the
Emperor, took care of the businesses which till then Gossembrot had
managed and succeeded hi in the guardianship of Ernberg, which he
held as security till 1523. But before 1511 he had akeady gone to live
in Augsburg. 1
His son, Hans Paumgartner the younger, married one of the Fugger
in Augsburg, and in 1518, at the end of the Emperor Maximilian's life,
was expressly mentioned as the man who paid money to the Hapsburgs.
He at that time lent the Emperor 10,000 fl. In 1524, 75,000 fl. were paid
out to Tiim for old claims against Mayimilian. In 1530 he lent the
Emperor 42,000 fl.; it was, however, paid back after three months with
17 per cent, per annum interest to his representative, Wolff Haller, in
Antwerp. In 1543 he also helped King Ferdinand with 10,000 fl., and in
November, 1544, in conjunction with the Fugger and the Haugs, lent him
100,000 fl. on silver. In the Schmalkaldian war he remained on the side
of the Catholics, and consequently was much hated by the Protestants.
For a long time he was an Imperial counsellor and was ennobled in 1539.
He was accounted among the richest merchants of his time. But serious
misfortune quickly came on his sons. One of them, David, left Augsburg
in 1552, became a partisan of William of Grumbach, and through his
senseless vanity became involved in his fall and perished on the scaffold
in 1567. He had akeady lost his fortune. His brother, John George, got
into financial difficulties in 1565, and was for five years in a debtor's
prison. Then he made over all his assets to his creditors, whose claims
amounted to 104,471 fl., and went abroad. 2
The Welser. Unfortunately we are not so well informed about the fate
of the second largest of the German trading houses of the sixteenth
century as is necessary, considering its all-embracing and many-sided
importance. While the Fugger preserved their archives the Welser, after
the fall of their business, lost theirs, and it is only recently, through the
piety and labour of individual descendants, that the scanty remains of
these treasures have again been collected. The information we have is,
however, sufficient to let us recognize the fundamental difference from
almost every point of view that existed between the two largest trading
houses of South Germany.
Origin. The Welsers belong to one of the oldest families of Augsburg;
*Cf. Laduraer, ZtscJir. d. Ferdinandeum*, 3, Folge (1870), p. 107. Adler Lo.
'Of. v. Stetten,ffeacAicAfet>. Augsburg, 1, 664, 590; v, Stetten, Gesch. d. Augn-
bwyer GescKlechter, p. 198.
138 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
but about their business - which for a long period, like the other burgher
families of South Germany, they would have chiefly carried on with
Italy -we first hear in 1473, when the brothers Bartel, Jacob, Lucas
and Dlrich Welser together founded a trading company, whose impor-
tance was increased through their connection with Hans Vb'hlin of Mem-
mingen. This Hans Vohlin, who was one of the line founded in the four-
teenth century by Vohlin von Ungerhausen, appear with his associates
in 1490 as having a part in the Tyrol silver business. The connection of .
the Welser with the Vohlins was doubtless already established, for
Anton Welser, one of the sons of Lucas, had in 1479 married a daughter
of Hans Vohlin. Lucas Welser was the ancestor of the three chief
branches of the family named after his sons Anton, Lucas, and Jacob.
The Lucas branch was extinct by 1628; the Jacob branch (the Nurem-
berg main branch) became extinct in 1878; while the Anton branch still
exists in its Ulm offshoot.
For some time Anton Welser lived in Memmingen, where his father-
in-law, Hans Vohlin, was burgomaster; but about 1496 he returned to
Augsburg, and in conjunction with his brother-in-law, Conrad Vohlin,
formed the firm of Anton Welser, Conrad Vohlin and Company, which
quickly became of great consequence. It also at once engaged in the
silver trade. They induced the town of Berne to have coined the un-
popular 'Eollenbatzen.' In this apparently they enjoyed the support of
the Emperor. 1
Development till 1517. We have already seen many times that the
Welser took a part in the great financial transactions due to the policy of
the Hapsburgs. But at the same time they carried on an extensive
trade and tried to adapt themselves to the new conditions in this depart-
ment. That is a great difference between the basis of their business and
that of the Fugger. While Jakob Fugger early gave up trading, Anton
Welser founded an important factory at Lisbon, and in 1503 his agent,
Simon Seitz, succeeded in obtaining the first privileges for the German
merchants. The Welser then took a prominent part in the great expedi-
tion to the East Indies, which was equipped by the German and Italian
merchants in 1505. Their share amounted to 20,000 fl.; that of the
Fugger, on the other hand, was only 4,000 fl.; and that of the Genoese
and Florentines together only 29,400 fl. The enterprise produced a
profit of 175 per cent, per annum; but in consequence of Portuguese
chicanery it was so long before it was divided and such difficulties were
put in the way of the Germans and Italians trading directly that to go
on with it was not to be thought of. 2 For this reason, after this the
'Ladurner, p. 101; Lohner, p. 259.
' Mitth. d. Ver. f. Geachickte d. Stadt NHrnbg Heft, 1, p. 100; Heyd, Gesck.
d. Lavtmtehandds, II, 523 ff. (new French Ed. II, 530 ft.).
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 139
Welser carried on the highly speculative business at second-hand with
East Indian spices from Lisbon to Antwerp and South Germany on a
large scale. For a long time fortune smiled on them so that for the time
being they made considerable profits. 1
We learn from Lucas Bern, who with his brother Andreas then had a
share in the profits, that his share amounted to:
31 per cent, from 1502 to 1504, or 10 J per cent, per annum.
39 1505 1507, 13
15 1508 1510, 5 ,
11 , 1511 1512, 5f
16 1513 1515, 5$
30 1516 1516, 15 ,
We also hear that the result of the business chiefly depended on the
state of the business with Portugal. For the whole period of sixteen
years there was an average annual profit of 9 per cent., which is quite
respectable, but cannot be compared with the profits of the Fugger, who,
as we have seen, earned an average annual profit of 54 per cent.
Certainly it may be that at times the profits of the Welser were higher
than appears from the accounts and dividends, and here again we come
upon a great difference between the Fugger and the Welser.
The business house of the Fugger never had more than a few persons
interested except near relations, and since the death of the brothers of
Jakob Fugger the management was always in one hand. The factories
therefore must, as a rule, have been managed by carefully chosen paid
assistants who did not belong to the family. The house of the Welser, on
the other hand, had a large number of persons interested, part of whom
either did not belong to the family or were only distant relations. They
worked at the factories, but at the same time they were entitled to a
share in the profits. So they did their best to carry on the business well.
But the whole system led repeatedly to great disputes as to the way in
which the business should be carried on and the profits reckoned, so that
in 1517 part of the company left believing that they had been cheated
by the others. 2
The articles of partnership of 1508 contain no less than eighteen
names, and in the course of the next year some others must have joined
the firm: Anton Welser the elder, Conrad Vohlin, Ludwig Reyhing, Wolf
Pfister, Jacob Welser, Marx Pfister, Hans Pfister, Conrad Imhof , Anton
Lauginger, Peter Heintzel, Hans Lauginger, Narciss Lauginger, Ulrich
Hanold, Simon Seitz, Hans Heintzel, Wilhelm Heintzel, Andreas Bern,
and Bartholomew Welser. Lucas Bern is not mentioned, but no doubt
he had an interest in the business.
1 Tagebwsh d. Lucas Bern, edit. v. Greiff, p. 30.
8 Lucas Bom (Lap. 19).
140 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
In 1517 Jacob Welser, Ulrica Hanold and Andreas and Lucas Bern
retired from the business; possibly some others did, too, whom the
Welser wanted to get rid of. Jacob Welser founded a new firm in
Nuremberg.
About the development of the Welser business before this great alter-
ation it may be added that in 1507 the Welser were mentioned in Ant-
werp; yet it was only in 1509 that they bought there a large house which
had just been built, called 'De Gulden Boose,' near the cathedral, where
the head post office is now. 1 Lucas Bern repeatedly acted as agent of the
firm at Antwerp at that time; in 1521 Gabriel Studelin is mentioned as
agent, and in 1525-30 Alexius Grimel, whom we shall come across again
later.
At this time, besides those in Antwerp and Lisbon, the Welser had
well-established factories in Nuremberg, Danzig, Venice, Milan, Borne,
Genoa, Freiburg, Berne, Zurich, Lyons, Saragossa, and possibly in other
places, which were regularly visited by individual members of the firm
in order to inspect the factories. In 1512 the Welser gave up the ship-
ping trade and closed down the factory at Danzig.
A new period in the development of the house begins with Jacob
Welser leaving the firm in 1517, and the death of Anton Welser which
followed in the next year. After this there was an increasing amount of
purely financial business, without, however, displacing the trading in
goods and the other undertakings. The Welser remained the second
largest business house, though their capital, which never approached
that of the Fugger, was considerably weakened by the division in 1517.
The Nuremberg Welser. Anton's brother, Jacob Welser, in 1493 was
managing the Nuremberg branch of the house, but also from time to time
was in partnership with Conrad Imhof , and when his father-in-law, Hans
Thumer, died in 1500 carried on this business till 1502. In one of the lists
of Nuremberg merchants attributed to the year 1511, it is said of him,
'He carries on a large trade in all countries such as no merchant of
Nuremberg has ever done.' But the real direction of the business was
then concentrated in Augsburg. In 1517, Jacob left the firm and founded
his own business in Nuremberg. He took in as partners his sons Hans,
Jacob and Sebastian, and Hieronymus Futterer; and later on, from time
to time, Hans Eutterer and Wolff Harstorfer as well; but the firm was
never particularly large. The capital amounted to 66,000 fl. in 1527;
92,000 fl. from 1529 to 1535; 243,000 fl. in 1543; but so much was taken
out by the partners that only 86,400 fl. remained in the business. In the
following two years this increased again to 281,000 fl. 8
1 Thys, Bulletin de la Prapriete, 1890, p. 8.
* Register der RattoMeg in unsser Versamlung (FreiherrL yon Welsersches
Familien-Archiv in Schloas Neunhof ).
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 141
The Welser of Nuremberg had factories in Genoa, Venice, Aquila (in
South Italy, for buying saffron), Milan, Antwerp, Lyons, Vienna, and
Schlackenwald in Bohemia; in the last-named pkce in order to carry on
their participation in the mines there. In 1516, not far from the tin and
silver mines of Schlackenwald, there was discovered new rich silver
deposits, and with the help of the Counts Schlich, who owned the land,
the flourishing town of Joachimsthal soon grew up. The Counts made
use of an old privilege and began at once to strike coins there. The first
genuine thalers, which at first were called 'Joachimsthaler,' came from
the mint there. The Welser of Nuremberg, in conjunction with Hans
Nutzel, lent the Counts a great deal of money, and also took a part in the
mining at Schlackenwald, which they extended. 1
The main business of the Welser of Nuremberg was pure trade, but
this did not debar them at times from carrying out very important
financial transactions; their operations at first, however, were on a very
solid basis corresponding to the ruling business principles in Nuremberg.
Thus, in the resolutions of the partnership in 1529, it is stated: 'Agreed
that^in Antwerp or the Netherlands no credit over 25,000 ft. shall be
given, and when such a claim falls due and the debtor wishes the ad-
vance continued the interest shall be got in; no interest shall be allowed
to run on interest; also no bonds of the Receivers General shall be taken;
but it shall always be required that the ruler of the land shall enter into
a written engagement jointly and severally, and finally promissory
notes shall not be accepted unless they are acknowledged by the
drawers.' Further, in 1545, it was decided not to lend the King of
France more than 24,000 crowns.
These were wise principles, but unfortunately they were soon aban-
doned. By the end of 1546 we find Jacob and Sebastian Welser taking
part to the extent of almost 100,000 ducats in no less than six great
loans, which the Fugger had granted to the Emperor against bills on
Spain. But it was much more dangerous that they decided in 1551 'to
venture 100,000 fl. on short term loans in the market and bonds of the
Receivers General. ' Such a spirit of enterprise in critical times could not
fail to result in great losses, and so, since this time, the welfare of the
Welser of Nuremberg soon went downhill.
Of the sons of the founder of the Nuremberg firm, Jacob the younger
managed the Antwerp factory since 1530, Hans the Augsburg branch,
which soon became more important than the main business. In his
father's lifetime Hans already seems to have been the soul of the busi-
ness, for in 1531 his brother Jacob, who is expressly described as Hans'
agent, was paid 19,800 livres, whose value Hans Welser in Augsburg
had in 1530 handed over against bills of exchange of the Emperor. The
1 Scheuerl Buch and Sterabeig, Qeaehichte d. Bohm. Bergwerlte, p. 322.
142 THE AGE OP THE FUGGEB
fixm was changed to Hans Welsei and Brothers before 1537, although
their father, Jacob, did not die till 1541.
Hans Welser attained to great consequence in Augsburg, and even
became Burgomaster. Contrary to his cousins in Augsburg, he was a
Protestant, but a moderate one, and did not wish to know anything of
the war against the Emperor. He died in 1559, five years after bis
brother Jacob. The third brother, Sebastian, remained in Nuremberg
and carried on the business after the death of his brothers till he gave up
the ghost in 1566. His sons, Jacob and Hans, then gave up trade which
no longer paid. At the time of their father's death their claims on the
French Court amounted to 55,245 livres Tournois. So much for the
Welser of Nuremberg. 1
The Augsburg Welser under Bartholomew. Of the other sons of Anton
Welser, Bartholomew, after his father's death, took over the manage-
ment of the head business at Augsburg, while Franz deserves mention as
the father of Philippine Welser. Bartholomew Welser is especially cele-
brated for his attempt at colonization in Venezuela which, however,
regarded - as it rightly should be judged - as a business enterprise, does
not deserve the praise lavished on him for it. It was an adventure on the
Spanish model. Begun without serious intentions of business profit, and
in spite of the system of exploitation equally on the Spanish pattern, yet
in essentials only by warlike means carried through as a genuine 'Con-
quista,' it was finally wrecked for want of sufficient power as well as by
the hostile disposition of the Spaniards. Yet the Welser expedition to
Venezuela will always remain memorable as the first and only attempt
of the Germans in America - even though under a foreign monarch, for
Charles V ruled there as King of Spain, not as Emperor - to acquire such
By the end of Anton Welser's life the business had acquired a some-
what new character by the large participation in the loans for the elec-
tion of Charles V as Emperor. We must refer to the previous chapter for
the details of this big affair. It was concluded in Anton Welser's life-
time; but as he died soon after it fell to his son to carry it out. With
it the Welser stepped into the first rank of the great financiers. Again
the Emperor at the Diet of Worms received from them a considerable
loan, and in the same year they also took a prominent part in the great
sales of the Neapolitan domains.
Of the following decade, apart from the Venezuela enterprise which
began in 1527, we only know that during the years 1525-8 the Welaer,
1 Lille, B. 2363. Hecker in der Ztschr. d. histor. ver. /. Schwdben, I, 52.
The latest description of the Weber enterprise in Venezuela is Schumacher in
the Festschrift z. Erinnerung an die Entdeckung Amerikas, 3d. H (Hamburg,
1892). Habler has, however, discovered some n
THE- OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 143
with Hans Ebnei in Nuremberg, earned on a large trade in copper,
which is described as monopolistic, and that with the Fugger they par-
ticipated largely in the great loans which the Hapsburg brothers had to
take up in 1530; but of the details of this participation we know just as
little as of that of the Fugger.
Now came the time when the Welser, too, thought it necessary to give
anew splendour to their old burgher patriciate; in 1532 the Emperor
ennobled the brothers Bartholomew, Anton and Franz Welser two
years after the same elevation in rank had happened to the Fugger.
These Augsburg Welser remained Catholic; they did not, however, keep
so unwaveringly true to the house of Hapsburg as the Fugger did.
During the agitations preceding the election of Charles V their attitude
had been vacillating, and once they even wished to draw back alto-
gether. In contrast with the Fugger they had in Lyons a factory which
was very important for them, and their interests there compelled them
to a see-saw policy between the two parties into which Europe was then
politically separated. Their attitude towards the religious conflicts was
In 1527 their agent at Rome was thrown into prison because he would
not lend the Pope 1,000 ducats. In 1532 there were mutterings in Lyons
that the Welser had taken a part in the exchange business by means of
which, it was said, the Bong of France would support the Evangelicals;
and in 1534 they begged the Emperor to take back the money he had
deposited with them, presumably to use it against the Protestants in
case of need; for the Welser were frightened of being involved in the
religious conflict. 1 It is consistent with this ambiguous behaviour that
Bartholomew Welser, on the 6th April, 1541, obtained for himself, his
children, his partners and the employees in his business an express letter
of protection. The Fugger had never considered such a thing necessary.
During the whole period the Welser were, it is true, repeatedly men-
tioned in connection with large financial transactions of the Emperor
but never without the Fugger, so there is no need for us here to repeat
the details of these transactions. On the other hand, it is important that
the Welser participated with 50,000 livres in a loan which the King of
France, after the outbreak of the fourth war with the Emperor in 1542,
took up in Lyons; certainly they were half compelled to do this, and
they had nevertheless to pay for it later.
Here we may allude to the correspondence in 1542-5 between Hier-
onymus Seiler (Bartholomew's son-in-law, who earlier had represented
the firm in Spain, but had gone out of it) and Alexius Grimel, formerly
the Welser's agent in Antwerp. It appears from this correspondence,
which will repeatedly occupy us, that even then the Welser in monetary
Gayangos, Calendar III, 2, 76. Lanz, Correspmdem, H, 121, 169.
144 THE AGE OF THE FDGGER
matters did not always make towards their own relatives the advances
that these hoped for. Seiler observes 'they wanted to have too much. 9
The Time of the SchmalkaUvm War. During the Schmalkaldian war
we see that in their business practice the Welser strove more and more
to be neutral, which is an essential difference between them and the
Fugger. 1 In the previous chapter we have already seen that at the
beginning of this war the Welser probably participated in the exchange
transactions concluded for the Emperor by the Court of Brussels. But
the Emperor also wanted a large sum of cash in South Germany at once.
The Fugger were ready to help him there too, but the Welser, on the
other hand, decidedly refused, although, as the Emperor knew, they had
a large sum to receive at the next Antwerp fair. The Emperor was
bitterly offended at this refusal, and the Welser had to pay heavily for
it later.
In order to remain neutral as far as possible in the whole conflict,
Bartholomew Welser, on 13th June, 1546, asked for permission from the
Augsburg Council to be allowed to remain away from the town for three
years. Permission was given, on which he betook himself to Arbon, on
the Lake of Constance, where apparently he remained until the end of
the war. In fact, the Welser do not appear to have lent any more money
to either party. This reserve doubtless was mostly due to the conviction
that the house was already more than sufficiently engaged in relation
to its strength. In particular, the large capital which remained in Spain
and could not be withdrawn, and the unluckly enterprise in Venezuela,
caused Bartholomew Welser much anxiety. He therefore, in February,
1547, sent his nephew Christopher Peutinger to the head-quarters of the
Emperor to beg for an order to pay on account of the outstanding claims
of the Welser in Spain.
But the Emperor, who then was already Lord of South Germany,
wanted to punish the Welser for their former refusal to help him. By
this time Charles' tendency to despotism, which till then had been held
back from political considerations, had broken out. Bartholomew Wel-
ser was quite right when he sorrowfully said 'that the evening is no
longer just.' We have a picture by Titian of the Emperor dated shortly
before the Sf.TiTnfl.11ra.Mian war; he sits in an arm-chair, bent, oppressed
by gout, with his forehead full of wrinkles and an angry, piercing look in
his eyes. That was what 'the evening' looked like. Yet his counsellors
were more to blame than he was for the arbitrary proceedings which
now began both in the politics and in the financial methods of the
1 The basis of the following are the business letters of the Welser written by
Christof Peutinger from the Emperor's head-quarters at Ulm. These are in the
Augsburg Stadtbibliothek, Peutin^nana, voL I.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 145
In finance, in addition to the influence of the son of Granvella, Bishop
of Arras, that of the Imperial secretary, Francisco Erasso, was disas-
trous. We will later give an account in its place of the mysterious
activity of this man, whom we have already met in the previous chapter.
Here we only repeat the observations that Christopher Peutinger made
about him.
When Peutinger came to Erasso to make representations about the
payment of the older Spanish loans, he was informed that the Emperor
must again have money, and that he would give Netherlands bonds
of the Receivers General for it. As we have already seen, people then
did not like to take this kind of security, because they were only a
personal obligation on the Receivers General to pay. So Peutinger did
not agree, and when Erasso observed that the charges on Spanish
revenues could be given and Peutinger asked 'on which?' the Spaniard
answered 'Sobre qualquiera cosa.' From this and other expressions of
Erasso, Peutinger perceived that he 'was up to some bad tricks.' When
Peutinger represented to him that formerly the Welser had been given
good securities and had been well treated, Erasso answered, 'Time
changes things'; the Welser had made a lot of money out of the Em-
peror, now they must lend him at least 100,000 ducats. Peutinger be-
came quite 'confused and sorrowful' at this, and observed that Erasso
had the Emperor on his side and access to him at all times, while every-
thing that he, Peutinger, said vanished like foam, however well it may
have been justified. He thought that Erasso's expression, 'El tiempo
muda las cosas,' had somewhat the same meaning as what Granvella was
reported to have said, 'There is a time to promise and a time to keep
one's promise.' The chief aim of the Emperor's Spanish Council, and of
Erasso in particular, was to prevent the Emperor making use of Spanish
income in the German war. This is why the saying now ran, 'Eat bird
or die.' Peutinger's impression was strengthened when he talked with
the Bishop of Arras, who said 'even more shocking things' to him.
First of all the Bishop reproached the Welser that they had left the
Emperor in the lurch in his need at Regensburg. Peutinger answered
that at that time the firm did not know themselves what would happen
to them and their property. They had much money to demand from the
King of Portugal's agent in Antwerp and from the Court of the Nether-
lands, but they could not get any. This was why it had not been possible
to serve the Emperor except in Spain against repayment outside of
Spain. But this had not suited the Emperor.
Then the Bishop explained that the Emperor knew that the King of
France had raised large loans in Lyons in which the Welser had partici-
pated with at least 40,000 crowns, and under another name with yet
more. Peutinger replied that this was not correct. The Welser had only
146 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
once been compelled to lend the King 12,000 crowns in order to be
allowed to go on carrying on business in Lyons, which was necessary for
them in order to be able to serve the Emperor further; they had not
done it to get a profit. We must interpose here that this was not strictly
accurate. From tie Seiler correspondence we know that the Welser,
under Seller's name, took part in the large arbitrage transactions of the
Florentine Ducci in Antwerp with Lyons and served the financial needs
of the French Court. But from the Tucher business correspondence, to
which we shall return later, we see that also in 1545 they wished to
participate directly in the great loan at Lyons. At that time there was
no talk of any compulsion being used, but somewhat later it appears
that pressure certainly seems to have been employed to make the
German merchants in Lyons more accommodating towards the
financial needs of the French Court.
Thirdly, the Bishop of Arras blamed the Welser for having repaid
claims and paid interest to the German opponents of the Emperor,
although he had expressly, forbidden this. The excuse that the Welser
had not known of this prohibition would not do. It was a 'cosa publica,'
and the Emperor had nothing to do with the Welser blinding themselves.
Peutinger explained that no repayments worth mentioning had been
made, but that it was necessary to pay interest to keep up the credit of
the house. Moreover, the Fugger had paid interest to the Emperor's
opponents. To this the Bishop replied that this had been done only
with the express permission of the Emperor; the Fugger had behaved
well and not abandoned the Emperor in his great straits. 'This Bishop,'
bemoans Peutinger, 'is more disastrous for us than his father, resolute as
the devil; and they now mean to hold us tight.'
It did no good that Peutinger begged with tears that the Welser
should not be ruined. The Emperor treated him in a kindly way, but
referred him again to Erasso; and after he had bribed both him and the
Duke of Alba handsomely, he had to be thoroughly satisfied that they
were content with a loan of 100,000 fl. on the Emperor's mere note of
hand, without any particular income being allocated for repayment.
The arrangement which the Welser then made to get this money, the
way in which everywhere they collected small sums, how anxiously they
calculated the unfavourable course of exchange, shows clearly, especi-
ally if we compare the large scale arrangements of the Fugger, how tight
and difficult the financial position of the second largest German trading
house had become at bottom. The whole conduct of the Welser at this
period further shows that they were no match for the Fugger in political
insight and mercantile acuteness. Tet Bartholomew Welser must be
described as a man of business acumen. But its kind was a different one
and not so suitable as that of the Fugger for the practical management
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 147
of a business house of the first rank. This can be seen from the letter in
which Bartholomew Welser renders the impression which the Emperor's
conduct made on him.
If the Emperor's counsellors, he writes, reproach us that we are
'inutiles en tiempo de necesidad,' they should reflect how thoughtless it
was to begin a war without having supplied themselves with money and
troops, with the result that almost 'they and all of us together had gone
to destruction.' 'It is easy for Erasso and his people to succeed in cut-
ting straps out of other people's skin!' And what will be the result of
the present procedure? The 'hotheads' will bring everything to ruin; the
Emperor will soon be aware of the harm done. Already now we see that
in the Netherlands, where the Regent, through her financial agent
Ducci, will compel the merchants according to her will. The merchants
who must arrange their affairs in the most orderly way cannot endure
that longer than they must. Already much money was taken from the
Court of the Netherlands and sent to the French: 'in time perhaps things
will be yet more disastrous there'; in fact, woZite confidere in printipibus.
Some day credit will not be forced: 'for who will trust him in such large
sums to another and particularly to such a powerful lord as the Em-
peror, a lord with whom he cannot deal by question and answer; he will
only do it of goodwill and no longer on compulsion, cost hi what it
will.' If the Emperor does not consider this it will come to such a point
that in all his kingdoms he will no longer have any more money or credit.
Bartholomew Welser gave formal orders to his Spanish agent 'in
these times' to go into no new lending business, however high the profit
may be, and though by this the profits of the business are much dimin-
ished, and also not to spend so much on bribes and other expenses, and
generally slowly and carefully to reduce the whole business, but before
all to make use of every opportunity of remitting money to Germany.
This was just the same resolution as that at which the Fugger also
arrived somewhat Liter. The Welser too failed to carry it out. Anton
Fugger, thanks to the favour he had won of the Emperor by his true
services and, further, thanks to his own skilful management, succeeded
in a short time in drawing out of the business at least considerable
sums and bringing them into safety before new demands came on him.
The Welser did not succeed in doing this.
The Later Period till the Crisis of 1557. In 1549 we again find Bartho-
lomew Welser's Company taking part in loans which the Court of
Brussels had raised on the Antwerp Bourse. Paul Behaim, who then
went to Antwerp as the Imhof's agent, was instructed to implore the
Welser's agent there as far as possible to prolong the participation
which the Imhof had in that loan under the name of the Welser. In
this year the Welser sent to Antwerp a new agent, Conrad Bayr, who
148 THE AGE OF THE PUGGEE
formerly had been in the service of the Imhof. As soon as he came to
Antwerp he informed Paul Behaim 'he had entirely turned round; he
associated on the Bourse with no Germans except the Schetze (who
were treated as Germans), Lazarus Tucher, Jacob Welser and Oertel
(the Fugger agent), in short - very grave and important.' The persons
mentioned were the heads or representatives of the the most prominent
business houses, to which class the Welser still uncontestedly belonged.
A Venetian Ambassador, reporting from Germany in 1548, names the
Augsburg Welser with the Paumgartner as the richest German trading
company after the Fugger. 1
Bartholomew Welser participated with 70,000 Netherlands Carolua
gulden in the loan which the Emperor took up in Augsburg in April,
1551. But, like the Fugger, did not pay ready money, but only gave
promissory notes of his firm, which then were discounted at 11 per cent,
per annum in Antwerp by Wolff Haller von Hallerstein. 2
Soon after Bartholomew Welser retired from business, but he lived
on till 1561. His sons Christopher, Leonard, and Hans, with his nephews
Matthew and Marx Welser and Bartholomew May, carried on the busi-
ness under the style of Christopher Welser and Brothers, which later
was changed to Christopher Welser and Company. In June, 1552, we
find this firm in Antwerp taking part in large loans which were taken up
to send a fleet to Spain to fetch American silver. The city of Antwerp
took charge of the loan in the interest of the merchants, who were in
pressing need of silver. The Welser participated with 81,085 Caroms
gulden, for two fairs (a half-year) against interest at 6| per cent, pro rota
temporis. 3
We have now arrived at the third generation which had to conduct
the business of the Welser since it had grown to be of European impor-
tance. It proved to be just as critical for the wealth of the family as we
have seen in the case of the Fugger. In Antwerp, as in Spain and Lyons,
the Welser allowed themselves to be drawn on to new risky financial
business, and when the frightful financial crisis of 1557 overtook them
their shares were:
Florins
1. Unpaid Claims on the French Court 39,215
2. Netherlands Bonds of the Receivers General 20,523
3. Spanish Loans 122,461
Total 182.199
of which nothing was to be got. 4 ;
1 Panl Behaim'a (I) Correspondence in the Oermanisches Museum and Fmtes
Serum Avxtr. Abth. II, Bd. XXX, p. 71.
Departemental-Archiv. in Lille (Chambre dee Comptes, B. 2493).
1 Briisseler Staatsarchiv (Chambre des Comptea, No. 23470).
< Wete- Archives at Schloss Neunhof.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 149
It is less dangerous, but characteristic of the enterprising spirit of the
Welser that in the great loan which the town of Nuremberg had to take
up through the Fugger in 1554 to carry on the war with the Margrave,
they participated with 60,000 fl. (the whole amount was 110,000 fl.). In
this their Antwerp agent, Conrad Bayr, played the chief part, just as the
Antwerp agent of the Fugger at that time had perhaps more influence
on the management of the business than Anton Fugger himself. 1
After the state bankruptcy of 1557, the Welser received for their
claims on the Spanish Crown 5 per cent. Spanish Rentes (juros), on
which they must in any case have lost 40-50 per cent. In settling their
claims they showed so little business ability that the remarkably effi-
cient Spanish agent of the Fugger, in reporting home about it, critically
shook his head. 8
The claims on the French Court and the Netherlands bonds of the
Receivers General remained for the most part unpaid.
Decline and Final Catastrophe. In the period that follows we have not
sufficient information about the business activities of the Welser to be
able to obtain a just picture of the increasingly rapid decline of the
house. There is little point in repeating here the separate pieces of in-
formation of which we can get possession.
In the hard times of 1562, when the South German business houses
suffered their first shock, the credit of the Welser remained at first un-
shaken; it was even for a time better than that of the Fugger. In 156ti,
when the Fugger and most of the other South German houses had
enough to do to keep up their credit, the Welser could help the English
Crown with a very welcome loan. Gresham writes from Antwerp: 'For
these Welsers I could never get in, untill now; which be men of great
name and fame throughout all Christendom, and through the death of
his old factor (which was a dog and a ranke papist), and his factor, being
nowe, is one that I have dealt muche in times past for myne own affairs,
when I did occupie merchandise being in Spain xii yeres past, who
hathe persuaded his masters to enter.' 8
Yet with the progress of the confusion in the Netherlands and the
general credit crisis the credit of the Welser, too, must have quickly
declined in proportion. Their Antwerp property was sold in 1580.
About this time Christopher and Hans appear to have completely re-
tired from the business. Leonard had already died in 1557 and Matthew
in 1578. Christopher's son of the same name founded the Ulm line of
the house, the only one which still exists.
The conduct of the business then passed to Marcus Welser, who took
Imhof and Welser Family Archives.
Fugger Archives, 2, 5, 12. Letter from Valladolid of 23rd April, 1568.
Burgon, Life and Times of TAomat Graham, H, 166.
150 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
into partnership Ms nephew Matthew (son of the Matthew who died in
1578), and the business had the firm name of Marx and Matthew Welser
and Company. It was by then already so weakened that it got into
serious difficulties in 1587, and would like to have dissolved in 1590 if
this could have been done in face of the difficulty of getting in the large
Spanish and other outstanding debts. So the business was carried on
farther. Other attempts were made at oversea trading on a grand scale.
These are very interesting in themselves, but cannot be followed out
further here. 1
After the death of Marcus Welser in 1596 Matthew carried on the
business for another eighteen years in conjunction with his brothers,
Marcus and Paul. In 1603 he became Imperial Treasurer (Keichspfen-
nigmeister), but after three years had to give up this position and, as a
result of his administration, remained a creditor of the Emperor for
considerable sums - a fact which will have hastened the downfall of the
house. Paul became Burgomaster of Augsburg. Marcus became a well-
known polyhistorian, Chamberlain to the Treasury of the town of Augs-
burg and Imperial Counsellor. He died in 1614, and on the day after
his death his brother was declared bankrupt. 'If Marcus Welser had
remained alive,' says an Augsburg chronicler, 2 'the dreadful, terrible
bankruptcy would not yet have been made public, which has caused
great harm to the whole town.'
There are many statements of the assets and liabilities of the house
at the time of its collapse. They differ among themselves, but allow the
hopeless position to be clearly seen.
The Welser themselves stated that their assets amounted to
372,000 fl.
Fiorina
Of this amount claims on the Emperor were 181,000
On the Elector of Mainz 39,040
On the States of Brabant (in arrears since 1576) 30,000
Landed property is given as 46,600
But according to an expert valuation not more than 55,600 fl. out of
this 372,000 fl. was unquestionably good. All the rest was doubtful or
quite worthless. The liabilities, according to one compilation, amounted
to 586,575 fl.; to another, 509,992 fl. Among these are:
The Fugger 131,000 fl.
According to another probably more correct statement, 74,666 fl.
'Dobel, Pepper Trade of the Fugger and Weber, 1586-91 in Zttchr. d. hist.
Ver. f. Schwaben, SHI, 125 ff.
Stadtbibliothek, Chrnnik der Jakre 1546-1617 (Augustana No.
THE OTHEK GEEMAN FINANCIERS 151
The rest are sums under 100,000 fl., mostly belonging to relations and
friends of the house. In the days just before the bankruptcy the Welser
had taken up money which increased the general bitterness against
them. At the suit of Hannibal, the chief creditor, both the surviving
brothers were imprisoned and finally set in irons. They offered, if they
were set free, to make over to their creditors all their assets and deal
with them as directed, and also to make over to their creditors all
property they might acquire later. The creditors, however, regarded
this offer only as an attempt to deceive.
Paul Welser died in 1620, probably still in prison. Marcus spent his
last days in complete poverty, so that he had to be supported out of the
family trust. He died at the age of eighty in 1633.
Thus the world-wide business of the Welser came to an inglorious end.
They had never, like the Pugger, influenced the course of history by
their financial transactions. Their chief importance lies in their repeated
attempts to secure for themselves, as South German merchants, a share
in the trade of the world, even after the great discoveries. These at-
tempts will always remain memorable.
The Hochstetter. In the first decade of the sixteenth century the Hoch-
stetter was the most important business house in Augsburg after the
Fugger and Welser. Ambrosius Hochstetter was the soul of the busi-
ness. He carried it on with his brothers Hans and George and some
other partners, and later on took his sons Ambrosius and Joachim into
partnership. The firm changed from time to time. The Hochstetter
were among the first South Germans to set up a branch in Antwerp. In
1486 they bought a large piece of land in the Kipdorp Strasse, which
they built upon and rounded off. This was divided up after the collapse
of the house, and a street was made through it which still bears the
name 'Hochstetter Strasse.' 1
In 1489-so the Augsburger chronicler Clemens Sander relates -
Ambrosius Hochstetter visited the Archduke Maximilian, who was held
in prison by the burghers of Bruges, provided him with the means of
subsistence, and also lent him money which enabled him to appease the
men of Bruges. This story is not improbable, for the Hochstetter, even
at the time of their fall, enjoyed the quite special favour of the house of
Austria, and Clemens Sander was apparently informed of their relations.
The chief business of the firm was concentrated in Antwerp, where as
a rule a member of the family lived. In 1505 they participated with
4,000 fl. in the great expedition of the South German and Italian mer-
chants to the East Indies; and since then carried on an extensive trade at
second-hand in spices between Lisbon and Antwerp. The Hochstetter
were the most hated monopolists of their time. They acquired, it was
Thys, Histor, deatraten, en openbare ptaataen van Antteerpen.WL 1893, p. 272.
152 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
said, their capital in small sums as deposits, and employed it to control
the market of individual commodities. Clemens Sander informs us:
'Princes, Counts, nobles, burghers, farmers, serving-men and women
have deposited ike money they had with Ambrosius Hochstetter, and
he has paid them 5 per cent. Many farmers' boys, who had not more
than 10 gulden, have given it to him in his business, and thought it was
in good hands. For a time he must have paid interest on a million
gulden. But it was common talk that he lied freely. No one has'known
that he paid interest on so much. He was a good Christian and entirely
against the Lutherans. But in his business he has often oppressed the
poor man, not only in the large articles of the world market, but also in
small wares. Thus he bought up ash wood when the roads were good and
brought it to market when the roads had become bad. He did the same
with wine and corn. He has often bought up the whole stock of one com-
modity at more than it was worth, so that he could squeeze at his
pleasure the other merchants who could not do this. Then he has raised
the price of goods in all lands and sold them at his pleasure.'
His own partners, too, made heavy complaints against Ambrosius
Hochstetter. In 1517, the year in which the great trading business of
the Welser split up on account of similar disputes, Bartholomew Bern, a
partner in the Hochstetter Company, complained to the town bailiff of
Augsburg and then, as he did not give him justice, to the Emperor and the
Empire that the Hochstetter had fraudulent balance sheets. Eem had
only 900 fl. in the business. He claimed 30,000 fl. as the profit on this
for six years, while the Hochstetters would only pay out 26,000 fl. to
him. If these figures are correct, the firm during the six years had made
an average annual profit of 500-600 per cent., which is quite incredible.
But in any case the suit was a perfect godsend, for the public opinion,
which was embittered against the large companies apart from that, and
particularly for the nobility who powerfully supported the discontented
Bern. Finally there was an arbitration, presided over by Jakob Fugger,
which awarded him part of his claim. Yet he considered his claim just,
wished to take the law into his own hands and pay himself out of the
Hochstetter's goods. For this he was put in prison, where he died. This
is Clemens Sander's account.
The Hochstetter speculated far beyond their resources. As it after-
wards appeared, their own capital was by no means very large, which
again tells against the enormous figures for profits. For even if, as was
said, the business had lost a ship and other goods had been stolen in
transit by street robbers, and if in addition the sons and son-in-law of
Ambrosius Hochstetter were gamblers and wasters, yet after such fabu-
lous profits the capital could not possibly have been so much diminished
. by these means as it is stated to be in 1528.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 153
In the years 1511-17 the Hochstetter obtained a considerable part of
the output of the Tyrolese silver and copper. But the business with
which the firm chiefly occupied itself in the last years of its existence
was a large speculation in quicksilver. They had bought up some for
200,000 fl. and thought they could control the market, when new rich
deposits were discovered in Spain and Hungary. In vain they tried to
get hold of these. The speculation failed and the Hochstetter lost a
third of the price they had paid. 1
Yet, in September, 1526, an agent of the English Crown in Antwerp
says that the Hochstetter are as rich and capable of performing their
undertakings as the Welser, on which the payment of the English sub-
sidies to the hard-pressed King of Hungary was transferred to them.*
Yet some months later in merchants' letters, written from South Ger-
many to Antwerp, there appear mysterious hints that the credit of the
house no longer appears to be secure. It appears now that the Hoch-
stetter plunged into a whirlpool of new business to escape the threatened
destruction. In April, 1527, Joachim Hochstetter, one of the sons of old
Ambrosius, obtained from the English Government permission for ten
years to import goods into and export goods from England. Hitherto no
South German merchant had ever done this. As immediately after
there was a great rise of prices in England he imported a considerable
quantity of wheat. In doing so he came into business relations with
Richard Gresham, a highly respected member of this celebrated mer-
chant family.
In March, 1528, Eichard Gresham recommended him to Wolsey, as
one of the richest merchants in the Netherlands and having much in-
fluence both at the Court of Brussels and in Germany. Hochstetter had
been very helpful to Gresham and other Englishmen when they had been
imprisoned in the Netherlands. But soon he himself needed their help.
Just then there were five or six ships loaded with grain for the Hoch-
stetter to be sent to England. Differences arose. The corn was seized in
Holland, and the Hochstetter, who had sold it to Eichard and John
Gresham for delivery against English cloth, could not fulfil their con-
tract. In July, 1528, Joachim Hochstetter himself travelled to England,
where he had often been before. There he accused the Greshams, saying
that during his last journey to England they had scorned him as bankrupt
in the Netherlands and done him harm in every way, so that the credit
of his house had been shaken in all Europe and he would be compelled
to sell a quantity of quicksilver under value only to obtain ready money
to pay his creditors. He demanded compensation from the Greshams
1 Here again our principal authority is Clemens Sander. Of. Gayangos, Calen-
dar HI, 2, 337, for the Spanish quicksilver mines.
' Brewer, Calendar IV, No. 2485, and 2662.
154 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
for the damage he had suffered. 1 Soon the house was completely
ruined.
In August, 1528, the Hochstetter concluded the following transaction
with the Court of Brussels. 8 The Imperial troops in Guelden had then to
be paid at once, or they would scatter. The Hochstetter declared them-
selves ready to lend 200,000 Garolus gulden to the Court of Brussels.
They handed over no cash, but 350,700 pounds of quicksilver and 60,760
pounds of cinnabar, which the Government on their side had to sell.
The sale was entrusted to Lazarus Tucher, a Nuremberger who had
settled in Antwerp, who already had carried on big transactions, especi-
ally in pepper, for the Hochstetter, the Welser and Manlich, and at that
time was the chief agent for South German speculation in Antwerp.
Lazarus Tucher explained to the Government that he had only been
able to get 126,000 Carolus gulden instead of 200,000 for the quicksilver
and cinnabar; also these articles were not saleable; and since he had not
been able to find buyers for the whole parcel, he, too, could not pay the
126,000 Carolus gulden in ready money, but only in instalments extend-
ing over many months. So the Government lost 74,000 Carolus gulden,
which appeared very excessive to the chief Receiver General of the
Netherlands, but was agreed to by the Emperor in view of his pressing
need for money. Through this transaction Lazarus Tucher came into
continued business relations with the Government of the Netherlands.
That Antwerp agent of the Tucher of Nuremberg, but who had no busi-
ness relations with Lazarus, reports of him in November, 1528: 'Since
the Hochstetter have got into bad repute he does not talk so loud and is
almost bankrupt himself, and conceals himself behind them, but each
day extricates himself, and alleges that they still owe him 1,400 pounds
Flemish for commission alone, on account of which he has now quar-
relled with the Hochstetter, who won't pay it him. He is blamed for
having brought them in and got them into ill repute. But he is clever
enough, and will know how to carry the matter through.' In July, 1529,
the same agent farther states: 'He now stands very well, but much is
said behind his back. Financing the Court had profited him and des-
troyed others.' This last refers to the Hochstetter who were then in a
very bad way: 'They have got a bad repute; no one is here (in Antwerp)
on their behalf except two servants; many fear that they will go to
smash completely next quarter day.'
In Antwerp Lazarus Tucher was considered responsible for the fall of
the house. Joachim Hochstetter himself blames the Greshamsfor having
ruined his credit; and in Lyons there was another scapegoat. By March,
Brewer, Lc. Nor 3087 (22), 3863, 4018, 4147, 4552, 4662. Gairdner. Calendar V,
No. 1774, belongs here. The date 1532 is certainly wrong.
Lille, Chambre des Comptes, B, 2345, and 2357.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 155
1528, the Tucher's agent sends information from Lyons 'that this
quarter day the Hochstetters have almost lost their credit, so that no-
body was willing to let them have money on bills.' 'The servant of the
Manlich did them a lot of harm by speaking too loud about them, and
has let them have nothing on bills, so the brokers we're induced to warn
one another of them. They had to pay a balance of 26,000 crowns here,
but they could only get 6,000 crowns without giving security. Finally
they induced Hans Welser and Marcus Lauginger to back their bills.
Further, Matthew Bern - this was their agent in Lyons - had assigned
to Wolff Harstorf er his body and property, and also all the quicksilver,
cinnabar and copper belonging to the Hochstetters in Lyons, together
worth 14,000 fl. If this had not been done they must have failed, for
they had accepted all bills of exchange. In Augsburg, too, there was
a powerful 'run' on the house, which, in fact, in a short time paid out
some 400,000 fl. At the last moment they made over a claim of 200,000
Carolus gulden on the Court of the Netherlands to the Fugger and Jean
Marcelis in Antwerp; this was disputed later on by the unpaid creditors.
In the spring of 1529 the old Ambrosius Hochstetter implored the
Fugger to help him in his need. He proposed that the creditors might
choose representatives to whom he should disclose the whole of his
assets and liabilities. This actually appears to have been done. But the
further proposal, that 100,000 fl. should be collected to maintain the
house, was not carried out. The chief creditors preferred to be satisfied
at once, which naturally made the catastrophe unavoidable. 1
At the beginning of June, 1529, Lazarus Tucher took over claims of
the Hochstetter in Portugal and Antwerp, as well as a large quantity of
pepper that they had to receive from the King of Portugal. Further, in
discharge of a debt which the Hochstetter had only contracted in Feb-
ruary of the same year, he took over all their extremely valuable leal
property in Antwerp. 2
The liabilities of the Hochstetter amounted then to over 400,000 fl., of
which more than 150,000 fl. had already been called in. Certainly they
themselves estimated their assets at 661,000 fl., but, according to a sober
estimate, they were only worth 180,000 fl., and could not with certainty
be reckoned at more than 70,000 fl. In these circumstances the collapse
could not be kept off. Only after long efforts, in which King Ferdinand
through his own commissioner took an active part, was an agreement
come to in February, 1530.
The family never recovered from this blow in Augsburg. But one of
the two sons of the old Ambrosius, the Joachim whom we have often
mentioned founded a new branch of the family in England, which
iFugger-Archiv.2,2,1.
'Antuerpener SchdffenMefe, 2 and 8 June, 1529.
156 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
flourished for a long time. Before the catastrophe Henry VIII had
appointed him 'Principal Surveyor and Master of all Mines in England
and Ireland.' 1 With his help the King wished to assist the English min-
ing, which was then in its infancy. Joachim Hochstetter, with six other
Germans, had offered to work all the mines discoverable in England, and
as a start to introduce 1,000 miners from Germany. How far these high-
flying intentions were then realized is quite uncertain. But in any case
Joachim's son, Daniel, lived in England and was the chief agent of that
large South German Company which under Elizabeth, as we shall see,
appears, in fact, to have given a strong impetus to English mining. In
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we come across his descendants
in Hamburg as members of the Merchant Adventurers Company who had
their chief factory there; this was the same Company which, under
Elizabeth, had ruined the active trade of the Hansa towns with England
There are certainly remarkable intricacies of industrial developments.
The Herwart. The Herwart of Augsburg are one of the most interest-
ing of the South German families, which makes it all the more regret-
table that we know so little of their business. In 1498 and 1499 we find
George Herwart and his brothers, one of whom was Christopher, par-
ticipating together in the often-mentioned copper syndicate with the
Fugger, Grossenbrot and the Paumgartner. This implies that their busi-
ness was then akeady of importance. In 1511 Clais de Clerc, in Antwerp,
is mentioned as agent of Christopher Herwart, and the latter with
the Florentine, Filippo Gualterotti, was a creditor of the Netherlands
Government, which had obtained loans from the two totalling 29,000
livres Artois (at 40 gr. Flemish) for the war in Guelders, at a rate of
interest about 20 per cent, per annum. 2 This is the first purely financial
transaction that we hear of from a South German merchant from the
Netherlands. Later on, too, we find the Herwart participating earlier
and more largely in the financial transactions of the Netherlands than
most of the other South German trading houses. In 1522 Marcus and
Hans Herwart Brothers acquired a house in Antwerp. Their agent there
then and in 1524 was Andreas Smut. In 1522 they paid out 10,000 livres
Artois in Antwerp for the account of the Netherlands Government.
In the same year, 1522, we come across in Antwerp another firm of
the family - Christopher Herwart and Company - which lent the Court
of Brussels 64,000 livres Artois at about 20 per cent. This loan was many
times renewed and not paid back until 1525. Lucas von Stetten appears
as agent of this firm. For the period from October, 1523, to December,
1525, he claimed the sum of 10,251 arrears of interest, since the loan
1 Brewer, Calendar IV, 5110. Also Ehrenberg, Hamburg und England im
Zetiatter der Konigin Elisabeth, p. 5 ff.
Lille, B, 2218.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 157
was mostly paid off in small instalments during this period: that would
have been at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum. But the Netherlands
financial administration was not willing to pay so much; finally, they
agreed on 8,000 livres, which corresponds to interest at about 9 per cent,
per annum. In the year 1529-31, too, Hans, Marcus, George, Christo-
pher and Erasmus Herwart participated largely in the big financial
transactions of the Netherlands Government. Once Marcus appears in
conjunction with George, at another time with Christopher; while Hans
and Erasmus are mentioned alone. George Meuting is mentioned as the
Antwerp representative of Marcus, Christopher, and Erasmus. 1 In 1542
the city of Antwerp took up a loan from the heirs of Hans Herwart. It
is certain that some members of the family had settled in Antwerp.
King Ferdinand, too, repeatedly obtained large loans from the Her-
wart. Thus in 1528 45,000 fl. (of which 20,000 fl. was in linen and cloth)
from Christopher Herwart in conjunction with Pimel; 13,000 fl. in 1541;
95,000 fl. in 1546; 100,000 fl. in 1547; and 199,442 fl. in 1549. 2
Part of the family remained true to the Catholic faith. In particular,
Hans Herwart was one of those whose letters were opened by the Pro-
testants in the Schmalkaldian war; while George, who was Burgomaster
in 1546, belonged to the opposite party. It is very doubtful whether this
Hans, whose anti-Protestant attitude we have just mentioned, is iden-
tical with theancestors of the same name of the later Augsburg line of the
family. For the last-mentioned Hans was a son of the Protestant Burgo-
master, George Herwart, and his sons again participated to a quite
prominent extent in the loans of the French Crown, with which, since
that time, the fortunes of the house were involved in a wonderful manner.
In 1546 we hear for the first time that the Herwart, through the
agency of Hans Kleberg, participated in a loan of the French Court
raised in Lyons. But we do not know which members of the family they
were. In 1553 Hans Paul and Hans Heinrich Herwart (the sons of Hans
and grandsons of George) participated with 46,500 crowns in the great
loan which the foreign merchants in Lyons had granted to the King of
France. Of these two brothers Hans Paul, in 1576, after the failure of the
house of the Manlich, became insolvent, and made over to his creditors
amongst other things his claims on the French Court. The other brother
continued the family in Augsburg, where it, however, never attained to
a particularly prosperous condition. 3
* Antwerpener Schoffenbrie/e, 7th Nov., 1522, 6th Feb. and 15th Nov., 1624; Lille,
B, 2301, 2315, 2320, 2351, 2357, 2361. Antw. Stads-Protocollen ed. Pauwds, I, 33.
* Thorsch, MateriaKen.z. Einer GesMchte der osterr. Staatasckulden, pp. 28, 34,
39,40fi.
* For the bankruptcy of Hans Paul Herwart cf. Hans Herwarth von Bittenfeld
in der Ztscto. d. Awfor. Vereins f. Schwaben, IX, 147 ff. Cf. v. Stetten, Gesch. d.
augsb. Geschlechter, and Seiferts, Genealog. Tabdlen.
158 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
On the other hand, two other sons of the Burgomaster George, Ulrich
and Jacob Herwart, settled completely in Lyons. Jacob died there
young in 1572; while Ulrich, who had married a Welser, left descendants
in France. Of these Daniel (born in!574, and married in Lyons in 1599)
is worthy of mention, because his sons, Bartholomew and John Heinrich
Herwart, played an important part under Louis XIV. This will occupy
us later. 1
Hieronymus Seller. Sebastian Neidhart and His Heirs. Hieronymus
Seiler is the stepson of Bartholomew Welser whom we already know of,
who at first had been in the Welser Company and then with Alexius
Grimel, a former agent of the same company, and had during 1536-45
carried on financial business in Antwerp in conjunction with the Floren-
tine Gaspar Ducci. This company was international. They lent money
to the Court of the Netherlands, but if they could utilize it better at
Lyons and with the French Court, they did it in spite of the Emperor's
prohibition. Political events only interested them so far as they had an
influence on business and business profits. In 1544 the Seiler and their
associates lent to the Netherlands Government 100,000 fl. at 16 per cent,
per annum on the alum tax. But the business went over into other
hands; and since soon after there was more to be made in Lyons than in
Antwerp the company remitted from the last-mentioned place to the
former large sums which should be lent to the King of France in the
name of Seiler, because he was Swiss by birth and so a neutral, and
belonged to a race particularly protected in France. The business with
Lyons had to be carried on very cautiously and secretly, since the
Emperor repeatedly had suspicious letters opened. Sebastian Neidhart
also took a large share both in the Netherlands business of 1544 and in
the operations conducted in Lyons in the following year. He was a son-
in-law of that Christopher Herwart in Antwerp who has often been
mentioned. As his heir he is mentioned in 1530 in connection with the
imperial finance in the Netherlands. We then find him, too, in the
Fugger balance sheet for 1536, in their large Spanish financial transac-
tions, and in the ledgers of the Haug for 1541-7 as having, together with
the Haug and the Fugger, a still larger interest in the loans granted by
these companies to King Ferdinand. Also, in 1546, he had lent the
Fugger the considerable sum of 14,570 pounds Flemish at 2J per cent,
per quarter.
Sebastian Neidhart was an international financier. That especially
came out in the war of Schmalkalden. At that time the Protestants
1 What follows is chiefly drawn, from the documents in the Augsburg Staats-
arehives. For the lawsuit against Neidhart, Seller, Ducci and Partners see
AngsbnrgerChroiiiolers(e.g. die Chronik 1648-63 im Augsb. Stadtarohiv, Schatze
lOa). Also Sentences du corueil dc Brabant in the Brussels Archives.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 159
suspected him and had his letters opened. But, at the same time, in
conjunction with Seller, Grimel, and some other South Germans, as well
as with the Florentine Simon Pecori, he established a trading company
in Lyons which was managed by Pecori. In Antwerp this company
again came into connection with Gaspar Ducci and carried on a flourish-
a August, 1546, just at the time when his letters were being opened
by the Schmalkaldians Neidhart writes from Augsburg to Seller, who
was then in Antwerp, 'I should have no objection to lending half (of the
company's capital) to the King of France.' Seller agreed; Grimel recom-
mended that the sum should be lent to the merchants in Lyons, which
was safer. But he was outvoted, and Pecori did, in fact, on behalf of the
firm, participate in October, 1546, in a loan to the French Court with
20,000 kronen at 4 per cent, per quarter = 16 per cent, per annum.
The King then used this money to support the German Protestants.
In the following years this traffic was continued and gradually be-
came of larger and larger dimensions. The company remitted and
drew bills of exchange continually between Antwerp and Lyons. When
money was abundant they borrowed and sent it where it got the highest
rate. Soon individual partners, especially the two Florentines, tried to
produce an artificial tightness of money in Lyons. Neidhart advised
against this at first because it was dangerous and fundamentally 'an
ungodly business, by which wealthy people must be undone, so that I
think when this business is finished I will never go into a similar one,
because it is cargo consdentice.' But he also wanted to get as high a rate
of interest as possible, and finally himself gave advice how to make
money still tighter. He feared, however, that as soon as Bartholomew
Welser and his stepson, Hans Paul Herwart, got wind of the affair they
would operate powerfully against it. In 1549-50 the company had lent
to the King of France more than 100,000 kronen, the greater part of
which belonged to Sebastian Neidhart.
The Court of Brussels had long suspected the dealings of the company
and had, it appears, received a direct denunciation from Antwerp,
where Ducci was generally hated, and at the beginning of the year 1550
had seized a number of letters of the company with remittances for
Lyons. Since their contents were suspicious Seller, Grimel and Ducci
were imprisoned; after some months, however, they were set at liberty
on heavy bail. The accusation was of usury and monopoly. In the
reasons alleged it was stated that the accused had attempted to force
the Antwerp Bourse so that the monetary position should be regulated
as they wished. The Procurator-General demanded: against Seiler and
Grimel, confiscation of all their goods and perpetual banishment from
the Emperor's territories; for Ducci, the death penalty, and, if necessary,
160 THE AGE OP THE FUGQEB
at first examination under torture. But, finally, the case dragged on till
the end of 1551 - Grimel and Seller were condemned to pay a fine of
60,000, and Ducci one of 20,000 Carolus gulden, and to pay the costs.
So the punishment of the two Germans was materially heavier than that
of the Florentine, who possessed powerful patrons in Brussels. 1
Since this nothing more is told of Hieronymus Seiler. On the other
hand, Michel Seiler, a relative, perhaps his son, represented the Welser
in Lyons from 1553 to 1580, and personally participated in the loans of
the French Court. Grimel tried to rehabilitate himself by serving the
Netherlands Government as money broker; yet he appears to have had
little luck with it and vanishes completely after 1552. Ducci's part, too,
was played out with the long case.
Neidhart, who, it appears, was also imprisoned for a short time, must
have died soon after. He left behind him four sons - Carl, Christopher,
Paul, and Matthew. In 1553 Christopher Neidhart was the person who,
next to the Florentine house Salviati, took the largest share in the great
loan which the King of France had raised in Lyons. On the list his
amount is 124,450 crowns, and, in addition, Gabriel Neidhart is on the
list for 20,900 crowns.
Finally, we possess a very interesting ledger of Neidhart's heirs for
the period 1559-70, from which it appears that the heirs carried on the
banking business on a large scale, but finally were ruined by it. In 1564
the claim on the French Court had risen to 627,780 livres. It is true
that up to 1567 20,000 livres were paid off. But the repayments ceased,
and in 1570 the claim amounted to 496,583 livres, or 269,882 Ehenish
florins. After that no more was ever got in. The firm then had a claim
of 120,132 fl. against the King of Portugal, which likewise remained
unpaid. This claim, too, was a very old standing one. Further, Neid-
hart's heirs participated in the advances which the German merchants
in Lyons granted to the Cardinal of Lorraine and the Duke of Guise, the
arch enemies of the Huguenots, in order, through their mediation, to
obtain reimbursement of their claims on the French Court. But this did
not happen, and the Guise gave just as little heed to repaying their own
debt. Money was also lent to the Infante Don Carlos of Spain on
inadequate security of jewels; the money should have been repaid in
1567, but was not, and since the Prince came to a tragic end the next
year the debt was still outstanding in 1570. It was the same with a debt
of the Duke of Florence, which dated from the year 1553. In short, the
total assets of Neidhart's heirs, which at the end of 1570 were computed
at 494,335 fl., consisted almost entirely of barren outstanding debts.*
1 According to his actual documents. The Augsburg Chronicler gives a different
account.
* The ledger is in the Augsburg Archives.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 161
The Neidhart were closely connected with the Manlich by buBinesa
and family ties. Gail Neidhart was the son-in-law and partner of the
older Melchior Manlich. When the Manlich failed in 1574 it was all over
with the Neidharts, and the family in Augsburg became extinct with
Carl's sons in 1625.
The Manlidi. The Manlich of Augsburg are mentioned as important
traders in goods in the business correspondence of the Tucher for 1526-S,
and in truth they at that time were people of some consequence both in
Lyons and Antwerp. Until the fall of their house they remained whole-
sale merchants proper, and just before the catastrophe they carried on
from Marseilles - where they had set up a factory - an unusually im-
portant direct trade by sea to the Levant with their own ships. This had
been done by no other German trading house. But like almost all the
other merchants of Augsburg they could not resist the temptation of
taking part in the business of lending to princes, which brought them
down.
In 1543 Mathias Manlich, in Antwerp, in conjunction with the Faum-
gartner and the Haug, lent King Ferdinand 60,000 fl., and the Nether-
land Government in bonds of the Receivers General a sum which is not
specified. During the years 1543-62, Melchior Manlich had a share in
the Haugs, 1
In 1553 Mathias Manlich lent the Fugger 14,000 fl.; two years after-
wards he took a lease of the copper output from Neusohl in Hungary
and granted King Ferdinand a new loan of 97,750 fl. In 1559 we also
find Manlich financing Ferdinand. But their ruin was not due to this,
but rather to their share in the French financial transactions. How this
participation came about and how large it was cannot, unfortunately,
be ascertained from the material available. But how large it must have
been appears from the fact that in 1564-7 Oswald Seng, the Manlich
agent in Lyons, managed the syndicate which represented the interests
of the South German creditors of the French Court. And in November,
1573, when the house was on the verge of bankruptcy, Adam Hartlieb,
who then for a short time had been in the service of Melchior Manlich
the elder, rode to Lyons with Carl Neidhart, Melchior's son-in-law and
partner, to rescue there what was to be rescued. Shortly before the
Manlich, in Marseilles at any rate, enjoyed the best credit. But at the
end of 1573, or the beginning of the next year, the catastrophe arrived.
That in the Netherlands the Gueux had taken away 50,000 fl. worth of
pepper helped to accelerate the crash. The liabilities of the house are
1 Ci for the following: Oberleitner, Archiv, fur Kunde osterr. Gtsch.-QueUen,
XXH, p. 101; Thoraoh, l.o. p. 44; v. Stetten, GesehicJOe von Augsburg, I, 602,
608; Hans Ulrich Kraffts, Denkwtodigkeiten, bearb. v. A. CoJm; Hans Hartlieba
Tagebuoh (MS. of the Hartlieb family).
162 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEE
given on the one hand as 70,000 fl., but, on the other, and moie prob-
ably as 307,554 fl. Their Levant agent, Hans Ulrich Krafft, confident
of the solvency of the house, guaranteed their extensive obligations,
with the result that he spent three years in a debtor's prison, of which
he composed a detailed and very attractive account.
The Adler. The Adler of Augsburg appear early in the history of
South German financial business, but they also vanish again- betimes.
In 1507 the Venetian Quirini numbers them with the Fugger, Welser,
Hochstetter, Gossembrot, Paumgartner and Herwart as the seven great
trading companies of Augsburg, which at that time lent the Emperor
Ma^niiHan 150,000 fl. on the security of landed property.* In 1522 we
come across Fhilipp Adler in Antwerp, where he conducted for the
Netherlands Government an exchange business with South Germany,
which, it must be admitted, was not a very important one. In 1530 the
Emperor borrowed 18,000 kronen from him in Antwerp, in respect of
which 20,160 kronen was repaid in Antwerp after half a year, which
means that this transaction cost the Emperor 24 per cent, for exchange
difference and interest. The sum was got in in Antwerp through Jacob
Welser. After this we do not hear anything about the Adler.
The Bern. The Bern in Augsburg had no conspicuous or independent
significance in the dealings in capital of the sixteenth century. As agents
of the Welser and Hochstetter, they served these great trading houses
truly in their business, but then quarrelled with them and left them.
Thereupon, in 1518, the brothers Lucas and Andreas Bern established a
business of their own which then often participated in the great financial
transactions of the Fugger. Also, in 1522, they paid to Franz Sickingen
for the Emperor an advance which after six months they received back
from the Netherlands Government. This would scarcely have been a
sufficient reason for a particular mention of them here, but the Bern
family were fond of writing. A cousin of the two brothers just men-
tioned composed a chronicle of Augsburg, and Lucas Bern kept a diary
which is justly used as an important source for the history of civiliza-
tion. Here all that is important is the statement - to which we are in-
debted to Lucas Bern - of the profits of his company. This shows rates
of profit varying from 2J per cent, to 14$ per cent., or an average profit
of 8} per cent, per annum over 21$ years, which is by no means a high
in 1541 his share in the capital amounted to 57,000 fl. His son of the
same name succeeded in almost six months (reckoned from the time
Bern joined the Welser Company) in losing the money earned by his
father in twenty years of hard work.
* AlMri, Jfeto* d. Ambatc. Venet., XIV, 28; also Lille, Chambre des Comptes, B,
2301, 2363; Lanz, Correspandenz, I, 405.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 163
Lucas Bern the younger was one of those who as early as 1546 re-
mitted money from Antwerp to Lyons in order to lend it to the French
Court there. He then participated more and more in this finance busi-
ness of Lyons. Thus in 1558 he put in 63,000 livres all at once. That
was fatal to him. He was one of the numerous Augsburg merchants who
had to suspend payment in 1562, and he died soon after.
The Haug and their Relatives. This Augsburg house, considerable in
itself, is important for us owing to the circumstance that we possess the
chief books of the company for a period of more than thirty years, and
from them can follow out very well the business activity of the firm, and
in particular how they got more and more involved in big financial busi-
ness and how the trade in goods fell into the background. 1
On 1st September, 1531, Anton Haug the elder, Hans Langnauer and
Ulrich Link, with some partners of secondary importance, signed
articles of partnership for six years, and also took into partnership a
number of their employes. The total capital amounted to 90,815 fl.;
the number of partners was seventeen. The firm had agents in Antwerp,
Venice, Cologne, Nuremberg, Ulm, and Schwatz in Tyrol. They obtained
spices, silks and cotton from Venice, copper and silver from Schwatz,
spices and English cloth from Antwerp. In Ulm and Augsburg they
wove wool into fustian and sent it for the main part to Antwerp. But
they carried on pure loan business as well with Ki^g Ferdinand, in
which they partly operated alone, partly in conjunction with the Fugger
and the Herwart.
When two years had elapsed the company with 90,815 fl. had gained
no less than 85,461 fl. - that is, 47 per cent, per annum. Because of this
heavy profit 20,000 fl. were put to reserve, and after withdrawing
10,000 fl. a capital of 144,000 fl. was carried forward.
On the 25th August, 1533, the assets in round figures were 410,000 fl.
Of these 92,000 fl. represented the financial transactions with the Aus-
trian Court. The rest consisted in the main of goods, documents
representing goods, and cash. In Augsburg the assets amounted to
111,000 fl.; in Antwerp, 86,000 fl.; in Cologne, where the silks were
mainly sold, 25,000 fl.; in Venice, 16,000 fl.; and 60,000 fl. were employed
in the Schwatz business, and so on.
The liabilities consisted of 235,000 fl. in eighty-nine items, of which
the most considerable belonged to the wives and children of some rela-
tions and friends.
We have no information for the years 1533-5. But these years must
have been extraordinarily favourable for the business, for the capital
with which in 1535 they entered into a new partnership amounted to
340,000 fl., although meanwhile many partners had retired. Allowing
'The ledgers are in the Augsburg Archives,
164 THE AGE OP THE PUGGER
for the shares of these, the capital must have trebled from 1533 to 1535.
It is given as 90,815 fl. in 1531 and 340,010 fl. in 1535. But after this
brilliant development a period of stagnation followed. In the eight
years 1535-43 there was only a total profit of 82,744 fl., which makes
about 3 per cent, per annum. During this period the business in goods
was continued, a new factory established in Lyons; on the other hand,
one at Cologne was given up.
In the balance sheet for 1543 the increase (probably a recent one) of
the Antwerp financial business becomes prominent. In this way almost
30,000 fl. (= 140,000 fl.) were invested; but, on the other hand, the
sums of this kind outstanding in Germany only totalled 55,000 fl., and
thus were considerably lower than in 1533. At that time the firm had
had no financial transactions in Lyons.
Meantime, Hans Langnauer had died; his capital for the most part
remained in the business as a deposit-carrying interest. Melchior Man-
lich and a younger Hans Langnauer entered tike firm, but both brought
in little, so that the capital of the company was diminished by about
90,000 fl. and was carried on as only 295,067 fl. for the new partnership.
The next two years were again very favourable. With 295,067 fl.
there was a profit of 94,928 fl., that is 16 per cent, per annum. 'But after
this time the course of all business was anxious and heavy, and one must
be apprehensive of waste' - it was shortly before the war of Schmal-
kalden - so 6,023 fl. were put to reserve.
The claims from the Antwerp financial business amounted in 1545 to
40,000 fl. (= 180,000 fl.), so they were about 10,000 higher than in
1543; on the other hand, the German financial engagements had de-
clined to 46,000 fl.
The two years 1545-7 brought in good profits; on 356,000 fl. there was
a profit of 98,000 fl., or about 14 per cent, per annum. The next two
years were still better; in them on 365,000 fl. a profit of 124,000 fl. was
attained, i.e. 17 per cent, per annum.
The German 'Court contracts' fell off in this period, while the claims
arising out of Antwerp financial transactions increased up to 1549 to
53,600 fl. (= 230,000 fl.). But, as well as this, in 1547 there was in
addition a claim of 36,000 crowns on the French Court, which up to 1549
increased by compound interest to 40,000 crowns or 60,000 fl.
In 1549 the total capital was diminished by 200,000 fl., and went back
to about the position of the year 1535. The firm's name then was 'Ulrich
Link, Anton Haug and Relatives.' But this great reduction of capital
was not due to any mistrust for the future of the business, but appar-
ently arose from the desire of the partners not to let too much capital
share in the profits, especially the shares of the deceased partners in the
capital. These were at once received again as deposits at interest. Since
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 165
this time the capital of the company diminished more and more, while
the deposits of the former partners increase more and more.
In particular, after the balance sheet of 1553, Ulrich Link and Anton
and Lienhard Hang went out of the firm. After that their capital
carried interest at 7f per cent. In 1555 Hans Pimel retired, so that only
eight partners remained. This number sank to four in 1560, which pre-
sumably was due to the increasing distaste for business of the more
cautious elements. The partners who remained plunged into more enor-
mous and world-wide undertakings, which were directly forced on them
by the enormous quantity of deposits at high interest at their disposal.
The profits were very goed during this period. But if we reflect how
small the capital was compared to the turnover, the average profit does
not appear to be remarkably high.
The average yearly profit was:
Per cent.
1549-51 12
1551^53 11|
1553-55 11
1555-67 10J
1557-60 40
1560-61 10J
The real solid trading went more and more into the background. The
chief activities of the firm were directed to money transactions and par-
ticularly in carrying on the copper mining works at Schwatz and the sale
of the copper produced.
According to the balance sheet of 31st December, 1561, there was:
Florins
Locked up in mines, houses and barren debts 200,000
Lent to the Emperor 212,000
Stocks in hand, chiefly copper 157,000
Divers debtors 219,000
Cash in hand 122,000
fl. 910,000
Against this their own capital (including the profits for
1560-61) was 268,000
Borrowed capital 642,000
A very critical position for a business to be in. Now, at the end of
1562, Melchior Manlich retired from the business, leaving only three
166 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
partners'- David Hang, Hans Langnauer, and Melchior link. The capi-
tal will also have become smaller, but unfortunately this cannot be
established since no more balance sheets are available. On the other
hand, we know that for the claim on the Emperor they had been given
a charge on the produce of the Hungarian copper, and this gave the
company almost the same control of the copper trade as that which the
Fugger possessed earlier. It appears they were led on to establish an
undertaking far beyond their strength for the improvement of English
mining.
At that time English mining was still a very small affair, and in the
main limited to working very ancient (prehistoric) tin and lead mines.
The Germans, on the other hand, were the foremost miners of the world,
and had developed the technique of mining to a high state. South Ger-
man capital had especially, since the middle of the fifteenth century,
co-operated prominently in this. So the English Kings since Henry
VIII tried to interest German capitalists and miners in the mineral
riches of their land. Like so many other industrial and political measures
of the Tudors they first came to maturity under Queen Elizabeth.
In 1564 a large company for prospecting for and winning minerals in
England was promoted by the firm of David Hang, Hans Laugnauer and
Relatives. In this the highest English statesmen and officials took
shares. Dealings between the English Government and the Augsburg
merchants were mainly in the hands of some new partners in the firm.
Of the twenty-four shares the Haug firm took eleven; Elizabeth's
minister, Cecil, two; Lord Leicester, two; and so on. At first they oper-
ated copper mines at Keswick and lead mines at Colbeck. The under-
taking was far beyond the powers of the Haug and does not appear to
have made a profit so long as they had an interest in it. We can here
only state the result. In 1574 the Haug had to suspend payment.
Jakob Herbrot. Jakob Herbrot earned a position for himself in the
Augsburg trading world. He was a well-known opponent of the Em-
peror Charles, and of the great Catholic patrician houses of Augsburg.
He was the only one who used his resources directly in the service of his
political and religious convictions. 1
In 1520 he began business with 1,200 fl., and in the course of the
following twenty-five years acquired so much property that in the war
of Schmalkalden he could assist the Evangelicals with considerable
sums of money. As head of the merchants gmld, he was the recognized
leader of the party of decidedly Evangelical views, who had their
strongest support in the guilds. He became Burgomaster and drew on
himself the hatred of the Catholic patricians, who had been robbed of
their influence by him, and to such an extent that this later accelerated
Heokerinin Der Ztsehr. d. histor, Vereitu fur Schwibm, Bd. L
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 167
his ruin. However, the real cause was the same as in the case of so many
other Augsburg merchants - excessive credit. Jakob Herbrot had made
considerable loans to the Emperor Ferdinand and the King of Poland,
and to do this had himself borrowed largely. When, then, in 1562 there
arose a general mistrust of the Augsburg trading community, there was
also a 'run' of the Herbrot's creditors. The Emperor Ferdinand in-
structed Melchior Ilsung, the Governor of Swabia, to borrow 30,000 L
in Augsburg to help the man who had got into difficulties chiefly through
the advances he had granted to the Emperor. But as soon as it leaked
out that the money was meant for the hated Democrats 'the counting
houses and the Perlach' (the Bourse) would not give anything. Jakob
Herbrot had to suspend payment and died in a debtors' prison in
1564.
The Tucker. In contrast to the condition of business at Augsburg,
that at Nuremberg on the whole kept clear of financial business
proper until the time of the war of Schmalkalden, although, as we have
already seen, individual Nurembergers entered into the financial service
of the Emperor Maximilian and some others, as we shall see later, at-
tained to great importance and riches as financiers in Lyons and Ant-
werp. They soon divested themselves of their Nuremberg origin and
became French and Netherlanders. Of the large traders properly settled
in Nuremberg, it was only the branch there of the Welser which in early
times carried on large financial transactions, especially in conjunction
with the Fugger. They, however, until the war of Schmalkalden, kept
within the limits of the usual prudence of merchants of Nuremberg. It
was only when just before the war that the French Court, through Hans
Kleberg, whom we shall get to know later, knew how to make use of the
South German merchants who frequented Lyons, that the Nurem-
bergers, too, began to turn from trade to finance. They were mostly
Protestants, or at any rate not unconditionally attached to the Em-
peror. Only one of the great Nuremberg trading houses - the Tucher -
kept off from the loans to the great Powers which gave a high rate of
interest, but were very risky.
The two generations of the Tucher who come under our consideration
here exhibit the best types of sturdy and solid German wholesale
traders, whom we know of in the sixteenth century. Anton Tucher
(1457-1524), the chief Burgomaster ('Losunger') of Nuremberg since
1505, a remarkable man, who was highly regarded by the Elector Fred-
erick the Wise of Saxony ('he praised him above all the burghers of the
Empire'), carried on in conjunction with his cousins, Hans and Martin, a
considerable trade, chieflywith Lyons. His son, laenhard Tucher (1524-
68), with his cousin Lorenz, continued and considerably extended the
business, especially by establishing a factory at Antwerp, so that the
168 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
firm had establishments at the two financial centres of the world at that
time. By means of the factories they carried on a very considerable
trade in goods. But when in 1545 Hans Kleberg, like most of the other
South German merchants who frequented Lyons, wished to persuade
the Tucher to participate in that loan to the French Court, Lienhard
Tucher wrote to his agent at Lyons that he and his cousin Lorenz had
resolved not to involve themselves in such business with great 'Heads.'
Lienhard Tucher again and again enjoined this principle on his junior
partners and agents, and remained proof against all attempts. Thus he
brought it about that his business suffered only a comparatively small
loss through the great credit crisis of the years 1557-62. Lienhard
Tucher, too, like his father, was for many years first 'Losunger' of
Nuremberg, and in addition a conspicuously sturdy merchant of wide
outlook, whose wise business principles deserve to serve as a model. In
this soundness he affords a very characteristic contrast to Lazarus
Tucher, a distant collateral relative, whose bold and fortunate financial
dealings we shall get to know of later. Lazarus Tucher had no close
business relations with the Nuremberg firm. 1
The ImAof. The Imhof , too, remained longer than the other big trad-
ing houses of Nuremberg in the ways of solid trade, but they had no
fundamental objection to financial business. During the period we are
considering here, the large trade of the Imhof with Italy, France, and
the Netherlands was mainly conducted by Endres Imhof under the firm
name of Endres Imhof and Brothers. Endres Imhof played a conspicu-
ous part in the public life of Nuremberg. He had a seat on the Council
for fifty-six years, and in 1565 succeeded Lienhard Tucher in the office of
first 'Losunger.' As a business man he exhibits a combination of the
qualities of Lienhard Tucher and the majority of the other South Ger-
man merchants. When in 1545, as a result of Hans Kleberg' s power of
persuasion, these began for the first time on a large scale to pour their
money in the bottomless cask of French finance, the Imhof as well as
the Tucher held back, so that Kleberg noted both houses as 'too ex-
tremely careful.' But later on the Imhof ceased to draw back, and par-
ticipated to an increasing extent in the profitable financial businesses of
the Bourses of Antwerp and Lyons. Endres Imhof, however, was at
least sufficiently prudent after each account to withdraw his share of
the profits from the incalculable risk of this business. In 1544 his share
in the capital of the company was 15,000 fl.; in 1548 it sank to 12,000 fl.;
and after 1550 remained at 14,000 fl.; while the very high profits were
partly entirely taken out of the business and partly left in it as deposits
at 5 per cent.
1 Of. Ehrenberg, Hans Kleberg, 'der gvte Deutsche' (MitOi. d, Vereins f. Geseh,
d, Sfadf Ntmberg), Nuremberg, 1893, p. 24 S. '
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 169
The profits, from 1544 to 1560 (excluding the years 1554-6), average
18 per cent, per annum.
For the years 1560-4 we do not know the profits, but we know them
again for the years 1564-70, in which they were 77 per cent, in all, or
12| per cent, per annum. In 1570 Bndres Imhof retired from the part-
nership and left his capital of 42,100 fl. in the business only as a deposit
bearing 5 per cent. In his lifetime he repeatedly made over large sums
of capital to his sons.
Concerning the participation of the Imhof in the big international
finance we possess some very interesting instructions, given in 1549 by
the company to Paul Behaim, their Antwerp agent. It enables us to see
how the Imhof at that tune invested their funds. We will here give the
chief contents:
The firm of Bndres Imhof and Brothers, in conjunction with an
associated firm of the family, Sebastian and Hieronymus Imhof (the
last of whom had settled in Augsburg, where he founded a branch
of the family which still flourishes), under the name of Bartholomew
Welsers Company, lent to the Court of Brussels 6,615 1*. 6 gr., of which
4,410 Is. belonged to Endres Imhof and Brothers. This share in the
'Court paper' they now wished to have for themselves, and to dissolve
the association with their relatives. They wished to 'have lying at the
Court' the sum which was just falling due. But since the agent was not
acquainted with the financial agent of the Court of Brussels, he was
directed to request the Antwerp agent of the Welser to extend the re-
payment of the money of the Imhof, as far as possible. 'As to price and
conditions, we should be content with the terms the Welser make for
themselves, but we hope that the Court will not give less than 5 per cent,
(for 2 fairs = half a year), since more could easily be got if, e.g., the
Emperor or the "King of England wished to get ready money from the
Bourse. But if you cannot get the Welser to promise that they will pro-
long our money, then get into touch with Kaltinhofer and Foschinger
(two South German financiers who had settled in Antwerp and whom we
shall get to know) and notify them that if they wish to deal with the
Court this quarter day, you are willing to employ 25,000-30,000 Carolus
gulden on behalf of your principals. If you do business with them you
must satisfy yourselves beforehand that the Welser will pay us; for if
they do not, and you had promised a sum to the others, then we should
have too much in one place. If you lend out the money through Ealten-
hofer or Poschinger then we should like to have the promissory notes in
our own hands; but if that is not possible we should be content to get
from them a sufficient bond.'
The firm also possessed bonds of the town of Antwerp for 7,875, but
only 2,100 belonged to them, while the rest was the share of the other
170 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEE
Imhofs and the above-mentioned PoscMnger. These had then fallen
due: 'Our 2,100 and 1,900 more we would willingly once more prolong
at the highest possible rate of interest for another six months on such
bonds under the great seal of the town of Antwerp and under the condi-
tions of which you have a copy. If much ready money is withdrawn
from the Bourse, or if sundry people should come together to make
money tight (Strettezza), money will be dearer this quarter and the
town of Antwerp will give more than 5 per cent, (for half a year); other-
wise we should be content with that. And no matter whether money is
tight or plentiful the town of Antwerp we think will in any case pay
as much as good firms in the Bourse (dita di bursha). We should then
like them as much, and prefer them to dita di bursha. But if they pay
J or | per cent, less than these and you can do business with the firm
which Bair (the former agent of the Imhof in Antwerp) have told you
of, then take the money away from the city and give it them.'
We see from this how zealously the Imhof thought of the most profit-
able way to employ their capital, but that, all the same, they did not
forget caution. This was, in any case, the chief service of Endres Imhof
himself. For, as we see from their correspondence, the junior partner
pressed vigorously for a greater participation in the French loans.
Endres only slowly gave way to this pressure.
In 1552 the firm first embarked in the business of bonds of the Nether-
lands Receivers General; however, the total was not very considerable.
The next step was that in 1553 some individual members of the family
took a conspicuous part in the French Crown loans: Sebastian Imhof
with 14,100 livres; Lienhard Imhof in Augsburg with 5,000 livres; and
Michael Imhof with 12,000 livres. But the chief firm seems at that time
still to have preserved its customary restraint towards these French
loans. It is true that just at this time it had already taken in hand a
financial transaction on a large scale somewhat closer.
In the years 1553-4, the town of Nuremberg needed uncommonly
large sums of money for the war against their mortal enemy, the Mar-
grave Albrecht (Alcibiades) of Brandenburg Kulmbach. When this war
was over the town began to extend and enlarge their fortifications, and
in particular to build the colossal towers in the wall which to-day yet
excite our astonishment. This likewise cost a great deal of money for
years. Particularly in the war with the Margrave very large sums had
to be made liquid in great haste. The old way of selling annuities on the
town was insufficient; the town had to follow the example of the great
princes and take up floating loans from merchants.
At first Endres Imhof formed a consortium to which, as well as his
firm, Sebastian and Hieronymus Imhof and the Augsburg Welser be-
longed. This consortium advanced to the town of Nuremberg the large
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 171
sums it was in need of at 12 per cent., and borrowed again at a lower
rate of interest at Frankfort am Main, Antwerp, and other places.
At first it was a matter of about 110,000 ft., of which the Welser
brought in 60,00 fl. and the Imhof 50,000 fl. But soon further sums
were added. In the autumn of 1553, owing to the large withdrawals of
money by the consortium, money was tight in Antwerp. The impor-
tance of the Antwerp Bourse for dealing in capital cannot perhaps be
shown more clearly than by the fact that Paul Behaim, sinceheno longer
acted for the Imhof, begged their Antwerp agent to let him participate
in the loans of his native town in Antwerp. The Imhof, too, sent their
agent, Paul Behaim, to Frankfurt am Main; but he for the most part did
himself borrow the money, but employed the services of the brokers,
amongst whom a conspicuous part was played by 'the modest Jew
Joseph, at the sign of the Golden Swan.' This is the only time that a
Jew is mentioned in the large financial transactions of the sixteenth
century, and it is certainly characteristic that it happened at Frankfurt
am Main, which was then a comparatively insignificant place for inter-
national dealings in capital. Just because of this the Jews there from old
times had kept a part of their importance in finance, while they were
never mentioned in the great bourses of the world. Joseph the Jew
procured the money for the Imhof chiefly in large sums. For example,
the most considerable of these at the Easter Fair of 1554 was one of
16,400 fl., lent by an abbot. For then everywhere - and this again shows
how ancient this traffic is - the clergy took part frequently. The rate of
interest at that time was 5-6 per cent. The Jew got 1 per cent, com-
mission and a yearly stipend as well. When he wanted to get out of it
some other little incidental profits, he was rapped on the knuckles;
nevertheless, Paul Behaim had orders to deal with him mildly, since he
was still needed. The turnover of the Imhof in this way amounted to
100,000 fl. at many Frankfurt Fairs, and their turnover at Antwerp
must at least have been as large. So far they only served the financial
needs of the town of Nuremberg. The town at that time was trying to
get money at any price, and the Imhof, who immediately had become
the bankers of the Council, instructed their agents to take up all that
was offered to them. This, however, changed when the war against the
Margrave was over.
Heretofore the town of Nuremberg was in the habit of paying only
5 per cent, on their loans, which they effected by the usual way of selling
annuities. For this reason they found it very painful that they had to
pay 12 per cent, on the loans raised from the Imhof, and as soon as the
most pressing need for money was over they tried to reduce this high
rate of interest. Certainly the town had to leave outstanding at 12 per
cent, that great loan of 110,000 fl. in which the Welser had participated
172 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
with 60,000 fl., since with money so tight as it was then it was not so
easy to find anybody who had such a large sum to lend them at a cheaper
rate. But for the new sums lent to them they were not willing, after
1555, to give more than 10 per cent. Only in the case of specially large
sums they declared themselves ready to pay 10-12 per cent. As the need
diminished, the rate of interest had to be reduced. Thus, in 1558 it fell
to 8 per cent.; in 1561 to 6 per cent.; and in 1565 to 5 per cent.: at
a time when the mightiest princes could scarcely get money on any
terms.
Through these great affairs which Endres Imhof undertook for his
native town, and apparently without any considerable profit for himself,
he must have completely lost his former repugnance to pure finance. For
after this time his firm took part in this, both in Lyons and Antwerp, to
the largest extent: notes of the Court of Brussels, bonds of the Receivers
General, bonds of the town of Antwerp, and particularly of the French
Grown, were with large speculations in pepper, saffron, and alum, the
subjects on which the business correspondence of the Imhof, in the years
1555-62, chiefly turns. But the credit of the house remained excellent;
in these years it was even better than that of the Fugger. If in 1553
Anton Fugger had obtained a small loan from Endres Imhof, Hans
Jakob Fugger in 1556 got one frombimof 10,000 fl., which, till 1561, was
repaid by instalments. Even in the frightful crisis which in 1562 shat-
tered the industrial position of the South German towns, the Imhof
remained to all appearance unharmed. But they suffered frightful losses,
and their inward strength was broken. In the French loans alone they
lost 50,000 livres (the associated firm of Sebastian and Hieronymus
Imhof 30,000 more); and they remained with 32,000 Carolus gulden un-
paid on Netherlands Receivers General bonds.
Endres Imhof died in 1579 at the age of eighty-seven, after he had
completely retired from business for nine years.
Other South German Trading Houses. There are many other South
German business houses of which all we know is that they took a more
or less prominent part in large financial transactions; yet our knowledge
of the part they took is so incomplete, and it was in the main, too, only
sporadic, that we here only give a summary account of them.
In 1522 the brothers Pimel paid for the Emperor to Franz von Sick-
ingen a sum which was repaid in Antwerp with 19,200 Carolus gulden.
They made advances to King Ferdinand of 56,000 fl. in 1527, of 45,000 fl.
in conjunction with the Herwart in 1528, and of 18,000 fl. again by
themselves in 1530. In the following year in Antwerp the Netherlands
Government paid them 15,000 crowns on their bills, against which they
on their side had made payments in Germany. Then in 1541 we come
across them with the Fugger supplying money to the Court of Vienna;
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 173
and in 1560 Sir Thomas Gresham in Antwerp took up from them a loan
for the English Crown. They are not mentioned after this. 1
The Rehlinger of Augsburg were one of the trading houses who were
definitely on the Protestant side in the war of Schmalkalden. Since
they had a factory in Lyons the league wished to make use of them as
intermediaries to procure the French subsidies there. In 1555 Christo-
pher Rehlinger sent King Ferdinand 74,400 L; in the same year Hier-
onymus Rehlinger the elder lent the English Crown a sum that is not
stated, and also sold them saltpetre, 1,560; he, too, participated with
5,000 livres in their Antwerp loan. Then their names vanished from the
annals of finance. 2
The Kraffter of Augsburg are only mentioned once, in 1551, in connec-
tion with the financial affairs of the Court of Vienna. In 1562 and 1563
they suspended payment, and their liabilities are given as 19,600ft. 8
The Roth of Ulm were regarded in the war of Schmalkalden as
undoubted adherents of the Evangelical Party. Yet they are not men-
tioned in connection with the French financial transactions, but they
were in 1541, 1544 and 1549, in connection with those of King Ferdi-
nand. 4
As early as 1546 the Zangmeister in Augsburg participated keenly in
the French loans. In 1553 they appear as next to the Neidharts as the
krgest subscribers with 99,400 crowns. In 1562 they had to announce
to their creditors at the Town Hall of Augsburg, 'that they without suffi-
cient thought embarked in multifarious and highly important transac-
tions in bills of exchange, but they had chiefly wrought their own des-
truction by locking up their money behind the Crown of France, since a
large sum of money for some years had been outstanding there without
producing interest, which they themselves had had to borrow at a high
rate of interest.'
They offered to make over to their creditors their business with all the
stock and book debts, and in case of necessity to pay for their evil deeds
with their 'body and life.' This is the last we hear of this trading
company. 8
For a time the Ligaalz and the Fleckhamer - two Munich firms who,
nevertheless, had their main business in Augsburg and Antwerp - must
have played a conspicuous part. In 1526 Earl Ligsak was mentioned in
1 Lille, Chambre dea Comptei, B. 2301, 2363. Thorsch, pp. 26, 28, 32, 34. Kervyn
de Lettenhove, S3ot. polit. U, 430.
' Augeburger Stadtorchiv, Litterolim, 1646; Thoweh, p. 42. Tumbull, Calendar
Queen Mary, No. 761. Kervyn, I, 174, H, 240.
1 Thorsch, p. 41. There are some documents as to his bankruptcy in the Auga-
i, pp. 34, 40, 42.
* Augsburger Stadtarchiv. and Gennanisohes Museum.
174 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Antwerp; but not till 1531 does Sebastian Ligsalz appear as taking a
part, and not on a very considerable scale, in the business of bills of
exchange between the Court of Brussels and Germany. In 1546 Ludwig
Ligsalz, in Antwerp, had lent the Fugger 6,544 ft. at interest. In 1549
Endres Ligsalz, in conjunction with the Haug, participated in the loans
of the city of Antwerp; in 1554 and 1558 in those of the English Crown;
and in the latter year also in the French loans. In the period 1553-6
the Fleckhamer are many times mentioned in connection with the same
financial transaction. In 1559 they borrowed largely on the Antwerp
Bourse at 10 per cent., and were even considered solvent in the following
year, but, like the Ligsalz, they failed soon afterwards. 1
Two Strassburg business companies, the two largest there, the Prech-
ter and the Ingold, are mentioned in the period 1543-58 in Antwerp, and
particularly in Lyons, as often taking part in large financial transac-
tions. Between 1560-72 the Ingold were declared insolvent. What hap-
pened to the Prechter we are not told. 2
Finally, we may mention some Nuremberg houses who began to carry
on financial transactions after the war of Schmalkalden. Among these
are, in the first place, the Pomer, the Furtenbach and many others who
helped King Ferdinand in the years 1547-53. Later the Furtenbach
transferred their main business to Genoa and participated in the Span-
ish loans. They are, for example, mentioned in 1630 as creditors of the
Fugger in Spain. But for the rest these Nuremberg families are not
mentioned later in connection with financial business. It is otherwise
with the Harsdorfer, the Fiitterer, the Elmer, the firms of Ambrosy
Bosch, Hans and Augustin Furnberger, of Caspar and Christopher
Fischer, Hans Scheuffetin, and many others. They were involved in the
French loans and seem to have been exhausted by the great losses they
The Great South German Financiers in Antwerp and Lyons. As we
have already seen, the South German merchants from early times came
into connection with Antwerp and Lyons, the two financial centres of
the world of the sixteenth century, and contributed a great deal to their
rapid rise. It was no small number of South German merchants who, in
their young days as agents or on their own account, arrived in the great
foci of a quite new trading life, where the money that they eagerly
sought for seemed to be lying in the streets.
They then permanently remained there, and according to their luck
and skill attained their end or again went under. Amongst these, for
1 Lille, B. 2363. Fngger-Archiv, Bilanz von 1546. BZaugsche Handlungs-
bfioher. Gennaniaohes Museum. TumbuU, Calendar, Qwen Mary, No. Ill, 751,
843-4. Kervyn, L 326. H, 240-1, 620.
1 Lille, B. 2436. Ehrenberg, Hans Kleberg, p. 34. Augsburg. Stadtarohiv. and
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 175
instance, was that George Meuting who for a short time played a pro-
minent part in Antwerp, but early vanished again. About the same time
in Antwerp we come across the Conrad Imhof who, in 1503, bought a
house in the Vlamincstrate and is mentioned as owner of a large house
'opt Clapdorp' in 1527. His daughter Anna married Jaspar Prays, a
Fleming. The family appears to have subsisted in Antwerp for a long
time. 1 Many of the Fugger's agents remained on in Antwerp after they
had become independent. Examples are: Bernhard Stecher, whose des-
cendants are later repeatedly mentioned in Antwerp; Matthias Oertel;
and Wolff Haller, of whom we are about to speak.
Some individuals from among these offshoots of South German mer-
chant families in Antwerp come into prominence as financiers and specu-
lators of the first rank. They are some of the most interesting pheno-
mena of their time, and it is surprising that historians have not long ago
turned their attention to them to a much larger extent than they have
done. We want to make up for this neglect.
Wolff Hatter von Halkrstein. Three generations of the Nuremberg
family of Haller were in the service of the Hapsburgs. Wolff Haller zum
Ziegelstein - the father of the man who will chiefly occupy us - was a
bruck. In his grant of a coat of arms on 1st May, 1510, the Emperor
declared that at the Court and elsewhere he had been 'useful, true and
diligent in important offices, and during wars and serious states of
affairs had served him well with his appreciable service,' and had been
knighted on the battlefield by the Emperor. His brother Bartholomew
was also an Imperial counsellor. They belonged to the South German
patricians, of whom Ma.Timi1ia.Ti availed himself in a way we already
sufficiently know. 2
Wolff Haller zum Ziegelstein had a son, who also was named Wolff.
He is the man whom we have already got to know as the agent of the
Fugger at Antwerp. He is first mentioned in this capacity in 1519. In
the previous chapter we saw he earlier and by the orders of the Fugger
must have performed real services to Charles, the then King of Spain.
In 1526 he expressed his gratitude for 'his excellent services for a long
time past, namely, first in this our Kingdom of Spain, when we first took
possession of it (1517), then in our election as King of the Romans
(1519), on our coronation as King of the Bx>mans (1520); also in our
journeys through the Kingdom of England (1522), and in our wars with
France (1521-6). He furthered our military affairs in Italy and Bur-
gundy, and in our great and difficult dealings in manifold ways has done
>Antw. Schoffenbritfe, and Bulletin de la Proprittt, 1888, p. 23.
1 From a codex in Museum at Brussels, Alt Herkomen, Stand und Wesen dec
176 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
conspicuous work with his body and by lending his property; daily, too,
here [he has served us] incur Kingdom of Spain and our Imperial Court.'
The Emperor then took him into his council and service and granted
him exceptional privileges.
Wolff Haller had given up his Nuremberg citizenship. In spite of this,
on the 29th June, 1526, the Emperor appointed him Mayor ('Schult-
heisser') of Nuremberg for life, and in the document drawn up for the
purpose he is quite unusually described as 'our Counsellor from his
youth up.' Three years later he married in Antwerp a daughter of
Cornelius von der Logenhagen, the Warden of the Mint there of the
reigning prince. 1 In 1530 he is again represented in a not very impor-
tant financial transaction of the Netherlands Government as representa-
tive of the Fugger; in 1531 as representative of the Paumgartner; and,
on the other hand, in 1531 as Treasurer of the Queen Maria, Stadtholden
of the Netherlands, and as 'Chevalier.' But this did not prevent his
having just then taken a vigorous part, apparently as banker, in the
financial affairs of the Court of Brussels. 8
In the family history composed in the Lifetime of Wolf! Haller the
second, he is described as 'Wolff Haller von Hallerstein, Knight, Coun-
sellor to his Roman and Imperial Majesty and steward to the Queen
Maria of Hungary.' How highly she thought of liiin is shown by the
fact that she stood godmother to his first child, with the Duchess of
Milan, the Countess of Egmont, the Countess of Zollern, and other ladies
of the highest aristocracy. He died in Brussels in 1559.
In the next generation there again was a Wolff Haller von Hallerstein,
who is mentioned as Keeper of the Privy Purse (Pf ennigmeister) of the
Emperor in his financial affairs; and in 1557 he was appointed by King
Philipp II to be Netherlands War Commissioner at a salary of 400
thalers. 3 It seems that in this office he was the successor of his uncle,
Euprecht or Robert Haller von Hallerstein, a son of Bartholomew
Haller zum Ziegelstein. This Buprecht had also settled in Antwerp;
there he married a daughter of Lazarus Tucher and died Netherlands
War Commissary. The family then continued on in the Netherlands.
In these Haller we must perceive the successors of those South
German patricians who entered the financial service of the Emperor
Maximilian. Only these had chiefly served the Emperor in Tyrol, while
the later Haller transferred the theatre of their industrial activity to
Antwerp, which put them on quite a different pedestal But it seems
that even there they always remained officials and courtiers rather than
1 Antwerpener SchofferibwAer, 6/9, 1524.
Lille, Chambre des Camples, B. 2357 and 2363. Brussels, CJiambre des Comptet,
Kramichiv Nteiberg: Manuals der Barren Etiern, 1551. Wednesday after
Christmas. Royal Archives. Brussels, Urk. v. 5/2, 1557.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 177
bankers and merchants. If this is so they form a contrast to the remark-
able man whom we must now get to know.
Lazarus Tucker. Lazarus Tucher was a contemporary of Wolff Haller
von Hallerstein (both were born in 1492). Outwardly the course of life
of these two men exhibit many similar features, but when regarded more
closely the essential differences come to light.
Lazarus Tucher did not spring from that widespread Nuremberg
family of Tucher who took such an important position both in public life
and in the business of their native town. Three generations earlier this
'Hans line' had separated from the 'Endres line' to which Lazarus be-
longed. Berthold Tucher, the father of Lazarus, went to Eisleben, where
he ran smelting works and a copper refinery. At first he made a good
living out of it, but later he had 'to suffer many adversities and sorrows';
but it is not clear what these were. He died at Eisleben in 1519. i
Berthold Tucker had no less than twenty-two children. In addition to
Lazarus we hear of: Erasmus, who traded with his uncle to Geneva,
settled there and died in 1525; Endres, who in 1512, aged fourteen, came
to the Netherlands, travelled for the Herwart to Portugal and 'the
newly-discovered islands' (he justified the highest hopes, but he too
died young): Bartholomew, Hans and Franz - all three similarly went
to the Netherlands to try their luck there. The first two seems to have
got on tolerably well, while Franz, as we shall see later, came to grief.
We observe in this how strongly the young South Germans of that time
were attracted to foreign parts.
Lazarus Tucher was the eldest of the brothers we have mentioned.
He studied three years in Leipzig, but then went to the Netherlands,
and, as the family chronicler informs us, 'sought the fortune which he got
rather in old age than in youth.' In 1518 (23rd August) we come across
him in the Antwerp Sheriff's books as 'Lazarus Tucher, merchant from
Nuremberg, now living at Doernich (Toumay).' At that time he gave a
full power of attorney to a merchant named Wolfgang Bucher, who
came from Leipzig, to get in his book debts, sue, etc. In Toumay he, in
1520, married Jacobina Cocquiel, daughter of the respected merchant
Nicolas Cocquiel, some of whose sons removed to Antwerp and there
acquired a considerable position in the trading world. 8
Lazarus Tucher, too, was only temporarily domiciled in Toumay.
Antwerp was the proper field of his activity. He is first mentioned there
in 1519. 8 On 17th June, 1519, Jan de Fontayne, a merchant from
Toumay, made over to him a house in the Predikeerenstrate; but a year
1 Genealogy of the Tucher family, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, No. 19475.
P. A. du Chastel, Notices gen&ralogiques Tmirnamennes, I, 536 fl.
'Christof Scheuerls Srieflnteh, published by Sodea and Knaake, H, 93. Also
The Antwerpener Sohoffenbuoher.
178 THE AGE OF THE FTJGGER
later he transferred it again to Jan Berthout, a merchant from Atrecht.
On 6th February, 1524, the Herwart's agent made over to him another
house in the same street, which he resold on the same day. So at that
time he appears to have been speculating in real property. His chief
business till 1528, however, is of a completely modern type. He was
broker, agent and speculator in some great articles of speculation like
pepper and woad. Thus he comes before us in the Tucher business
correspondence of the year 1526.
At that time the Antwerp agent of his Nuremberg cousin asked him if
the Government had the design of putting a new tax on kinds of money
in circulation. Lazarus Tucher said yes, and then had a long conversa-
tion with the agent. Just at the end he used an expression by means of
which he apparently wanted the agent and Ms principal to 'bear' woad,
of which they had bought a large quantity as a speculation. The agent
informs his house of this and adds, 'I do not know whether he is in
earnest or joking. He has often played such tricks and is often himself
broker, buyer and seller all together.'
Soon afterwards: 'Lazarus Tucher has almost all the pepper in his
hands, if one goes to some one who has it to sell, he refers one to
Lazarus Tucher. For he is both seller and broker together. I have more
than once said to him in a friendly way that he might think of me if
anything should come to his hands. All the time he professes himself
very ready to do this, and that if he could serve you and anything
should come to his hands, you should have the preference. But I put no
reliance on him; for I well know that he must be submissive to the
Hochstetter, Manlich and Bartholomew Welser.'
In 1528 Lazarus Tucher first began his financial transactions. We
learnt to know accurately the occasion in which this first occurred, when
we spoke of the fall of the Hochstetter. He built his fortunes on the
ruins of this mighty house. In that great financial transaction of the
year 1528, in which he used his ability unscrupulously, he not only
acquired a great deal of money and raised his credit in the business
world, which always judges by results, but in particular he knew how to
impress the Netherlands Government and to get into such good favour
with them that afterwards, for a long space of time, he remained their
most important financial agent.
We have already heard what an agent of the Tucher reported about
the business position of Lazarus Tucher shortly after the events of 1528,
which we have related. Here we may quote from these letters a few
more passages relating to the inwardness of his business methods and
his private life. At that time a young Tucher was to be apprenticed to
a merchant at Antwerp. The agent advised against choosing Lazarus
Tucher: 'With him he will have to consider for himself what he ought to
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 179
learn. For he [Lazarus Tucher] pays no attention, is seldom at home,
and has not eaten ten meals at home in the course of a year. Hierony-
mus Tucher (of the main branch of the house) keeps the books, his son-
in-law (presumably Charles Cocquiel) is cashier: he looks after both of
them.'
In 1529 Lazarus Tucher bought the house of Marcus van Kerken (at
the corner of the present Rue de l'Empereur and Rue tie rAmmann)
for l,540fl. He wanted to pay at once in cash. But the vendor, in
accordance with the Antwerp custom, only wished to have a third or
a quarter in cash and to leave the rest at interest until his children
came of age. 1 Lazarus Tucher's son sold this again, and kept till his
death a house he bought in 1534, which similarly was situated in the
present Rue Ammann. In addition, he owned an estate called Gallifort
near Antwerp.
Lazarus Tucher, in 1529, as successor of Pieter van der Straten, as
well as additional to Gerard Stercke, was the chief agent of the Brussels
Court for the great loans which they were always raising on the Antwerp
Bourse. Since 1531 he maintained for ten years the first position in this
department of business; he had then to give it over to the Florentine,
Gaspar Ducci. Yet till 1552 he had many business relations with the
Government. In particular, he knew how to utilize the capital of the
South German merchants for the monetary needs of the Netherlands
Court, which again, by this means, served the policy of the Emperor. Up
to 1529 only individuals of the largest South German houses had par-
ticipated in these profitable but risky financial transactions. After that
they were more and more drawn in, which, as we saw, finally resulted in
the ruin of many of the first families. The critical period of this traffic
did not begin till Lazarus Tucher had ceased his business activities.
But, in any case, he had contributed much to lead the South German
trading community on to the fatal path of unsafe business. The details
of the loans which Lazarus Tucher took up for the Court of Brussels
we shall get to know later.
He also did financial business with the city of Antwerp and the King
of Portugal, but first and foremost with the English Crown. The latter
transaction we must here follow out in somewhat greater detail, since
they enable us to get to know somewhat better the character and busi-
ness principles of Lazarus Tucher. He was among the first of the Ant-
werp financiers who lent money to the English Crown. Already, by
1549, a loan of 167,218 Carolus gulden, which Tucher presumably had
lent to King Edward VI shortly after he ascended the throne, was
due for repayment.
iT^erwherHandluwMefvomZSth June J52d,uidThy B , 8uX.de la Prvpriete,
1889, p. 31.
180 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
William Dansell, the English financial agent at Antwerp at that time,
was instructed to obtain a prolongation of the loan at 12 per cent.; but
Tucher would not agree. Dansell then had to borrow the money to pay
him from Erasmus Schetz, another important merchant of Antwerp.
Only when this had been accomplished Tucher professed himself ready
to make a fresh advance, but refused to co-operate in the export of coin
to England, which was forbidden by kw. Nevertheless, a loan of
150,000 Caroms gulden took pkce. Yet Dansell, on account of the way
in which the money was conveyed to him, had to endure many re-
proaches from the Government, which over his head got into direct con-
nection with Lazarus Tucher about a further loan. Tucher was willing
to grant it at 12 per cent., but he would only pay in goods and be paid
back in cash, while the English Government conversely wanted to re-
ceive cash and pay in goods. This appears to have rendered the business
abortive. 1
When, then, in 1552, Thomas Gresham was appointed financial agent
to the English Crown in Antwerp, he immediately got into touch with
Lazarus Tucher, who lent 10,000 fl. (= 60,000 Carolus gulden) at 14
per cent. In April, 1553, Gresham wrote home that his friend Lazarus
Tucher would again advance to the King 200,000 Carolus gulden, which
was to be considered a very satisfactory thing since the Emperor had to
pay 16 per cent. But it seems that the business did not come off, since
King Edward became dangerously ill and died some months afterwards.
His successor, Mary, withdrew her confidence from Gresham and sent
Christopher Dauntsey to Antwerp, where, by his clumsiness, he severely
damaged the credit of the English Crown. At the beginning of Novem-
ber, 1553, he borrowed from Lazarus Tucher 100,000 Carolus gulden at
13 per cent, for a year. Tucher further promised to deliver a further
100,000 within a week, so far as his friends in Germany would not have
made other dispositions of the money.
In England people were displeased with this settlement, because the
rate of interest was considered too high. So Gresham was sent off to
Antwerp in all haste, with instructions to borrow 50,000 pounds
( = 300,000 Carolus gulden) at 11 per cent., or the highest 12 per cent.
Immediately after his arrival Gresham tried to cancel this unprofitable
business with Lazarus Tucher. It proved to be yet more unfavourable
for the English Crown, because Tucher declared that he would not pay
till the end of November, but that interest should run from the begin-
ning of the month, which raised the rate to 14 per cent. This damaged
the credit of the English Crown so much that Gresham at first did not
dare to negotiate about a new loan. Full of vexation he wrote home that
1 Acts of the Privy Council, H, 310. Turnbull, Calendar, Edward VI, Nos. 139,
142, 146, 148, 160, 153, 156, 161, 162, 164, 172, 184.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 181
before Dauntsey's arrival people had obtained money at 12, or even
at 10 per cent., and the merchants had been glad of it. If, on the other
hand, Tucher's contract was carried out, it would be difficult to get
anything under 13-14 per cent. But Lazarus wanted his pound of flesh. 1
On the 26th November Gresham wrote to the Privy Council: 'This
daye Lazzerus Tucher came unto me upon the Bourse, and asked
"whether I had any answere whether his bargayne should take place or
not." I said to hi that I could only marvell that Dauntsey had offered
such a rate of interest and that he should have required it. His answer
was that "a had concludyd a bargaine, and that a looked to have his
bargin kept; for that a knew that the Counsell had wrytten to the
Fuggers for money" . . . Further a dyd declare unto me that at the
fyrst a concludyd with Mr. Daunsey but f or i c m floryns; and that aftyr-
wards, the said Daunsey came unto him, and requyred and prayed him
to furnishe hym with i c m more: which a showed me that a had it not of
his own, but was fayn to take it uppe upon his own credit, to doo the
Queene service. Which (here writing) was small profitt to the Queene,
but to his own proffit. For that he tooke it uppe aftyr x per cento, and
woll make the Queene pay xiii. . . . But according as I have written
you, if this bargain doo take place of Tucher's, you maye not looke to
have any monny upon interest under xiij upon the hundred; by the
reason this matter is so spread abroad, and advices given throughout
all Cristendom.'
The last observation was entirely true. Thus, for example, Matthias
Oertel, the Fugger agent, at once brought this affair to the knowledge of
his masters, and Anton Fugger answered that 13 per cent, was certainly
a high rate if the news was true. And in the following year a report of a
Venetian Ambassador contains the information that the English Crown
was accustomed to borrow money at over 14 per cent, at Antwerp, and
that at the moment the Queen owed more than a million. 2
Gresham now sought to satisfy the obstinate man. He wrote to the
Council: 'This Lazzerus Tucher is a very extreme man, and very open-
mouthed. As also, according as I have wrytten you, a hathe dyvers
partners in the bargayne; and considering the letter that your Lorde-
shipes have written him, wherein you [ac] knowledge Danssey to be her
Highness' servant, he doth now ground himself not a littill upon that
word.' In short, the business had to stand, with the result that when
Gresham, according to his instructions, wished to borrow more money,
he was asked for 15 per cent., and when he offered 10-11 per cent, the
l Turnbun, Calendar, Edward VI, No. 663; Queen Mary, Nos. 69, 73, 74, 77,
83, 86, 89, 98 fi. Burgon, Life and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham, I, 128-38.
Flanders Correspondence, State Papers Office.
1 Brown, Calendar T, 661.
182 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
merchants asked him indignantly if he thought they did not know that
Lazarus Tucher had got 13 per cent, for eleven months, and whether
their money was not as good as his.
But in spite of this Gresham remained on friendly terms with Tucher.
In 1558 he advised his Government to honour Tiiro like certain others of
the foremost financiers with a beautiful golden chain. When two years
afterwards in Antwerp a monk preached very disrespectfully against
Queen Elizabeth and for it was threatened by the English merchants he
begged Lazarus Tucher to obtain the Queen's forgiveness through Gres-
ham. Also Tucher repeatedly lent money to the English Crown -in
1558 11,000 fl. at 14 per cent., and further sums in the same year; in
1560 again 26,666* . Even the heirs of Lazarus Tucher had in 1564 to
claim some thousands of pounds from Queen Elizabeth. Gresham, who
at that time was extremely short of money, was in serious danger of
having to go to a debtors' prison for this trifle. He only escaped this
fate by quickly getting sureties. 1
We possess letters from the last years of Lazarus Tucher which he
addressed to Lienard Tucher, his cousin, of the Nuremberg main branch,
who is already known to us. It was in 1561. The great credit crisis
which irrevocably destroyed the prosperity of the South German busi-
ness community had already broken out. The two old men, so dis-
similar from every point of view, exchanged their experiences and busi-
ness principles. Lazarus Tucher chiefly complained of his brother
Franz. He had lived badly and had been beguiled by Wolff Poschinger
(a financial agent of South German origin who will occupy us later) to
take bonds of the Netherlands Eeceivers General. Lazarus, who knew
well how unsafe this paper was, helped his brother in 1555 to divest him-
self of them again. But Franz Tucher did not give up his light-minded
business habits, and had to suspend payment in 1560 or 1561, where-
upon Lazarus satisfied the creditors.
So then Lazarus asseverated that as, thank God, he needed no more,
he would have nothing more to do with a high rate of interest, which
usually was accompanied with great risk, but chiefly would aim at
security to bequeath to his descendants what God had bestowed on him
through his work. Except a small amount of bonds of the Receivers
General he had outstanding only a claim of 40,000 ducats on the King of
Portugal; yet, according to the latest news, affairs in India were again
quiet, so that he hoped in the course of time to get out without loss.
'And in truth you will find that next to the English, which is small, this
Portuguese debt will be paid before those of all the other potentates. I
wish from my heart that anyone who is involved with the Kings of Spain
1 Burgon, I, 200, 260. Turnbull, Calendar, Queen Mary, No. 755. Kewyn de
Lettenhore, Relat. polit. I, 316, 326; II, 240-1; III,. 609 ft
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 183
and Ranee should not have a harder bed to lie on than you or I. At
times it is not possible to avoid serving the great. I, in particular, as an
old Courtier, as I two days ago have had to lend my gracious master,
the Prince of Orange, at his repeated pressing solicitation, 15,000 fl. for
his marriage with the daughter of Duke Maurice. I desire now neither
much nor little interest, in order in this way to obtain more easily the
repayment of the capital. But I would rather have been free from it
altogether. For my efforts now are directed to get away from all Poten-
tates and Lords and to put out my money so that I can have it back
again when I want it, as the present hard times, my age and my infirmi-
ties require it. I strive now more than I did before to obtain a quiet
time for the rest of my life, and I, especially in summer, live at my house
Gallifort, where I am seldom without good company.' If only all the
South German bankers had acted like Lazarus Tucher in his old age it
would have been better for them and the welfare of Germany.
Two years later Lazarus Tucher died. During the great days of the
Antwerp Bourse he was unquestionably one of the most conspicuous and
interesting phenomena which then attracted the notice of the whole
world. He was a type of business man of such a modern character that
history must consider him as one of the fathers of modern Stock Ex-
change methods. Although the Emperor made him a counsellor, and
although he was highly regarded at the Court of Brussels and by many
other princes, yet, in contrast to Wolff Haller von Hallerstein, he re-
mained his whole lifelong primarily a man of business. His descendants
became extinct at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but only
after they had intermarried with many of the foremost noble families
of the Netherlands.
Other Antwerp Financiers of South German Origin. Wolff Poschinger
appears to have been a feeble copy of Lazarus Tucher. Unfortunately,
we know little about him. 1 He is first mentionedin Antwerp in 1532, and
since he then was aged twenty-eight he cannot have carried on business
on his own account very much earlier. In 1549-55 he is several times
mentioned as financial agent of the Court of Brussels, and one of those
through whom the South German trading houses conducted their invest-
ments of capital in Antwerp. He died in 1558. His son of the same name
is mentioned in 1560 in connection with similar transactions, while a
daughter married Paul Tucher (a nephew of Lazarus) and brought to
him her father's fine house in the Rue Haute.
A similar, only probably a less conspicuous, part was played in Ant-
*Alao written: Boschinger, Pusohinger, Putschinger. Of. German. Museum,
Behaim Corresp. 1649, June; Tuchersches Familien-Arehiv, Brief von Laearua
Tucher, 1561, 14/3; Haugsches Handlungsbuch v. 1549; Briisseler Staatsarchiv,
Chambre des Omptes, No. 23470.
184 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
werp about 1543-9 by a man called Kaltenhofer, who from his name
may have been a South German, but possibly a Netherlander - especi-
ally as his Christian name was Eustache. 1
Horns Kleberg, 'the good German' of Lyons. We now come to a man
who, next to Lazarus Tucher, is unquestionably to be regarded as the
most remarkable figure in the large circle of German financiers of the
sixteenth century. 8 Hans Kleberg came from a bourgeois Nuremberg
family, Scheuhenpflug, a member of which many generations before had
fled from the town after an unusually scandalous bankruptcy. Hans
Kleberg's father appears then to have adopted a new name. His son
was early active in the trading house of the Imhof , and especially in
Lyons, where he presumably some time before 1525 established a busi-
ness of his own, which he soon brought into a flourishing condition. At
the same time he remained in friendly relations with the Imhof. We
know further that by 1521 he had become a citizen of the town of Berne,
so that as a Swiss he could, without molestation, carry on his affairs in
Germany and France during the wars then breaking out between
Charles V and Francis I. Many other South German merchants did the
same. But Kleberg did more; he performed political and financial ser-
vices for the French Government. In 1524 he is accused of having de-
nounced to the authorities at Lyons two men who had letters on them to
the Imperial commanding officers in Spain, so that they were arrested
and imprisoned. In 1526 we come across him at the French Court. In
1527 the town of Berne dunned Francis I to pay a claim of Kleberg's for
18,187 gold crowns which was in arrear. This was the first really big
financial transaction which the King concluded with a German mer-
chant. It is particularly interesting, in the communication of Berne
Town Council, to find the extraordinary free language which immedi-
ately recalls the letter written some years earlier with the same purpose
by Jakob Fugger to Charles V. The Council goes so far as to threaten
that if he is not paid Kleberg will call high personages to his assistance!
In 1528, after many years of vain efforts, Kleberg succeeded in bring-
ing home as his wife Felicitas, the daughter of Wfflibald Krkheimer, a
patrician of Nuremberg. But the marriage turned out unfortunate.
Kleberg had to promise before the marriage that he would settle in
Nuremberg. But he could not keep his promise because his business
affairs required that he should permanently be in Lyons. But his wife
refused to follow him there. His father-in-law, Willibald Krkheimer,
took the side of his daughter, and tried unsuccessfully to prevent the
Council from absolving Kleberg from his duties as a citizen. Whereupon
1 Lille, B. 2436. German. Museum, Behaim Corresp. 1649, June.
'Prom Ehrenberg, Hans Eleberg, <der gute Deutsche' (Mitth. d. Ver. f.
'
. f. Gesck.
'
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 185
Felicitas got ill and died in 1530, after a long illness. This caused Pirk-
heimer, who all along had been set against Kleberg, to make the mon-
strous accusation that his daughter had been poisoned by her husband.
We possess, however, the statement of impartial persons, from which we
learn with certainty that Pirkheimer's complaints were at least im-
measurably exaggerated.
In general, Kleberg was much hated by the good families of Nurem-
berg. Kleberg was proud, perhaps, of his money, as the spiteful Pirk-
heimer thought, but certainly also of his great gifts, by the help of which
he had become, not merely rich, but also much looked up to in Lyons.
The great charitableness which he displayed there earned for him the
name of 'the good German.' In Berne and Geneva, too, he equally
enjoyed general esteem. But the members of the great Nuremberg
f amUies with whom he had daily intercourse in business and commerce
did not cease to regard him with aversion. They did not forgive one
of their despised plebeians for rising above their heads, and Kleberg,
who in Lyons showed himself as a homely man, averse from all
external marks of respect, turned his pride to his countrymen. The man
who did a kindness to an opponent in Geneva and added, 'I will be his
servant and friend whether he likes it or not,' never forgot till the end of
his life the injuries of his countrymen.
In the last period of Kleberg's life we have more information about
his business activities. In 1536 he had obtained French naturalisation
from the King; then in 1543 was appointed 'Valet de Chambre Ordinaire
du roi' - a title which, in any case, shows that he had been of real service
to the King. He at once brought several seignorial properties, in respect
of which the King permitted him to exercise jurisdiction. By this Kle-
berg had become a member of the French nobility, as so is repeatedly
described as 'noble homme.' Certainly the services by means of which
he had climbed to this height were of an essentially financial kind, for
the tale that he rescued the King's life at the battle of Pavia is unques-
tionably a legend.
Kleberg at Lyons achieved what Lazarus Tucher succeeded in doing
at Antwerp. He succeeded in utilizing the capital of the South German
merchants for the abundant loans to the King. Probably this first
occurred in 1543, but especially in 1545. Then the first South German
houses which had branches in Lyons were induced by Kleberg and the
high rate of interest promised by the King of France to participate with
50,000 crowns in the loan raised at Lyons. As well as promises, energetic
threats must certainly have been used at that time to produce this
result. Kleberg played with his fellow-countrymen like a cat with a
mouse. At times he was useful to them and said 'he would leave his
body and goods with the Germans.' Then, again, when a new higher tax
186 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
was imposed on them he declared 'He could help them with fifty words,
but he wouldn't do so,' and they then came together to beg for his help,
he treated them hardly, complained of their ingratitude and asked
'whether they did not at home regard him as a needlemaker or a copper-
smith?' And even .added that 'He wished to be a Frenchman here and
not to assist Germans any more, unless they should also be useful to
On this basis an understanding was arrived at. The South German
merchants fell into the trap, and Kleberg had, in addition, got the per-
sonal satisfaction that the proud families of Nuremberg had to humble
themselves before him. Only the Tucher and the Imhof kept away from
the French loans.
We cannot here tell all which more recent researches have brought to
light about this remarkable man. We will only touch on a few particu-
larly interesting facts.
When the war of Schmalkalden broke out the Evangelicals at first
thought of Kleberg, in order by his agency to procure in Lyons the
monetary resources they were pressingly in need of. To this end Jakob
Sturm travelled from Strasburg to Lyons, but to his consternation he
found Kleberg seriously ill and had to go off again without having
effected his object.
Soon after Hans Kleberg died, leaving behind him a great fortune,
which his heirs seem to have lost again in a short time, in spite of the
fact that Kleberg personally had lent only a little money to the King,
so that at his death his fortune consisted for the most part of cash, and
in spite of the fact that his widow (Kleberg had married again in
Lyons) had invested it in real estate in accordance with the provisions of
his will.
There stands in Lyons an old statue which has been renewed in the
nineteenth century. Immemorial tradition alleges that it had been
erected by the people of Lyons to the 'good German.' Whether the
Tockman,' as the statue is popularly called from its rocky surround-
ings, was in fact originally dedicated to Kleberg (as is the case since the
renovation in 1849), the materials we have at present do not enable us
to determine. But it is sure that the 'good German' lived on in the
remembrance of the people, and meanwhile that tradition may be con-
sidered as worthy of credence until it is conclusively disproved.
An accurate analysis of the characteristics of Kleberg, so far as the
unfortunately limited material allows us, reveals that in almost all
points this remarkable man had a double nature. It is characteristic
that his good quali ties as a whole are turned towards foreign parts, while
regarded from his native land the Janus head of Kleberg exhibits only
hostile, distorted features.
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 187
Later Lyonese Financiers of South German Origin. Hans Kleberg has
only a, few friends among the Germans at Lyons. As such are mentioned:
Christopher Ebner from Nuremberg, Christopher Freihamer from Augs-
burg, Jacob Jager and George Weikman from Ulm. The first three were
the only German witnesses present when Kleberg's will was drawn up,
and they are remembered in it. After Kleberg's death George Weikman
with some other German merchants were considered by the Schmal-
kaldian League for making arrangements for procuring money for the
League at Lyons. All of them took part in the loans to the King of
France - Weikman and Freihamer in considerable amounts. Also they
all permanently remained in Lyons. We know that Christopher Ebner
died there in 1559. But apparently none of them took a leading part in
the relations of the South German merchants to the French Crown and
its financial affairs. It is only more than a decade after Kleberg's death
that some moving spirits arose among the South German merchants
carrying on business in Lyons: they are George Obrecht and Israel
Minckel, both of Strasburg.
George Obrecht is mentioned in 1544 in the Tucher business letters
from Lyons. At that time there was a threat of taking away the safe
conduct from the German merchants there in order to make them
accommodating for the loans of the French Crown. Obrecht was sent by
the Germans to Paris to obtain the continuance of the safe conduct
But he was unsuccessful; he rather made the affair worse into the bar-
gain by his indiscreet handling of it. Finally Kleberg, who himself very
likely had done an ill turn to the German, again smoothed things out.
In 1555 we again find Obrecht in Paris, whence he communicates to the
Nuremberg Council information about the stay of the Margrave Al-
brecht Alcibiades. 1 He no doubt had had something to do at the French
Court. After 1556 he and his countryman Israel Minckel appear as
recognized leaders of the South Germans in their financial relations with
the French Crown. Minckel, who, in spite of his fore name, was not
a Jew, is mentioned in 1561 as Master of the Mint, and a member of the
old Corporation of Companions of the Mint. 8 He was also a man whose
calling -as the Mint was then organized - was very near that of a
banker. Obrecht, meanwhile, probably had traded at home and did not
get into touch with financial affairs until he had come to Lyons.
The details of the big affairs which Obrecht and Minckel carried on
in the years 1556-64 for the South German merchants with the French
Crown we shall get to know later, and shall then see how tragically these
'Behaim Correspondence in German. Museum. Of. Brown, Calendar VI,
764; Clerjon, Hisfoire de Lyon, VI, 10; Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, ed. de la
Ferriere, 1, 285, 349, also section, 2, chap. 2.
Hanauer.1,148.
188 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
affairs ended. The two men by their activities inflicted unspeakable
harm on the well-being of the South German towns. For the immense
sums that then migrated to France were for the most part never repaid.
We are told nothing of the further fate of Obrecht and Minckel. At any
rate, their part was played out with the year 1565.
At this time Lyons was in rapid decay, from which it did not recover
till much later, when the wars of religion were over. Tet many mer-
chants kept on their businesses there during the -confusion. Among
these were those relatives of the old patrician family Herwart, who we
already know had settled in Lyons. Our recital of the South German
financiers will end with these, the last, who are demonstrably offshoots
of this family.
We know that two of the sons of the Augsburg Burgomaster George
Herwart died in Lyons, and that one of them left descendants there.
We have also indicated that two grandsons of this Ulrich Herwart later
played a prominent part. They are the brothers Bartholomew and
Johann Heinrich Herwart. 1
These two brothers, of whom Bartholomew was manifestly the most
important, were bom at Lyons in 1606 and 1609; and since their father
was born there they can no longer be considered as Germans. We came
across them first in 1632, the year in which Gustavus Adolphus died.
At that time they were closely attached to Bernhard of Weimar and
supplied him with money which enabled him to take Alsace in 1638.
When Bernhard diedinthefollowingyear they supplied the money which
was necessary to induce his army to enter into the service of the French.
In the following year they appear to have transferred their main
business to Paris, and after that only to have kept on a branch in Lyons.
Mazarin, in 1643, recognized their great services to the French state.
In 1644 their advances made it possible for the King to make the most
of the victory of Freiberg and take Phillipsburg. The King rewarded
this by appointing Bartholomew Herwart Intendant of Finance. In
1649, when the Treasury was so exhausted that they could not pay the
troops of Turenne's army which threatened to declare itself for the
Fronde, Herwart, by paying up the arrears of pay, succeeded in alienat-
ing the troops from the celebrated commander. Mazarin, in the pre-
sence of the King and the Court, announced that 'Herwart has rescued
France and preserved the crown for the King. This service shall never
be forgotten.'
By the above-mentioned and other similar loans in the Mowing year,
the Herwart handed over 2| million livres in all, which were by no
*<% tte'iatereeting article of Freiherr Hans Henrarth von Bittenfeld in der
Zi**r.<Lhistor. Ver. /. Schwabtn, 1, 184 ff., and Depping, Un btoquier ptotwtant
eo France au XVH ridofe (Berne AMforijtie, X, 285 ff., XI, 63 fi.).
THE OTHER GERMAN FINANCIERS 189
means sue to be paid back. Bartholomew risked his life in the re-
peated negotiations with the seditious troops. For all these services he
was appointed Controller-General of Finance in 1657, and after that was
directly under the Surintendant Fouquet, to whom he personally ad-
vanced large sums of money.
Like many financiers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these
Herwarts were both state officials and bankers, which naturally was
more useful than state finance from the point of view of business re-
sults. Bartholomew's character, too, does not appear to have been one
jed him of having, in con-
junction with Colbert, brought about his (Fouquet's) fall. Colbert him-
of the best. Later, his friend Fouquet accused him of having
self, too, thought very little of Herwart, and only used him so long as he
needed him, namely, till 1665, when he combined Herwart's office with
his own.
Bartholomew Herwart died in 1676. He was an intimate friend of La
Fontaine, who spent his last years in his house. Finally, it is note-
worthy that he used his high position in the financial administration to
introduce many Huguenots into it, where they made themselves so
useful that after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes Colbert saw them
depart with a heavy heart. Herwart's descendants then emigrated to
England.
The chief importance of the two Herwarts lies in the fact that they
were the last offehoots of the South German financial magnates of the
sixteenth century. When Colbert nationalized French finances the only
field still remaining for the international princes of finance was finally
lost, about the time when the tragic remains of the lugger money busi-
ness were buried in Spain.
North German Capitalists. Apart from the people of the Netherlands
proper it was only quite a small number of North Germans who took
part to any considerable extent in the great international financial
transactions of the sixteenth century, and among them there is scarcely
one merchant to be found. On the other hand, we are astonished to
notice for decades in the front ranks of the Antwerp capitalists the well-
known names of prominent members of the Holstein nobility; above all,
of the Bantzau, but also of the BrockdorfE, Ahlefeld, and others.
The Ranteau at that time were one of the richest German noble
families. Heinrich Bantzau, in his Genealogia Ranzoviana (which ap-
peared anonymously in 1585), himself gives us information as to the
wealth of his family, and adds: 'In our time one of the family has almost
simultaneously lent many hundred thousand thaler to the Emperor
Charles V, the Queen of England, the King of Denmark and the towns
of Antwerp, Ghent, Liibeck, and Hamburg.' Heinrich Bantzau un-
doubtedly here refers to himself. But not only he, a great statesman, a
190 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Maecenas and a learned man, and Stockholder of Schleswig and Hoi-
stein, but his father Johann, the celebrated soldier, his cousin Moritz,
the bold cavalry leader, and his father-in-law Franz von Halle aus
Drakenburg und Rintelen-all of them had lent extraordinary large
sums of money at Antwerp at high rates of interest. We only know a
part of these Antwerp financial transactions, but that is sufficiently
remarkable.
In 1550 Johann Rantzau, in conjunction with Franz von Halle, lent
King Edward VI of England 70,246 Caroms gulden, which were repaid
in the following year. In September, 1552, Franz von Halle is noted as a
creditor of the English Crown for 185,560 gulden, and Johann Rantzau
for 18,559 gulden. Apparently Franz von Halle had permanently taken
up his quarters in Antwerp. At any rate, he is buried there. 1
Then we hear for the first time again in 1563 that the English Govern-
ment owed money to Moritz Rantzau and Faulus Brockdorff. They had
the same representative in Antwerp, whose name we are unfortunately
not told. Queen Elizabeth had sent Sir Thomas Gresham to Antwerp to
obtain a prolongation of her debts which were falling due. Everybody
agreed except the agent of Rantzau and Brockdorff. He demanded
his money and threatened that if he did not get it he would exercise
his right of holding Gresham and other English merchants as security
and would arrest them. For the security of the city of London, which
was given with the bonds of the English Crown, included the right
to do this. 8
In any case the Holsteiners did not make any loss on their English
claims. But they did much worse with their claims against the town of
Antwerp. How these arose the materials that we have do not make
clear. We only hear that they chiefly served to pay the cost of the forti-
fications of Antwerp. They date from the 'sixties of the sixteenth cen-
tury. Originally the rate of interest was 12 per cent. But in 1570 the
town declared that it was not in a position to pay such a high rate, and
asked that it should be reduced to 5 per cent. The Holstein creditors
were very indignant. They were willing at the most to reduce the in-
terest to 7 per cent, provided that the capital was paid off by seven
yearly instalments in Hamburg. At last they agreed on 6 per cent., and
payment off within seven years. The agreement was confirmed by the
Finance Council of the Netherlands, but nevertheless was not kept.
The interest was never paid, and ultimately a considerable part of the
capital was lost.
Yet, comparatively speaking, the Stadtholder Heinrich Rantzau
* Ad* of the Privy Council, HI, 408. Nans, Memoirs of BurgKky, p. 405.
1 Burgon, Life and Times of Sir Thomas Qreshatn, H, 28, 38, 43. Kervyn, TO,
THE OTHEB GERMAN FINANCIERS 191
came off best. It is true that during his life he exerted himself in vain to
get any payments. In 1581 he requested King Philipp II to allow him to
attach the burghers of Antwerp and their goods. He repeated this
request in 1585 in a letter to the Stadtholder Alexander of Parma and
also threatened the town to take the law into his own hands. At the
intercession of Parma he kept his patience longer. But in 1592 he wrote
to the people of Antwerp: 'Not small is the sum which you owe me. For
if the yearly interest unpaid had been capitalized, the sum exceeds a
million Carolus gulden; and if some of your obligations stand in other
people's names, yet they belong to me, my wife and my children.'
Through the mediation of the King of Denmark Rantzau at last ob-
tained, at any rate, the promise that the town would use their utmost
endeavours to recognize his claim. For it appears that they did not
consider themselves unconditionally obliged to pay it because the debt
was on account of the Government. At last, in 1596, they formally ad-
mitted at least 125,000 thaler of the claim. This was only arrived at
through Rantzau's relations with Brussels. Yet he died two years later
without having lived to receive the repayment. His heirs had to wait
many years longer for it. It was not till 1606-16 that at any rate half of
the 400,000 guldens (which they claimed inclusive of interest) was paid
out to them. The remaining Holsteiners who were interested appear
mostly to have got nothing. According to the settlement of 1570 their
claims amounted in all to 117,000 thaler.
But that was by no means the whole. For from other sources we
know of an admitted debt of that time of the town of Antwerp to
Benedictusvon Ahlefeld which amounted to 43,713 thaler. It appears
thatultimatelyhalfofitwasclearedupinieOO. Weknowthatinl597the
heirs of Moritz Rantzau demanded satisfaction both in the Netherlands
and at the Court of Spain. But there is no trace of their having got it.
Friedrich Brockdorff, Detlef von Ahlefeld and Melchior and Otto
Rantzau appear to have taken the law into their own hands and im-
prisoned some Antwerpers who were travelling through Holstein. But
it is not clear what they got from this. 1
The town of Antwerp obtained loans from many other German
nobles, in particular 400,000 thaler from Count Mansfeld. This was
through the mediation of Gresham, who for this purpose sent his trusted
servant Richard Clough to the Count, who had given his word to Queen
Elizabeth. Further, a Herr von Holzfeld who had a claim of 21,767 fl.
against the town, succeeded in being partly paid in 1570 by intercepting
1 CL Anto. StadspratocdOen ed. Pauwds, 1, 341, 346 ff., 368 ft, 370, 386, 422 ft,
bis 458, in Hambg. Commerzbibliothek 'Copybook of Jurgen Poorter, a clerk of
Fran Barbara Rantean, widow of Moritz Rantzau; von Berthean in d. Zttchr.
d. Oat. f. 8ctte8wig-Host.-Laws*bg. CfescMdOe, XXTT (1892), 277 ff.
192 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
some Antwerp merchants on their way to Frankfurt am Main. In the
following year it is mentioned that the town made some repayments to
Duke Adolf von Holstein. And in 1572 the town had to defend itself
in the Imperial Chamber (at Wetzlar) against a claim of Count Johann
zu Wiedt for 42,000 fl. But it is not certain that the last-mentioned
claims really were concerned with loans transactions. 1
Finally we must here shortly allude to a North German noble or
patrician family, the Bodeck, who were induced to carry on financial
business through the fact that their kinsmen settled in Antwerp and
acquired a large fortune there. They came from Prussia, and belonged
to families of Knights of the Order who had conquered this land.
Johann von Bodeck lived from 1454 to 1521 in Thorn. His son Bona-
venturo went over to the Augsburg confession and settled in Antwerp,
where he had dwelt at least as early as 1554. In 1564 he stood security
to the town of Antwerp for the Hansa Town in respect of the interest
in a claim of 40,000 fl. which Antwerp had against them. 8 When the
disorders broke out in Antwerp he migrated to Frankfurt am Main, and
died there in 1591.
*CL Burgon, I, 337 F.; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Mat. dipt, des Pays-Bos, et
I'Angleterre, II, 270-626.
' Antw. StadspratocoUen ed. Pauwela, 1, 181.
CHAPTER 3
THE FLORENTINES AND THE OTHER TUSCAN
FINANCIERS
LTHE FLORENTINES
ftENERAl Considerations. The fact that the Florentines played
*-' the chief part in the history of the Renaissance has never yet been
satisfactorily explained. Venice and Genoa were also rich cities, and no
one can dispute the many-sidedness of Venetian enterprise. If therefore
the importance of Venice, not to speak of Genoa, is not to be compared
with that of Florence, one fact which has not yet been observed in this
connection was largely responsible for this. The chief strength of the
trade in commodities, while the Florentines since the thirteenth century
had gained their riches chiefly as bankers, and this had brought them
important connections in the Courts and high places of almost the
whole of Europe; and since their trade required little work from the
individual it had left them plenty of leisure for higher interests. These
facts gave a powerful stimulus to their already highly developed
capacity for culture and to their ambitions. Moreover, since their state
was so small, that at any rate while it had no port, they could only play
a leading part in the world through their money, many of the nobler
spirits among them threw themselves with extraordinary passion into
the cult of art and science. They managed to combine a munificent
liberality in these directions and a mode of life of the greatest elegance
with a certain distinguished simplicity - a fact well brought out by one
of their best historians, Varchi. 1 Among the great financiers of the six-
teenth century, the Florentines are the only ones whose chief branch
of business in the Middle Ages was dealing in large international bills
and other credit transactions. When economic changes at the close
of the Middle Ages forced into the background the commerce and
industry of Florence as in the case of the other Italian cities, the
Florentines had to turn their inherited faculty for finance to greater
account than ever; and the greatly increased demand for credit offered
them abundant opportunity for its exercise. Until late into the second
half of the fifteenth century the Medici and the families connected with
them, the Portinari, Sassetti, Tornabuoni, Guidetti and so on played
the leading part among Florentine bankers, though their aim in the
v. fiorent. Kb. 9: 'II vitto de' Piorenti
Iincredibile mondizia e pulitezza.'
II b, 49.
Ifc THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
case of the Medici at any rate was no longer money, but polifical power.
Lorenzo the Magnificent no longer carried on trade as an end in itself.
His agents turned this to account by furthering their own interests at
his expense, so that the business fell into a dangerous disorder. Other
families then came to the front, among them those who had been at
enmity with the Medici and therefore had been banished and deprived
of political power, and who therefore aimed at getting fresh strength and
influence through financial dealings abroad. The course of events re-
stricted their field of operations, but it remained large enough for experi-
enced business men by means of intensive cultivation to continue to
reap a rich profit for a long time.
There were five principal regions where the Florentines during the
last centuries of the Middle Ages had developed their business as mer-
chants and bankers on a large scale. These were the Levant, Italy,
France, the Low Countries, and England.
The Levant was taken from them by the forward movement of the
the Turks, but chiefly by the change in the direction of the world's trade.
Their efforts to make good its loss by bringing in Spain and Portugal
were not successful. 1 They were able to keep their hold longer over the
other regions, but the struggle of the Medici for supremacy in the
Bepublic had as a consequence an ever-growing connection between
Florentine business and political interests and those of the French
Crown. This fact forced them on to the side of the Valois in the world
struggle between the Valois and the Hapsburgs. Finally the Bepublic
was overthrown by the Medici backed by the Hapsburgs, and this drove
all their opponents and those who had not yet come to terms with the
new state of affairs into the French camp. This development was
fostered by the rise of new powers in the Low Countries, Italy and
England, who finally drove out the Florentines. In France, on the other
hand, these either, like the Fugger, never found a firm foothold, or, like
the Genoese, were gradually forced out by Florentines, or finally, like
the South German Protestants, came to grief over their own business.
It come about therefore that of all their business fields, the Floren-
tines retained only France, which, however, continued for a long time
to yield them rich and growing profits.
The Florentines in Rome and Naples. Lists dating from about 1470 of
the Florentine branches in the different countries have come down to
us.* These show that at this time there were thirty-two banks in Flor-
ence itself, and that among them the chief part in large international
finance was played by the firms of Pier Francesco e Lorenzo de Medici e
*Cf. Heyd, Genchichte des Levantdkandds, II, 523 fi.
From the Chronicle of Benedetto Dei and a Ms. in Miiuohener Hof- und
Staatsbibliothek (ItaL MSS. No. 160).
THE FLORENTINES 195
Compagni and Jacopo de Pazzi e Sue Nipoti. The most important
centres of Florentine banking in Italy, apart from Florence itself, were
Rome and Naples. In Rome at least ten Florentines had important
business, and forty persons are named as entrusted with the charge of
them. There were about the same number of Florentines staying in the
Kingdom of Naples. 1
In Rome there was little wholesale trade proper, but banking business
flourished on an extraordinary scale, for it was fed both by the world-
wide financial system of the Papal Curia and by the streams of foreigners
who came to Rome in the years of Jubilee and the other feasts of the
Church, The connection is notorious between these financial trans-
actions and the distribution of high ecclesiastical office and prefer-
ment. It came about, therefore, that in one period the Florentines
played the first part also in the College of Cardinals and generally speak-
ing in the whole organization of the Curia.
Among them the Medici had been since the beginning of the fifteenth
century the chief bankers of the Curia, an influential and profitable
position which they had managed to retain under a succession of Popes.
Only when Lorenzo il Magnifico fell out with Pope Sixtus IV the Pope
transferred his financial business to Francesco de' Pazzi, an action
which materially helped to inflame the enmity of the two great families.
The attempt of the Pazzi two years later to overthrow the Medici led to
their own downfall. This again provoked the war between the Floren-
tines on the one side and the Pope and King Fernando I of Naples on
the other, a war which did considerable damage to Florentine business
in both markets. Under the next Pope, Innocent VIII, Lorenzo de'
Medici regained his former position. The business connection between
the Medici and the Curia ceased on the death of both these men, and
other Tuscan bankers came to the front, notably the Sienese Agostino
Chigi and the Florentine Bindo Altoviti, the friend of Rafael, Michael
Angelo and Benvenuto Cellini. The Altoviti had branches in France,
the Netherlands, and England. We know, however, very little about
The highest ecclesiastical interests were intimately connected with
the finances of the Florentines. Rome became the scene where an un-
paralleled splendour was united with an extreme corruption. It was
this combination which first struck in Luther's reverent soul the note
which afterwards resounded so powerfully when he saw the conse-
quences of the same system on German soil.
Among the Florentines settled in Naples the Strozzi at this time held
1 Reumont, Geach. tL Stadt. Son, ILL a, 441 ft ., ILL b, 398 ff.; B. Brown, Calendar
II, 176; Marino Sanuto Diarii, XVI, 27, 1613.
1 Reumont, I.e. Pateerini, OeneaJogia delta famiglia AOomti, p. 51 ff., 54
196 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
the chief place. Filippo Strozzi the elder, one of the most noted and
favourite members of this gifted family, was banished from Florence and
settled about the middle of the fifteenth century in Naples. There he
gained a large fortune by business with the King Ferrante, who was
always in need of money, and with the similarly situated nobility of the
country. In Borne, Naples and Florence there was then no place where
money could be more safely deposited than in Strozzi's bank. No
interest was paid on such deposits, which could, however, be employed
with caution in active credit operations. Filippo's assistants were
chiefly members of his own family, as at his table in Naples he was able
to count more than eighteen Strozzi. He was the founder of the fortunes
of this branch of the family. 1 Recalled from exile, he spent the end of
his life in Florence. The Medici honoured, and at times even employed
him, but did not cease to regard him with suspicion. He built the
magnificent Palazzo degli Strozzi, and died in 1491 . We shall have more
to say later of his son, the famous Filippo Strozzi, and his grandson, the
no less famous French marechal.
In the first quarter of the sixteenth century the Florentines were still
the chief financiers both in Home and Naples. The Genoese, the Fugger
and the Welser ran them closer and closer, but the Florentines still kept
the lead. It was only taken from them by the Genoese after the sack of
Borne and the changes which ensued on the political scene.
The Final Period of the Medici in the Netherlands and England. The
Florentine branches in Bruges and London had from early days been
closely connected. As late as 1470 Benedetto Dei says of them: 'They
rule these lands, having in their hands the lease of the trade in wool and
alum and all the other State revenues, and from thence they do business
in exchange with every market in the world, but chiefly with Borne,
whereby they make great gains.' This statement is rather boastful, but
we have evidence from other sources as to the continued predominance
at this time of the Florentine financiers both in England and the
Netherlands.
At first the Medici played far the most important part in the case of
both countries. Their chief representatives were Tommaso Portinari and
Tommaso Guidetti. In 1462 they are mentioned as representatives of
the firm Lorenzo and Giuliano Medici, and by 1468 they must have lent
large sums both to the King of England and the Duke of Burgundy. 2
The business they transacted in the following years with both princes
was,however, more important still. According to Philippe de Commines,
1 Of. Reumont, Beitr. z. ital. Gesch., V, 223 ff.
'Pagoini, DeOa Detima, III, 171; Buser, Die Bezidnmffen der Medicaen zu
Frafe-eic&,437; Olivier, Dela Marche, quoted in Dupont, Memoires de Comyne*,
n> 337.
THE FLORENTINES 197
who was well informed on this point, in the year 1471 Charles the Bold
of Burgundy lent Edward IV of England 50,000 crowns to enable him
to return and regain his kingdom, which he succeeded in doing. Tom-
maso Portinari gave security to the Duke for the 50,000 crowns and
soon after for 80,000 crowns more. Guidetti lent to the King similar
sums on several occasions during the struggle for supremacy; and
Edward when he had overcome his opponents rewarded him by the
grant of valuable trade privileges. The Medici meanwhile had great
trouble in getting their money back again. 1 The other business which
Tommaso Portinari did for them in Bruges turned out even worse.
Tommaso Portinari held a very distinguished position at the Bur-
gundian Court. This may have made him incautious in granting credit
to the warlike Charles the Bold and his daughter Maria, who was the
wife of Maximilian I, the worst payer of all princely debtors. His
roasters did not, however, fare so badly as the Florentine trading com-
panies Da Rabatta and Dei Campie in Bruges, who after Maria's death
in 1482 were ruined as the result of the advances they had made to her.
The Medici did, however, lose large sums, and as a result apparently, in
1485, Lorenzo gave up the branch in Bruges 2 and discharged Tom-
maso Portinari. Portinari thereupon entered the Netherlands service
altogether and continued to play a huge part in finance, though he was
also employed in diplomatic missions.
At this time the Burgundian Hapsburg Court was so deeply in debt
that a large part of the famous Crown jewels had to be pawned. An
inventory of the year 1489 puts their value at 801,000 fl. s
Jewels estimated at the values given below were held in pawn by the
following persons:
100,000 fl. by Christoforo Nigsoni of Genoa.
100,000 fl. by Tommaso Portinari \
36,000 fl. by Antonio Gualterotti [ all of Florence.
12,000 fl. by Antonio Frescobaldi )
Others again were held by merchants living in Bruges.
Tommaso had a costly lily richly set with gems, which 'riche fleur de
liz' was called by the Italians il Riccho Fiordalisio di Borgogna. It
weighed 19 Ib. The money lent upon it was to be repaid from the
Flemish customs on English wool, the Tonlieu of Gravelinghen which
Portinari had leased in 1485. As this failed to materialize, the jewel
1 M tmaires de PMippe de Comynes, ed. Dnpont, I, 257, H, 337; Kervyn de
Lettenhove, LeUres et negotiation* de PMippe de Comines, I, 66; Rymer, Foedera,
'Qiao Capful, Geschichted. fluent. Bepublik, translated byDut8ohfce.il, 129;
Kenmont, Lorenzo de' Medici U Magnifieo, 2nd ed., II, 302.
tJakrbtchd. hauthistor. Sammlungen dea wterr. Kaiserhawes, Vienna, 1883.
Prk., p. xxv.
198 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
found its way to Florence, and after the death of Tommaso Portinari was
first taken over by his nephews Folcho and Benedetto and then by the
firm Girolamo Frescobaldi e Gompagni as Portinari's representatives
in Bruges. In 1498 it came into the hands of Alemanno and Jacopo
Salviati who deposited it in the Spedale di Santa Maria Nuova in
Florence. Two years later it was handed over to Antonio by Pier
Gualterotti and had not been redemeed by 1502. 1
Folcho Portinari, one of Tommaso's nephews whom we have already
mentioned, had in 1494 a claim of 3,800 Fl. against the city of Bruges,
and in 1498 the Frescobaldi took a lease in his name of the Flemish
customs on English wool which had been leased to his uncle.*
Tommaso Portinari also did signal service to King Henry VII of
England. Later his sons Francesco and Guido settled altogether in
England, where they were treated with special favour by the King. In
1554 a Portinari is mentioned who had served Henry VIII and Edward
VI as a military engineer for fortifications. 3
The last of the Medici mentioned in the Netherlands was Raffaele, who
was a partner in the Gualterotti firm from 1513 to 1522, but was also a
Knight of St. James and Imperial Chamberlain. The Guidetti also are
very often mentioned at this time in connection with finance, but the
first place had already been taken by other Florentine houses, especially
the Frescobaldi and the Gualterotti.
The FrescobaUi and the Gualterotti. At the time when the Medici had
ceased to count in the business world and the Fugger had not yet
attained their predominant position, the Frescobaldi and the Gual-
terotti were the foremost financial powers in Europe, but not for long.
Their importance rested entirely on their business in the Netherlands
and England. There is scarcely any mention of it in Florence in 1470,
when they still had no banks there; while Girolamo Frescobaldi, then
twenty-six, was carrying on business in Bruges. He is mentioned in
Bruges down to 1515, but before that date had a branch in Antwerp.
Here he bought a piece of land and it gradually became the centre of
gravity of the business. The Gualterotti, who are first named in 1489,
did the same. In 1518 they had branches both in Bruges and Antwerp.
Antwerp had been their centre since 1504 for the pepper import
from Lisbon, organized on a joint basis, and they had shared in the
expeditions of German and Italian business houses to the East
1 Pagnini, Delia Deeimi, in, 294; Gachard, Supports sur lea archives de LiOe,
p. 69 fl.; Archives de Lille, chambre des camptes, B. 2152, 2160, 2163; Ulmann,
Kaiser Maximilian I, 845 ff. (Brit. Mus. Add. Charters 1262, Brewer, Calendar
17, No. 6227 ff.)
Gilliodte van Severen, Invent, des Archives de Bruges, VI, 386; Gaohard,
Rapport sur les Archives de Lille, p. 70.
Brewer, Calendar 1, 5434; IV, 2171. Turnbull, Calendar, Queen Mary, No. 196.
THE FLORENTINES 199
Indies. 1 Pure finance, however, occupied them more and more. Here
Girolamo Frescobaldi and Filippo Gualterotti were the traders, but
we meet many other names.
We have seen that in 1489 the Frescobaldi and the Gualterotti had
lent large sums to the Burgundian Court, and that these had remained
outstanding many years. Girolamo, or, as he was mostly called in the
Netherlands and England, Jer6me Frescobaldi, had in 1494 a claim on
the city of Bruges for 5,800 FL, the largest claim of any individual
with the exception of the agent of the King of Portugal.
In 1498, as we have seen, the Frescobaldi, representing Folcho
Portinari, leased the Gravelinghen customs. From this time onwards
they were in constant relations with the Netherlands finance administra-
tion; but the amounts of the transactions were usually small. 2 The
Frescobaldi's business with the English Government began soon after
the accession of Henry VIII, who lent large sums from the treasure
accumulated by his father to Florentine merchants in order to develop
their trade with England. The Frescobaldi as well as Guido Portinari
and Giovanni Cavalcanti were among these favoured Florentines.
They in their turn furnished the King with munitions and commodities
and managed his payments abroad."
In the beginning of 1516 the Frescobaldi enjoyed the confidence of
the English Crown to such an extent that the King employed them to
act as his agents in paying large subsidies to the Emperor Maximilian,
though Bernhard Stecher, the Fugger's Antwerp agent, had previously
pointed out to the English agents that the Frescobaldi were hardly in a
position to carry out the transaction. This in fact turned out to be the
case. The Florentines were unable to convey the money in time to
Northern Italy, where the Emperor and his army then were; and
Maximilian, as we have seen, was therefore forced to make an inglorious
retreat. The Frescobaldi were accused of having been bribed by France.
The reg and Wolsey were extremely angry, while every one else be-
lieved that their delay had been due to secret instructions from the
English King. In reality they had neither the means nor business con-
nections in South Germany sufficient for such a transaction. Finally
they had to borrow from the Fugger under the guarantee of the English
Ambassador the sum of 60,000 fl. in order to relieve the Emperor's most
pressing needs. 4 The inner weakness of the firm which became evident
at this juncture led to its downfall two years later. The Frescobaldi
1 Heyd, GesMMe d. Levantehandde, U, 523 ft. (French edition. II, 630 ff.).
"Lille, B. 2173, 2177, 2210, 2224, etc.
Brewer, Calendar 1, 922-3, 1413, 3410, 3496, 4068, etc.; Brown, Calendar II,
Of. Brewer, H, Nos. 1384, 1475, 1736, 1792, 1816, 1928, 1937,;i968,2023, 2034,
2153, 2113, 2166, 2230. Brown, H, 722, 730.
200 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
and the Cavallari from Lucca, who were closely connected with them in
business, owed King Henry VIII the sum - enormous for those days -
of 60,000, part of which was to be repaid in alum and salpetre, while
the rest was to be kept at the King's disposal at any time. In the year
1517 a new agreement was concluded between the King and his debtors
under which the debt was to be repaid in yearly instalments. In the
following year, however, they were unable to pay the instalment. 1
Either from this cause or because the Frescobaldi had lost their credit
for other reasons, the firm went bankrupt in May and June, 1518.
Their Antwerp property had to be put up to auction and a composition
was made with their creditors. In 1532 among the arrears due to the
English Crown the claims on Filippo Frescobaldi and Antonio Caval-
lari were regarded as hopeless, and the Fugger too in 1527 wrote oft their
claim on Lionardo Frescobaldi e Fratelli as a bad debt. The total
liabilities in 1518 were estimated at 300,000 ducats. 2
In June, 1518, when the fall of the house was already inevitable,
Cardinal Campeggio besought Wolsey to shield the Frescobaldi. The
fact that a composition was reached shows that Wolsey did so. When,
however, Leonardo Frescobaldi died, about 1529, Wolsey transferred
the Frescobaldi' s acknowledgments of indebtedness to third parties,
who tried to obtain payment from the surviving members of the
young Francesco, Leonardo's brother then asked Wolsey to continue
the protection which had helped his father and brother. 8 Whether this
request was granted we do not know. The Italian writer Bandello, who
on his travels stayed in London, tells a tale of Francesco which if true
- and Bandello is fairly reliable in such stories of his own time - sheds
a friendly light on his further history.
According to this story Francesco, after living a long time in London,
had returned to Florence.* Here he befriended a young Englishman
who on his travels came to Florence in need of help. This was Cromwell,
Wolsey's secretary and eventual successor. Frescobaldi meanwhile had
been ruined and had nothing but a few doubtful arrears, among them
15,000 ducats in England. In order to collect these he went to London,
where Cromwell, recognizing him in the street, took him home and gave
him friendly entertainment. Cromwell helped him to make good his
claims and offered him a large sum to found a new bank. Frescobaldi,
however, wanted quiet and went back to Florence, where he died.
The house of Gualterotti lasted rather longer. It is mentioned in the
Netherlands financial transactions till 1519, when they held a share of
1 Brewer, Nos. 2963, 4004. Nos. 3098, 3141, 3491. Brown, H, 443.
1 Marino Sanuto, Diarii, XXV, 427.
Brewer, Calendar IV, 6974-6.
< Brewer, No. 2963 (No. 6974-6).
THE FLORENTINES 201
55,000 fl. in the large loans which Charles raised for his election as
Emperor. They, however, probably lost heavily over the Frescobaldi,
with whom they had business connections, or else political conditions
told against their business in Antwerp. Anyhow, after the death of
Filippo Gualterotti, who was the soul of his business, his son Francesco
resolved to wind it up. He employed for this purpose Benedetto
Gualterotti, who continued to be spoken of in Antwerp till 1529. 1
End of the Florentines' financial Transactions in the NeOierlands and
England. With the Gualterotti the last Florentine banking house of
importance disappeared from the Netherlands. Gaspar Ducci, though
mostly called a Florentine, really came from Kstoja, and in any case
did not belong to the firms we are now discussing.
There were, however, even in later times, a considerable number of
Florentine merchants in Antwerp, and they in 1546 were even granted a
new privilege. Even those among them who, like Cavalcanti, were of
some importance in England, were of very little account in Antwerp
business. 2 The chief reason for this is probably that the business situa-
tion of the Florentine banking houses was increasingly embarrassed by
their connection with the policy and finances of the French Crown.
Here we have the counterpart of the relations of the Fugger and the
Genoese in regard to Lyons. The financiers who had thrown in their
lot with one of the parties contending for the mastery in Europe, could
no longer hold out in the chief financial centre of the opposite party.
The development in England was quite different. Here Giovanni,
Bernardo, andlater Tommaso Cavalcanti, throughoutthe reign of Henry
VIII held the first place in finance after the Bonvisi of Lucca. Tommaso
Cavalcanti in 1544 was a chief creditor of the King, who for some years
then had been unable to lend broadcast in his early manner and was
forced to get more and more into debt. In order to do this he made use
at first of the Italian merchants resident in London. Shortly before his
death, however, the English Government learnt that they could borrow
to better advantage in Antwerp, and this became the regular method
under Henry's successors. The services of the Florentines were there-
fore no longer necessary. Tommaso Cavalcanti was, however, still in
business in London in 1556, but he had no further connections with the
finances of the Crown. The last remnants of their trade in England was
soon taken from the Florentines by the English merchants. The
descendants of the old Florentine merchant families still spoken of in
England under Elizabeth had taken to other professions. 3
1 CL Lille, B. 2177, 2210, 2218, 2224, 2286; Gaohard, Rapports sur lea Archive*
de LiUe, p. 70; Antioerpener Schoffenbriefe, 1525, 27/7-
Priv. of 1646 in the Liate dea Edits de Charles V, p. 295.
Of. Brewer, Calendar I, Nos. 1089, 3426, 3466, 3496, 3746, 6030 u. B. 1; Green,
Calendar Add., 1647-65, p. 436.
202 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
The Florentines in France. The Florentines' connection with. France
had lasted for some centuries before the opening of our present period.
In early times it had been entirely an economic connection. The
Florentines, in their capacity as merchants and bankers, had acquired
great wealth in France, but at the same time had often done important
service to the country and the Crown. Under Cosimo de' Medici the
Elder, his son Piero and his grandson Lorenzo, the connection gained
political importance, at first on the side of the Medici, to whom the
French King's favour was important for their political ends. Since their
opponents also sought this favour, the rivalry so developed only served
to make Florentine policy dependent on France and to give the French
the casting vote in Italian affairs. 1
We shall see in detail later with what energy and success Louis XI
and his successors strove to attract and keep at Lyons the international
markets, which since the decay of the Champagne fairs had been held at
Geneva, and which were of the greatest importance for the whole of
Southern Europe. Their aim was chiefly the Florentine merchants. It
is doubtful, however, whether Louis XI meant to entangle the Floren-
tines in their relations with France to such an extent that they would
never be able to free themselves. In any case, throughout his long reign
he never tried to use his growing influence over the Florentines for his
own political ends. His dislike for foreign wars is given as the explana-
tion for this omission. In view of what is known of his character it is
certain that Louis XI would not have taken such pains with the Floren-
tines without some definite purpose. He must at least have wanted to
put their trade and their capital as freely as possible at the disposal of
France. This purpose was attained. It was not the military adventures
of Charles VIII and his successors in Italy that brought lasting advant-
age to the French Crown, but the large increase of economic relations
which had followed from the Lyons fairs.
In 1462 the King had pronounced his ban on the visits to the Geneva
fairs, and in 1463 he transferred their privileges to Lyons. Immediately
the Florentine merchants, who had previously done business in large
numbers in Geneva, transferred their factories to Lyons. A factory of
the Medici is mentioned theie in 1464; and their first chief representa-
tive was Francesco Nori. The King at first does not seem to have done
business with them on a large scale. A coolness moreover soon arose
between Louis XI -and the Medici, whom he accused of having advanced
large sums to the King of England and the Duke of Burgundy for the
war against France through their branches in London and Bruges. He
accused Francesco Nori of having supported his enemies. On the dis-
charge or recall of Nori, the coolness ceased. Even after this it appears
i . Buser, Die Beziehutyen, der Medicaer zu FranlreM, pp. 33, 105 fi.
THE FLORENTINES 203
that the political and monetary interests of the Medici were often at
odds, until the political interests finally won the day. 1
About 1470 there were two Medici banks in Lyons. The chief bank
('e grandissimo,' according to Benedetto Dei) was that of Lorenzo e
Giuuano Medici, Francesco Sassetti e Compagnia. Their chief agent
was then Lionetto de Rossi, who gave his master Lorenzo de Medici
even greater cause for discontentment than Tommaso Portinari. It is
said that he managed so badly that the bank was several times on the
verge of bankruptcy, and in 1481 Lorenzo insisted on the winding up of
the Lyons factory. Lionetto de Rossi was, however, only recalled and
the Medici business in Prance took a turn for the better under the steady
hand of Cosimo Sassetti. 2
The second Medici bank in Lyons belonged to the Her Francesco
branch of the family. It sent money to Florence and also carried on a
trade in cloth.
There were also banks of the Pazzi, Capponi, Corsini, and Ghini
Portinari and Company. About 1470 the Florentines already had in
Lyons a consulate and their own church. There were besides large
numbers of Florentine bankers and merchants in Avignon, Montpellier,
Marseilles, and Aigues-Mortes. 8
Important as Florentine interests in France already were, they were
greatly increased by the fact that every one of the many revolutions in
Florence ended with the banishment of many of the adherents of the
defeated party and a great number found their way to Lyons. This
happened in 1466, 1478, 1494, 1512, 1527, and after the fall of the
Republic in 1530. This and the intermarriage of two daughters of the
Medici with French Kings (1533 and 1600) made the number of Floren-
tines settled in France, and until the middle of the sixteenth century
especially in Lyons, so great that people could speak of 'a French Tus-
cany.' In order to get a clear idea of the importance of the Florentines
in the French state, we only have to remember the two Strozzi, who
were commanders by land and sea of the Duke of Luynes, the all-
powerful minister of Louis XIII, an offshoot of the Florentine Alberti,
of the Marechal d' Ancre (Concini), the favourite of Marie de Medicis, of
the Due de Retz, Marechal de France and High Chamberlain under
Charles IX and Henry III, and his brother the Cardinal Gondi. 4 These
1 Buser, pp. 119, 141, 156, 166 ff. Vaesen et Oharayay, Lettres de Louis XI, voL
m, 43 ff., 251; Pagnini, Delia Detima, U, 60.
1 Buser, pp. 248, 294; Reumont, Lorenzo de' Medici il Magnifico, II, 301 ff.;
Gingina, Deptches de* ambaanadeurs milanais, II, 309; Kervyn de Lettenhove,
Lettrea et negotiations de Philippe de Commines, 1, 214, U, 83 ; Molini, Document
di storia italiana, I, 13 ff.
MS. of Benedetto Dei quoted in Pagnini, H, 304, of. H, 50.
As in L'Hermite de Solier, La Toscane Franfaiee (Paris, 1661).
204 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
brilliant figures are not, however, our chief interest. The people we
deal with are men whose work made less stir, but left far deeper marks
in the French state than that of the warriors and statesmen we have
mentioned.
The Period 1494-1612. At the death of Lorenzo il Magnifico, in 1492,
the direction of public affairs in Florence passed into the hands of his
son Hero. The Duke of Milan, Lodovico Moro, was then trying to sum-
mon the French to Italy in order with their help to obtain supremacy in
the peninsula. Hero de Medici accordingly found himself in a situation
with which he could not cope. He refused to lend money to the French
King Charles VIII, who was bent on trying his luck in Italy. The King
accordingly borrowed the necessary money for his expedition from the
Genoese under the Duke of Milan and banished the agents of the Medici
from France. 1
In Lyons it was feared that the other Florentines would also be
banished, and this measure was actually threatened in order still further
to excite the rage of the people of Florence against Hero de Medici and
so by his fall to obtain support for the great French expedition. This
two-edged measure was, however, not put into force. As the Florentine
envoys then staying in France said in their letters to Hero, the Province
Lyonnais would have lost a third of its revenues at the going of the
Florentines.
The French King's anger was, however, only directed against the
main branch of the Medici, whose business in France thus came to a
sudden end. The other branch of the Medici, that of Her Francesco,
which was at enmity with the others, received special marks of favour
from the King.
In November, 1494, Hero de Medici was driven from Florence.
Amid general rejoicing King Charles made a state entry into the city
and concluded a treaty with the Republic which secured to Florentine
citizens the privilege of trading in his kingdom with the same rights as
his own subjects. In return Florence promised to pay the King 120,000
gulden. These two clauses of the treaty, though hitherto they have
excited little attention, are more important than those which relate to
the cession of Hsa and other cities to the Florentines. They are specially
notable for the fact that they were not broken.
The first to betray the Medici in this crisis and thus to seize the
slipping reins of government was Piero Capponi. In all probability he
had conspired to this end with the King, during the long months when
he stayed with Trim as Florentine envoy during the preparations for the
Italian expedition. On the fall of the Medici, when Charles was in their
palace negotiating with Capponi about the treaty, he wished to impose
* Desjardins, Negotiations diplomat, de la France avec la Tovxmt, I, 313,1408.
THE FLORENTINES 205
hard conditions on the Republic. Capponi is said to have torn up the
draft treaty and to have replied to the King's angry exclamation, 'We
will have the trumpets sounded,' 'We will ring our bells,' whereupon
better terms were granted. This account of the proceedings cannot
be accurate. We get a better glimpse into the play of the interacting
forces when we notice that the Florentine war indemnity was paid
either wholly or in. part through the agency of the Capponi in
Lyons; and that as late as 1498 the Capponi acted as agents for
the letters between the Florentine Signoria and their envoys in
France. 1
The period of thirty-six years which followed, the final period of
Florence as a free city, is filled with the struggles of the democracy,
which sided mainly with the French and the Medici party which
favoured or opposed the French in accordance with their own ends.
There had then arisen the influential group of the Optimates, who
supported the Medici and hoped to form a plutocratic government
with their help.
In the first half of the period (1494-1512) democracy ruled, from 1602
onwards under the Gonfaloniere Piero Soderini. It might be thought
that in these years there would have been constant and close economic
and political connections between Florence and the French Crown.
This, however, does not appear to have been so. There were many
political disputes, especially about Ksa, which the French, contrary to
their engagement, did not hand over to Florence. The King on his side
made repeated demands on the Republic for money, which were either
granted unwillingly or often not at all. The Republic did not wish to
destroy its chances with the Emperor, and tried as far as possible to
remain neutral, thus incurring the charge from the French side of
favouring the policy of the Emperor.
In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that so little is
heard of financial transactions between Florentine merchants estab-
lished in Lyons and the French Crown. This may be partly due to lack
of information, but Machiavelli, who visited France three times at this
period as the envoy of Florence, would surely not have passed it over
in silence if the merchants of his country had then been very important
to the French Crown.
After his third embassy (1510) he gives a detailed account of French
finances, and especially of the extraordinary financial measures. He,
however, says nothing as to floating debts raised from the Florentines. 2
On the other hand, we know that the Florentines living in the Nether-
lands, especially the Frescobaldi and Gualterotti, had frequent money
DeBJMdin8,I,605;II,20.
Ct Ritratti, DeOe Cose di Franeia.
306 THE AGE OF THE PUGGEB
dealings at this time both with the Emperor and the Netherlands
Government, which was closely allied to him both dynastically and
politically. It appears therefore that the Florentines were then not
very dependent on the French Crown in an economic sense. The fact
is noteworthy that the Florentines who played the chief part in Ant-
werp belonged to other families than those who had their chief business
in Lyons and that the trade of the latter no doubt extended still further
in this period, and thus increased the community of interests between
France and Florence.
Jacopo Salviati and Filippo Strozzi, 1512-27. In 1512 the Medici
returned to Florence and the political relations with France became dis-
tinctly cooler. In the following year a Medici became Pope as Leo X
and Florentine policy became entirely dependent on that of the Papal
Curia, which was swayed by other motives than the monetary interests
of the Florentine merchants. These nevertheless now became important
politically. They were incarnated in the persons of the Pope's brother-
in-law and trusted adviser, Jacopo Salviati, and in Filippo Strozzi, the
son of that Filippo Strozzi 'the Elder' who had made his fortune in
Naples. He, like Jacopo Salviati, had married a Medici and had been
nominated by the Pope as Depositario of his revenues. These men were
undoubtedly the two most distinguished citizens of Florence. As
leaders of the Optimates they had helped largely in restoring the Medici
and were now their chief supporters. Above all, they were both at the
head of large banks which had branches both in Home and Lyons.
Our sources unfortunately do not enable us to follow out in detail the
connection of all these relations; they leave no doubt, however, that such
a connection must have existed.
barked on the expedition to Italy which resulted in the victory of
Marignano and the conquest of Milan. Pope Leo was long undecided
which party to choose, and we hear that his reflections at this time
turned on the business interests of the Florentines in France. 1 Never-
theless he maintained the alliance with Spain and only went over to the
French side after Marignano, hoping by so doing to ensure the supremacy
of his family.
At this time we again hear of large financial transactions between the
Florentine merchants in Lyons and the French Crown. In contrast to
his predecessor Louis XII, Francis I was a prodigal prince, splendour
loving and open-handed. His coronation cost enormous sums, more than
the first expedition to Italy. The customary extraordinary forced loans
from his subjects now proved totally insufficient. Loans had to be
'GmoCapponi.GwcAtc^cd^r^.BepuWii. German trans, by Hans Diitschke,
H, 291.
THE FLORENTINES 207
raised from the Florentines in Lyons on the security of future revenues.
In the beginning of 1516 he owed them apparently 300,000 ecus, which
fell due but could not be repaid, and the Lyons Fair settling days had
accordingly to be extended. The loan, however, still remained unpaid,
as the royal finances were entirely exhausted. Nevertheless in April
more money was raised for an expedition to Italy, which, however, did
not come off. This was done by pledging the salt tax to some Floren-
tines. At this time the Salviati had the largest business house in Lyons.
The Pope used all his power to further their interest even in regard to
the French King. When in 1518 Francis was planning a crusade against
the Turks, for which the Pope had granted money, he wished that this
money should be deposited in the Salviati's bank in Lyons, but the
King did not agree. 1
Jacopo Salviati stayed in Borne, and was therefore able to keep a good
watch over his financial interests. Filippo Strozzi, on the other hand,
returned to Florence, where Lorenzo Medici honoured him, but kept him
as far as possible from state affairs. Only when Griulio Medici, who was
Filippo Strozzi's brother-in-law and most intimate friend, became the
most important man in the state, Filippo obtained great influence and
began to neglect his business. After Pope Leo's death he was sent to
Home in 1521 and found the affairs of his bank in great disorder. His
credit had been gravely affected by bad management and a large failure
in Naples. He managed, however, to put things straight again and to
maintain the honour of his house. Pope Adrian VI made him Treasurer
of the Curia, and under Clement VII he went even farther. With him
he was on a very confidential footing and served him in a most liberal
manner without commercial calculation, for he was far too ambitious
and restless to be able, like Jacopo Salviati, to combine his monetary
interests with his political aims. Both men succeeded, however, in
getting their sons into the College of Cardinals. We shall soon see that
in the Italian wars of the French King the Florentines must have trans-
acted a large amount of financial business for him; but their economic
dependence on the French Crown only developed very gradually. In
the election of the King of the Eomans in 1519 they did nothing for
Francis, while the Gualterotti, as we know, shared in the loans by which
the House of Hapsburg secured the election.
In 1521 the King ordered all the property of the Florentines in Paris,
Lyons and Bordeaux to be seized. Everything was inventoried and a
watch was set on the houses. This, it was said, had come about because
the Florentine bankers had betrayed the war preparations by their
letters to Flanders and other countries of the Empire. Moreover, they
1 Canestrini, Nfgoe. dipL de la France avec la Toscane, H, 761, 765, 770. Brewer,
Calendar II, No. 1303. Marino Sanuto, Diarii, XXTT, 167; XXVI, 259, 303,
208 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
had promised the King a loan of 100,000 ecus, but afterwards had lent
this money to the Emperor in return for a charge on the revenues of
Naples. In the following year the Emperor complained that the Floren-
tines, who had been unwilling to advance him on good security 20,000
ducats, had now engaged troops for the French King without asking for
security. 1 We see therefore that the Florentines were still wavering. It
needed events of a different order entirely to destroy the neutrality of
Florentine capital.
The Period 1527-30. The sack of Rome by the Emperor's troops in
1527 brought heavy loss to the Florentines who lived or had factories in
that city. This catastrophe, however, was only a beginning of a series
which affected their trade yet more adversely. The next of these events
was the second expulsion of the Medici from Florence. The group of
Optimates who were specially influential in the last years of the Re-
public contained many different elements. Their chief common charac-
teristic was that they aimed at a government of the distinguished and
rich. These aims naturally did not appeal to the people. The Optimates
therefore sided with the Medici and the Medici with them. Their rela-
tionship was, however, quite peculiar. The Medici made use of the
leaders of the Optimates with their distingusihed kinsman Pope
Clement VII, and they also helped them in business; but they tried to
keep these dubious friends as far as possible out of Florentine politics.
The Optimates' most respected leader, Jacopo Salviati, was kept by the
Pope constantly busy in Rome, and Clement was not displeased that he
as well as the other great Florentine bankers should incur popular hatred
in the Papal State on account of the financial transactions which they
undertook in the service of the Curia. Further, when, in 1527, the Pope,
either from imprudence or stinginess, had disbanded his troops so that
he was overcome practically without resistance by the Imperial forces,
he had the report spread that Jacopo Salviati was to blame for this. It
was only on his deathbed that the Pope withdrew this false charge which
had made Salviati hated throughout Italy. In 1526 the Pope had been
besieged in St. Angelo by Colonna, instigated by Hugo di Moncado, an
emissary of the Emperor, and had been forced to come to an agreement
with Moncado. He had then handed over Filippo Strozzi as a hostage
and had neglected to ransom him. Strozzi, however, was released by
Moncado in order to turn Florence away from the Medici. He, however,
returned to the Pope, and waited a year for the moment for taking
revenge and achieving his party's end. 3
1 Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris sous le rigne de Franfou I, ed. Lalanne, p. 103.
Beigenroth, Calendar II, 407.
1 Ct Varchi, Star. Fiar. Lib. II, Filippo Strozzi'a biography by hia brother
Lorenzo and Macbiaveffi's letters to Quiooiardini.
THE FLORENTINES 209
After the sack of Home he hurried with his wife to Florence, bringing
the first certain news of the great catastrophe. Helped by his wife and
another leader of the Optimates, Niccolo Capponi (whose father Kero
Capponi had been the chief actor in the expulsion of the Medici in 1494),
Filippo Strozzi managed to get the Medici out of the city under his
protection, and thus remained on good terms with them. This rendered
him suspect to the people, who anyway hated the Optimates. Niccolo
Capponi, however, still retained the confidence of the majority and was
chosen Gonfaloniere. Even he, however, in spite of his undoubted
honesty, was the subject of violent attacks.
In 1528, after his wife's death, Strozzi left Florence for Lyons, giving
business there as his reason. There he occupied himself with study and
had dealings only with the Florentines in Lyons, with whom he made
himself very popular. On one occasion, during a famine when the rich
Florentines were threatened by the people, Strozzi organized the
defence, arming all men capable of bearing arms and so saving the city
from the looting which threatened it.
Meanwhile Niccolo Capponi was deprived of his office as Gonfaloniere,
tried and only just escaped being sentenced. The attempt to bring in a
government of Optimates thus utterly failed, and for a while the
Democrats ruled once more. But their days, too, were numbered. In
the summer of 1529 Charles V came to an agreement with the Pope
which brought the Emperor the grant of the profitable Gruzada and
other ecclesiastical sources of income. The price of this agreement was
the Republic of Florence.
At this time the Venetian envoy Suriano gives us the following
account of the Florentines' business: 'The Crown of France owes
private persons in Florence 600,000 ducats. In Home the Florentines
have spent 350,000 ducats on buying offices. They suffered great
losses at the sack of Rome. Formerly Florence alone made a profit of
8,000 ducats a week from goods delivered to Rome, but now only 1,000
ducats or a little more, since intercourse with Rome has been forbidden
for fear they should again come to depend on the Pope. Trade in com-
modities with Naples has been destroyed by the war; the export of
silks and brocades to France has likewise been destroyed by the war and
the secession of Genoa to the Emperor's side. Trade with Flanders has
been stopped by the closing of the Venetian territory. These barriers
are, however,circumvented,andinspiteofaU these losses and hindrances
the Florentines are still extremely rich. Eight or ten families have about
100,000 ducats apiece. Tomasso Guadagni is said to have 400,000
ducats, though most of it is in France; Ruberto Degli Albizzi about
250,000, Pier Salviati 200,000; the Bartolini, Antinori, Soderini,
Strozzi, and others, each more than 100,000. More than eighty families
210 THE AGE OP THE PUGGER
have between 50,000 and 100,000, and the number with property worth
less than 50,000 ducats cannot be counted.' 1
Among the families here named as the richest, the Salviati and the
Strozzi at any rate belonged to the party of the Optimates. The
Florentine historian Varchi also calls Pier Salviati very rich, and says
that he was one of those who lived in the grand style, not like merchants,
but like nobles. The Guadagni, the Albizzi, as well as the Salviati, had
apparently made most of their money in France. The' firm of Tommaso
Guadagni e Gompagni is mentioned in Lyons in 1508, and Ruberto
Albiszi in 1523, both in unimportant financial dealings with the French
Crown. 2 Salviati's transactions, however, were more important, and
here we must pause for a moment.
In June, 1528, Clerk, the English envoy in Paris, was trying to defend
himself against Wolsey, who charged him with having used Piero Spino
as an agent for a payment to the French Xing though he knew him to be
in the service of the Genoese Antonio Vivaldi and on the side of the
Emperor. Clerk answered: 'And as for this man, he is a Florentyn, on
that hath contynuyd and folowyd the French* Courte many yerys,
and on that hath made and makith contynually all the great exchanges
that hath ben by th King for his affayres of Italy, whither th Frenche
King hath not always sent redy monay, as your Grace can right well
considre if he wer imperyall, the Frenche King and other of the Coun-
saill here wold not use hym, and trust hym with ther monay, as they
have don and dayly doo.' . . . 8
This Piero Spino or Spins was apparently an important person in
Tucher, Caspar Ducci and Hans Kleberg, he was half financial agent and
half banker. He is mentioned in 1524, just before the battle of Pavia.
He was then sent by King Francis in order to look after a convoy of
munitions to Cardinal Salviati, a son of Jacopo Salviati, and at this
time Papal legate in Lombardy. At the beginning of 1527 Pope
Clement VII was, as we know, in a critical position and besought the
French King for help. After long hesitation it was decided to give Piero
Spino 10,000 scudi to be sent to Lyons, where with the 20,000 scudi
already there, they were to be given to the Salviati for transmission to
Italy. In February, 1529, it is reported that the Salviati undertook for
the King a payment to Italy of 30,000 scudi.* A Tucher business letter
of 1532 mentions Leonardo Spino as the Salviati's agent in Lyons.
> Albfei, B&at. d. Ambasc. Venet., Ser. II, yoL V, p. 420 fi.
* Pagnini, Detta Detima, I, 129; Tardif, Monuments historians*, No. 2957.
Brewer, Calendar, No. 4390 ; full text in State Papers, Henry VIII, voL VII,
p. 83.
Oanartrini, 2fgoc. dipl. H, 808, 887, 1049.
THE FLORENTINES 211
This all seems to show that the Spin! had close business connections
with the Salviati and that Piero was probably their representative at
the French Court.
To return for a moment to the Venetian envoy's report in 1529.
Even supposing its figures are not quite accurate, it shows at least that
the large Florentine bankers in the year 1529 had invested a consider-
able part of their property in France and chiefly in the towns of the
French Crown. This was when the agreement between the Emperor and
the Pope had already sealed the doom of the Republic. In vain Florence
besought the French King for help: he gave nothing but empty pro-
mises. As he had deserted Genoa, so now in the peace of Cambrai he
abandoned Florence. He never even sent help in money to any con-
siderable extent. He had just ransomed his sons from the Emperor for
the enormous sum of 1,200,000 crowns and had nothing to spare for
Florence. The Republican Florentines in Lyons entreated hi to pay
at least a part of his debts to them as they fell due, but he only sent
30,000 scudi to Italy through the Salviati in 1529. When in the year
following it was proposed to repay the same amount, this proposal
was forbidden by the Papal legate, who appealed to the Treaty of
Cambrai. 1
A few of these Republicans in Lyons, among them Ruberto degli
AHnzzi, succeeded in getting together another 20,000 ducats. Those
who shared their views in England and the Netherlands also collected
a little money - not much, for the Florentines in those countries were
now neither numerous nor specially rich - and moreover they did not all
favour the Republic. The Florentines in Venice gave nothing, in spite of
frequent entreaties. Few too of the Optimates came to the help of the
Republic in its extremity. The Consul of the Florentines in London, a
Carducci, obtained money from King Henry VIII, but as he went bank-
rupt immediately the King lost more than 50,000 ducats. All help was,
however, vain; the Republic was lost.
It is not our business to inquire into the importance of this event in
the history of Italy. It is important for us to ascertain the effect on
Florentine business of the loss of their freedom and the final supremacy
in Italy which the House of Austria obtained after its long struggle with
France.
The Florentines now put their business and their capital almost
exclusively at the disposal of the French Crown, which had so long
deserted their cause.
In Rome and Naples the Florentine bankers were soon completely
driven out by the Genoese; in the Netherlands by tie Genoese and the
i Canestrini, H, 1003 fi., 1049. Gayangos, Calendar IV, 1, pp. 375, 522, 691.
Varchi, ed. Arbib. II, 323, 361 ff. Brewer, Calendar IV, 6774.
212 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
South Germans; in England by the English merchants. They had never
played a prominent part in finance in Spain. Their finances in France
developed in consequence all the more vigorously. 1
An important fact, which has hitherto escaped the notice of historians,
is that the victory of the House of Austria drove Genoese capital into the
Imperial Spanish camp, while it made Florentine capital entirely French.
No doubt political and economic forces combined to produce this
development. The political causes were decisive, but they again had
economic roots. If the greater part of the rich Florentine families
sympathized with the French, this was because their monetary interests
bound them to France. They could not free themselves; the com-
munity of interests between them and the French Crown became closer
and closer. Many of them hated the Medici; and when banishments on
a large scale began once more, the Florentine colony in Lyons became
a hotbed of conspiracy against the new Tuscan dynasty. Many left their
country of their own free will, because there was no opening for their
energies. Political confusion and speculation meant ruin. Anyone who
could not make terms with the new order had to try his luck abroad.
No pkce offered such favourable conditions to the Florentines as
France, where they were welcomed at the Court with open arms; for
the enemies of the Medici were enemies of the Emperor. These refugees
from Florence therefore for a long time cherished the hope of driving
out the Medici by means of French help. There were several attempts,
though the refugees had to help themselves almost entirely. The
French Court made all possible use of them, learnt from them all it
could and accepted their good money very joyfully, but never again
involved itself in Italian adventures. The marriages of the daughters of
the Medici with French princes made no difference, as they were not
important for French foreign policy. Both before and afterwards
Tuscany under Hapsburg protection counted among the enemies of
France.
The Strozzi after 1530. Capponi had died just before the fall of the
Republic. The other leaders of the Optimates, Jacopo Salviati and
Filippo Strozzi, directly afterwards tried to realize the aim of their
party, the creation of an oligarchy under the leadership of the Medici.
Pope Clement, however, was now aiming at an absolute monarchy, and
in this plan he made skilful use of the leaders of the Optimates, so that
all the popular hatred fell to their share. When they had done their part
and Alessandro de' Medici was Duke of Florence, he soon rid himself of
such questionable adherents. Filippo Strozzi, who had played the chief
role in the comedy the Pope had arranged, was accused of having wished
'For Borne, cf. Benmont, Oeechichte der Stadt Bom, m b, 449 ff., 683; for
Naples, Rocco, De' lanM di Napoli, p. 3 ff.
THE FLORENTINES 213
to poison the Duke, and though he established his innocence he thought
it better to go to Home.
Here Strozzi came to an arrangement with the Curia, but he could
only get his claims recognized by renouncing many years of accrued
interest. When, in 1533, the Pope had betrothed the youthful Catherine
de' Medici to Prince Henry of Prance, he asked Filippo Strozzi to escort
the bride to Marseilles. He wished to utilize the Strozzi's credit in order
to pacify the French Court on the subject of Catherine's dowry.
Filippo accepted this task and promised to pay over the dowry of
130,000 scudi within a year. At the wish of the Pope, who was anxious
to get him out of Italy, he remained, though much against his will, for
six months longer as Papal legate at the French Court, where he made
himself much loved by the King.
Meanwhile Filippo's son Piero was imprisoned in Florence on a false
charge. His father complained in vain both to the Pope and Alessandro,
and it was only after a long interval that Piero regained his liberty.
He thereupon set out for France, and meeting his father in Lyons, he
told him that the Duke had obviously decided not to suffer the Strozzi
to remain in Florence any longer.
This was in 1534, when the Pope was very ill. Filippo Strozzi found
himself, at the French King's wish, on the journey to Borne, where it
was intended that he should further French interests in the case of the
election of a new pope. This journey met Filippo's wishes all the better
because there were still arrears of 60,000 scudi outstanding on
Catherine's dowry. When he reached Rome the Pope was already dead.
As we know, the Florentines, and more especially the Strozzi, were
hated by the Eoman populace as the directors of the Papal finance.
At the time we speak of, the people thought that they had a special
reason for this hatred. The Strozzi in Borne had promised to provide
the Eternal City with corn from Sicily at an agreed price. The Viceroy
of Naples had, however, forbidden the export of the wheat, so that the
Strozzi's agents had had to import it from distant countries - Brittany,
and even Flanders - a thing which very rarely happened. Some cargoes,
moreover, were lost by shipwreck, and others arrived behind time.
There was a famine in Borne, and the people in their anger tried to
destroy the Strozzi's house.
This was the state of things which Filippo Strozzi found on his
return to Borne. He took it greatly to heart; and when he noticed that
his credit was suffering, he made over the Boroan business to two
Cardinals on terms very unfavourable to himself. The new Pope,
Paul III, demanded the return of the ecclesiastical revenues and other
valuable objects pledged to Strozzi on account of the arrears of
Catherine de' Medici's dowry. Filippo was clever enough to accede to
214 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
this demand, and the Pope thereupon recognized his predecessor's
engagements, so that Strozzi once again only lost the interest.
Meanwhile he tried to liquidate his property in Florence. This, how-
ever, did not succeed as he had hoped, for the property was valued at
over half a million. Nevertheless he did not return to Florence and his
relations with the Duke Alessandro became steadily more unfriendly.
Filippo joined the movement of the banished Republicans and accused
the Duke of having tried to have him assassinated. '
The Florentine Republicans now (1535) for a short time pinned their
faith to the Emperor, but soon saw that nothing was to be expected
from him. He protected Alessandro in spite of all his crimes, and finally
gave him his daughter in marriage. The banished Florentines were
thus thrown once more entirely on the French side. The Cardinal du
Bellay, then French ambassador in Home, was nevertheless nervous
lest these negotiations with the Emperor should succeed and warned
Strozzi not to take part in them. In order to exert still greater pressure
the King had Filippo's agent in Lyons, Gian Francesco Eini, imprisoned
on account of the 30,000 scudi still owing on Catherine de' Medici's
dowry, and this in spite of the fact that the King had for a long time
himself been owing Bini a larger sum. This incident, however, seems to
have been cleared up when the Florentine negotiations with the
Emperor broke down.
The renewed outbreak of war between the Emperor and France once
more awakened the hopes of the Florentine exiles. King Francis, they
thought, would go to Italy with a large army to set Florence free.
They accordingly contributed to the cost of the French annanent
with advances of money. The agents of Filippo Strozzi in Lyons ad-
vanced 15,000 ecus, although their master could not as yet be counted
among the avowed enemies of the Medici.
When the news of Filippo's shares in the French war loans was
brought - in an exaggerated form - to the Emperor, he caused Strozzi' s
property in Naples and Sicily to be confiscated. Strozzi now feared that
the same thing would happen in other parts of the Empire, where he
had money owing to Wyn, and he was in fact forbidden under a heavy
penalty to have financial dealings with the French Court. He accord-
ingly sent his son Piero in all haste to Lyons to get the transaction
annulled. This, however, was not necessary as no further steps were
taken against the Strozzi. The sending of Piero, however, in itself
turned out very badly for his father, because King Francis caused the
young man to take part in the war in Piedmont against the Imperial
forces, and even made him a commander. His father, much incensed,
tried in vain to turn him from his decision, and as he no longer felt safe
in Borne, went to Venice.
THE FLORENTINES 215
The Emperor had hitherto refused to yield to the pressure of the
Duke of Florence and have him proscribed, but he now gave him up.
Hereupon Filippo and his sons Piero and Euberto, together with many
of their friends, were declared rebels, and all the goods of the Strozzi in
Florence were confiscated. Filippo now had his employees in Venice
and Lyons informed that if they wished they could leave his service,
since it was forbidden to serve rebels. They all, however, declared that
they would not leave him, so that Filippo'e commercial interests did not
suffer.
He now lived quietly under the protection of the Signoria of Venice
and occupied himself chiefly in study, till one night Lorenzo di Pier
Francesco de' Medici came to him and told him that he had just
assassinated the Duke Alessandro. This was the signal for Strozzi to
begin open war against the dominion of the Medici. Under the advice
of the French envoy in Venice he joined ths Cardinals Salviati and
Ridolfi, who had both been among the chief opponents of the murdered
Duke. A coup was prepared against Florence. Cosimo de' Medici was,
however, at once chosen Duke, and the Emperor sent troops to Florence
which were more than a match for their opponents. They accordingly
wished to give up the game. The French, however, now interfered,
promising to support them with money to hire troops. Here the prime
mover was the Cardinal de Tournon, the Governor of the Province
Lyonnais. Strozzi, however, answered that the favourable moment was
past, and the opposing party were now too powerful. Moreover, he had
never been repaid the 15,000 scudi which he had lent the Cardinal on
the King's account some months before in Lyons for the war in Pied-
mont. Evidently the King wanted to make war at Strozzi's expense.
The French envoy in Venice hereupon declared that the King would
give 20,000 scudi if the Florentine exiles would do the same. The
exiles, however, would not agree and sent Bartolomeo Cavalcanti to the
King to inform him as to the state of the case and to tell him that the
undertaking could not be carried out unless he granted 100,000 scudi.
Meanwhile the French King had sent Filippo 15,000 scudi and urged
him to free his country with this exiguous sum. Piero was also working
in the same direction. He had hired troops which he could not keep
together without a war and he wanted to earn laurels. Filippo, how-
ever, stood his ground. He kid stress on the fact that the undertaking
had no hope of success, and declared that it was for princes and republics
to keep up armies and not for private people. Hereupon his own son
and the other exiles accused him of putting his own profit before his
country. The French advanced no more money, so that Piero had to
disband his troops, and went to Rome. At last, against his better judg-
ment, Filippo gave in so as to avoid the hatred of Ms friends and kins-
216 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
men. He paid 20,000 scudi, and said that he would make further contri-
butions if the exiles did the same. The enterprise failed. Filippo was
taken prisoner, and in all probability secretly murdered. The victorious
Duke meanwhile spread the report that he had killed himself after
writing on the wall of his cell in his own blood the words, 'Exoriare
aliquis.' (May some (avenger) arise.) We have seen what matter-of-fact
considerations played a decisive part even in Filippo Strozzi's last
venture, and it is on this account that we have treated it in detail. The
sad end of the man called with many others the 'richest man in Italy 1
made a deep impression on MB contemporaries.
Two of his sons took military service under the French - Piero became
Marechal, Leo, the Prior of Capua, an admiral. They both remained
bitter enemies of the Medici. The fact that their service was chiefly
military did not, however, prevent them from giving the attentions to
finance which was demanded by its importance in war. In 1546 the
Schmalkaldian League sent Jacob Sturm of Strassburg to France to
negotiate with the Kg about a treaty and the grant of subsidies.
Sturm got into touch with the Marechal Strozzi, who offered to put the
sums paid by the King to himself at the disposition of the League on
security without interest. Strozzi on this occasion showed great
technical knowledge of finance. The same thing is reported of him again
in 1557. 1
Two other members of another branch of the family, Giulio and
Lorenzo Strozzi, settled in Lyons after the great revolution of 1530.
They founded a banking house, which participated in the loans of the
French Crown as early as 1536-7. In 1576 the firm was called Alfonso
e Lorenzo Strozzi. They then used the Genoese bill fairs, but their
domicile was certainly Lyons. On the other hand Lorenzo Strozzi, who
is mentioned as a financier under Henry III, had already moved to
Paris.
Other Developments of Florentine Business in France until the Death of
Henry II, 1559. Our sources do not enable us to follow in detail the
the century following the fall of the Republic and we must content our-
selves with a general sketch.
In the first period, which extends to the financial crisis of 1557 and
the death of Henry II, the firms we already know, the Salviati Capponi,
Albizzi, Guadagniand Strozzi, still play the chief part. Their financial
relations with the French Crown were first managed by the Cardinal de
Toutnon, Governor of the Province Lyonnais. In June, 1537, he was
granted powers to give security on the royal revenues for the sums lent
to the King by Tommaso Guadagni, heir of Tommaso the Elder and also
i- Sturm's Eeport in Augsbg. Stadtarohive. Brown, Calendar VI, 904.
THE FLORENTINES 217
of Olivieri Guadagni. In August this process was repeated and in
April, 1538, the Guadagni and the Delbene, a family which had just
begun to come forward, shared in the lease of the salt tax effected
through the Cardinal. In 1543 Albkzo Delbene, together with Tommaso
Certini (?) took a lease of the alum import for ten years, and Albizzo's
brother Alberto Delbene was sent in 1548 by the King to the Pope to
promise him 350,000 scudi of subsidy, in case of an attack from the
Emperor, though in fact no such attack was thought of. In 1559
Albizzo Delbene still belonged to the Florentines who followed the
French Court. 1
In 1545 the firm Averardo Salviati e Compagni in Lyons secretly
tried to induce South German merchants to share in the loans of the
French Crown and were also in touch with Antwerp for the same pur-
pose. These attempts, as we have seen, were successful. We have a list
from the year 1553 giving the shares of the Florentine business houses in
the French loans. They amount to a total of 523,075 ecus, not so much
as the South Germans and Swiss with 720,925 ecus, but nevertheless a
large sum, which in the next few years increased greatly. The Salviati
in 1553 advanced a further sum of 99,325 ecus to the King. 8
This was the period of the Sienese war. Pier Strozzi as a French
Marechal defended the Republic of Siena, threatened by the Duke of
Florence, Cosimo, and the Spaniards. The money he used to pay his
troops was produced in great part - like the leadership of the under-
taking - by the Florentine exiles. Siena fell in 1555, but the war never-
theless continued and the Florentines in Lyons tried to spur King
Henry II to fresh efforts.
In 1556, Bindo Altoviti concluded in the name of the Florentine exiles
a loan with the King's representatives. This amounted to 300,000 ecus,
at 16 per cent., and Altoviti made himself personally liable for its repay-
ment. In August of the same year the King through the Mareehal
Strozzi once again borrowed 300,000 ecus in Lyons at 16 per cent,
interest. Of this amount 120,000 ecus was obtained from the Floren-
tines, in whose name Albizzo Delbene acted for the Guadagni; and
180,000 ecus from the South Germans under Israel Minckel and Georg
Obrecht. The whole sum was forwarded to Venice by the firm Lorenzo
Capponi e Tommaso Kinuccini, which then managed the Guadagnis'
business in Lyons, and it was used to pay the Pope's subsidies. The loans
grew at an enormous rate. The Marechal Strozzi was dissatisfied with
these transactions. At the beginning of 1557 he stated that these loans
*Act&> de Iranvns I, vol. HI, 9055, 9252-3, 9956; IV, 13265. Desjardins,
Canestrini, Ntgoc. diplomat, III, 232, 398.
Seller Correspondence in Augsbg. Sfc-A; Behaim Papers in German.
Museum; Bibl. Coste in Lyon, No. 6933.
stopped payment. This was followed in 1559 by the peace o
Cambresis, which made an end of the political hopes of the F!
218 THE AGE OP THE FUGGES
cost the King 23 per cent., i.e. 16 per cent, for interest, 4 per cent, on
loss on the bill transactions with Venice, and 3 per cent, on account of
the depreciation of the currency. 1
A few months later came the inevitable crash and the French Crown
e of Cateau
exiles; and a few months later by the death of Henry II, which was equally
final for their loans. In vain Leonardo Spino put in claims on behalf of
the Florentine creditors of the Crown, chiefly the Capponi Albizzi and
Salviati. Many efforts were made to come to a composition. The Floren-
tines must, however, have lost the greater part of their money, as we
can prove to have been the case, with the South Germans. 2 Of the rich
Florentine families which had a leading position in Lyons at this time,
the Guadagni and the Albizzi immediately disappear from the ranks
of financiers. The firm Pietro Salviati e Compagni appears once more
in 1563 in the business papers of the Welser and is not mentioned again.
We meet Madame Delbene in financial dealings in 1582, and the Capponi
bank was in existence in Lyons as late as 1594. These firms had, however,
ceased to play a prominent part in finance : they had given place, either
voluntarily or of necessity, to others among their own compatriots.
The Time of Charles IX and Henry III. The chief feature which
distinguishes this period from the preceding one is the transfer of the
chief centre of Florentine finance from Lyons to Paris. In the last stage
it ceased altogether at Lyons. In 1575 there were only a few Florentine
houses still left there; in 1592 the Capponi alone remained, and two
years later their firm was taken over by the Zametti of Lucca.
The first Florentines, who under Charles IX, or rather under the
Begency of Catherine de' Medici, again dared to have financial dealings
with the Crown, were Orazio Rucellai and Lodovico Diaceto. The first
had left Florence as an opponent of the Medici, and the second had fled
on account of a murder. Both had then acquired property in Lyons.
When the Huguenot rising of 1562 was put down in Lyons, the lease of
the Lyons Douane was transferred to Diaceto. The Douane was an
institution very dangerous to the fairs, and Diaceto so greatly damaged
trade by his exactions that the city, which had previously held the
customs itself, did everything to recover them. Though it offered as
much as Diaceto, he was preferred, because a favourite of Catherine's
was his sleeping partner. The lease of the domains in Picardy was then
transferred to him, in spite of the opposition of the people. By this time
he himself was then numbered among the favourites of the King and
the Queen Mother - a position he owed chiefly to his liberality and the
R. Brown, Calendar VI, 314, 330, 687, 649, 904.
' Deejardins, Lc. HI, 400; AJberi, Belaz d. AmboM, Ventf., VIII, 424.
THE FLORENTINES 219
splendour of his appearance. The King nominated him Court Chamber-
lain. He then moved to Paris, wherehe built a splendid palace, spending
150,000 ecus on its decoration. In order to enter the ranks of the French
nobility and to marry one of their daughters, he bought Chateau-
Vilain, which carried the title of Count, for 400,000 francs. He gained
the means for this style of living by further financial dealings, which he
continued during the reign of Henry III until the great investigation
which was brought against the financiers in 1584. He then disappears
from the scene. Henry IV remitted to his widow the sums which her
husband was still owing on the lease of the Lyons customs, presumably
after the strict accounting which followed the inquiry of 1584. 1
It was also during the rising of the Huguenots in 1562 that Orazio
Rucellai came into rektions with the Crown, which was then without
credit and had tried in vain to raise money in Antwerp. Rucellai' s bank
in Lyons came to the rescue and received the Crown jewels in pawn.
This business connection seems to have lasted. Orazio is not mentioned
in our authorities till Henry III. In 1581 he had taken the lease of the
Gabelle, the notorious tax on salt. He demanded a reduction in the rent
on the ground that he was suffering great loss through frauds. He was
able to obtain this reduction because Monsieur d'O, the Surintendant
des Finance, and the Chancellor Chiverny themselves were interested in
the lease. Rucellai belonged to the King's Conseil, and even in the great
inquiry of 1584 he remained at first untouched. Later it was extended
to him, but he seems to have got off scot-free. Next year, in any case,
he was still mentioned as making advances to the French Crown. A
fresh inquiry in the year 1588 into the abuses which had taken place
during the lease of the Gabelle in the years 1578-88 was originally
directed chiefly at Orazio Rucellai, of whom we hear nothing further in
finance. He had at this time already returned to Florence and he re-
appeared at the French Court at the opening of the inquiry, not to
make money, but to negotiate the marriage of the Archduke Ferdinand
(with whom he was now in high favour) with a French princess. He
brought this affair to a successful conclusion, and this silenced the
attacks on his previous financial administration. He remained from
this time onwards in Paris, where he died rich and respected in 1605.*
The next Florentine, who came to the front as a financier under Henry
III, was Girolamo Gondi, who, however, was only a collateral of the
French main line of this family. Antonio, the ancestor of the French
Gondi, had emigrated to France in 1527, where he later had a dis-
* deqon, Histoire de Lym, VI, 13 ff. Picot, Histoire des Stats Qeniraw, HI, 32.
Desjardins, Lc. IV, 189, 205, 610, 633. Ammirato, f am. nob. Fiorent., pp. 18, 137.
Tardif, Monum. histor, No. 3612.
" Desjardins, IH, 493; IV, 369, 433, 538 ff. Pioot, HI, 117, 199 fi. Archives
ettrietues de I'hwtoire de f ranee, Ser. I, XVH, p. 51 ff.
220 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
tinguished position at the Court of Henry II, having been already en-
nobled. His sons were: Albert Due de Beta, Pair de France, Marechal
and Generalissimo of the French Army, Lord Chamberlain under
Charles IX and Henry III, Gouverneur de la Provence, etc., and Pierre
Cardinal Gondi, Archbishop of Paris, President of the Conseil d'Btat
under Charles IX, Henry III and Henry IV. Albert's descendants inter-
married with the oldest French nobility. It has been pointed out that
the Magdalena Gondi, who in 1455 married Giovanni Salviati and was
the ancestress of Cosimo de' Medici, first Duke of Florence, was through
Cosimo's granddaughter Maria de' Medici also the ancestress of the
French Kings from Louis XIII and of the last reigning Stuarts.
Girolamo Gondi belonged, however, to another branch. He was in any
case not a protege of his distinguished cousins, but of the Cardinal
Birague, an Italian who had & share in his business, as the Duke of
Betz had in those of Vidiville, the first Frenchman who managed to
penetrate the circle of the great financiers hitherto in practice, excluding
Italians. Girolamo Gondi is mentioned under Henry IV as late as 1599.
The Archduke Ferdinand I of Tuscany had since 1593, and perhaps
earlier, advanced large sums to the Kings through the agency and in the
name of Gondi. They amounted in all to 1,298,955 ecus, and were an
important help to Henry in his struggle for the Crown. Nevertheless
the King, when the victory was won, on Bully's advice withdrew from
Gondi and the other old 'Partisans' the revenues they had leased, so that
even the Archduke, in spite of repeated warnings, had a claim of 517,989
ecus outstanding in 1619. 1
With Girolamo Gondi the last member of the old Florentine families
disappeared from French finance.
In the case of the Italians who did this business down to the time of
Colbert it is often impossible to determine where they were born. In the
case of a few of the most distinguished we know that they did not come
from Florence. For a long time the inhabitants of some other Tuscan
cities Mowed in the footsteps of the Florentines. To these we must now
turn our attention.
n
OTHER TUSCAN FINANCIAL MAGNATES
^yosfmoCAj^'o/jSiewa. TLeSienese were thefiistoftheltalians to carry
on financial business beyond the Alps. During the thirteenth century they
had travelled to England and the Northern Kingdoms as papal collectors.
At the Champagne fairs they played a chief part; they then were more
1 Brown, Calendar VII, 430. Desjardins, IV, 420, 438, 492, 494, 533. Arrets du
CaneeU d'Efat de Henri IV, 1. 1, NOB. 2260, 2866, 3122, 4236, 6581. Reumont,
GetehieMe Toskana'e, I, 337, 342, 388, 399. Sully, Oeconomies Rayah*, IH, 68.
Pezey, Bittoire de to maiton de Gondi.
THE FLORENTINES 221
important than the Florentines, who did not, until the fourteenth cen-
tury, thrust them into the background, where they remained. In Bruges
they no longer were called a separate 'Nation.' Yet towards the end
of the fifteenth century they had an Indian summer of their prosperity.
For then the SpanoccM of Siena were among the most important
bankers in Home and Naples, and Agostino Chigi 'il magnifico,' who for
a long time had close business relations with them, was in 1494-1520
accounted the richest merchant in Rome, or even of all Italy. Certainly
the Italians were very generous with such superlatives. Undoubtedly
Agostino Chigi was very rich. He left in money and personal property
at least 150,000 ducats, as well as important real estate. His contem-
poraries estimated his income to be 70,000 ducats, yet he was not a
financial magnate of international importance.
He played a great part at the papal Curia. At first he was only one
of that considerable number of merchants who were designated 'mer-
catores Bomanam Curiam Sequentes.' But under Pope Alexander II he
had repeatedly supplied the pressing needs of the Eternal City for wheat
to the satisfaction of the Pope, who gave him preferential treatment
in other matters. So he took a lease of the duties and taxes of the Curia,
the Roman and Neapolitan salt works, and especially the large papal
alum works at Tolfa. He also had important financial transactions with
Alexander VI, Julius II, and Leo X. Under Julius II he had almost the
position of a finance minister. Charles VIII of France, on his way through
Rome to Naples in 1494, borrowed of him. In 1511 and 1519 he helped
the Republic of Venice with considerable sums on the security of jewels. 1
Even larger than his capital was his credit, which he was extremely
skilful in increasing. Some envious rivals once organized a 'run' on his
bank. But he had foreseen this, and not merely at once paid out what
was demanded, but he asked each one in a friendly way whether he
would like gold or silver and in what form. Another time he exhibited a
lot of small sacks filled with grain and implied that they were full of gold.
By such arts he is supposed to have increased his credit so much that at
the Sultan's Court he was called the great Christian merchant. There,
as well as in the west, he was specially known through his extensive deal-
ing in alum. In 1508 he got the lease of the Netherlands monopoly for
importing alum at a rent of 85,000. But he appears to have kept aloof
from financial business proper outside of Italy. He became known as a
great patron of art. He helped almost all the foremost artists of the time
who were then in Rome by giving them commissions and in other ways.
His heirs very soon lost the greater part of his riches. The advances
they made to the Popes Adrian and Clement were not repaid. Pope
G. Cugnoni, Agostino Chigi H Magnifteo, Rom. 1878-1883. Also Reumont,
GeackickteBom8,m&,441,im,mB.i AMn,Kdas.d. Ambanc. Fend., V4, p. 431.
222 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Clement in 1626, by means of Andrea Doria, took them away from the
Castle of Port Heicole in Etruria which Agostino Chigi had bought
from the republic of Siena. The sack of Borne in 1527 increased their
losses. The lease of the alum works got into the hands of the Genoese,
who then began to dominate papal finance.
Gaspar Duoci of Pistoja. The man with whom we have now to deal
had a yet more peculiar position than Agostino Chigi. He rises before
our eyes like a meteor and vanishes again quickly, without our knowing
whence and whither. Gaspar Ducci 1 is first mentioned in 1517 as the
Antwerp representative of the Lucca firm of Jacopo Arnolfirci, Niccolo
Nobili & Co. He bought for them English woollens of John Gresham,
the representative of Richard Gresham. In the same year he appears as
representative of Bartolomeo Gondecini. He was then one of those half
brokers, half agents, and held a position like that of the English broker
of to-day. He is so mentioned in 1531 and 1532. Then he was already
much involved in lawsuits, as later his relative the well-known Gillebert
van Schoonabeke in a petition to the Antwerp magistrate complains that
Ducci had always been a ill-conditioned intriguer and quarrelsome
fellow, who could not live in peace with anyone. 2 In the 'thirties Ducci
appears to have begun to act as an intermediary in financial affairs.
In this way he get into relations with Alexius Grimel, the Antwerp
agent of- the Welser, Bartholomew Welser and the latter's son-in-law
Hieronymus Seller. But his connection with the house of Welser broke
off in a bitter dispute in which the Welser appears to have come off
worst. Hieronymus Seiler had much to put up with from his father-in-
law on account of this. But since this time Ducci was generally feared
on the Antwerp Bourse, and his desire for business and his pride in-
creased more and more. He kept up his connection with Seiler and
Grimel, who had left the Welser firm. We have already narrated the
various kinds of new complications which came out of this.
Not unjustly was Ducci pointed out as the originator of all these
questionable excesses and abuses which brought financial business on
tiie Antwerp Bourse into bad repute and had then already ruined
many well-to-do merchants. An occurrence in 1540 caused a great
sensation. In this year Ducci had contrived a monopoly (not further
specified, presumably an artificial tightness of money, such as he un-
questionably produced later) to ruin the agent of the King of Portugal,
who in fact got into sore straits. The affair came to the ears of the city
authorities, who forbade Ducci to go to the Bourse for three years. He
His name is also spelt Gasper, Gaspar oder Jasper Douche, Douchy, Duchy,
Dozzi, Duel, Tutzy, and BO on.
* Of. G&uud, Un prods cel&re aw XVI" siicle in the Compte-Rendu de la Com-
missions d'hidaire 4, Ser. XV, 307 ff., and papers to the SeUer-Neidhart-Grimel
suit in the Augsburg archives.
THE FLORENTINES 223
did not, however, have to endure this penalty to the full, for in 1542 he
had business relations with the Brussels Court. There he could not
have carried on without going on change.
In 1542 he was the general collector of the fees for the letters of safe
conduct issued by the Netherlands Government for exceptional permis-
sion to trade with France. Ducci used the short time during which he
collected these fees to remit large sums of money on his own account by
Hieronymus Seiler to Lyons, where they probably were lent to the King
of France as was the case later. The affair was discovered and the money
confiscated. Since the Welser had a share in it, Seiler did not disclose
his principals and Ducci, who then was also suspected, only paid a
small part of the loss, and Seiler had to bear the greater part himself.
Before this Ducci had got into high favour with the Emperor of the
Netherlands Court by obtaining for them on the Antwerp Bourse in a
number of separate sums loans on bonds of the Receivers General of not
less than one million Carolus gulden at 12 per cent. - a comparatively
cheap rate. Certainly he got an extra J per cent, for 30,000 Carolus
gulden, and 1 per cent, for a further 300,000 since he had to raise the
former a month and the latter six weeks before paying it out. But all the
same it was a considerable service that he thus performed. In addition
he contributed 20,000 Carolus gulden to the non-interest-bearing loan
made by the merchants for the defence of the country. This was the
highest amount paid by an individual. 1
By these means he succeeded in thrusting Lazarus Tucher from his
position of chief financial agent of the Netherlands Government. Ducci
acted as intermediary in by far the greatest part of the Government
loans in Antwerp during 1542 to 1549. Undeniably he served the
Government well, for the rate of interest sank first to 11 per cent, and
then to 10 per cent., and later he obtained small amounts at 9 per cent.
Only temporarily in 1544 the rate rose to 16 per cent. In 1543 Ducci
further recommended the introduction of a new export tax of 10 per
cent., which he then farmed himself. The tax brought in considerable
sums, but increased the hatred of the merchants of Antwerp against the
man who invented it. The same result followed when in 1544 he outbid
the former farmers of the alum import and in conjunction with
Sebastian Neidhart, Alexius Grimel and their associates took over the
lease against an advance of 100,000 fl.
In such circumstances it is not surprising that he was as well thought
of in Brussels as he was badly in Antwerp. He was made an Imperial
Counsellor, he bought the beautiful estate of Hoboken near Antwerp,
and married into a most respected Netherlands family. But his con-
flicts in Antwerp increased continually. He was accused of having
i Lille, B. 2430, 2436 and others.
224 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
slandered to the Regent two rivals, Francisco Juliani and Francisco de
Baros, and caused them to be punished, that he had even had an attack
made on Baros' life by hired bravos, so that Baros had to leave Antwerp.
Then it is said he boasted that he had procured the condemnation of
Baros by means of bribery and so mocked at the Court. Further, he had
instigated men of bad repute to seize with pikes and halberds the house
of Marie van der Werwe, a lady of one of the- foremost families of
Antwerp. He always had 15 to 20 bravos in his pay, which made the
streets unsafe. This was so well known that even the little children ran
behind Ducci's creatures, to whom he gave instructions to kill one, to
mutilate another, to give a box on the ears to a third. In short, he
assumed a right of punishing and at the same time boasted that he
could do what he liked without any expectation of punishment himself.
This unheard-of behaviour aroused general popular indignation, and
Gillebert van Schoonabeke (the great Antwerp builder with whom
Ducci, although related to him by marriage, had quarrelled, at the
beginning of 1545) became the popular mouthpiece in the address to the
magistrate we have already mentioned.
Schoonabeke was then keeper of the public scales. A dispute which
at first was of no importance arose between him and Ducci as to the
method of weighing alum. Other matters embittered the dispute, and
one day as he left the Bourse Schoonabeke was attacked by two of
Ducci's men with naked weapons. He thought that he would certainly
have been killed if his servant had not thrown himself between. After
that he only dared go out with an armed guard. The Ducci had
threatened him with such a beating that he would have to keep to his
bed for four months. He had even recently sent him an insulting
message through Lazarus Tucher, who wished to compose the quarrel,
that he still had in the town the servants who had made the attack and
that Schoonabeke had better look out.
The complainants did not merely call Ducci a notorious seeker of the
quarrels, but also 'a Florentine who plays the hypocrite well, but neither
forgives nor forgets till death,' a hater of God and men, enemy of all
good, liar, intriguer, and in short the worst fellow in the world.
But all these complaints were fruitless. In spite of being summoned
five times Ducci did not appear before the Town Criminal Court
(Vierschaere) and finally obtained an Imperial prohibition. Since the
Court had meanwhile banished from the town the people who had beer
set on by the Italian, Ducci accused the magistrate of having done this
out of enmity for him, and a new quarrel arose.
How much Ducci was looked up to in Court circles after all these
scandals which attracted great attention is shown by the fact that th<
foremost members of the Netherlands nobility, such as Philippe de Croy
THE FLORENTINES 225
the Duke of Arschot, Maximilian d'Egmont, Count von Buren, and
many others, were entertained by him. 1
In business too Ducci's position was as important as it was peculiar
and many sided. First he was the most important financial agent of the
Emperor and the Netherlands Government in Antwerp, secondly he
carried on an extensive business as a capital broker on the Antwerp
Bourse, thirdly he acted as agent in large financial transactions for foreign
business houses, with whom he corresponded directly, and fourthly he
was a banker on his own account and director of financial syndicates.
The importance of his activities can be gathered from the fact that,
for instance, at the end of 1546, the Fugger had a claim against him
for 43,200 pounds Flemish (= 259,200 Carolus gulden). On the other
hand, at need he lent them equally large sums, and from other South
German firms. In 1545 he is represented as owing the Haugs 12,600
pounds Flemish, while later the Fugger turned out to be the real debtors.
In addition to these many-sided businesses there was another, as
interesting as it was dubious, which finally proved fatal for Ducci. He
carried on a large arbitrage business with Lyons. We have already
described the technique of this. The transactions were made on the joint
account of Sebastian Neidhart, Alexius Grimel, Gaspar Ducci, and
Simon Pecori; but Ducci was the soul of the business. Anyhow, he
instructed his partners in the art of making money tight. The con-
scientious scruples of the German partners were quite foreign to him.
According to them he was just as avaricious, high and mighty, ungrate-
ful and untrustworthy, as the whole population of Antwerp thought
him. Ducci's part in the whole affair was in every way very suspicious.
At the beginning of 1545 Stephen Vaughan, an English agent, wrote
from Antwerp to Henry VIII that Ducci had been summoned to the
King of France to get him money, and he was pro-French like all the
Italian merchants in Antwerp. The latter statement is palpably wrong,
and Ducci was only pro-French so far as his monetary interests were con-
cerned. He did not begin to be a traitor in this year, if he sent money
to Lyons which there would be lent to the French Crown. For during all
this period there was outwardly peace between the Emperor and France.
But it was going far for the privileged financial agent of the Court of
Brussels, an Imperial Counsellor, not to find it incompatible with his
position to give assistance to the Emperor's bitterest enemies. Yet in
1550 the whole company were only officially condemned for usury and
monopoly. We have already described the course of the proceedings and
how, although Ducci in the end got off better than his companions in
fortune whom he had led astray, yet his part as a financier was over.
Of his later life all we know is that what he had so often done to
1 Gairdner, Col., voL XX, 875.
226 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
others befell him. He was treacherously wounded. Soon after he must
have lost his fortune, for in 1560 he made over all his rights on the Lord-
ship of Hoboken to Melchior Schetz. Guicciardini, who in the 'sixties
wrote his excellent book on the Netherlands containing full details of
the merchants and bankers of Antwerp, does not say a syllable about
Ducci. Other sources only say that he died about 1577.
The Bonvisi of Lucca. The merchants of Lucca were among the first
of the Italians who crossed the Alps for the purposes of trade. By the
thirteenth century they are frequently mentioned as merchants and
bankers in England as well as at the fairs of Champagne, and unlike the
Sienese they managed later to retain a respectable share in this business.
At Bruges they formed a separate 'Nation,' at the Geneva fairs they
played a prominant part, and they understood how to maintain their
position at Antwerp and Lyons in the sixteenth century. In finance,
where the Florentines, Genoese or South Germans worked with the full
force of their large capital, the merchants of Lucca certainly fell into
the background. But their cautious neutrality made it possible for
them, even at the time when Europe both politically and industrially
was divided into two hostile camps, to keep in with both. In England
they repeatedly attained the lead, and later on in France too, when the
Florentines there had more or less retired from business. In Antwerp
they outlived most of the other Italian trading houses. This seems
chiefly to be due to a wise moderation in acquiring and serving. The
Bonvisi in particular were typical from this point of view. Unquestion-
ably during the whole of the sixteenth century theirs was by far the
most important of the Lucca trading houses.
By 1505 the Bonvifii are mentioned in England. For decades they
were among the Italian merchants who paid interest on large sums of
money to Henry VIII, till towards the end of his reign the position was
reversed and they on their side granted him substantial loans. Next to
Lorenzo it was Antonio Bonvisi who was highly regarded under Henry
VIII. He helped the advance of science, was a true friend of Sir Thomas
More and Cardinal Pole, and an opponent of the Reformation. When
after Henry VIII's death the Reformation took a very decisive course
in England, Antonio Bonvisi went back to Antwerp. There in 1555 Sir
Thomas Gresham had financial transactions with him for the English
Crown. In the same year the friendly spirit and straightforwardness
which he exhibited in this business was praised in contrast with
Gresham's avarice and stinginess. The financial relations of the Bonvisi
with the FingliBh Crown continued until the reign of Elizabeth.*
1 Brown, Calendar, 1, 346; VI, 265. Brewer, Calendar, n, No. 1364; HI, No. 64;
IV, No. 2212; V, p. 1716; Green, Calendar, Add. 1647-65, p. 436. Aet of the Privy
Council, 1, 396, 479-80. Turnbull, Calendar, Queen Mary, p. 197, 199, 212-13, 367,
THE FLORENTINES 227
They were among the first Italians to settle in Antwerp, where in
connection with cloth and silk businesses we find mentioned in 1517
Martino, in 1529 Martino and Ludovico Bonvisi (the latter also in 1542),
in 1521-6 the firm of Niccolo Bonvisi & Co., which had Bernardo
Cenami as partner and chief representative. Apparently they kept clear
of monetary transactions with the Emperor and the Brussels Court. So
they did not lose their credit in the great crises of 1557 and 1575. On the
contrary, in 1579, when Antwerp had lost most of its importance, they
are described by an agent of the Fugger as one of the trading houses
remaining there which had by far the best credit, the Fugger naturally
excepted. 1 During the whole of the sixteenth century the Bonvisi were
established in Lyons. Here they participated prominently in the
financial business of the French Crown. But all we know for certain is
that Antonio and the heirs of Ludovico Bonvisi had a claim against
Henry II of 39,925 ecus in 1553 and 121,023 ecus in 1557. .
At last only the branch in Lyons remained. There in 1629 the firm
failed with liabilities of 700,000 ecus. But the cause of this catastrophe
does not appear. The date points to a connection with Spanish
finances, in which in fact the firm at last appear to have taken a
part.*
Other Merchants from Lucca. Apart from the Bonvisi and the
Cavallari who were associated with the Florentine house of Frescobaldi
and disappeared soon after its fall, there is only one other Lucca mer-
chant to be mentioned in connection with England. This was Acerdo
Velutelli, who played an important part during 1570 to 1576 as a re-
tainer of the Earl of Sussex and representative of the Florentines estab-
lished in France and the merchants from Lucca and Genoa in Antwerp.
But he is not mentioned any more. He and the Genoese Horatio
Pallavicino were the last Italians employed to any considerable extent
in the financial affairs of the English Crown. After the Bonvisi the
Cenami were presumably the largest Lucca business house. 3 In 1553
their collapse was announced in Antwerp, where Bernardo Cenami is
mentioned in 1521 as representative of the Bonvisi and Bartolomeo
Cenami founded his own firm. But after this the family was prominent
in Lyons. In 1553 Bernardo Cenami with his compatriots the Bemardini
had a claim of 27,725 ecus against the French Court. Unquestionably
the firm then remained in connection with the French financial adminis-
1 Sanuto, Diarii, XXHI, 563. Of. Guicciardini, Descritt. d. Paeri Batsi, edn.
1681 , p. 127, Antwerpener Schoffenbriefe and Fugger Correspondence. Thys, Histor.
d. stratum, v. Antwerpen, 2 ed. p. 502 ff.
' Brown, Calendar, HI, 177. Buoys, Histoire de Lyon, p. 458; Behaim, Corre-
spondence in German. Museum and Fugger Correspondence.
1 Correspond, dipl. de la Moth* F melon, IV, 117; V, 148; VI, 9, 425. Kervyn de
Lettenhove, Negoc. Dipl. des Pays-Bos et de VAngletem, VIII, 175.
228 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
tration, but they are not mentioned as having a foremost position till
after 1586, especially during the period 1593-7. In these years a Cenami
with Gondi Zametti and others, was one of the most important tax-
farmers and 'Partisans' in France. Cenami and Zametti often operated
together, apparently also frequently for the Grand Duke of Tuscany,
who, relapsing into the business of his forbears, lent large sums to Henry
IV. But when Henry was secure on the throne, Sully thrust aside
Cenami with the other old 'Partisans.'
This makes it all the more remarkable that the family reappeared
again under Mazarin. They were favoured by him and the Queen'
Mother Maria de Medici. When, after the death of Louis XIII, Mazarin
ruled France quite alone, a Cenami was, after Herwart, the most im-
portant Court banker, and, what comes almost to the same thing,
Mazarin's private banker. It is expressly mentioned that he lived in
Lyons. Mazarin had deposited large sums with him which were
confiscated at the time of the Fronde. Before 1653 Cenami went
bankrupt, and Mazarin lost 413,000 livres. He is not mentioned any
more.
The Arnolfini, another Lucca family, were represented in Antwerp in
1517 by Gaspar Ducci. In 1525 they bought a house of the Frescobaldi,
and in 1579 they were one of the few trading houses of note which still
remained in Antwerp. For many decades the firm was called Bonaven-
tura Michaeli, Jeronimo Arnolfini and Companions, later (1556-79), the
heirs of Bonaventura Michaeli and Jeronimo Arnolfini. Their financial
business in Antwerp was unimportant. But the Arnolfini in Lyons and
their firm undoubtedly in 1553 in Lyons took up 17,675 ecus in the
French Crown loan. They are mentioned in Lyons in 1576; we do not
know their further fortunes.* Other families of Lucca like the Balbani
and the Deodati only occasionally engaged in finance. Yet in the case of
the Balbani there is the same development as in the Bonvisi and
Cenami. For a long time Giovanni Balbani was highly respected and
carried on in conjunction with the Diodati a large sugar refinery in
Antwerp, where the firm failed in 1566. It appears to have been re-
established, but after that the Balbani were no longer of importance in
Antwerp, but they are mentioned in Lyons in 1590. They were then
entrusted with the care of the carriage of letters and dispatches of the
Spanish Crown between Spain on the one hand and Flanders and Italy
on the other, and they complained that the post was opened by the
tArrfa du Conseil d'Etot de Henri IV, 1. 1, Noe. 51, 402, 490, 604, 1482, 1744,
2186, 2351, 2549, 2685, 2942, 3039, 3109, 3329-30, 3428, 3497. Oeeonomies royales
de Sully (Coll Petitot, HI, 11, 68; VII, 159).
Corresp. dipt, de la Mad* Fen&cm, IV, 117; V, 148; VI, 9, 425. Kervyn de
Lettenhove, Negoc, dipl. des Pays-Bos et de I'Angleterre, VHI, 175. Veluteffl wird
THE FLORENTINES 229
French Government, which had a special office in Lyons for this pur-
pose. 1
Under Henry III and Henry IV Sardini of Lucca is named as a great
'Partisan,' but he was not so important as Diaceto, Rucellai, Gondi,
Cenami, and Zametti. z
Zametti, the most important financier of Henry IV, also came from
Lucca. In 1594 he acquired the bank of the Capponi, the last Floren-
tine house in Lyons, and after that had uncommonly large loan trans-
actions with the King, who had by then established his position. The
largest of these was one of 700,000 ecus in 1598. Zametti was often
associated with Cenami, but often worked without him. Zametti was of
low origin, but his descendants played no insignificant part in France.
For instance, one of his sons was Bishop of Langres. 8
The Affaitadi of Cremora. The Affaitadi of Cremona are among the
first Italians who tried to take part in the direct trade between Lisbon
and the East Indies. Giovanni Francisco Afiaitado was already in
1501-3 of some importance in Lisbon.* When they were debarred from
the direct trade with the East Indies the AfEaitadi were again among the
first to conduct large contracts for spices with the King of Portugal so
as to secure for themselves at second hand this profitable monopoly.
For this purpose they had an important factory in Antwerp, which from
about 1525 was managed by Tommaso degli Affaitadi. His sons
Giovanni Carlo and Giovanni Baptista became highly looked up to.
The former was called Chevalier, Seigneur de Gbistelles (he purchased
this latter in 1545); Baptista was even 'Count.' About the middle of the
century they were the chief shareholders in a large syndicate that
bought from the King of Portugal the whole cargo of spices of his
East Indian fleet, and paid trim large advances in respect of it. 6 During
the period 1542-58 the AfEaitadi are frequently mentioned as credi-
tors of the town of Antwerp, the English Crown and King Philip.
They also appear for a time to have had a share in the lease of the
Netherlands alum monopoly. But these engagements were never very
1 Kervyn de Lettenhove, I.e. IV, 363. Pericaud, Notes at documents p. servir A
Vhistoire de Lyon sow le rigne de Henry III, p. 16. Of. also Thys, Histor. d. straten
v. Antw. passim.
* Journal de 1'Estoik (ColL Petitot), 1, 102, 313. Arrfo du ConseU d'Etat de
Henri IV, t. I, No. 42 ff. bis No. 4654.
* Arrets du CanseU d'Etat de Henri IV, t. I, NOB. 690, 2572, 3329, 3428, 4254,
4483, 4633, 4990, 5121, 5258, 5328. Oeconomies royales de Sully, H, 208; III, 89,
103, 191, 205 u. s. f. Cf. Memoires of I'Stoile and Bassompierre.
Cf. the French later edn. of Heyd, GesMchte des Levantehandels, U, 512-14,
526, 551.
* Handhmgsbticher der Affaitadi im Konigl. Staatsarchive at Brussels; Lille, B.
2616; Antw. Stadsprotokotten ed. Pauwels, I, 33. Bulletins de la Propriett (Antw.)
1887, p. 15; Green, Calendar, Add. 1547-65, p. 436; Eugger-Archiv 2, 5, 12.
230 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
important, and in 1575 it is expressly stated in one of the Fugger com-
mercial letters that the AfEaitadi had nothing to do with the Spanish
Crown. But all the same they got into difficulties two years later and
had to ask their creditors for a moratorium of six years in which to dis-
charge their liabilities. This is the last we hear of them.
The Last Italian Financiers in France. In 1584 when the French
Gabelles were going to be farmed out, two syndicates,the first Parisian
and the second Italian, Ramelti of Turin, who for some years had been
active in French financial business, negotiated on behalf of the Italians.
He offered to pay out the claims of the former lessees of whom Gondi
was the most prominent, amounting to 800,000 ecus. The Florentine
envoy who reports this adds that he will get the bargain, since the
French could not produce such a large sum. In fact the loan was trans-
ferred to the Ramelti's syndicate, partly through the influence of the
Duke of Epernon. 1 But the observations were just. For under Henry
III Vidiville is the only person with a French name in the foremost ranks
of the 'Partisans.' Two more-Le Grand and De rArgenterie - are
added in the first years of Henry IV. Under Sully this development pro-
gressed further; meanwhile Sully tried to rob the 'Partisans' of their
power by wise economy. Under Louis XIII so long as Concini, the
Marechal d' Ancre, bore sway and then again under Mazarin the Italians,
protected by Marie de Medici, obtained new influences. And, what
had never happened before, Mazarin handed over the direction of the
finances to an Italian, Jean Particelli, Sieur d'Emery. In addition to
Cenami and Herwart, several Italians, Vanelli, Cantariniand Serantoni
(we do not know what towns they came from), acted as chief bankers
for the Grown and Mazarin. But numerous Frenchmen are mentioned as
Partisans. They were mostly of low origin, in particular Court lackeys.
They associated together and worked in the main with the money of
private people to whom they paid interest.*
The popular hatred of the Italian favourites, which in Catherine de
Medici's time had repeatedly led to outbreaks, broke out under Marie de
Medici in 1617 and caused the fall of the Marechal d' Ancre. Then it in
1648 greatly strengthened the Fronde against Mazarin, since which time
Italian names entirely disappear from French finance. This is rather
earlier than the last offshoot of the South German financial magnates,
Herwart, who lasted on till the early days of Colbert. There did not
remain much more for Colbert to do in nationalizing French financial
administration. The French who replaced the Italians inherited both
their technique and the hatred of the populace, who gained nothing
from having driven out the old masters of finance.
1 Desjaidins, IV, 607 &. and cf. IV, 430, 494.
* Korean, Choix det MazaHnadea, 1, 113; Defense de Faaquet paesim.
THE INTERNATIONAL BOURSES
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
CHAPTER 1
ANTWEEP
'THE Rise of Antwerp. Antwerp is one of the many cities whose
* favourable situation for world trade was only fully exploited at a
late stage. Since the beginning of the fourteenth century it had been a
market of some importance with two fairs a year, attended by mer-
chants from England, Italy, and the Hansa towns, but the city grew
very slowly till the middle of the fifteenth century. There was a great
trade in commodities between the Mediterranean cities, which controlled
the Levantine commerce, and the whole of Northern Europe, where the
German Hansa towns monopolized the trade. This trade in commodi-
ties, together with the international dealings in bills and money, was
concentrated in Bruges. The transfer of the centre from Bruges to Ant-
werp was brought about by a combination of political, economic, and
other causes and occupied nearly a century. The first great movement
of foreign merchants from Bruges to Antwerp took place in 1442, and
even in 1533 Bruges had not quite lost its international importance. 1
The silting up of the Zwin which hindered the loading and unloading
of sea-going ships in Sluys, the port of Bruges, might perhaps have been
got over, but this was prevented by the long and sanguinary disturb-
ances of which Flanders was the theatre after 1482. These made it im-
possible for foreign merchants to stay in Bruges, while the rulers did all
they could for Antwerp, which was already favoured by nature, in order
to punish the rebellious population of Bruges.*
Before this time the English, whose already great privileges were
largely extended in 1446, had raised their trade in cloth to be one of the
most important branches of Antwerp's business. Now, on the discovery
of the sea route to the East Indies, the agent of the King of Portugal
introduced the spice trade, which soon gave a distinctive character to
the Antwerp trade, and an ever increasing number of Portuguese,
Spaniards, South Germans and Italians settled permanently there,
whereas before they had only visited the fairs. 8
1 Papebrochius, Annatea Antwerp, I, 414; Gilliodts van Severen, Compte-rendu
de la GommMm d'histoire, Ser. 4, voL 7, pp. 216, 233, 272.
* Schanz, Engl. Handdspolitik gegen Snde des Mittdaltera, I. 8 fi. Guiociardini,
Deacntt. di tutti i Poesi Bossi, 1567, p. 84. Bertijn, Chronyckder Stodt Antwerpen,
ed. 1879, pp. 49, 52; Veiaohter, Inventaire des Charles d'Anvers, NOB. 580, 581.
The merchants ofNuremberg received privilegesforBrabantalsoml432,1433,
and 1468. Antwerp is mentioned in that of 1433, in that of 1468 only Ghent,
Bruges and Ypres. The first South German visitors to Antwerp are mentioned in
1477. Of. also Ghillany, Geschichte d. Seefahrers Hitter Martin Behaim, pp. 24, 102,
104. The Florentines moved from Bruges to Antwerp 1512-18, the Genoese mainly
after 1522. The Portuguese agent is first mentioned in Antwerp 1494. Guicciar-
dini, Descritt. d. Paesi Bassi, edition of 1581, p. 126,
234 THE AGE OF THE FUGQEE
Now, in the comae of four decades Antwerp developed into a trading
centre such as the world has never seen before or since; for never since
has there been a market which concentrated to such a degree the trade
of all the important commercial nations of the world. An English
memorandum of 1564 says that the men of Antwerp had 'eaten out of
their trade' the merchants of the other towns. This is quite correct if
instead of the men we put the city of Antwerp, for the market attracted
to itself the trade of the other markets, and their merchants settled in
Antwerp to obtain the extraordinary advantages offered them there.
The natives, on the other hand, were only of secondary importance.
They had comparatively little commerce on their own account, as a
Venetian envoy remarked in 1525, but occupied themselves with sub-
sidiary trades. They helped the foreigners by acting as brokers, agents
for warehouses, later also as bankers, agents, etc. Wholesale trade pro-
per was, both in Bruges and Antwerp, chiefly in the hands of foreigners. 1
What now were the extraordinary advantages of Antwerp? What
was there specially to distinguish, it from Bruges?
The Importance of Antwerp in General. Antwerp took the place of
Bruges as the metropolis of the trade of Northern Europe, but even a
superficial view shows important differences between the commerce of
the two cities. Among the foreign merchants trading at Antwerp some
nations were much less strongly represented there than at Bruges: for
instance, the Venetians whose role in the world's trade was now played
out; then, the Florentines, who kept away from political reasons; the
'Osterlings, 'at any rate the merchants of the Baltic, who in part suffered
the same fate as the Venetians, and in part from an early date were con-
nected with Amsterdam, already in the sixteenth century more import-
ant for the Baltic corn trade than Antwerp. Antwerp was accordingly
all the more frequented by inhabitants of the North German North Sea
cities and those of the North of the Low Countries. The chief influx,
however, consisted of merchants from Portugal, Spain, England, and
South Germany.
The English now first betook themselves to active trading and
Antwerp served as far their most important staple. Spaniards and
Portuguese were brought in shoals by their large colonial undertakings.
The alteration of the centre of commercial gravity which told against
the Venetian and Baltic merchants made the North Germans visit
Antwerp in great numbers. They had previously dealt chiefly with
Venice, but had played only a small part at Bruges. In Antwerp, on the
other hand, thanks to the amount of the capital they held and their
enterprising spirit, they kept the chief place for many decades. A
similar development can be traced in the case of the Genoese.
Sloane MSB. 818. AlWri, Beta*, d. Ambaac. Fenefc, IV, 22.
ANTWERP 235
If we penetrate a little farther, we note that the foreign merchants
dealing in Antwerp represented a far greater proportion of their
countrymen than in Bruges. Here we think of the important develop-
ment which has led to the system of dealing on commission. In the
Middle Ages the merchant at first travelled in person and then, since the
Crusades, he had sent his agent. Now, in Antwerp we meet, not oily
agents representing different business houses, but also an innovation,
foreign merchants permanently settled in Antwerp who had a business
connection with a whole group of their fellow-countrymen. We find
the same thing occurring in the Netherlands also. It is rather astonish-
ing to find in Antwerp in the early sixteenth century the quite modern
type of the English broker, both broker and commission agent, which
has only just began to be usual in Germany in quite recent times. 1
In order to show the scale of the business done by foreigners in
Antwerp as compared with Bruges, we have only to turn our attention
to the two great branches of the Antwerp trade, East Indian products
and English cloth. In earlier times the East India trade had branched
out from the Levant into many different channels; now for the greater
part it flowed in one stream to Lisbon and thence to Antwerp, for the
King of Portugal sold the cargoes as a whole to large rich syndicates who
obtained a monopoly and took care that, in order to keep up prices, the
whole trade should be concentrated in Antwerp. 8 For the same reasons
the English managed their cloth trade in the same way. For this reason
too most other commodities were concentrated in Antwerp and their
quantities were correspondingly increased, e.g. we note that South
German fustian, an important article in the world's trade, was only now
produced in a wholesale capitalist manner for export; or, to take
another example, Hungarian copper, for which Venice had formerly
been the chief market, had since the beginning of the sixteenth
century been sent in large quantities to Antwerp and thence exported
to the rest of the world.
This tendency to progressive concentration was, however, chiefly
manifested by the fact that the bourses of the different nations which
had existed in Bruges were in Antwerp united with the international
For the Genoese Desimoni e Belgrano in den Atti d. aoc. ligure, voL V,460ff.,
for the Portugese the Antwerp Jury rolls: Statutes of the Adventurers Company
for the English, Cologne histor. Archives for the German Hansa.
Wheeler, Treatise of commerce (1601 ), p 36: 'The Portingall - like a good simple
man, he sailed every yeare full hungerly about 3 parts of the earth almost for
apices; when he had brought them home, the great rich purses of the Antwerpians,
subjects of the king of Spain, ingrossed them all into their own hands, yea often-
times gave money for them before hand, making thereof a plaine Monopoly.' For
English cloth, of. Ehrenberg, Hamburg und England im Zetialter der K6igin
236 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
bourse, a point to which we shall return. The best answer to the ques-
tions as to why the world tirade was concentrated in Antwerp is given
by a memorandum drawn up at the beginning of Philip II' s reign by the
foreign merchants in Antwerp as a determined protest against the pro-
posed nomination of sworn insurance brokers. 'No one can dispute,
they say, that the libertys granted to the merchants is the cause of the
prosperity of this city.' 1
The trade in Bruges had been free compared with the restrictions
prevalent in other cities in the Middle Ages, but in comparison with
the absolute freedom enjoyed by the foreign merchants in Antwerp
Bruges seems mediaeval. For instance, in Bruges the brokers were a
monopolist corporation, but in Antwerp they were free. In Bruges only
sworn money changers could engage professionally in money changing
or giro bank business. In Antwerp, on the other hand, the Charter of
1306 granted this right to all burghers, and in the city's prime there were
practically no restrictions on the trade in money, precious metals and
bills. Clearing-house business was carried on by book transactions with-
out ready money. The hotel and lodging-house trade, which was extra-
ordinarily important to the foreign traders in the Netherlands, was in
Bruges, but not in Antwerp, the subject of many stringent regulations
on the part of the authorities. The trade restrictions which remained
in Antwerp originated almost entirely with the foreign merchants.
Both the ruler and the city magistracy tried to give trade all the free-
dom possible.
Foreign merchants had as much liberty as those of the country and no
one of the foreign nations was more highly privileged than the rest.
Accordingly the divisions which had existed in Bruges between differ-
ent sections of the population fell into abeyance, at any rate in so far as
they had originated in jealously guarded rights and provileges. Only the
English, who had had a considerable trade in Antwerp's early period,
kept a somewhat special position. The other nations were distinguished
by their appearance, language and customs; but in other respects
they formed one merchant class with identical rights, duties and
The absence of trade restrictions in Antwerp had one very important
consequence. It altered the significance of the fairs.
Fairs and Bourse in Antwerp. In the fifteenth century Antwerp had
two fairs, the Whitsuntide fair in the spring and the St. Bavon's fair,
vulgarly the Bamas or Pamas fair (the French St. Bemy) in the autumn.
There were in addition two other fairs whichwere held till the 'forties
of the sixteenth century, in Bergen-op-Zoom, though they had then
rather fallen into decay and were transferred to Antwerp. These were
Bulletin de la Socifte de Geographic d'Anvers, p. 215.
ANTWERP 237
the Cold market at Christmas and the Easter market which originally
began at Candlemas. 1
The two old Antwerp fairs in the early spring and the early autumn
were what the English merchants used chiefly for their cloth trade.
The cloth fleets came in at these times and on their arrival the English
held their 'show days.' It was very seldom that they visited the other
fairs. 8 There was no important change in these arrangements while the
English dealt in Antwerp, and even afterwards, for they were deter-
mined by national conditions on which the English wool season as well
as the shipping season depended. When, however, the English cloth
trade ceased to be the determining factor in Antwerp, and the other
foreign merchants transferred themselves in a body from Bruges to
Antwerp, the firm structure of the old fairs was broken down. In 1484
the Bruges Office of the Hansa towns complained that in Antwerp the
men of Brabant held a new staple with all sorts of goods and booths
the whole year through not only at market times. Two years later it
was said that the people of Antwerp had begun a new market with the
English and now wanted to do business out of season. 3 As far as the
English were concerned, the alteration was not followed up. The im-
portance of fair time in the Middle Ages consisted in the temporary
suspension of the restrictions on the trade of foreign merchants which
took place at these times. In Antwerp, since trade was free all the year
round, the fairs lost much of their importance.
The other reason which had made fairs necessary in mediaeval times
also became obsolete. Trade had grown till it was sufficient to keep up
a regular market all the year round. Another important alteration is
closely connected with this growth of trade. Many commodities were
now made in standard types which served as a basis of trade, and others
were only dealt in from samples. In both cases the goods were not seen
before the transaction was concluded. The result was the conversion of
Antwerp from a fair centre to a bourse centre.
Bruges also had its 'Burse,' the first that bore the name. This, how-
ever, was not a bourse in the modern sense that is a meeting place for all
merchants, it was the meeting of the Italians who had their consular
houses in the Bourse Square. Each of the other nations had a separate
assembly. The Bruges Bourse was chiefly used for dealing in money and
bilk; the trade in commodities was carried on either in the large 'Halles'
or in the houses and warehouses where the goods were stored. 4
Cf. Vaughan'a Report to CromweU, 1534; and Brewer, Cdendar, voL VTI, 575.
For later times Guicciardini, Descritt. d. Paesi Bassi (1567), p. 83.
Schanz, Engl. Handdspolitik gegen Ende dea MitteUtUers, I, 12.
> Haneerecesae ed. Sehafer, I, 399, II, 25.
4 Cf. Ehrenberg on broken, lodging-house keepers and the Bourse in Bruges
from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Ztschr. f. Handdorecht, voL XXX.
238 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
In Antwerp in the second half of the fifteenth century there was a
merchants' bourse. When the trade boom began, apparently in 1460,
the Antwerp City Council set it up close to the Great Market in the
English or Wool Street, where the English had their pack houses; this
was also close to the port, the public weighing place and the money
changers' banks. This was done for the express purpose of furthering
trade.*
An institution of this kind, set up by the authorities for a certain
purpose, was an important innovation. It is still more important that
the Antwerp Bourse was meant from the first for all trading in Antwerp.
This is proved by the inscription on the splendid new bourse erected in
1531: 'In usum negotiatorum cujuscunque nationis ac linguae.' The
English alone, at any rate in later times, had a special bourse; and this,
as Guicciardini remarks, gave rise to a remarkable division of business,
not according to nations, but according to transactions. 8
'The merchants,' Guicciardini says, 'go morning and evening at a
certain time to the Bourse of the English. There they do business with
the help of brokers of every language, who are there in great numbers,
chiefly as to the buying or selling of commodities of every kind. Then
they go to the new Bourse, where in the same way they deal chiefly in
bills and money loans (depositi).'
We need not inquire here whether all dealing in commodities in
Antwerp when of a bourse-like character took place on the English
Bourse. It is sufficient to establish the fact that all nations when they
had bourse business to transact had to visit one of the two bourses.
Within the new bourse the different nations feU into divisions, as also
happened later on in Amsterdam. The Antwerp bourse was the first
international or world bourse in the full sense of the word. A contem-
porary poet, Daniel Bogiers, describes the business in the new bourse:
'A confused sound of all languages was heard there, and one saw a
parti-coloured medley of all possible styles of dress; in short, the Ant-
werp Bourse seemed a small world wherein all parts of the great world
were united.'
Generally speaking, Antwerp in the sixteenth century must even to
the outward eye have been an incomparable city. The splendid luxury,
often united with fine artistic feeling of a number of merchants who
came together from every quarter of the globe, made much money, and
1 Verachter, No. 704. Thys, Histor. der Strata* vm Antwerpen, 2nd Ed., 1893,
p. 92fi.
Desmtt. <L Paesi Baasi Ausg., v. 1581, p. 171. Mortens en Torfs (Quchied. v.
Antw., IV, 188); Henne (Rtynt, de Charles Quint en Bdgique, V, 319). Sohanz (Engl.
Bemdekpolitit, 1, 14) puts the creation of the English Exchange in 1515, while
Guicciardini (Ed. v. 1581 , p. 102) and Thys (2. Ausg. p. 86) put it as 1550 (Schanz,
II, 231).
ANTWERP 239
in the manner of the time, and especially the population among whom
they lived, lost no opportunity of making display and joyful celebra-
tions - all this made a life such as the world has never again seen. 1
The four fairs at Antwerp continued, but lost most of their import-
ance for business in commodities properly speaking, with the exception
of the English cloth trade. The payments of the fair which had been
an appendage became the matter of chief importance. This is clearly
proved by the fact that in the case of the two fairs at Bergen-op-Zoom
only the payments were moved to Antwerp, the fairs themselves re-
mained in Bergen, though no business was done there. The fair pay-
ments were to begin on the 31st October, or the 31st January, on the
1st May and on the 1st August, and to last ten days in each case.
Later these developed into four quarter days:
10th February for the Christmas market.
10th May for the Easter market.
10th August for the Whitsuntide market.
10th November for the Bamas market.
Finally these quarter days were often prolonged, if fiscal necessity
made it desirable. In this case it was a question of quarter days for the
entire business in bills and loans, whether for private or public ends.
The payments for commodities were made separately a month later.
Apart from the payments at fair time money was usually scarce and
dear; and far the largest part of the gigantic dealings in capital in
Antwerp was accordingly transacted at the quarter days. This was not
carried out as in Lyons by clearing-house methods, but by assignment
from hand to hand -a still more imperfect form of clearing-house
business which gave rise to many lawsuits. 2
Speculation in Antwerp. We cannot here enter into the technique of
the Antwerp trade. In order, however, to understand what follows It is
necessary to show how extremely speculative was the trade in the chief
articles, East Indian spices. Among these pepper was the most im-
portant and the most risky. The pepper trade was a prerogative of the
King of Portugal, who sold the cargoes of the East Indian fleets to large
syndicates who thereby obtained a monopoly at second hand. They
often bought the cargoes while still at sea, gave the King of Portugal,
who always needed money, large advances, and repaid themselves by
charging a high price. They were able to regulate the price in their own
interest in Antwerp, where the bulk was disposed of, at any rate till the
arrival of the new fleet from the East, which then set the price.
1 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Belat. polit des Pays Bos et de I'Angleterre, H, 596 ff . ,61 1.
a speech of the Venetian Senator Contarini in 1584, quoted in Lattes, Liberti
deUe Banehe a Venezia, p. 121, die Coutumes de la vide d'Anvers, U, 522 &., and
the Imperial Edicts of 1537 and 1539 in the Place, v. Brabant, I, 511, 513, 515,
240 THE AGE OF THE FUGGES
These two factors, the interest of the large syndicates and the
amount of the new imports, determined the price of pepper on the
Antwerp Bourse. Both were incalculable, as were all the other contri-
butory conditions, of which war and peace were the most important.
The course of prices was often therefore very 'jumpy' and speculation
had an hitherto unparalleled opportunity. This was made the more
important by the fact that the price of pepper determined most of the
market by acting as a barometer for the temper of the bourse. 1 The
conditions of the business in many other commodities were analogous,
e.g. the importation of alum was a prerogative of the Netherlands
Government, which fanned it out to syndicates of merchants. Other
branches were treated at times as practical monopolies, which were then
broken down, giving rise to extravagant fluctuations, e.g. the copper
trade.
All this contributed to make dealing in commodities in Antwerp a
risky business for anyone who was not able to follow the market from
hour to hour and even for those who did so. Of the abundant evidence
on this head we will confine ourselves to the commercial reports sent in
the years 1543 and 1544 by Christopher Kurz, a Nuremberg man, to the
Tucher firm, by whom he does not seem to have been directly employed.
At this time astrological prognostications flourished in the Nether-
lands ; these were prophecies of every kind which were reproduced in
print. Christopher Kurz had puzzled out an astrological system by
which he said he could foretell prices. He praised his invention to the
Tuchers, Tni^ing sober business statements with fantastic combinations
in a way that seems absurd to us, but which probably at the time gave
quite a different impression. Kurz writes in one of his first letters that
Lienhard Tucher, whom we know as a much respected and able mer-
chant prince, had shown himself disposed towards his proposals
(though 'after many appeals and requests'). Lienhard Tucher made
marginal notes on the reports Kurz sent which prove that he read them
carefully and did not fail to observe the prognostications. 8
Kurz started from the unimpeachable statement that 'trade in spices
needs great foresight.' He said that he had found a system for fore-
telling a fortnight in advance the prices of pepper, ginger, and saffron.
'I sought it three years, but until this year found it not. I think God
hath given it to me. I have observed it for the space of a year. Yet
will I not boast myself of it, till I myself have observed it for yet a time
longer with mine own eyes and have traced it out. Yet I doubt not, it is
'Tucher business correspondence, 1529-46, ledgers of the Affaitadi in the
Brussels Archives (1648-51 and 1556-8).
'Tucher Family Archives, III, 11. For Netherlands 'Prognosticatien,' cf.
Enuttel, Pamfletten, NOB. 86, 91-4.
ANTWEBP 241
well founded; if it be not, I shall know ere a half year be out. In the
same manner I have known how to show for the matter as touching
cinnamon, nutmegs and cloves from one market to another. But as I
have always seen you wary about committing yourselves with such
goods, I have forgot some pieces of this experiment, as I write not
of all those which I have. Still should I hear that ye would hazard with
spice dealing, there shall be no lack of such. But ye must be diligent
to frequent the places where such are bought and sold, as Venetia - and
wonder seized me wherefore you use not Frankfort which lieth near to
your hand. For there is not only good gain oftentimes to be made with
spices, but likewise with bills can one hap on many a good chance.
As ye have often noted in my writings to you how great an alteration
is there here day by day in bills on Germany, Venice, or Lyons, so that
in the space of eight, ten, fourteen or twenty days with other folks'
money, a man may make a profit of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or more per cent., with
such there is here each day great business on the Bourse. On these also
have I my experiment so that I may foretell not only from week to
week the Strettezza and Largezza (tightness or ease in money), but also
for each day and whether it shall be before or after midday. I have,
however, nigh forgot this again, since I have found you so reluctant.'
Then he speaks once more of saffron. Lienhard Tucher had written
that he might perhaps act on Kurz's advice as to this commodity:
'So bethink you that the sale lies with you and buy in with all heat at
Lyons. Truly, Honourable Sir, from such motions of the mind you
must learn wherefore I speak my judgment in part. So soon as ye see
how much hath from this year and how much remaineth over, and that
now such wares be driven so high in every place that they, according to
the store of them, cannot come higher, what course have you then to
buy as you, I wot well would be fain to do? But this is naught for the
upper influences so blind the natural reason with affections or desires.'
Here he adds a long reasoned statement as to the best times for buying
saffron.
Kurz writes that he always rose before four and was surrounded 'with
work as a man in the ocean with water, for our astrologers aforetime
have written much, but little with reason; wherefore I trust not their
doctrine, but seek mine own rules, and when I have them I search in
the histories whether it hath fallen out right or wrong.' He took up
political prophecy and gradually became an astrologer by profession
and of great repute. Among other things he prophesied that the Papacy
would be extinct in from 40 to 60 years' time. He could not foretell the
fate of the city of Nuremberg till he was told the date when the first
stone was laid 'for where no root is, there can nothing grow.'
As to the Infante Philip, later Philip II, Lienhard Tucher sent him.
342 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
exact details as to Ms birthday, when Kurz began to cast his horoscope.
The result was sad, but practically the exact reverse of actual facts.
The only thing that came out right was 'that he wasteth himself with
his wars and therefore always becometh poorer.' Kurz regretted 'that
the Prognostication fell out so ill; other astrologers would perhaps have
thrown a cloak over it; but as there is nothing but sickness and povertie
and so much of ill luck that I would not fain be Philip. Should the
Empire have such an Emperor, which I believe not if man have com-
plained over Ferdinand, they shall yet shriek forth complaints over
Philip. Why should I write much in Summa? A worse Nativity hath
not come to one this year past. Cloves (he continues, in the same breath)
will be profitable and it could do no damage to make trial with eight or
We have here the beginning of modern speculation in commodities
clearly recognizable though mixed with strange medieval whimsies.
Lazarus Tucher, whose dealings we know, was in his early days a great
speculator in the present-day sense. Christopher Kurz is only a carica-
ture of the type and reminiscent of many phenomena which may be
met with in the bourses of our own day.
First of all it must be clearly stated that a large part of the dealing in
commodities in Antwerp was so risky that prophecies of this kind as to
the future course of business could obtain credence even with mer-
chants of the first rank like Lienhard Tucher. We need not attend fur-
ther to Kurz's statement that his system was already used in many
business houses in Antwerp.
The speculative colouring which dealing in commodities assumed
injured it in the eyes of many solid merchants, while the poor develop-
ment of the technical side of speculation had the same effect on the less
solid. The arrangements had not yet been invented which made it
possible later to speculate in commodities without the complicated
information, trouble and expense of actual trade.
There is a very important opinion of fourteen Paris jurists in 1530
as to whether the forms of business then practised in Antwerp were
allowed by canon law. 1 It is based on data supplied by Spanish mer-
chants resident in Antwerp. It is stated that many of the richest firms
no longer like dealing in commodities unless all the merchants were
unanimous in believing that there was a good prospect of profit.
Otherwise they preferred to refrain mainly for three reasons:
1 Eacritto quo los dottores de Paris embiaron a los sefiores de la nation espafiola
reridentes en la ville de Emberes sobre ciertas deudas que lea embiaron a preguntar
assy de cambios y fianpas como de otras oosas, Begun que por el dioho escritto
e, el qual saco de latin el muy i* aeiior Dottor A
L Hisp. 30).
ANTWERP 243
(1) It was so troublesome to export or import commodities, to ware-
house and resell them, a process needing investigation of the buyer's
credit, while the number of sound firms dealing in commodities was
declining.
(2) It was too risky, for they feared to lose their capital or get it 'frozen. '
(3) Finally, it did not offer so good nor so sure a profit as dealing in
money and bills. They therefore engaged increasingly in the latter.
A few decades later Lodovico Guicciardini, a man of good economic
sense, who in other respects was full of enthusiasm for the greatness of
Antwerp's trade, confessed that the dealings in money at Antwerp
were now a public danger. 'Formerly the nobles, if they had ready
money, were wont to invest it in real estate, which gave employment to
many persons and provided the country with necessaries. The mer-
chants employed capital of this kind in their regular trade whereby they
adjusted want and superfluity between the various countries, gave
employment to many and increased the revenues of princes and
states. Nowadays, on the other hand, a part of the nobles and the
merchants (the former, secretly through the agency of others, and the
latter openly in order to avoid the trouble and risk of a regular profes-
sion) employ all their available capital in dealing in money, the large and
sure profits of which are a great bait. Hence the soil remains untilled,
trade in commodities is neglected, there is often increase of prices,
the poor are fleeced by the rich, and finally even the rich go bankrupt.'
We know that in the main this picture is a true one. The merchant
class of the mediaeval centres mostly turned their energies to dealing
in money. The people who were their successors, the Spaniards and
Portuguese, did not know how to profit by this chance. They borrowed
the capital necessary for world trade from the former and had to give
back to them the lion's share of the profits. The trading nations of
modem times, the English and the Dutch, had not yet laid hands on
the heritage of the Mediterranean cities. Guicciardini' s pessimistic view
of his own times is easily understood.
The Beginnings of Premium Business. In the year 1541, perhaps
before and certainly often later, the Netherlands Government forbade
'Contrats de gageures et d'assurances des changes.' We leam what this
was from an interesting tract of the Licentiate Ghristoval de Vilklon
printed in Valladolid in the year 1542. 1 'Of late in Flanders a horrible
thing hath arisen, a kind of cruel tyranny which the merchants there
1 Provechoso tratado de cambios y eontrataciones de mereaderes, cap. XV. Verach-
ter, Invent. No. 1642, Cmttumes de la vitte d'Anvers, II, 401 ff.; IV. 9. Belgrano in
Giarnale ligwitico, II, 255. Bensa, II contratto di assicurazione nel media evo, p. 126,
178 passim. (Scommesse di promozione di Cardinal!, di Sede Vaoante.) Marino
Sanuto, Diarii, XVI, 27. Brown, Calendar, II, 176; V, 296, Codice d. Tone. Legidaz.
244 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
have invented among themselves. They wager among themselves on the
rate of exchange in the Spanish fairs at Antwerp. They call these wagers
parturas according to the former manner of winning money at a birth
(parto) when a man wagers whether the child shall be a boy or a girl.
In Castile this business is called apuestas, wagers. One wagers that the
exchange rate shall be at 2 per cent, premium or discount, another at
3 per cent., etc. They promise each other to pay the difference in
accordance with the result. This sort of wager seems to me to be like
Marine Insurance business. If they are loyally undertaken and dis-
charged, there is nought to be said against them. But there are many
ruinous tricks practised therein. For dealing of this kind is only com-
mon in merchants who, holding much capital, perhaps draw a bill of
200,000 or 300,000 ducats in Flanders or Spain and conclude on one
of these wagers, whereby one leaves the other free which of the two
transactions he will carry out. By their great capital and their tricks
they can arrange that in any case they have profit. This is a great sin.'
We shall see later in detail what the merchants did. It is easy to see
that here we have the beginnings of the present premium business.
Unquestionably it was also used in dealing in commodities. We find
in 1591 in Hamburg, which took its modern commercial technique
from Antwerp and Amsterdam, that there is a form of business where
one party wagers that in six weeks wheat will sink below a certain
price. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the purchase op
conditie, op weddinge, a condition ou gageure had already become usual
both in Rouen and Amsterdam in commodity dealing. In many cases
it had sprung from the original system of wagers. 1 The fact that the
premium business originated for bill business was natural, since it was
always of a more speculative nature than dealing in commodities.
Traffic in Btlls at Antwerp. The Paris opinion of 1530 describes the
Ricorsa bill in two documents between Antwerp and the Spanish fairs
as the most usual kind of bill business. In this form it was not merely a
veiled loan transaction, but was rather a speculation since two bill
transactions had to be concluded which were separated both in time and
place, the one in Antwerp, the other in Spain. There was, however, as
well the Bicorsa bill in one document, which was purely a veiled loan.
The first Mud, however, was much commoner, and those who wished to
defend it against the doctrine of usury could point to the fact that
money was as often lost as won over it.
The speculative nature of the bill transactions is shown by many
1 Van Damme, Manitre la plus induatrieuse A tenir Kvres, etc., Rouen, 1606.
Henry Waningen, Tresor de tenir livrea de compte & I'ltalienne, Amsterdam,
1648. Van Neulighem, 5oeeMode Amsterdam, 1630. Maoynes, Lex M ercotoria,
' J *"~2,p. 144.
ANTWERP 245
sayings of the merchants. Christopher Kuiz we have already quoted.
In 1550 the Imhofs sent to Antwerp a new agent, who wrote to his pre-
decessor, 'If a man see profit before his eyes, he must undertake nothing
with arbitrio unless he have orders, it turns itself about three times.'
Arbitrage in bills, which had been much carried on in Antwerp since
about 1540, contained three elements: (i) the wish to make money on the
difference between the prices of bills in different places, (ii) speculation
on their fluctuations, (iii) the wish to obtain the highest possible in-
terest. Sometimes the one element was more prominent, sometimes the
other, but in most cases they were all inextricably mixed, e.g. Paul
Behaim writes that he wants to remit money to Frankfort-on-Main and
to draw on Venice; but since money has become more liquid, nothing is
to be got out of such arbitrio. The order to borrow money on Nurem-
berg and to lend it out again profitably in Antwerp could not be carried
out, as no solvent borrowers could be found. If money were to be had in
bills on Venice at 72J gr. per ducat, he would try to lend it out in
Antwerp at 4 per cent, for four months (= 12 per cent, per annum)
which would mean getting 75f gr. for the ducat. Hence a bill could be
drawn from Venice on Antwerp and get a profit of l-2 per cent, with-
out having to tie up one's own money in the transaction. This example
will be enough to show how bill arbitrage was carried on in Antwerp.
There were attempts to force the market to create artificial tightness
or ease (strettezza or largezza), as we have seen in the case of Gaspar
Ducci and the syndicate he formed. This had its chief office in Antwerp;
but his attempts to rig the market were chiefly at Lyons, and its devices
were exercised first in one market and then in another, borrowing money
in Antwerp to lend it out again in Lyons or vice versa. It was thus
possible to reduce the risk of bill arbitrage, or even at moments to
establish a virtual monopoly.
These excrescences discredited the whole Antwerp bill business. The
arithmetician Jan Impyn writes in 1543: 'As to bills, the common people
here knows very little. People fall foul of the merchants and yet wot
not what a bill is. Men hold the merchants for usurers and sharper than
Jews, whereas they should be praised; for without bills there can in no
more trade than sea-going without water. Yet of course bills, like all
else in the world, can be mishandled.'
The merchants defended the Bicorsa bill and arbitrage on the ground
of the necessity of adjusting tightness and ease in the different markets,
but strict canonists did not allow this. Even Guicciardini blamed these
excrescences, though he defended bill business in general. 1 No attempt
* Jan Ympyn Christoffds, Nieuwe instnietie ende lewys der looffdycker eonsten
des rekenboecks, Antwerp, 1543; Guiooiardini, Descritt. d. Paesi Bonn, ed. of
4681, p. 171.
246 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
evet seems to have been made in Antwerp to fix official average rates
for bills in Antwerp as was done in Lyons. This no doubt depended on
the fact that in Antwerp the bill business was not as in Lyons concen-
trated at the close of the fairs, but was distributed throughout the year,
and the daily amount of the business was too large for such attempts.
The Paris opinion of 1530 says, however: The price at which the mer-
chants do business they call the bourse price (precio de la bolsa); for
no one sets the price for himself, but only the Bourse association
(commidad de la bolsa).
It is interesting to note that the bourse is here called in its first be-
ginnings an association, and is given the name by theorists who thought
of other corporations as bourses. Actually, however, the Antwerp
Bourse price was only the market price in the sense of the German com-
mercial code, i.e. an actual price, not an average price fixed by any
official body. These bill prices were communicated in the merchants'
letters or in special leaflets, the origin of which is uncertain, but it was
probably first in Antwerp.
Antwerp Deposit Business. The bourse 'depositum,' a name which is
a cloak for a loan, is not mentioned at Antwerp till comparatively late.
Among theorists well versed in the Antwerp business, the author of the
Paris opinion of 1530 makes no mention of the Deposito: Villalon,
writing only thirteen years later, mentions it only as a bill from one fair
to the next, as it had existed from quite early times; but Saravia
Delia Calle, writing only a little later, mentions 'deposito' at interest
and condemns it as a form of concealed loan. The usual form is
first described by Guicciardini, who says: 'Here it is now called
Deposito in order to cloak with a fine word the ugliness of the act -
the loan of a sum of money for a certain time at a fixed price and
interest, e.g. according to the permit granted by the Emperor Charles V,
confirmed by his son King Philip, at an annual rate of 12 per cent. This
rate was granted to merchants in bad times in order to avoid worse
evil. . . . Such transactions would be actually useful, if people would
be content with reasonable interest. This, however, is not the case,
and the deposit business has assumed an arbitrary and unbearable
shape.'
What Guicciardini describes here is the undisguised loan, which has
no similarity with the bank deposit we know. The so-called 'Deposito'
in Antwerp was as old-established as the bourse business itself, but it
had previously borne another name, and in the business community,
e.g. in the correspondence between the South German merchants and
their agents the new expression came into use very slowly. They spoke
of 'money' or 'money at interest' which was worth 2 per cent, or 3 per
cent, from one fair to another. The older designation 'finance' is used
ANTWERP 247
as equivalent to deposito, and if a distinction is to be drawn between the
commercial and the fiscal loan Ditta di Borsa is spoken of. In 1549 the
Imhofs write to their Antwerp agent: 'We hold the city of Antwerp
will pay as much interest as Dita di Burcha. At the same price we like
the city better.'
The interest rate for the Deposito was the Antwerp market rate as
determined by the frequent fluctuations of the money market. The
'fixed time' which Guicciardini mentions was usually one fair, less often
two, rarely three or four. A fair, as we know, was on the average a
quarter. The time of the fair payments was, however, often altered, so
that a fair often meant more or less than a quarter.
In commercial loans on the bourse, the interest was usually 2 per
cent, or 3 per cent, a fair, i.e. 8 per cent, to 12 per cent, per annum; some-
times the interest was as low as If a fair (7 per cent, per annum). We
do not hear that it ever rose above 3 per cent. Only when some in-
dividual firm was in difficulties, it had to agree to far higher rates.
Even the Fugger were so situated in 1563, when they borrowed 300,000
crowns from Juan de Curiel deUa Torre. The nominal rate was only 10
per cent., but since the Fugger had to take in payment Spanish State
rentes at par, though they stood only at 50 per cent., the actual rate
was a little under 30 per cent. The 300,000 fl. which the Schetz had to
borrow in severe embarrassment from the Genoese in 1572 were just as
dear. These loans, however, cannot be called regular bourse loans.
There was unexampled tightness in 1562-3 and 1572, but we know that
in 1563 the Fugger owed large sums to other people in Antwerp at 8 per
cent, to 10 per cent.
Conditions were quite different for the princes' loans and sometimes
with those of the cities. These were not, properly speaking, deposit busi-
ness, and are hardly ever so called. We will return to this point, but
must first discuss the form of the acknowledgment of indebtedness in
deposit business.
In the correspondence of the South German business houses there is
the most often mention of 'letters,' e.g. 'On good dittas and German let-
ters^ per cent, is paid. Everybody at this time is looking for a Fugger
letter.' The expressions dittas and letters are often used as equivalent.
It is not stated whether the 'letters' were bonds or bilk (Schuld or
Wechsel Briefe). Both forms were actually used in deposit business
in Antwerp, the bond being a bearer bond, and the bill a bill with one
signature. Of these the former, which was used also in credit dealing in
commodities, was the commoner. These bonds could be sold and pledged
without cession or giro, and if lost they could be paid off after public
proclamation. An imperial order of 1537 declared them formally binding
like bills. It was henceforward sufficient to make them valid that the
.248 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
drawer had put his signature 01 trade mark on them. Bearer bonds
accordingly offered all the advantages of the bill exclusive of the greater
facility for being turned into ready money, which the bill obtained
towards the end of the sixteenth century through the giro at the
Genoese bill fairs. 1
General Sketch of Antwerp Finance Dealings. Originally all loans at
interest were called 'finance' in Antwerp, but later this term was re-
served for loans concluded with princes, provinces, or cities. In this
sense, a distinction was drawn between 'finance,' i.e. fiscal money deal-
ings and commercial transactions, bills, and deposito. The original
meaning was retained, however, in the Netherlands finance accounts.
There we find a standing heading entitled 'Deniers Frins (Pris) a
Fraict et Finance,' the fact that interest was payable was expressly
contrasted with 'Empruncts or Frests sans Fraict ne Finance.'
The different kinds of loans concluded on the Antwerp Bourse were as
follows:
(1) Bonds of the Court of the Netherlands, i.e. loans of the Netherlands
Government, of which there were many varieties. They bore the per-
sonal undertaking of the Emperor, or later the Spanish King, as ruler or
his Governor, whether man or woman, and were charged upon certain
definite revenues, or were under the guarantee of high state officials or
individual cities, especially the city of Antwerp.
(2) Private bonds of the highest officials or dignatories of the Nether-
lands on the Government account. We shall come across cases when
this was the Government's only means of raising money.
(3) Bonds of the Provincial Diets of the Netherlands, especially the
states of Brabant on account of the Government for taxes (aides)
already granted to it, but not yet collected.
(4) Bonds of the individual Netherlands cities, partly on their own
account, but chiefly for lie Government. Those of the city of Antwerp
were the most popular. Next those of the 'Seven Cities of Flanders'
either together or separately, those of Antwerp, Malines, etc.
(5) Bonds of the Netherlands Receivers General. We have already men-
tioned these important papers. They were private bonds of the Rent-
meister, i.e. General Tax Receivers of the different Netherlands pro-
vinces on Government account. Originally they were only given to the
creditors for greater security in addition to the Government bonds.
Then the latter were omitted. As, however, the creditors were often dis-
contented with the Receivers' bonds by themselves, they were given
Court bonds in many different towns, which stated the special
revenues from which the Receivers General were to pay the debt and
Veraohter, Invent. No. 711; Place, v. Brabant, 1, 609, 511, 615, Register in
Bulletin des Archives d'Anvers, vol. L
ANTWERP
promised not to apply these revenues in any other way. In many cases,
however, the Eeceivers General were the principal debtors, and the
ruler, in spite of his promises, did not feel bound to step in should they
fail to pay. Hence the creditors obtained no payments for the enormous
quantities of these bonds. Fine examples of them engrossed on parch-
ment can still be found in the archives of the South German patrician
(6) For completeness' sake, it must be added that large bourse firms
often issued loans on account of the Netherlands Government, charging
1 per cent, to 2 per cent, for their del credere. In this case it was not
the bonds of the Government but of the issuing house that were dealt
with on the bourse. Accordingly these did not constitute a public
finance transaction.
(7) Bonds of the English Crown, regularly under the guarantee of all
Privy Councillors and the City of London, and on occasions under that
of the Merchant Adventurers who had their staple in Antwerp.
(8) Bonds of the King of Portugal, whose Antwerp agent was in most
cases personally liable.
In these bonds, the princes always promised repayment 'in verbo
regio' 'de bonne foy, en parolle d'empereur et roy'; the cities engaged all
their burghers with their property 'conjunctim sive insolidum'; interest
was granted in form only as a special concession (in remunerate one
laborum suorum ex nostra mera liberalitate et favore donavimus -) in
order to avoid the laws against usury; and the interest was often
reckoned in the capital of the debt. There is still much that might be
said as to these formalities and they were certainly important in law.
Their economic significance, however, was small, as the creditor was
not secured by the more or less binding form of the bond, but by the
certainty that the debtors could and would pay.
Economically speaking, little importance attached to the bearer
clause inserted in all Netherlands bonds and in no others, not even those
of foreign princes. The latter on occasion were transferred as easily as
the former. This was specially applicable to the Netherlands bonds of
the Eeceivers and those of the King of Portugal. Even those provided
with the Bearer clause seem like the rest to have required special trans-
fer if assigned. As a rule neither the Netherlands Eeceivers General nor
the city of Antwerp nor the other public debtors lent their bonds and
seals for small amounts. Anyone who wished to invest small sums in
bonds had to apply to a large bourse firm, who did .the business under
their own name and made out to the person who paid them the money
a declaration of trust (revers) which set out his share in the original
bond and promised not to part with it before the part creditor was fully
.satisfied. For example, the Fugger in 1556 formed great syndicates for
250 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEJR
taking over large lots of the Netherlands bonds of the Keceivers General.
If, however, there was any question of dividing up the bonds in which
many persons were interested, great difficulties arose.
Many examples will show us how extremely complicated the business
became through the system of numerous guarantees which mutually
propped one another up. Most princes' loans bore interest higher than
the market rate, so that merchants often borrowed money at 2-3 per
cent, at one fair and lent it to a princely borrower at 4 per cent. In
times of financial stress the difference was often 12 per cent, a year and
more, but the risk was more than correspondingly increased. The city
of Antwerp, on the other hand, did not usually pay much more than the
market rate. When in 1557 the Kings of France and Spain ceased pay-
ment the bonds of the city of Antwerp were still in good repute, and
Antwerp could still borrow large sums at the same interest as the best
bourse firms. At last, however, towards the end of 1561 people began to
mistrust Antwerp, withdrew their money and lent it to the Diet of
Brabant. Finally, however, even this was no longer solvent.
Views as to the goodness of the different securities were very different
at different times. Thus for a long time the bonds of the Beceivers
General were regarded with distrust, while later even the largest
amounts of these were easily disposed of. Finally they proved entirely
worthless. Lazarus Tucher, who had a good judgment in such matters,
still held in 1561 that the Portuguese loans were the best next to the
English, although at that time no interest had been paid on them for
years and they continued to pay nothing, while a composition was
effected in the case of the French and Spanish Crown loans. The
bonds of the English Crown, the only loans of this class which in fact
proved safe, were often entirely discredited. Bourse opinions were just
as misleading then as they are now. The bourse's reactions to political
news also have altered very little in the last three hundred years.
Financial Agents of the Netherlands Court and the Croum Agents in
Antwerp. It happened on occasions that the financial counsellors of the
Netherlands came in person to Antwerp to raise loans. This, however,
was a symptom of financial difficulties and was therefore damaging.
The Brussels Court for the most part used a broker or merchant as agent
for its Antwerp loans, and the other governments had always to do the
same.
We have already learnt to know the financial agents of the Brussels
Court as a body. This office was filled from 1516 to 1523, and on occa-
sions until 1531 by Fieter van der Straten; he was followed from 1528 to
1531 by Gerard Stercke and the well-known Lazarus Tucher (1529-41);
then Gaspar Ducci (1542-50); finally, after 1552, Gaspar Schetz. In the
intervals other merchants again held a similar position, Jorys Meuting,
Thomas Muller, Jan Mois, and Gilles Sorbrucque. They served the
Government as agents on behalf of others and as bankers on their own
account. Besides this they occupied certain official posts and had the
title of Imperial Counsellor. Their work as financial agents was not
legally denned; it was not an office, but an occupation. It was, there-
fore, distinct from that of the established agents. For a long time only
the King of Portugal had an established agent in Antwerp. He sold
pepper and other spices from the East Indies - a trade of which the
King had a monopoly, and bought copper, munitions of war, ship-
building materials, and other commodities. This gave rise to advances
on an increasing scale and finally to pure loans. The first of the Portu-
guese agents was Diego Fernandez, who is spoken of in Bruges about
1490, but by 1494 had begun to stay at times in Antwerp. Others were:
about 1500, Alonso Martini; 1503, Thomas (?) Lopez; about 1511, Albert
(?) Lopez; 1514-21, Jean Brandon, who honoured and protected
Albrecht Diirer when he stayed in Antwerp. His successor was Buy
(Rodrigo) Fernandez (d'Almada) who held the position for some time,
perhaps till 1543, the year when there is first mention of JoaoRabello,
who was still acting in 1548. After 1556 we come across Francesco
Pesoa, whom Guicciardini mentions in this position in 1667, by which
time its importance had sunk considerably. When the correspondents
of the South German firms speak of 'the agent' it is usually the King of
Portugal's agent that they mean.
The English Crown had from early times many connections with
Antwerp, which was far the most important centre for English foreign
trade. Henry VIII's political agents, Spinelli, Knight, Pace, etc., often
stayed in Antwerp, where they had relations not only with the English
merchants, but with those of other nations, collected news and negoti-
ated on many occasions about money. For a long time, however, their
dealings were not about loans, but large money payments to be con-
veyed to the Emperor. The first agent proper of the English Crown was
Stephan Vaughan, a merchant from London, a member of the Adven-
turers Company, who stood in relations in 1557 with Cromwell, not yet
a Minister. Later he was often employed by the Government to collect
news in the Netherlands, to buy war materials and conduct negotiations
about trade policy. 1 He did not borrow in Antwerp till 1545. His
successor two years later was William Dansell, who did much the same
work as Vaughan till 1551, not, however, to the satisfaction of the
English Government, which recalled him in disgrace. Both Vaughan
and Dansell were also Governors of the Adventurers in Antwerp. 2
1 Brewer, Calendar, IV, 3053. Of. Burgon, Oresham, I, 57 ff. Sohanz, Engl.
Handdspolitik, I, 77.
' Burgon, I, 03-5. Turnbull, Calendar, Edw. VI, No. 33 &
252 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
At the beginning of 1552 Dansell's place was taken by Thomas
Giesham, also a London merchant and member of the Adventurers Com-
pany, who, like his father, uncle, and brother, had often had dealings
with the English Crown. His services, not only to the Crown from 1552
onwards, but also to the whole of England, so far exceed those of other
financial agents and established agents that we must give him a section
to himself. First, however, we will say a few words as to the agents of
the Governments of Spain and the Netherlands. One of these was
Caspar Schetz, who after Ducci's fall was financial agent of the Brussels
Court. In the year 1552, when Gresham took up the parallel appoint-
ment for the English Crown, Schetz was entitled 'Facteur des finances de
Pempereur,' which none of his predecessors had been. Three years later
he was nominated by "King Philip II of Spain as his permanent agent in
Antwerp. From the instructions then given Mm we see that he re-
ceived a fixed annual salary, together with a commission on his business
and allowances for any journeys. So far as we know none of the other
royal factors had a position so closely analogous to that of an official.
Yet Gaspar Schetz had large monetary transactions on his own account
with the Government he represented as well as with other Governments.
The King of Portugal's agent was even interested in the great pepper
contracts which he concluded with merchants in Antwerp on account
of his King. If we consider essentials rather than the form, Thomas
Gresham was the agent who served his royal employer the best and the
most faithfully.
The last of the princely agents, Juan Lopez Gallo, was entrusted in
1559 with the management of the Spanish finance business proper,
while Gaspar Schetz kept those of the Netherlands. We have already
seen that his actions were not above reproach.
In 1567 Guicciardini, enumerating the agents resident in Antwerp
in his time, called them all 'huomini qualificatissimi, 9 an understand-
able description as he was close friends with some of them and
had reasons to shield the others. He tells us that the Spanish and
Portuguese agents since the bankruptcy of their Kings did no more
business for them. There was subsequently no real change in this
situation.
Sir Thomas Gresham. It is clear from what has been already said why
this is the place to describe the work of this remarkable man. He did
not belong to the financiers 'Geldleute,' with whom he did constant
business in Antwerp, but was originally one large commodity merchant,
a 'Merchant Adventurer,' who was employed by three rulers on account
.of his outstanding qualities and the high position he enjoyed in the
business world as Crown agent in Antwerp. In this capacity, that of
'royal merchant,' as he was also called, he is one of the most important
ANTWERP 253
figures in the sixteenth century and the history of England. His im-
portance, however, mainly took its rise from Antwerp. 1
Gresham's first task was to raise loans in Antwerp for the English
Government. The English merchants were not yet able to satisfy
by themselves the Government's demand for credit, while the
foreigners dealing in England had mostly, on the initiative of their
native competitors, been slowly harried home to their own countries.
In any case they would not have been able to provide the large sums
which the English Crown had to borrow since the end of the reign of
Henry VIII. This could only be done by means of the great Antwerp
money market. In 1566 Gresham could boast that since he took up his
post fourteen years before he had obtained 1,840,000 EL for the Eng-
lish Crown and had repaid it nearly all. The loans were concluded in
the usual way for one or two fairs and on maturity had to be either
repaid or prolonged. Before Gresham's advent, extension had always
been an expensive business, as his predecessors had as a usual thing
bought jewels and commodities of all kinds at high prices from the
creditors, thereby moving the real interest much higher than the
nominal rate agreed on. Gresham soon abolished this practice. More
important still, however, was the improvement he effected in the
credit of the English Crown. Soon after the death of Edward VI,
Gresham boasted that he had raised the credit of the King so greatly
that he would have been able to borrow any sum he liked in Antwerp,
'wherefore his enemies began to fear him, for hitherto his power had
not been known.'
Allowing for some exaggeration it is certain that under Gresham the
credit of the English Crown was far better than that of the other princes
who borrowed in Antwerp. This was specially true of the period since the
accession of Elizabeth. Under Mary, Gresham had at first been removed,
but was recalled when the Queen's credit had been damaged by the
stupidity of another agent. During Mary's lifetime, however, Gresham
was unable to carry out his own wise financial plans, so that the credit
of the Crown underwent some temporary setbacks. He was able never-
theless to establish it again, thanks to his unrivalled knowledge of
the Antwerp Bourse and the large financiers, of whom many - including
the Schetz-were his intimate friends.
Gresham treated the financial dealings of the English Government as
they should be treated - that is to say, as commercial business, with
discretion, caution, and honesty. This was the secret of his success.
From the first he insisted that all obligations must be punctually ful-
Based on Burgon, Turnbull and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Acts of the Privy
Council. Cf. also Ehrenberg, Hamburg und England im Zeitdtter der Konigin
Elisabeth, p.60ff.
254 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
filled. If necessary he pledged his own credit. He always kept himself
exactly informed as to the state of the money market. He knew how to
rivet the money and bill brokers to his interest; and as early as 1553 he
wrote home, 'No bourse passes wherein I am not furnished with a state-
ment of all monies borrowed on that day.' On Mary's death he hastened
to Antwerp to assure the Queen's creditors that all her obligations
would be promptly discharged according to her dying injunction to her
Finally, when the outbreak of rebellion in the Netherlands had
thrown the Antwerp money market into confusion, Gresham felt that
the moment had come for making England independent of foreign
countries, not only as to trade, but also in credit. On the 14th
August, 1569, he wrote to Sir William Cecil: *
' . . . I would wissh that the Q. Majestic in this time shuld not use
any strangers but her own subiectes wherebie he and all other princes
maie se what a prince ofpowr she ys. And bie this meanes there is no
dowbt but that her highnes shall cause the Duke of Alva to know him
self and to make what end with that low Countreys as Her Majestic will
her self what brute soever is here spredde abrode to the contrary. Sir,
seing I am entrid so farre with youe for the credit of the Q. majestic
beyond the seas wherein I have travailed this 20 yeres and bie experi-
ence in using oure owne merchanntes I found gret honnoi to the prince
as also gret profit to the merchanntes and to the whole Bealm what-
soever our merchanntes saye to the contrarye for when our prince
ought owrown meane merchanntes 60 or 80 (thousands pounds) (Mti)
then they knew them selves and were daily reddie and sure as good
chere as stranngers did whiche Syr I would wissh again in this time of
extremity to be usid for that I know our merchanntes be able to do
yt. . . .'
This was true, but at first Gresham had difficulties in obtaining large
sums from the English merchants, and they often complained of the
harsh treatment of them. Gradually, however, they came to appreciate
such an opportunity for capital investments; and since Antwerp was no
longer available, after a longish and uncomfortable period of transition
the moment arrived when the English Government could satisfy their
extraordinary credit requirements at home. Gresham introduced this
great change and actively supported it; he was also one of the first to
press for the abolition of the State ban on interest. Before this, however,
he had done other, perhaps even more important, services. In the early
days of his appointment he had managed by skilful manipulation to
influence the rate for bills on London in favour of England and the
Crown loans. Afterwards he directed all his energies to improving the
'Brit. Mus. Lansd. MSS. 12, foL 16.
ANTWERP 255
English trade balance and the value of sterling. He achieved these ends
chiefly by two acts which needed long and careful preparation, the
destruction of the trade of the German Hansa towns with England
and the coinage reform of 1560. In his reports to the English Govern-
ment he laid down the principles which finally regulated the currency
of the European States in the new epoch. He acquired his exact know-
ledge of currency and bills through his business in Antwerp. We need
not prove this here, and the fact by no means detracts from Gresham's
merits. His merits consisted in the application of the principles
and expert knowledge of the business world to the affairs of a great
monarchy.
He remained all his life an exact and successful merchant, as well as
a patriot and a true servant of his rulers - a rare phenomenon among
the merchants and financiers of the sixteenth century, who seldom
managed to combine both sets of qualities.
Gresham owned a house in Antwerp in the Lange Nieuwstraat, but
London was his home and the chief seat of his extensive business. He
crossed the sea repeatedly on the Grown business, without in all cases
getting a recompense in proportion to his trouble and deserts. His
travelling allowances were only 20$. a day, and he often had trouble in
getting the promises of compensation for his services fulfilled. Yet there
is no doubt that his post as Eoyal Agent was a source of profit. He died
one of the richest men of his day, after giving London an Exchange on
the pattern of the one at Antwerp and founding a college called by his
own name. He left his widow an annual income of 2,388, so large for
the sixteenth century as to excite doubts as to its correctness. It
must, however, be regarded as authentic. 1
Gresham was also frequently employed on political missions in the
Netherlands, and in the critical times of the Netherlands rebellion he
provided England with materials for war, risking life and property in
evading the prohibitive laws of the Netherlands. For many years he
conducted the extensive news service of the English Government in the
Netherlands, and it was in the first instance due to him that Queen
Elizabeth and her statesmen were better informed as to everything that
went on in Europe than any other Government. Gresham's remarkable
double position comes out here, for the news which sent to his Govern-
ment originated chiefly in the commercial world. He was thus able to
exploit for his country on every side the advantages of the world
bourse.
Chronicle of the Antwerp Finances up to 1542. Up to 1510 or there-
abouts the merchants who could lend capital in the Netherlands had
their agencies in Bruges. In the year 1510 there first appear in the
iBurgon, 11,490.
THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
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ANTWERP 257
Netherlands finance accounts payments to the Fugger on bills drawn in
Augsburg and repayments of advances made by the Spaniard Antonio
de Vaille, who, like the Fugger, was already settled in Antwerp. The
loan business which then grew up in Antwerp had for long a very irregu-
lar character. The loans were not concluded from fair to fair; other and
usually larger terms were fixed by agreement - half a year or even more.
Moreover, the loans were not yet very considerable. There were enor-
mous fluctuations in the rate of interest. As yet there was no trace of a
market rate as far as these loans were concerned. The latter gives
further details for the years 1509 to 1512.
On the 29th January, 1512, the city of Antwerp, at the most urgent
request of the Queen Eegent and the financial connections, borrowed
from certain unnamed German merchants 20,000 on the Government
account to pay the German mercenaries. These merchants were to
obtain repayment for themselves from the Aides of Brabant already
granted. This loan cost 2,400 for five months and ten days = 27 per
cent. The broker also received 100 .
On the other hand, there were at this time loans which bore no
interest.
In 1515, Prince Charles, afterwards Charles V, was declared of age,
on the promise of 140,000 Fl. to his needy grandfather Maximilian.
He then entered in state into Antwerp, already declared in this year by
one of the English envoys to be 'one of the flowers of the world.' He
prepared to make the journey to his Spanish kingdom. He was in
great need of money both for this journey and the payment of the
140,000 to the Emperor, and also because his grandfather on his
mother's side, King Ferdinand of Aragon, had bequeathed Mm a great
load of debt. Large sums accordingly had to be borrowed in Ant-
werp, amounting in all to 166,000 . The greater part of this sum had
to be prolonged on maturity in 1516. For this year we can state in
tabular form the money borrowed in Antwerp by the Netherlands
Government.
Besides the increase in the size of the loans we note that the fairs have
begun to be used as terms. The sums borrowed in the second half of the
year were meant for the war in Friesland, which made necessary even
larger loans in the following year.
At the beginning of 1517 the city of Antwerp, in order to meet the
costs of the war, tried to sell annuities repayable within three years from
the Aides of the province of Brabant. All efforts failed, however, to
attract buyers on tolerable conditions. Accordingly in February, 1517,
a sum of 45,000 was borrowed under the guarantee of the city of
Antwerp from Antwerp merchants, the Government paying the cost.
The interest amounted to 5,000 to the St. Remy fair, or 19 per cent.
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THE AGE OF THE PUGGEE
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ANTWERP 259
per annum. Moreover, the loan of 27,000 from the Fugger which
matured at the Whitsuntide fair was prolonged, together with interest
then amounting to 3,000 , till Christmas, 1518, and a further sum of
42,000 was borrowed from the Fugger at a cost of 7,000 in interest.
We need not calculate the rate here.
At the St. Remy fair in 1517 60,000 of the maturing debts could not
be met. The city of Antwerp, high State officials and nobles had given
their guarantee. In order, therefore, as is expressly stated in the finance
accounts, 'to keep his word and protect the honour of the lords and
gentlemen and their credit, and that of the city of Antwerp,' Kirig
Charles ordered the prolongation of the remainder till the Easter fair,
1518, at a cost of 10 per cent, for the half-year. The total amount paid
in interest on such loans in the year 1517 was 34,441 at 40 gr. = 5,760
L fl. In January, 1518, bands of discharged soldiers, eight or nine
thousand strong, threatened to invade the Netherlands to plunder
('pour piller et menger les subgects'). Cavalry of the standing army
(compagnies des gens de guerre a cheval des ordonnances du roy) were
summoned to drive away the unbidden guests. Since, however, these
regular troops could not leave their garrisons without having their
quarters paid for, it was necessary to give thetn six weeks' pay. Since,
however, the State Treasury was empty on 15th February 11,000 L
had to be borrowed in Antwerp till the following Easter fair at a cost of
486 10s. 6p/., or about 18 per cent.
On the 15th July in the same year the Court of Brussels, in order to
give their months' pay to the garrisons of the province of Friesland,
which was as yet unpacified, borrowed 38,000 in Antwerp from the
Fugger, a debt for which a Receiver General of Revenue for the first
time made himself personally liable. The loan cost only 4,000 for
thirteen months, not quite 10 per cent., supposing the facts are correctly
stated. At the autumn fair in the same year a sum of 41,000 was bor-
rowed on Receivers General bonds till Easter, 1519. This operation
cost 4,000 or about 20 per cent, inclusive of the brokerage to Pieter
van der Straten, who also raised 107,600 at 15 per cent. The total
spent in this year on interest was 22,602 at 40 gr. = 3,767 fl.
Among the loans of the years 1519, 1520 and 1521 we note the follow-
ing:
^ Per cent.
13,000 L from 14.8.1519 to Christmas at *"* ^e 1
24,000 L from Sep. 1519-Easter 1520 at 15
26,000 L from May 1519-Easter 1520 at 7
22,800 L from June 1520-Candlemas 1521 at 12
28,000 L from June 1520-Candlemas 1521 at 10
72,000 L from Aug. 1520-Christmas 1521 at 13
THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
32 636 I,}* 101 * ^ 152 - Easter 1521 at
71,'539 L from Dec. 1520-Whit-Sunday 1521 at
30,000 L from May 1521 to St. Remy 1521 at
23,200 L from 1 .7.1521 to Candlemas 1522 at
20,000 L from 1.10.1521 to 15.1.1522 at
Hfrom Oct. 1521 to Easter 1522 at 16-18
In addition considerable sums in brokerage were paid to Pieter v. d.
Straten and to Bernhard Stecher, the Fugger's agent. There is as yet
no question of a market rate of interest for these loans.
The year 1522 is specially interesting for us. Early in the year money
had to be raised at any price for the Emperor, who was in the greatest
possible straits for money. In February 100,000 was raised in the
following way. The Spaniards Francesco de Vaille and Francesco de
Moxica, in association with certain other firms, lent this sum in Antwerp
and were to receive in return 52,600 ducats in Spain. The loan was
granted 'sans frais ne finance,' but the interest was included in the
exchange rate for his ducats. There was some nervousness, however,
lest the 52,500 ducats in Spain should not be paid. To meet this
emergency on the request of the merchants, two nobles of high rank,
Heinrich Graf von Nassau and Anton Lalaing, Graf von Hoochstraten,
who was head of the Netherlands finances, pledged themselves per-
sonally to pay the equivalent in Antwerp at the September fair in 1522.
This operation cost 7,494 .
For another claim De Vaille and Moxica were referred to Naples.
Since, however, this bond was not honoured ways and means had to be
found to meet it in Antwerp.
In April a further sum of 64,000 was required in haste. Pieter v. d.
Straten advanced this in bis own name, receiving in return four bonds
of 16,000 apiece: the first issued by Jean Seigneur de Berghes, the
second by Count Floris Egmont, the third by Adolf of Burgundy Seign-
eur de Bevres, and the fourth from Philippe de Cray, Marquis d'Arschot.,
This sum of 64,000 was also to be repaid at the September fair. The
real lenders were as we shall see the Herwart of Augsburg. Several
other loans were raised. At the end of April, or the beginning of May,
the Emperor needed at once another sum of 140,000 for his projected
journey to England and for other purposes. He accordingly summoned
the Conseil Priv6 and the Conseil des Finances in order to consider how
to raise the money. There was no lack of proposals. The domains were
to be pledged; or life annuities or perpetual annuities to be sold; the
ANTWERP 261
Aides could be anticipated on floating loans. Objections were advanced
against all these financial expedients. Perpetual annuities were diffi-
cult to redeem, life annuities very costly; floating loans from merchants
still more so (these including brokerage cost 18 per cent., 20 per cent.,
or 22 per cent, per annum) . Pledged domains usually remained in the
hands of the lenders; the cities which formerly had advanced money on
Aides already granted were now overloaded with debts and their credit
had gone. Finally, as time pressed, the Emperor sent the Counts of
Nassau and Bergen twice in great haste to Antwerp, and through the
agency of the Magistrate the followhig agreement was arranged. Cer-
tain merchants declared their readiness to pay the Emperor at once
70,000 in return for the three years' rent for the lease of the Customs of
Antwerp and Zeeland, amounting to 117,000 (39,000 per annum).
The city of Antwerp had to guarantee the payment of the 117,000 to
the merchants, and were on the other hand released from their obliga-
tion to pay to the Archbishop of Mainz and the Count Palatine 18,000
fl. a year on the Emperor's account. The customs above mentioned had
been pledged for this amount. This last act was obviously illegal, but
then the whole transaction was highly extortionate. "When the im-
perial envoy reported in Brussels, it was remarked at once that the
merchants would get their capital back in less than two years. Never-
theless the agreement had to be sanctioned. The merchants nominally
paid in cash to the Emperor 117,000
and received at once in interest 47,000
and therefore they paid actually only 70,000
For this they received 39,000 a year for three years, i.e. an interest
of more than 30 per cent, per annum on 70,000. In fact, however, the
transaction was not finished on these lines. The Genoese Toromaso
Bombelli brought about another arrangement whereby the merchants
received back their 70,000 , together with 15,666 interest for one
year, 22 J per cent., still a very high rate. The Emperor wanted to give
Bombelli 1,000 for his service, but he refused 'because he had not suc-
ceeded in inducing the merchants to forgo the interest for the first year.'
This unparalleled action shows how such extortionate transactions were
regarded by respectable merchants.
Since the transaction we have described brought in only 70,000 ,
instead of 140,000 , a further 72,000 had to be raised by other means.
The Emperor accordingly in June owed the merchants at least 300,000
to 400,000 at the time when he wished to travel direct from England
to Spain in order to put down the last rebellions of the Comuneros. Then
262 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
occurred one of those moments of acute financial embarrassment which
we have already mentioned. There was no money to equip the ships
which were to convey the Emperor, or to pay the soldiers who were to
conduct him to Spain. Only Erasmus Schetz, after great efforts on the
part of Count Hoochstraten, lent 10,000 on the security of a goblet of
the Emperor and several gold chains belonging to the Countess. The
other merchants excused themselves on the ground 'that there was no
money on the bourse, that trade was at a standstill on account of the
disorders,' and so forth. Finally, however, the Count succeeded in
getting 20,000 till the autumn fair, paying 4,339 interest, or 52 per
cent, per annum.
At the autumn fair several large loans matured, including the
100,000 of Francesco de Vaille and his associates. The Queen Regent
was then in Antwerp, and since the creditors pressed for payment, a
grand esclandre was feared. Means were at last found, but the new loans
raised to pay off the old again cost on an average 21 per cent, per annum.
On the different loans it varied between 13 per cent, and 27 per cent.,
without counting the brokerage to Pieter van der Straten. The interest
paid in this year on floating loans was 82,000 .
The financial situation, however, was at bottom a favourable one.
All the same in the year following 18-24 per cent, interest had to be
paid for the prolongation of the floating loans, and when an attempt
was made to pay off the 64,000 due to the Herwart by selling annuities
no one was found to buy them and the loan had to be prolonged. At
the end of 1523 the floating debt amounted to about half a million. 1
The greater part of this, however, was paid off by the end of the year
following, and in 1526 it was entirely disposed of. The Government had
completely got the better of the merchants, as we see from the following
story. The amount due to the Herwart, 64,000 , was to be repaid in
October, 1524. Actually the repayment took place in instalments in
the course of the following year. The Herwart naturally demanded
interest for this delay, only 12 per cent., however. This request was
not granted, and after long negotiations they had to be content with
9 per cent.
The course of a few years witnessed enormous fluctuations in the
general level of interest.
The whole organization of business in Antwerp was still very imper-
fect in 1526, as we see from the following statement by an agent of the
Tucher:
'I will endeavour to learn when the four markets here and in Bergen
begin. I have asked many men and no where have had a sure answer.
Men say they begin at various times. The last Famas market begins
la Archives, Chambre des Comptes, No. 120, foL 202 ft.
ANTWERP 263
after Our Lady's Birthday in August and the payment for the same on
the 23rd October.'
Antwerp at this time was not yet a money market of great inter-
national importance. We possess an English memorandum, drawn up in
1564, which deals with this point as follows: 'What nations or merchants
were wont formerly to lend out money in order to serve the princes and
states in their wars and other necessities? The German merchants were
the greatest and some Italians. Who now lends the most money? The
merchants of Antwerp and other merchants in the Low Countries. It is
not much more than thirty years since in Antwerp there were not above
two or three merchants who lent money at interest, and these from their
own resources could advance barely 20,000 fl. or 80,000 thaler.
Now, on the other hand, there are thirty or forty great merchants who
could lend 300,000 without hurt to their other business.'
This testimony is to be received with caution. The English memor-
andum wished to magnify the rise of Antwerp, which it attributed to
English trade. It is moreover not clear whether the designation 'mer-
chants of Antwerp' covers those whose chief business was there or those
who had a factory there. In the first case the Fugger, Welser, Herwart,
de Vaille, Gualterotti, etc., were not to be regarded as Antwerp mer-
chants; in the other it would be wrong to say that in 1530 in Antwerp
only two or three merchants could lend large sums of money. The real
state of affairs was that the Netherlands Government could then on
occasion borrow considerable sums from the foreign merchants trading
in Antwerp. The largest sum, however, in the period treated hitherto
did not exceed 500,000 Art. at 40 gr., or 357,000 fl. Eh. There was no
change either in the next few years. On the other hand, in 1527 the
Fugger alone had claims on the Hapsburg brothers amounting to three
times this amount, and only a small part of this originated in Antwerp.
Only the King of Portugal, besides the Netherlands Government, owed
the Antwerp merchants large sums. These, however, were not pure
financial transactions, but advances on pepper sales, purchases of
copper or credit, etc. That Antwerp in the first quarter of the sixteenth
century was not an important money market is shown above all by the
high rate and violent fluctuations of the interest which the Netherlands
Government had to pay in that market. These were almost the same as
those which, except in certain isolated cases, the Fugger, Welser and
other South German houses charged their royal creditors on the
Augsburg loans.
In 1526 and 1527 there was nothing doing in the Antwerp money
market; but in the following years business began to revive. In 1528
there was only one important transaction, the loan of 200,000 from
the Hochstetter. In this case the Government had to take in payment
264 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
quicksilver and cinnamon, commodities which were then purchased by
Lazarus Tucher at a loss to the Government of 74,000 . The financial
officials regarded this as a very huge loss, but since no other interest was
paid and the loss distributed over five years, it was tantamount to
interest at 18 per cent., and in reality things might have been worse.
The usual rates of interest in 1528, 1529 and 1530 fluctuated between
14 per cent, and 22 per cent., the upper limit being nearer the average.
The largest transaction in these years was a loan of 218,812 con-
cluded in November, 1529, for seven months at the rate of 20 per cent,
per annum in order to meet bilk drawn by the Fornari and other
Genoese merchants on the Netherlands finance administration. Next
most important was a loan of 125,000 contracted in August, 1529, to
meet the bills of the Fugger, Welser, and Herwart. This cost 21J per
cent, per annum, in spite of the personal guarantee of the highest finance
officials; also, after a quarter, 74,000 of it had to be prolonged, which
cost a further 17| per cent. This, however, was a small matter com-
pared with the enormous loans which the Fugger at this time granted
to the Emperor and his brother.
The following examples will show the extreme complexity of the
transactions of the Netherlands Government at this time. In 1527 the
Emperor had to make a payment of 45,000 to the Bishop of
Utrecht. A bond of the Hochstetter for 30,000 payable in 1529 was
given in payment. The Hochstetter, who did not pay over any ready
money, were given a guarantee by the city of Antwerp, which in turn
received a guarantee from Count Hoochstraten, the chief of the Nether-
lands finances. He promised the Bishop of Utrecht, should the Hoch-
stetter fail to pay, to do so himself, and received in his turn under-
takings from the Emperor that he would be compensated for any pay-
ments he might have to make under his guarantees. The Hochstetter,
as we know, got into difficulties and transferred the guarantee of the
city of Antwerp to Diego Mendez in Antwerp. They became bankrupt
shortly afterwards, and the Bishop of Utrecht applied in the first in-
stance to Count Hoochstraten, while at the same time Diego Mendez
applied to the city of Antwerp, which in turn had recourse on the un-
fortunate Count, now in danger of having to pay twice over. He accord-
ingly seized the remainder of the Hochstetter's claim still due on the
loan of 200,000 L. This claim, however, which amounted to 170,000 ,
had been handed over by the Hochstetter on the eve of their bank-
ruptcy to the Fugger. This gave rise to new lawsuits; finally, however,
Wolff Haller undertook to redeem for 6,000 one of the Count Hoch-
straten's bonds, while the other had already been met.
The following statement shows the sums shown in the Netherlands
finance accounts under the heading 'Deniers pris & frais et finance' dur-
ing the years 1521 to 1530. They contain chiefly interest and brokerage
for the floating loans, their losses on bill transactions and instalments of
repayments. They therefore give a fair picture of the Netherlands
finances at this period. The livres are at 40 gr. Flemish.
1526 1,092
1522 112,195 1527 1,623
1523 18,569 1528 93,688
1524 5,679,, 1529 92,151,,
1525 10,864,, 1530 57,079,,
This makes a total of 455,000 L for ten years or an average of
45,500 L. a year. During this period the total revenues of the Nether-
lands Government averaged 1,440,000 L a year and the Aides (the
direct taxes granted by the Diets) alone averaged a million L at 40 gr.
From this must be subtracted, however, the considerable grants of
reductions and remissions of taxation amounting on an average to
250,000 L a year. Taking this into account the Netherlands Govern-
ment rejoiced in an average yearly income of 1,200,000 L, against which
the 45,500 L for the floating debt charge was a mere trifle. The financial
situation of the Netherlands was extraordinarily favourable, and yet
it could not always borrow even at 20 per cent, and over. 1
Further, in the year 1531, the Emperor undertook enormous repay-
ments of his old and new debts in the Netherlands from the extra-
ordinary receipts under the Peace of Cambrai and from the Aides of the
same year; the city of Antwerp alone received nearly half a million L
Art. at 40 gr. On the other hand, during the same year he had to take up
large floating loans at 12 per cent, to 21 per cent, interest; and Stephen
Vaughan, who for some time had done all sorts of business for the English
Government in Antwerp, was never tired of reporting how short of money
the Emperor was. 8 He borrowed largely in Augsburg at this time, as we
have seen, promising repayment in Antwerp, losing 18,375 L or 215,250
L, owing to the adverse exchange. Even his contemporaries wondered
why, in spite of the increasing stream of gold and silver from America
flowing into his treasury, the Emperor always had recourse to short-
term loans at high rates. 8
The following decade saw little change in these conditions; but there
is an unmistakable, though slow, reduction in the rate of interest. In
1535 and 1536 it fluctuated between 13 per cent, and 20 per cent. Most
1 In Brussels Archives (Papiers d'Etat et del' Audience, No. 873): Revenues et
depenses d. Charles V, 1520-30.
Gairdner, Calendar, V, No. 246; State Papers, Henry VIII, vol. VII, 301.
'Brewer, Calendar, VII, No, 440 (1534).
266 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
large loans, However, only cost 13 per cent, to 15 per cent., though the
demand for money was increasing and the market was tight. 1
In February, 1535, when there was fear of a French invasion, a sum
of 250,000 L, partly for six months and partly for a year, was borrowed
from Lazarus Tucher at 14 per cent, under the guarantee of the Queen
Regent, the Knights of the Golden Fleece, and high officials. The loan
was not met on maturity - (it was not in fact paid till 1542) - and the
rate of interest rose accordingly to 18 per cent, to 20 per cent., but not
beyond this; it then gradually sank, and in 1539 fluctuated between 10
per cent, and 13 per cent., and in 1541, the demand for money having
increased, between 12 per cent, and 16 per cent. In the last-mentioned
year the rate of interest is usually stated in the finance accounts, while
hitherto only the amount paid had been entered. At this time 3 per
cent, to 4 per cent, was usually paid from one fair time to the next on
the Court loans. Lazarus Tucher, Dismes de Ferrere, and Gilles de
Sorbrucque lent money on these terms, the largest amount being
197,000 L. The total interest paid in 1541 was 96,516 L, not higher than
in many of the preceding years. It was only in 1542 that this limit was
considerably exceeded.
The Period from 1542 to 1551. There is no better illustration of the
financial situation of the Netherlands Government at this period than
the following figures from the Comptes de la Recette Generate.
Receipts. Expenditure.
1540 1,040,795 f 928,855
1541 1,051,017 976,075
1542 3,986,294,, 2,631,200,,
1543 3,376,437 3,674,531
While, therefore, the years 1540 and 1541 together showed a surplus
of almost 200,000 L, the two years following had a deficit of nearly a
million, in spite of the inclusion in the receipts of large loans and other
extraordinary receipts. This change for the worse is due entirely to the
war with France, which cost in the Netherlands alone 1 \ million pounds
(at 40 gr.) and in 1543 2 million. As a result the Brussels Court's financial
transactions in Antwerp greatly increased in scope under the skilful
management of Gaspar Ducci, while the rate of interest at first fell be-
cause the supply of capital exceeded the demand.
period in the history of Antwerp. The danger of war had caused the
building of new fortifications, and the city had at the same time been
extended and had become such a well-secured place that 'many men
i Lanz, Carresfondenx Carls V, t. 668, 665. For 1537, ibid. U, 673, 677.
ANTWERP 267
from the country and other districts streamed in to dwell there.' l
Guicciardini seems perhaps to exaggerate the importance of this cause of
Antwerp's development.
In 1542 an arrangement was made as to several large advances of
Lazarus Tucher, who did not come off particularly well under it. In
1535 and 1536 he had lent 368,825 L, and for six years no interest had
been paid, nor had the promised repayments been carried out. He now
received his capital and only 52,731 L for interest over the whole period,
equivalent to not more than 2 J per cent, per annum. For small advances
in 1538 and 1539 he obtained as much as 13 per cent, to 16 per cent.
The first loans for which Caspar Ducci acted as agent were concluded
at Candlemas, 1542, at 11 per cent, to 12 per cent., in order to repay
the maturing bonds of the Receivers General at 12 per cent. He re-
ceived in return as security new bonds of the same kind, which he resold
to merchants and other holders of capital. At the subsequent fairs he
raised in the same way still larger sums for the war expenses. In the
course of the year he borrowed about a million pounds (at 40 gr.),
almost all at 12 per cent, per annum.
In August, 1542, when a French invasion was feared, a subscription
was opened on the Antwerp Bourse for a voluntary loan without in-
terest, which yielded the sum of 209,800 . This was repaid next year
by the sale of annuities and in other ways, and another voluntary loan
was made, 200,000 being contributed by the city of Antwerp and
104,000 by private individuals. This, however, was not a financial
transaction, but a contribution from patriotic or other motives to the
defence of the country.
In 1543 Gaspar Ducci raised 1,200,000 L, Lazarus Tucher 200,000 L,
and Eustace Kaltenhofer 120,000 L, of which a part remained unsettled
for not quite the whole year. As the interest paid amounted to 102,200
L at 12 per cent., the amount of the debt throughout the year averaged
850,000 L, an hitherto unprecedented burden of floating debt.
The city of Antwerp also raised in this year extraordinarily large
amounts for the building of the new fortifications and the enlargement
of the bounds of the city. 2
In the year 1544 the loans continued; the supply of money was shorter
and the rate higher. We can see this process best in the business letters
of Hieronymus Seller. As late as the Pamas fair in 1543 12 per cent,
was paid on the prolonged bonds of the Receivers General; but by the
end of January, 1544, the rate had risen to 14 per cent. At the beginning
of February, the letters say, 'I am glad that thou thinkest the Bonds of
1 Descritt. d. Paesi Bassi, ed. 1581, p. 127.
' Deseritt. d. Paesi Bassi, ed. 1581, pp. 95, 127. StadtepratokcOen, ed. Pauwels,
1,33.
268 THE AGE OF THE PUGGEE
the Receivers General will bring a good deal of ready money on the
Bourse this quarter day.'
The rate asked now began to be 8 per cent, till the Whitsun fair, i.e.
for six months. 'Should peace come there would be money enough at 5
per cent, (the half year).' The scarcity of money was partly due to
the fact that the Receivers General had paid no interest for several
fairs.
In May and June the rate for the Court loans was usually 16 per cent.,
and this continued in the months following. We have a certificate of the
Netherlands finance administration for the 26th August, 1544, which
states that on the sums borrowed for the Emperor in Antwerp the rates
are ordinary interest (frait ordinaire) 12 per cent, per annum, extra-
ordinary (par forme de gratuyte) a further 1 per cent, per fair, a total
accordingly of 16 per cent, per annum. The reason for this increase of
the rates is stated to be the extraordinarily large sums raised, not only
for the Emperor, but for the King of England. Nicolas Nicolai, the
Receiver General of Brabant, at the Whitsun quarter day had been
unable to meet the obligation of 360,000 L he had assumed, from the
Aide of 400,000 L which the Diet had already granted. The Diet
had to issue its own bonds for capital and interest. Finding the in-
terest too high however, the Finance Administration issued this
Certificate and the Diet accordingly granted interest at 16 per cent,
and repayment at the Christmas market, 1545. 1
We are never told the amount of the loans borrowed in Antwerp for
King Henry VIII by his agent Stephen Vaughan; but we know that in
1545 the King owed the Fugger in Antwerp 152,180 pounds Flemish, or
913,080 L of 40 gr. on a single transaction. The Netherlands Govern-
ment had never dealt on this scale in Antwerp. 2
The Antwerp debt of the King of Portugal at the end of 1543 is esti-
mated by his agent Joao Rabello at two million Cruzadi or Portuguese
ducats, an incredible amount even allowing for the fact that a great
part of this was merely payments in advance for pepper contracts. The
chronicler adds that the agents had reckoned such a high rate of
interest that the King's debt doubled in four years. This is quite prob-
able, for the agent had himself paid 12 per cent, to 16 per cent, per
annum, or rather 3 per cent, to 4 per cent, per fair. If he charged the
King 4 per cent. = 18 per cent, this would double the capital in four
years at compound interest. 3
The Haug of Augsburg had the following claims outstanding in
Antwerp in 1545:
1 Brussels, Chambres de Camptes, No. 110.
Bymer, Foedera, ed. 1704, XV, 101.
Sousa, Anwtee deetreiDont Joao III, ed. Hwmlano, p. 408 ft.
ANTWBEP 269
8,648.4.2 L City of Antwerp.
3,150 L King of Portugal.
13,929 .6 .3 L Bonds of the Receivers General.
12,600 L Gaspar Ducci, interest in Fugger loan.
1,646. 5 L Various.
This amounts to a total of 39,973.15.5 L FL, or in round numbers
240,000 L of 40 gr.
The Fugger had the following claims outstanding in Antwerp in 1546:
21,746 . 13 L City of Antwerp.
30,739. 11. 8 L Brussels Court.
6,000 L King of Portugal.
83,900 L King of England.
44,000 L Gaspar Ducci, interest on bonds of Receivers General.
These sums amount to 186,386.4.8 L Fl., or in round figures
1,118,000 L of 40 gr. This gives some idea of the sums which the South
German merchants taken by themselves invested in Antwerp. Some of
this money of course was borrowed in Antwerp. For instance, the
Fugger borrowed as follows:
14,570 . 12 . 6 L from Pamas fair, 1546, to Christmas fair, 1547, at 2J per
cent. (=9 per cent, per annum), from Sebastian
Neidhart.
12,600 L from Pamas fair till Easter fair, at 5 per cent. ( = 10 per
cent, per annum), from Barth. Welser & Co.
4,090 L from Pamas till Christmas fair, at 2J per cent. ( = 9 per
cent, per annum), from Anton Haug and kinsmen.
6,544 L from Pamas till Christmas fair, at 2J per cent., from
Ludwig Ligsalz.
6,201 L for two fairs, at 4 J per cent. ( = 9 per cent, per annum),
from Count van Dale.
8,170 L for one fair at 2 J per cent. ( = 8J per cent, per annum),
from Geronimo Diodati.
2,385 L for one fair, at 2 per cent., from Erasmus Schetz.
And so forth, m a ldng a total for 35 entries of 110,234 L Fl. or
661,404 L at 40 gr.
This money cost the Fugger on an average 8 per cent, to 10 per cent,
per annum, while on their side they received 12 per cent, on the bonds
of the Receivers General, 13 per cent, on the debt of the English King,
13 per cent, on that of the Brussels Court, and 11 per cent, on that of
the King of Portugal.
It appears that the Fugger regarded the interest paid by the King of
England as high, for they asked their agent not to tell Ducci how high
it was. The bonds of the Receivers General fell into discredit at the
270 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Pamas fair, partly because no interest was paid and partly on account
of the onset of the war of Schmalkalden. No one would have them and
money generally was easy. Even now, however, the Government bor-
rowed through Ducci large amounts at 11 per cent, to 13 per cent.
The next few years up to and including 1551 saw little change in these
conditions. The princes continued to borrow largely, but on the whole
the interest showed a downward tendency. In 1549, however, William
Dansell, the English Crown agent, borrowed at 13 per cent., and said
he could raise another 100,000 L Fl. at 14 per cent. 1 He said emphatic-
ally that this was not excessive as the Emperor paid 15 per cent, to 18
per cent. This, however, was incorrect, for we see from the Netherlands
Finance Accounts that the Government only paid 10 per cent., and even
9 per cent, on small amounts which were offered to it.
This is confirmed by the interesting instructions given in June, 1549,
by the Imhofs in Nuremberg to their Antwerp agent. All this shows
how intensely at this period the South German business houses wished
to invest their capital in financial transactions, and that they were
quite content with 10 per cent, per annum.
Dansell was a clumsy agent, and the interest he paid for what he
borrowed on the Crown account in Antwerp was therefore unduly high.
The Privy Council knew better and recommended him not to pay more
than 12 per cent. Lazarus Tucher in fact declared his readiness to lend
22,500 L FL at this rate, but the agent was to take payment in kind, a
losing game. On loans in money he was asked to pay 13 per cent, as
before, and he offered 12 J per cent, without success. The unfavourable
treatment accorded to the English Crown by the Antwerp financiers
had become such a settled habit that Gresham had the greatest
trouble in getting better conditions by his skilful management of
the market. 8
The higher interest paid at this time by the French and English Kings
naturally made it harder for the Emperor to get the money he required.
The Government accordingly tried to carry out in all stringency the
long-standing prohibition on the export of specie, e.g. Lazarus Tucher,
who was the most intimately acquainted with the Brussels Court, re-
fused decidedly to help the English agent to export ready money.
Dansell succeeded, however, in secretly sending away large sums at his
own risk. The merchants' preference for paying him in kind was, how-
ever, stimulated by the prohibition. Gaspar Ducci, less scrupulous than
Lazarus Tucher, carried on exchange dealings with Lyons, whereby he
managed to create artificial tightness of the market, sometimes in Lyons
1 Tnmbnll, Calendar, Edward VI, No. 137.
Turnbull, Lo. NOB. 139, 142, 146, 148, 160, 153, 166, 161, 162, 164, 172, 184,
193, 198-9, 207.
ANTWERP 271
and sometimes in Antwerp, in order to get more for his money in either
market. This arrangement, however, came to grief in the end.
The development of the Antwerp money market after 1522 unques-
tionably owes much to Ducci, who succeeded by his sly and daring
financial expedients in attracting money from all sides. To a far greater
degree than Lazarus Tucher he is the first representative of a class of
financier which has become increasing familiar.
Already at this time in the Antwerp money market small syndicates
had begvin to be formed. We know already the Ducci-Seiler-Neidhart-
Grimel-Pecori syndicate. This, however, was, properly speaking, a com-
mercial undertaking: what we mean here is something different. The
Fugger had for a long time past granted other business houses an in-
terest in their financial undertakings. This system was further developed
in the period 154SS-51. The Fugger granted the Haug an interest,
and the Haug did the same to yet other merchants, e.g. in 1549 the
Haug had outstanding in Antwerp:
4,503 L lent to the Eeceiver General, Jan van Koden. Wolff
Poschinger was interested in this and also in:
2,500 L claim against the Eeceiver General Jan Partnol.
20,400 L lent to the city of Antwerp.
14,489 L lent to the Queen Eegent.
The Ligsalz were interested in both these last loans.
As the Imhof then wished to invest money, their Antwerp agent
applied to Ducci, Poschinger, Kaltenhofer, the Welser, etc.
Perhaps it would be more accurate not to speak of syndicates in all
these cases. A syndicate was frequently formed, but still more fre-
quently the interest only came about because there were no divided
bonds in round numbers, so that in a financial operation in which several
persons were interested only the largest holder held the bond and then
issued declarations of trust to the rest. Generally speaking, there were
seldom such large syndicates in Antwerp as in Lyons; for there all
financial dealings were concentrated on the loans of the French Crown,
while in Antwerp the business was distributed among many different
kinds of loans.
Though at this period the merchants and other capitalists began to
crowd into the finance business, yet so far not to an excessive or un-
healthy extent. Foresight and caution still prevailed in many quarters,
and many groups still remained without the dangerous inclination to
participate in finance, while certain of the greatest business houses,
notably the Fugger, had the intention of withdrawing from this business.
Many firms of the second rank, however, had of late made much money
with little trouble in financial dealings, and these took good care that
272 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
this inclination reached an ever widening circle, as soon as new calls of
an extraordinary sort were made in the money market.
The Period from 1551 to 1557. The state of the Netherlands finances
was again quite satisfactory by 1551. There was no extraordinary ex-
penditure and the floating debts were either repaid or shortly to be so.
The budget showed a surplus of 173,500 L (at 40 gr.), available for
fortifications, arrears of soldiers' pay, etc. The outbreak of the war with
France and the rebellion of the Elector Maurice of Saxony altered all
this.
In the Pamas fair of 1551, the quarter day of which fell in November,
445,900 L of the bonds of the Eeceivers General fell due for payment.
The sums destined for this purpose had, however, to be used for the war,
and another 554,000 L had to be borrowed, so that Caspar Schetz, who
was now financial agent of the Brussels Court, had to borrow in all a
million pounds (at 40 gr.) or Carolus gulden. He resold bonds of the
Eeceivers General at 12 per cent, and so was able to satisfy the most
pressing needs. Money was, however, so tight during the fair that
Alexius Grimel, who had also promised the Government 300,000 L, was
unable to keep his word. With great trouble he got together 246,228 L,
obtaining 128,000 L from the Afiaitadi, 70,000 L from Martin Lopez,
30,000 L from Christopher Welser, etc. Grimel had to give the Govern-
ment bonds on these firms, since ready money was unobtainable. The
rate, however, did not rise above 12 per cent, per annum.
At the Easter fair, 1552, a loan of 255,000 Carolus gulden at
12 per cent, was borrowed from the Fugger through Gaspar Schetz.
On the other hand, Thomas Gresham, the newly appointed agent of the
English Crown, in February, 1552, had to pay Lazarus Tucher 14 per
cent, on a loan of 14,000 L Fl. ( = 84,000 Carolus gulden). He must have
borrowed other money in addition, for in April he repaid the Fugger
77,500 L Fl. (=465,000 Carolus gulden), and in the whole period
from 1st March to 27th July 106,300 L (= 637,800 Carolus gulden),
none of which he brought with him from England. A debt of 44,000 L
owing to the Fugger and one of 12,000 L to the Schetz, a total of
66,000 L FL (= 336,000 Carolus gulden), had to be prolonged at 14
per cent, till the pay day of the Whitsun fair in August. 1
Meanwhile the Netherlands Government was also forced to pay
higher rates; but even at 13 per cent, and 14 per cent, it could only raise
small amounts in May. At the beginning of April the Queen Regent
had entreated the Emperor to send from Spain some of the rich supply
of American silver which had just arrived there. The permission was
given, but the Government had no money to equip the fleet which was
to fetch the silver. The city of Antwerp now came forward. It bor-
iBurgon,I,.80fi.
ANTWERP 273
rowed the necessary sums, mostly at 13 per cent, ot 14 per cent., from
the merchants, who themselves wished to import large sums by means of
the fleet, and were therefore some of them disposed to assist at low
interest. One of them, Joos van den Steene, even advanced 50,000
Carolus gulden without interest. The arrival of the fleet was delayed,
however, and in the autumn market little money was to be had for 14
per cent. 1 The Netherlands Government accordingly, in 1552, only paid
in interest 141,300 Carolus gulden and this mostly on loans contracted
outside Antwerp, chiefly by the Emperor in South Germany. This was
less than had been paid in 1542. In this year the Government had the
extraordinary demand for money chiefly by selling annuities. In 1551
about 23,000 Carolus gulden worth of annuities on the provinces of
Flanders, Brabant, Holland, etc., at 4-6 per cent, were sold and a capital
of about 310,000 fl. was raised.
In 1552, on the other hand, the sales were :
for war expenditure 94,600 fl. annuities at 8 per cent, to 10 per cent,
for repayment of float-
ing debt 79,000 fl. 6 per cent.
amounting to a total 173,600 fl.
a yield in capital of 2 million Carolus gulden. 2 These sales of annuities,
however, had nothing to do with the financial transactions of the
Government on the Antwerp Bourse, as is testified by the difference in
the rates. In the sale of annuities, the personal credit of the Emperor,
the Queen Eegent and the Netherlands Receivers General did not come
in, while it was the decisive factor in the Antwerp dealings. This per-
sonal credit was then at a low ebb, a circumstance largely attributable
to the Emperor's ill-starred policy and also the ruinous system of
financial management introduced by Erasso.
The Antwerp money market could easily have let the Government
have the money, as it proved by its treatment of the English Crown,
whose new agent had contrived by his skilful and honest management
greatly to improve his King's credit. s Gresham had endeavoured at the
Whitsun fair to induce the Fugger and the Schetz to consent to a further
prolongation of their claims, which amounted to 56,000 L Fl. He was
unsuccessful in this and went home to report to the Government. He
was ordered to resume his efforts and in particular to tell the Fugger that
the King would gladly have paid his debt on maturity, 'but in this
troublesome time of the world, it behoved his Majesty to so consider
* Brussels, Chambres des Comptes, No. 23469 and 23470.
Brussels, Chambres des Comptes, No. 434.
274 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
his estates that for divers great and weighty considerations, his Majesty
otherwise is moved to employ the same money which was prepared for
their payment. And therefore his Majesty doubted not that the said
Fulkers will be content to think this consideration reasonable and not
forget the benefits and good bargains that they had had of the King's
Majesty, with good and true payments at all times made, and assure
themselves that were it not for weighty causes, his Majesty would not at
this time defer any such payment. Wherein his Majesty the rather
hopeth of this contentation, for that Antonio Fulker himself, beingherein
conferred with by his Majesty's Ambassador with the Emperor, seemed
ready to gratify his Majesty, not only in this matter, but also a greater.'
Gresham was but little edified by this commission. On his return to
Antwerp on the 20th August, the day when the claims of the Fugger
and the Schetz should have been met, he wrote to the Duke of North-
umberland, who then had the greatest influence on the King's Council:
'For that yt shall be no small grief unto me, that in my tyme, being his
Majesty's agent, anny merchant strangers shulld be forssid to forbear
their monny against their willes; wyche matter from hensforthe must be
otherwayse foreseen, or else in the end the disonnestye of this matter
shall hereafter be wholly layde upon my necke, yff any thinge shuld
chance of your Grace, or my Lord of Fendbrocke, otherwise than well;
for we be all mortal. To be playne with your Grace in this matter
according to my bowndyd dewtye, veryly if there be not some other
ways takynne for the payment of his Majesty's detts, but to force men
from tyme to tyme to prolong yt, I say to you the end thereof shall
neyther be honnorable nor profitable to his Highness. In consideracyone
whereof, if there be none other ways takynne forthwith, this ys to most
humbly beseche your Grace that I may be dischargyd of this offyce of
Agentshipe. For otherwise I see in the end I shall reserve shame and
discredit thereby, to my utter undoing forever: wyche ys the smallest
matter of all, so that the King's Majesty's honour and creditt be not
spotted therebye, and specially in a strange country; whereas at this
present his credit is better than the Emperor's. For now the Emperor
geveth rvi per cent., and yet no monny to be gotten.'
Gresham had raised some of the money with which he had paid some
of the King's debts in his own name and credit, for otherwise he could
not have obtained it. He had, moreover, begun to break the habit intro-
duced by his predecessors of taking in payment at each prolongation of
the debt jewels or other goods at exaggerated prices. He now proposed
a new method of raising the King's credit and paying the royal debts.
He proposed that the Government should put at his disposal in Lon-
don the sum of 1,200 a week; that he should daily sell bills for 200 on
London, using the proceeds for the payment of the King's debts. He
ANTWERP 275
hoped by this means to make the exchange more favourable to England.
The plan was sanctioned, but was shortly afterwards abandoned by the
Government. Gresham, however, succeeded in attaining his object by
other methods.
We cannot pursue this subject in detail here; it is sufficient to say
that before King Edward's death, in 1553, Gresham had paid all the
Crown debts and raised the exchange of sterling from 16 Sch. to 22 Sch.
He had in this way relieved the Treasury of an annual burden of interest
amounting to 40,000 , converted an export into an import in the case
of money, and so greatly improved the King's credit that he could ob-
tain any money he wanted. We have already reported his boast as to
this service and its political effects.
Gresham had a tendency to exaggerated self-praise. Thus he reports
that on the 12th April, 1553, his friend Lazarus Tucher had offered to
advance the King 200,000 fl. at 12 per cent., at which Gresham was the
more rejoiced as the Emperor had to pay 16 per cent. 1 Now, on the same
day the Emperor had sold to the Fugger 30,00 fl. of perpetual annuities
on the provinces of Brabant and Flanders in return for a capital pay-
ment of 300,000 fl.; the rate was, therefore, 10 per cent. It is possible,
however, that bonds of the Eeceivers General and other loans on the
bourse may have cost as much as 16 per cent. When, however, Gres-
ham writes four days later that the 100,000 ducats lent to the Emperor
on the 14th would not hist a month, and that he had neither money nor
credit, his statements were exaggerated. At the end of 1553 the Fugger
alone had claims on the Emperor on bonds of the Eeceivers General
amounting to 92,528 fl., or about 555,000 Carolus gulden, the interest
being usually 14 per cent., but sometimes 12 per cent. The Fugger at
this time borrowed money at 10 per cent, and lent it out again at 12 per
cent, to 14 per cent.
The fact remains, however, that the Emperor's credit was much
injured by the methods of Erasso and his associates, while that of the
English Crown improved through Gresham's skilled operating. Gres-
ham's merits were clearly shown when on Edward's death Mary had
him removed and replaced by Christopher Dauntsey, whose clumsy deal-
ings with Lazarus Tucher soon did great damage to the credit of the
English Crown. Dauntsey borrowed 200,000 Carolus gulden from
Tucher at 13 per cent., which became 14 per cent, owing to the condi-
tions of payment, while the market rate was only 10 per cent. (Novem-
ber, 1553), and Lazarus Tucher had obtained the money himself at this
rate. Gresham, recalled in haste to Antwerp, was justified in writing to
the Privy Council.
Turnbull, Calendar, Edward VI, Nos. 653 and 655.
276 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
We have a letter from Anton Fugger to his Antwerp agent Matthew
Oertel written a few weeks after Gresham's report. Anton Fugger ex-
presses astonishment that the English Queen was again wanting to
borrow at 13 per cent.: 'it is a great interest, if it be so.'
Gresham reported soon after that the tightness of the money market
was not solely due to Dauntsey's relatively unimportant transactions,
but was also due to the South German cities borrowing all the money
they could raise at 12 per cent., e.g. the city of Nuremberg did so
through the Imhof , for the war against the Margrave Albrecht Alci-
biades of Brandenburg, both in Antwerp and elsewhere.
In December, 1553, Gresham was ordered to raise in all haste
100,000 at 12 per cent, at most. He could not do this, and had to
report that there were indeed two persons ready to advance sums of
40,000-50,000 Carolus gulden, but they were shameless enough 'to ask
15 per cent. He had offered 10 per cent, to 11 per cent., but had been
indignantly asked whether he thought that they did not know of the
affair with Lazarus Tucher and whether their money was not as good as
his. The financiers had agreed among themselves not to lend under 13
per cent. Only Art van Dale and Christopher Pruen had offered 16,000
at 6 per cent, for six months, but at that time he had no authority
to borrow for a shorter period than a year. Meanwhile he had received
the authority, but the Emperor's borrowing had made money tighter.
' . . . This Bourse of Antwerp is strange - one day there is plenty of
money and the next none - because there are so many good takers and
deliverers, that if one will not, another will. Fugger and Jasper Schetz
are bare of money, and no good can be done with them at present, as
the Emperor owes about 300,000 /. . . .' l
There are several contradictions here, to be attributed to a misunder-
standing. Gresham could not give as a reason for the sudden fluctuations
in the supply of money the presence of so many sound borrowers and
lenders. Their presence would make the supply more constant. It was not
because, but in spite of this fact the supply fluctuated at this disturbed
time, and this must have seemed 'strange' to one who knew the Antwerp
market as Gresham did. Gresham wrote soon after that he would not
rest till the credit of the English Crown was as good as in the last days of
King Edward. Shortly after he had to borrow 120,000 Carolus fl. at 13
per cent, from the Schetz, the Ligsalz, and the Fleckhamer; but early
in January he was able to get 50,000 fl. from the Diodati at 12 per cent.
It is interesting that at first Gresham had difficulty in getting from
the merchants the sums they had promised, because the Queen's pro-
missory notes still bore the late King's seal. Gresham had accordingly
to add his own signature to the bond for the money advanced by the
> Turnbull, Calendar, Queen Mary, No. 104.
ANTWEBP 277
Ligsalz, and had to promise to produce either a promissory note provided
with the Queen's seal or else a certificate signed by the Queen and the
Privy Council to confirm the legality of the old seal. This difficulty
raised by the German merchants was removed, when the Italians de-
clined to pay over their advance on account of a rumoured rebellion in
England. This also prevented Gresham from obtaining money else-
where; and it was only on the news of the suppression of the rebellion
that the Queen's credit rose again. At the time of Gresham's departure
from Antwerp at the end of February, 1554, it had not entirely re-
covered from the shock it had received six months before. Some
months later Mary married Philip of Spain. This event, even before
it actually took place, notably affected the money market and the
financial transactions of the English Crown and the Emperor.
The Antwerp money market, as we have seen, had at this time be-
come increasingly dependent on the import of Spanish-American silver.
Most large financiers, especially the South Germans and the Genoese,
were so deeply engaged in Spain that they would take on no further
business unless by this means they could get some of their Spanish
holdings in the form of ready money. The Spanish people pursued with
fanatical hatred those who sent money out of the country, and the
Emperor had to bear in mind this temper, which was a chief reason of
the great rebellion of the Comuneros. The financial policy initiated
since the time of the Schmalkaldian League by the help of his Spanish
secretary Erasso was chiefly directed to prevent Spanish finances from
being overstrained for the benefit of other countries. Since the days of
Villach, however, this end had proved unattainable, and claims on the
'Indian gold and silver' were the favourite method for the repayment of
the Emperor's loans. Under these circumstances the ban on the export
of money was untenable, and we know that since 1552 very large sums
had been sent both by the Government and the merchants from Spain
to the Netherlands and Italy. On the betrothal of the English Queen
to the Spanish Heir Apparent, the finances of both countries were to a
certain extent pooled, with the result that the English Crown was
allowed to draw ready money from Spain.
Already in January, 1554, this had been suggested to Gresham by the
Genoese, who hoped in this way to reduce their Spanish holdings. The
arrangement was, however, only concluded in May, immediately before
the marriage. We know that the Fugger were also interested in the
affair as well as the Genoese, and that Gresham travelled to Spain to
fetch the money. 1 He found there indescribable tightness of money and
his measures resulted in the immediate bankruptcy of one of the oldest
banking firms in Seville. 'I fere,' he wrote, 'that I shall be the occasione
Ct Burgon, I, 149 ft; Turobull, Queen Mary, Nos. 135. 206 fi.
278 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
that they should play all bank-rowte.' If such were the plight of Spain,
what could Antwerp expect from it ? How was money to be raised for
the war with France which broke out again in 1555?
In March of that year, the French King concluded in Lyons a loan on
so large a scale that it was known as 'Le Grand Parti.' This was a great
threat to the Emperor, akeady weary both of war and Government.
His credit was, however, insufficient even to secure the prolongation of
the maturing debts - 500,000 ducats' worth of these were due at the
Easter fair, and the merchants would only consent to their prolongation
on condition that King Philip, then only King of England, should add
his signature to the promissory notes and would promise to have pay-
ment made, not in Spain as was originally arranged, but in Antwerp.
If the statement is correct that the ducat was here taken at 80 gr.
Flemish, while in ordinary exchange it was only worth 60 gr., the
Emperor had indeed to pay heavily for the prolongation of these bills. 1
There was at this time great tightness at Antwerp; even at 3 per cent,
a quarter there was no money to be had on 'deposito.' There was a
rumour of the impending arrival of a fleet from Seville and the Canary
Isles, which was to bring specie, but little credence was given to this.
Erasso arrived in April, but though he now acted for the English King
in Ms negotiations with the merchants for a loan, he only succeeded in
getting 300,000 crowns in return for pledging the Netherlands customs
on alum. Nothing was to be got without special security.
In the following months there were several other loans of about the
same amount; in June 300,000 crowns for the daily expenses of the
Court, which for weeks had been without ready money to the indigna-
tion of all the purveyors. It appears that this loan cost over 25 per cent.,
and a previous loan not less. The merchants said that all the revenues
were pledged till 1557. The pooling of the Spanish Netherlands finances
with the English injured the English without benefiting the rest. 2
In August Erasso came once again to Antwerp. The Imperial troops
were in pressing need of money, but nowhere loans could be raised,
and the payment had to be compulsorily deferred for a month. Mean-
while the hope was that a fleet would arrive from Spain with specie.
The market rate stood at about 12 per cent. The English Crown owed in
Antwerp, apart from the King's personal debts, 148,256 L Fl. 38,000 L
of this amount was paid at the Pamas fair by Gresham, who compelled
the English merchants to advance this amount in Antwerp against
repayment in London. In the prevailing scarcity of money' the mer-
chants took this very hard. Gresham managed, however, to bring about
a momentary improvement in the English exchange, and the credit of
1 R. Brown, Calendar, VI, p. 26.
'Brown, VI, pp. 48, 99, 107.
ANTWEBP 279
the English Crown. The payment of 38,000 L of debt was regarded as a
'Royal payment' and reported everywhere. 1 Gresham applied the pro-
cess which he had thus tried several times afterwards. But he had once
more to borrow large sums from the foreign merchants at 14 per cent.
The Queen in the autumn of 1556 resorted to the old expedient of a
forced loan at home and obtained a considerable sum at the cost of
a large increase of unpopularity. 8
Meanwhile Charles had abdicated in favour of his son, who came in
for a crushing load of debt and a war with France which continued to
become more intense. Philip succeeded in the two first years of his reign
in raising the enormous sums necessary for the war and the payment of
the interest on the old debts, but only by overburdening his countries
and overstraining his credit on a scale such as the world had never seen.
It is quite impossible to give a complete picture of the far-fetched
methods of Philip's financial policy in these years. We shall deal with
it later, meanwhile we only give some data in reference to financial
transactions in Antwerp.
The Netherlands finance administration, which in 1552 spent only
141,300 L of 40 gr. for interest and other expenditure in connection
with the floating debt, had to pay on this account:
In 1554 285,982 L
In 1555 424,765 L
In 1556 1,357,287 L
In view of this gigantic increase in the floating debt it is all the more
remarkable that the average rate of interest did not rise, but throughout
this period varied between 12 per cent, and 14 per cent. It is stated,
however, that the King had to pay as much as 24 per cent, in Antwerp. 8
In this instance, however, special transactions were in question,
e.g. Asientos for Spain, where the money famine had reached its peak.
The merchants, who could not withdraw their large holdings from Spain,
tried to avoid increasing them; and if the King forced them to provide
new advances for Spain they repaid themselves for the risk by corre-
spondingly high exchange rates. In his extremity the King had on
occasions to consent to take goods in payment at exaggerated prices, a
proceeding which would result in an interest rate of 23 per cent, to 24
per cent. In the same month, however, when such a transaction is
reported (April, 1556) the Fugger in Antwerp took over 1J million of
Carolus gulden worth of bonds of the Eeceivers General which paid
interest at 12 per cent.
iTurnbull, No. 429-30; Brown, VI, 213; Burgon, 1, 182 fi.
Brown, VI, 588, 623, 1057; Burgon, I, 192; Tornbull, No. 474.
Turnbull, Calendar, VI, 421; AlWri, Rdaz., VIII, 297.
280 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
As we have said, everybody was affected by the credit boom, and
every one wanted to share in financial operations which promised such
profits for so little trouble. Even the great business houses like the
Fugger, in spite of their experience and their serious desire to withdraw
from risky business, gave way to the general tendency and thereby
It was only in the spring of 1557 that the Antwerp Bourse, which had
seemed an inexhaustible source, at any rate as far as direct loans were
concerned, first failed the Government. The city of Antwerp, however,
which was then in reality a financial agency of the Government, at
whose disposal the city's credit had to be put without reserve, managed
to borrow large sums on the bourse at 12 per cent, to 13 per cent.; for the
city's bonds were generally considered a good investment and the market
rate in general was only Jl per cent, to 11J per cent.
Anton Fugger himself wrote to his Antwerp agent: 'I have learnt that
the Christmas payment is to be prolonged till Easter, and that the city
of Antwerp will thus help itself out; since one can do no otherwise and
there is no harm in it, I must let it be.' This shows how little the true
relation between the Netherlands Government and the city of Antwerp
was evident even to the greatest financier of his time, in his old age. The
city at any rate proved the more solvent of the two. The Government
ceased payment in August, 1557; but the city continued to pay, though
only because its credit then still continued good, and only sank very grad-
ually. In point of fact the city was already at this time overburdened
by tiie debt which it had contracted in the service of the Government.
It is impossible even to give a rough estimate of the number of
millions of floating debt, whether direct or indirect, on which the Nether-
lands Government had to pay interest in Antwerp. The total amount of
financial transactions concluded on the Antwerp Bourse in the course
of a year was estimated in 1557 by a Venetian envoy at 40 million
ducats or crowns. 1 This figure is, however, only meant to give a rough
idea of the importance which Antwerp had attained as a money market.
Thirty or forty years earlier floating loans of the Netherlands Govern-
ment amounting to 100,000 to 200,000 Carolus gulden had been
sufficient to drive up the rate of interest from 13 per cent, to 27 per cent.,
even though the Government was easily in a position to repay their
borrowing very soon. Now the Antwerp Bourse lent not to the Nether-
lands Government alone, but to the Governments of Spain, England
and Portugal also, year in and year out, many millions which these
Governments could never repay. Yet the interest never rose much
over 13 per cent. This is the effect of stock exchange methods even
in their infancy on the management of credit.
CHAPTER 2
LYONS
'T^HE Rise of Lyons. The rise of Lyons was to a far greater extent
* than the rise of the International Bourse at Antwerp, the conscious
and carefully tended creation of the rulers of the country. After the old
fairs of Champagne had fallen into disuse in the first half of the four-
teenth century, France was without a trading centre of international
importance. Geneva, meanwhile, had- become important with its fairs,
and, thanks to the peace and freedom enjoyed by foreign merchants
there, that city was for long relatively as important a trade centre for
Italy, France and South Germany as Bruges was for traffic with the
Northern European peoples and those of the Mediterranean. Notably,
it is stated by various authorities that the Geneva fairs were specially
important to the Florentines' trade in money and precious metals. 1
As early as 1419-20 and 1443-44 the King of France, Charles VII
(in 1419-20 still Dauphin), had tried to attract the Geneva fairs to
Lyons by the grant of large privileges, especially the decontrol of the
trade in money and precious metals, rigidly controlled everywhere else
in France. The attempt was unsuccessful, though the T^ing confirmed
the privileges in 1445, 1454, 1457 and 1461. At last, Louis XI was more
successful. On the 20th October, 1462, he forbade all merchants to visit
the Geneva fairs, and was able to induce their natural protector, the
Duke of Savoy, to join in this prohibition, as he was on bad terms with
Geneva. The Duke bitterly repented this later, as the decline of the
fair thus engineered did him great damage. 2
The year 1463 was the real date of the birth of the Lyons fairs, which
rose very rapidly after that time. The King gave them all the privileges
of the Geneva fairs. For several decades, indeed, the two were rivals;
but in spite of all the efforts of Geneva, soon abetted by the Duke of
Savoy, large international business tended increasingly to go to Lyons,
both for trade in commodities and more especially for dealing in money.
Louis XI was one of the earliest of mercantilist politicians. The chief
economic reason advanced by him in his Ordomnamce of 20th October,
1462, against the Geneva fairs was the fact 'that French gold and silver
are daily exported thither.' This was perfectly true. The Florentine
1 For decay of the Champagne fairs see Bourquelot, Etudes star lea Foirea de
Champagne (Mem. de 1'Acad. des. Insoript. et Belles Lettree, 2 ser. t. 5), voL H,
301 ff., esp. Coustumes des foires (Lc. II, 367); Hohlbaum, flans. Urk.-Buch, HI,
455; Lefevre, Lea finances de la Champagne, p. 38; Borel, Lea foires de Geneve an
15 siecle, 1892, p. 8). For Florentines in Geneva cf. Borel, Lc. p. 106 ff., 134 ff.
and passim.
' Borel, Lo., pp. 13 and onwards. Penoand, Notes el Documents pour eervir Al'Ms-
toire de Lyon, s.a. 1485. A Genoese Chronicle, Bistor, pair. num. Scriptores, 1, 627.
282 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
money changers in particular did a feverish trade through Geneva in
French and other coins. They took the coins of full weight home with
them and had them recoined, putting the light coins again into circula-
German merchants in great masses to Geneva reached the Italian mints
without touching France.
It had already been realized that it was a great advantage for a prince
if there was a large trade in monetary capital in his dominions. In 1470,
when the city of Geneva appealed to the Duke of Savoy to support its
efforts to restore the fairs, it was represented that if the Duke needed
100,000 or 200,000 gulden, he could easily raise them in Geneva in three
or four days at fair time, while, as things were, he had to have recourse
to Lyons, which was both troublesome and risky. If the fairs were
brought back to Geneva, money would flow in from all sides; if they
were held out of the country, they drew the money with them, and
nothing remained in the country except a little customs on goods in
transit. Moreover, when in 1485 two of the Lyons fairs were temporarily
transferred to Bourges, the city of Lyons supported its appeal for their
return with the same reasons. 1
Undoubtedly this was a chief reason of the steady support which
Louis XI and his successors gave to the Lyons fairs. For example, a
special commercial Court of Justice, the first in France, was introduced
for the fairs, and those who failed to recognize its jurisdiction were
severely dealt with. Finally, in 1538, exemption from taxation was
granted to foreigners, especially those from Florence and Lucca who did
not marry in Lyons and acquire land there. This connection is still more
plainly evident in 1550, when the King increased the privileges of the
fairs 'on account of the profit which he derived daily from the great
dealings in money transacted at the fairs in Lyons.' 2
The Importance of Lyons in general. The expectations of the French
Crown in regard to the Lyons fairs were more than fulfilled. Even if the
trade in commodities could not compare with that of Antwerp, it was
yet in the traffic between France, on the one side, and South Germany on
the other, sufficiently ample and many sided. 8 The creation of the fairs
rendered Lyons vastly more important for the French Crown. What
Lyons meant for the Crown, either in a political, military or financial
sense, in the century from 1463 to 1562 cannot be rated too highly.
* Galiffe, Materiaux pour I'hiaiorie de Geneve, I, 382; P<5ricaud, lo.
' Cf. Privileges des Foires de Lyon (1649); Vaesen, La Jurisdiction Commercial*.
& Lyon sous I'Ancien Regime (M6m. de la Soc. Ldtt. de Lyon, 1877). Lettres de
Louis XI, ed. Vaeeen et Charavay, II, 203, Actes de Francois I, t. in, 10560,
10695, 10723; IV, 13020, 13790; Rubys, Hietoire de Lyon, p. 376.
"Nicolay, Deseript. de la vitte de Lyon (1673), pubL by la Soo. dS Topogr,
histor. deLyon, 1881, p. 159 ff.
LYONS 283
Lyons became above all the centre of the large and delicate web of
political relations between France and Italy. It became the focus of the
news service for all Europe. In Lyons the Swiss Cantons, without whose
troops France could not carry on her wars, received their payments.
Lyons was the great recruiting ground for the French Kings' warlike ex-
peditions into Italy. Often these Kings themselves lived in Lyons, the
second capital of France. Lyons also was the channel through which
the greatest influences of the Florentine renaissance reached France.
The chief root of all these effects was not in the trade in goods, but in
the traffic in money and bills. All the French Kings since Louis XI had
directed their efforts to the increase of this traffic. On this account they
granted Lyons unlimited freedom of exchange, including re-exchange
and lending at interest which were elsewhere prohibited. Only the
English, as hereditary enemies, were excluded from this permission.
Bill business with Rome was also forbidden: a restriction attributable to
the complaints of Parliament as to the export of money on account of
the Papal Curia. All exchange transactions settled at Lyons were sub-
ject to the strict exchange law, and for the fairs every form of currency
was granted free circulation. 1
These measures succeeded so greatly in increasing the traffic in money
and bills that Andrea Navagero could say in 1528: 'In the four fairs at
Lyons an infinite number of payments are made on every side, so that
they form the basis of the circulation of the whole of Italy and a
large part of Spain and the Netherlands. Herein lies their use for
We should add that this was also the immediate cause of the advan-
tage which the French Crown derived from the fairs. Large masses of
liquid capital, for the time being free, were attracted to Lyons, so that
the French Crown could capture an increasing quantity of these by
offering higher interest. When this habit was once established, it served
as a bait for other capital lying idle outside Lyons and which was pro-
ducing less interest than the French loans.
The great importance of Lyons for the finances of the French Crown
was soon recognized by its opponents, as is shown by the fact that before
1513 the opponents of the French Crown had tried to induce the Papal
Curia to take steps against the Lyons fairs. This is proved by a petition
which the Emperor's envoys in Home brought before the new Pope,
Adrian VI, either at the end of 1522 or the beginning of 1523. The text
l Fair privileges of 1462, cap. 2, 8, 7, 8 (Ordinances dea roia de France, XV,
646). Cf. Ordinances, XV, 204 ff.; Le Glay, Histoirede Louis XI, voL I, 291 &.,
327 ff.; Ficot, Histoire des Etots Generaux, 1, 511 ff. Cf. Journal des Stats Gmeraux
de 1484 red. par Massdin, p. 699; Monfaloon, Histoire monumentale de Lyon, I,
347; Pfaicaud, Notes et documents, a. 1485.
> Relaz. d. Ambasc. Venet., ed. Tommaseo, 1, 36.
284 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
of this interesting effort is as follows: 1 'The Emperor says that both
Pope Julius and latterly Pope Leo (1513-21) sanctioned the restoration
of the fairs from Lyons to Geneva, where they were aforetime. The
Cardinal Medici (later Clement VII) is perfectly informed on this point.
The execution of this permission would be most advantageous both to
His Holiness and to His Ma j esty. For if the trade of the merchants, who
are for the most part subjects of the Church and the Emperor, is once
more set free, this will diminish the strength of the King of France, as
in that case that trade (at Lyons) ceases.'
The obstinate efforts of Charles V to stop the Lyons fairs resulted
finally in the founding of the Genoese bill fairs - an important con-
sequence.
Fairs and Bourse in Lyons. Lyons also had four fairs: the Foire
d' Apparition des Kois in January, the Foire des Paques in April, the
Foire d'Aout in August, and the Foire des Toussaints in November.
Each fair lasted fifteen days; only the South German merchants had a
further fifteen days of liberty and the Swiss ten days. Generally speak-
ing, the Lyons fairs kept their full mediaeval significance longer than the
Antwerp fairs; it was relatively late before they sank into mere quarter
days; but for the Italians the money and bill transactions which fol-
lowed the commodity fair had from early times been the principal thing.
Except at fair-time money, even in Lyons, was hard to come by. In
Lyons business in money and bills had a peculiar form based on the
older institutions of the Champagne and Geneva fairs. 2
The settling days of the fair had from the first formed a separate
period longer than the fair itself. At the beginning this was two or
three weeks; later fiscal reasons caused its undue prolongation as in
Antwerp; finally, its length was fixed by municipal regulations at a
month.
Before the merchants attended the fair they entered in their 'market
book' (Italian Scartafacdo) all the payments due from or to them in the
fair. At the beginning of the fair payments these books were compared
with one another. In the case of every entry found correct the person
from whom the payment was due made a mark which was taken as a
binding recognition of the debt; later he had to sign his whole name.
The bill - for, generally speaking, there was no question of anything but
bills - was accepted in this way. If an item was not recognized, the
owner of the book wrote by it 'S.P.' (sous protest).
After the acceptances of the old bills there followed the new business
> Gachard, Correspandance de Charles V et d' Adrian VI, Preface CV.
Ct Meder, Handettmeh, Nurttberg, 1668, BL 63; Nicolay, Lo. p. 150 ff. (1673);
Pericaud, Notes et documents, s.a. 1676; Bubys, Histoire de Lyon (1604), p. 496;
Roberts, Merchants Mop of Commerce (1638), cap. 303.
LYONS 285
with foreign markets, which originated either at the preceding fair or as
the result of the acceptance, or otherwise. Here we meet for the first
time a peculiar arrangement, the settlement of an official average price
for each species of bill, the so-called Conto. This arrangement, the
origin of which is not clear, is first mentioned by the Florentine cleric
Buoninsegni. 1
He distinguishes between real trade bills (solo per commodo delle mer-
canzie) and speculative or loan bills (con oggetto di guadagno, per arte
senza oggetto di mercatura). At first he thinks only the first sort existed
and thus the price fluctuated very little. This, however, had lately
altered, and now most bills were purely speculative or loan bills. Abuses
had crept in in this connection. Skilful operators had tried successfully
to settle the price of bills arbitrarily, and they had accordingly formed
syndicates and had artificially tightened the supply of money and so
managed to get control of the price of bills. In order to obviate such
practices and the consequent disputes as to the true and just price, the
bill dealers had decided to fix average rates for bills as soon as bills
began to be dealt in at each fair, so that foreign business connections
could, if necessary, be referred to these rates.
The process is on the whole correctly stated here. At any rate, later,
in other fairs, these were the reasons for the institution of the Conto. In
Lyons this was done as follows: The bill dealers met on a certain day and
formed a circle (Faire la Ronde); the Consul of the Florentines then
asked the dealers of the different nations in turn what they thought the
price ought to be. The answers were noted and the average taken.
This was the official rate for bills, which was noted in the bulletins (Lauf
or Ldufzetteln; in Italian lAste) and sent abroad. The dealers themselves
were naturally not bound by this, their business was left to free bargain-
ing. Yet the Conto at the beginning had some meaning for the market
itself, as previously many transactions had been concluded at the aver-
age rate which had not yet been settled. Later on the proceedings were
altered in many particulars. The Prevot des Marchands of Lyons took
the place of the Florentine Consul, and the different rates were given in
writing. The Conto remained in existence, as an empty form, up to the
time of the French Revolution, but its practical importance had long
departed.
The payment proper closed the fair. It was affected chiefly by vire-
ment de parties, giro or soonfro, as follows: Two persons were commis-
sioned to collect and compare (scontriren) all the fair books. They then
cancelled the payments against one another, and only paid the balances
. iTrattatodeicambi,1573. Cf. e.g. Scwcia, l,Qu.5,No. 53 ff., l,Qu. 7,Par.2,
Amp! X, No. 101; De Turn, Qu. 1 , No. 30 ft.; Roberts, Merchants Map of Commerce,
301; Rubys, p. 498; Peri, II negotiant, I, c. 25.
286 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
in cash. 1 We note that one unit of account, the ecu de marc or scudo de
marce, was taken as the basis of all payments, and that the actual pay-
ments were made in a special currency, originally a pure gold currency,
but afterwards a mixed currency with a fixed relation between gold and
silver, only dissolved at the end of the fair. The total result is a peculiar
organization very modern in most of its chief features, the character-
istic product of the Latin commercial genius. The fair payments at
Lyons owe their form to the Florentines, a fact which is clearly shown by
the development of the Lyons Bourse. The Bourse took its name from
the business which was first and for long to the exclusion of all others
transacted in it; it was la Place du Change, or simply le Change. It was
a square near the Church of St. Eloi, near the single bridge which then
linked the different quarters of the city on either side of the Sa6ne. The
bridge still bears the name of the Font du Change and the square also
retains its name. In 1389 it was called the Place de la Draperie, a name
it kept for some time after the first institution of the fairs in 1419; at
that time the square on the other side of the bridge before the church of
St. Nizier was set apart for the money changers. The 'change' at St. Eloi
is mentioned in 1489, and probably it had been there since 1462. 2
The Consular house, the Loge of the Florentines, was here, and it was
originally the scene of the characteristic acts of the Lyons, fair pay-
ments, the acceptances, the settlement of the average price and the
clearing house operations. The historian de Rubys, writing in 1604,
adds to his account of these proceedings the statement that the Floren-
tines had introduced exchange dealing and therefore kept the lead in
this form of business as well as in the fair payments. This is true, but if
he means that it was introduced two hundred years before the fairs, this
cannot refer to Lyons, but to France as a whole. 3
When later the Florentines gradually disappeared from Lyons, the
leading place in the fair payments fell to the head of the Lyons mer-
chants, 'Prevot des Marchands. The Place du Change was provided in
the seventeenth century with a special Loge du Change, which since
1810 has been used as a Protestant Church.' 4
The organization of the Lyons system of payments has been much
admired, and was in fact a notable achievement for the times. The
1 Speech of Venetian Senator Contarini in 1584 in Latte's Liberia dette Banche a
Venezia, p. 121.
> Montfalcon, Hist. Monum. de. Lyon, 1, 462, 510. Registres Gonsvlaires de Lyon,
1416-23, ed. Guigne, I, 296. Clement, Jacques Cceur et Charles VII, t. II, 352.
* Rubys, Histoire de Lyon,, p. 496. Pericaud, Notes et documents (Henri HI),
p. 90, and Archives historiques et statistiyues du department du RMne.t. IX, 332.
Perioaud, Lo. p. 6, 94; Clerjon, Histoire de Lyon, VI, 148. (Arch, munitip.
de Lyon, Invent, gen, XVI, 396 fi.). Cf. Vaesen in d. Mem. de la 800. m. de
Lyon, 1877-8, p. 148.
LYONS 287
Spaniards, however, had a still more highly developed system, and at a
later time the Genoese equipped their fairs with a system of payments
which far outshone that of the Lyons fair.
Dealing in Capital in Lyons. In Lyons, like Antwerp, loans were
usually given the form of the deposits and the Ricorsa bill. The former
was the more prevalent in the heyday of the Lyons fairs, though the
Florentines still continued to use the Ricorsa as well. It was only after
the bull which Pope Kus V issued against it in 1570 that the deposito
was less often employed both at the Geneva fairs and at Lyons. 1
There is nothing special to note about the Lyons deposito, and we will
accordingly content ourselves with a few quotations from German com-
mercial letters, e.g. Vincenz Pirkheimer, an agent of the Tucher's, wrote
in 1531 from Lyons: 'At the last Easter fair a considerable sum of money
was left on our hands, because there was no special use for it. There
were no bills to be bought, which could have been resold on delivery,
which else would have come to pass. There are enough good Dittas that
lend money at 2-2| per cent, till the next fair, but not enough good
Dittas that want money.' Accordingly, he lent the money for two fairs
to the treasurer of the Duke of Savoy on the pledge of jewels, or rather,
he bought the jewels and 'of our grace we may let him redeem them at
the appointed time.' This brought in interest at 16 per cent. Soon after
he says: 'There is now no demand for money, and in exchange (au
change, i.e. on the Bourse) there is not more than 2 per cent, a quarter.'
This state of things continued, and in 1535 we hear, 'Money is not worth
more than If to 2 per cent, in Banqua.'
These were all bourse deposits, but this expression is first used in
1559. At that time the French merchants complained that every one
was now ceasing to deal in commodities in order to engage in bill and
deposit business, i.e. to commit usury. This Nbuvelle Fayon de Dep6ts,
they said, enriched few and impoverished many. 2 Soon after we note
the rate for deposits regularly stated at the end of the exchange bulletin.
The best account of the method of dealing with the Ricorsa bill at
Lyons is drawn from the treatise on bills of the Florentine merchant
Davanzati, who describes this business in the middle of the sixteenth
century on the basis of his own practice in Lyons: 3 'If thou (A) hast
money in Florence and wilt have exchange in Lyons, because thou
mayst have profit from the exchange back again, so give to me (B) who
need money, 64 scudi in Florence, if that be the exchange rate; against
i Nicolay,Z>e^p^<fetoBe<feIyon (1573 ed. 1881), p. 153. CL alfio Rubys,
p. 289; P&icaud, Notes et documents, Henri III, p. 113.
Arch, munidp. de Lyon H.H. IX, p. 629; undated, but probably of the period
1552-3.
288 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
this I promise to have a mark of gold paid in Lyons to Tommaso Sertini
(D). I give thee a bill on Salviati (C), thou sendest Mm to Tommaso (D)
so that he may cash it and deal with the re-exchange. The letter where-
in thou dost this is called the Advice or Spaccio. Tommaso (D) carried
out thy orders. He pays thy mark of gold in Lyons to Piero (E) and
receives from Hm a bill on Federigo in Florence (F) in accordance with
which he (Federigo) has to pay thee (A) 65| scudi in so many days.
Tommaso sends thee this re-exchange, and when it matures thou hast
made 1J scudi. Herein, however, thou hast to run the risk of three
failures, mine, Tommaso's and Piero's. Therefore must thou look with
Argus eyes at the firm to whom thou shouldst give the bill, him to whom
thou remittest it and him by whom this second man should have the re-
exchange drawn. Wherefore those who are not in business are wont to
give their money to a bank, which deals with the transaction for a
double charge: 2 per cent, for the trouble and 2 per cent, for the delcre-
dere for the quarter. The fees in Lyons (Consular fee, charges and
brokerage) amount to l per cent. A man who does not employ the
agency of a bank will, after deduction of the above fees, make on an
average 8 per cent. If a banker is employed, his fees 1 per cent, are also
to be deducted.'
These figures are, of course, only rough averages. In view of the
violent fluctuations in the price of bills, the Ricorsa in two acts as prac-
tised in Lyons was often very risky. Conditions in Lyons were similar
to those we have seen in Antwerp. Anyone playing for safety had to use
the deposito, and anyone not satisfied with the rates paid by sound
firms on the bourse (buone ditte) - mostly not more than 10 per cent. -
could lend money to the Crown, which usually paid 16 per cent. This
was the form of investment to which capital turned more and more.
The total of the Lyons traffic represented extraordinary sums at any
rate for the period. Even in 1573, when Lyons had passed its zenith by
more than ten years, Nicolay says: 'There is not a fair in Lyons, be it
never so poorly provided, but what millions of gold are dealt in on the
Bourse.' Even in 1638 the English merchant Roberts writes: 'I have seen
that in such wise (by clearing-house methods) in one morning payments
worth a million crowns are settled, without a pfennig of ready money
changing hands.'
The Beginnings of the French Crown Loams in Lyons. There is no ques-
tion of dealing in capital at Lyons before 1463. Even then, however, it
is a long time before we hear of large borrowing by the French Crown
from the merchants doing business at Lyons. Louis XI, throughout his
reign, usually met his extraordinary financial requirements by raising
forced loans without interest from his subjects. We hear only of small
interest-bearing loans at Lyons, e.g. in 1467 the King's officials, in order
LYONS 289
to pay for war material, borrowed money at the Lyons fair 'a perte et
interets.' This was unwelcome, and the King ordered the immediate
repayment of the loan. 1
Louis XI did not carry on expensive foreign wars. His successor,
Charles VIII, when in 1494 he was getting ready for his great expedi-
tion to Italy, had to borrow largely from the Genoese bank of the Sauli.
This was done at their Lyons factory, for Philippe de Commines reports
that the loan was ' de f oire en foire,' and cost 14 per cent, for each four
months. 8
In the subsequent period the Florentines are mentioned on several
occasions as lending money to the French Crown, always, however, in
small amounts. Charles VIII did not require to take large loans at in-
terest in Lyons because he had at his disposal a less costly source of
money in the subsidies and contributions of the Italian princes and
republics. His successor, Louis XII, was a careful manager. In 1512 he
tried to raise a forced loan from the foreign merchants doing business in
Lyons, but had to desist on their threatening to leave the city. He was
more successful with new forced loans from his own subjects. 3
It was only under the prodigal and warlike Francis I that the loans of
the French Crown in Lyons reached the grand scale. We know that in
1516 the Ki>g owed the Florentines in Lyons 300,000 ecus, and in 1529
600,000 ducats. About this time the 'Good German,' Hans Kleberg,
began to have dealings with the French Government, and the whole
development attracted great attention from the Hapsburgs, who tried
from the first with great pertinacity to deprive the French Crown of the
financial strength it derived from the Lyons fair.
A report of 1521 shows us the way the Crown managed its financial
dealings in Lyons at this time: 'The King sent lately from his Parliament
in Troyes the directors (Generaux) of his finances to Lyons, there to raise
money for his requirements. They are returned and have borrowed at
interest about 200,000 ecus from the bankers and merchants of Lyons.' 4
In his bill transactions with Italy, which were mostly advances, the
"King at this time already employed a permanent agent, Pier Spino, who
followed the Court; but in Lyons the Crown had then no permanent
representative.
The French Finance Administration had now got over its dislike of
loans at interest; but as we have seen the Florentines were not disposed
to lend the King all he required for his swollen expenditure on war costs
* Lettres de Louis XI, t. HI, p. 190.
* Memoirea de Philippe de Camynes, ed. Dupont, H, 292, 331.
Vaesen in M 6m. de la 8oc. Kit. de Lyon, 1877-8, p. 25; Segtstres des d&ibera-
tiaw du bureau de la viUe de Paris, 1. 1 (1499-1526), p. 204
*ibl. de VEcdU du chartes, XX, 372.
290 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
and personal luxury. What his thrifty mother gave him from time to
time or the many loans of the Pope and different Italian states, all dis-
appeared like drops on a hot stone. Down to 1522 the King's financial
straits are described in the strongest terms; in spite of all his boasting he
could never dream of keeping the promises with which he wished to buy
the Roman Crown. 1
At the crisis of his financial difficulties in 1522 the directors of finance,
who had travelled to Lyons for the purpose, managed to raise a fairly
large loan from the foreign merchants. The Strozzi contributed 31,000
ecus, the Guadagni 22,000 ecus, Hans Kleberg 17,087 ecus, etc. This is
perhaps the first loan which can be called a bourse loan. It was not,
however, carried through without compulsion; at any rate, shortly
before the property of the Florentines was confiscated at the order of the
Bang; while immediately after the loan they were granted new privi-
leges. 2 This same year, 1522, is to be considered the year which saw the
beginning of the French funded debt.
The money famine was now somewhat abated; but the King did not
keep his promises to the merchants, and this destroyed his credit. The
historian Guicciardini, who must have known, gives as one of the causes
of the slackness of the French war operations in 1526 that the King had
lost his credit with the Lyons merchants and could get little or no loans.
This situation remained unchanged in the following years, and finally
made the Peace of Cambrai necessary for the French. This peace en-
tailed heavy financial obligations on France. The ransoms of the King's
children amounted to 1,200,000 ecus; the power of the dynasty and the
loyalty and capacity to pay of French people were now strikingly illus-
trated, for the notables granted this enormous sum, which was then
compulsorily assessed as a loan and paid without too much grumbling. 8
In the period of peace which followed, only once is there any talk of
a large Crown loan in Lyons, and it is not certain whether it was ever
carried through. A Tucher agent reports in 1532 from Lyons that the
King wanted to raise money there in order to send it to Switzerland and
Germany, 'God wot why or whither.' We know from other sources that
the King sent that year and in the following years considerable sums as
subsidies to the German allies, and that he needed a great deal of money
for the pay of the Swiss mercenaries; but we do not know whether he
1 Brewer, Calendar, II, Nos. 253, 522, 626, 1393, 2349; Baumgarten, Gesehichte
Karls V, voL H, pp. 38, 96. Of. also Desjardins, H, 899, Actes de Franpna /, No.
Mete* de Irony&t 1, Nos. 1629, 1594 and 17485.
* Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris sous le rigne de Franfoie I, ed. Lalanne; Gail-
lard, Histoire de Francois I; Brewer, Calendar, IV, NOB 789, 1072; Cdeccion de
document ineditos, voL XIV, p. 254; Acted de Francois I, NOB. 4385, 4623, 6492,
64218.
actually borrowed this money in Lyons. In any case, it was only after
the outbreak of war in 1536 that the scale of the loans became very large.
The Work of the Cardinal de Tournon. The great French publicist
Bodin in his famous work Les Six Livres de la Republiyue, published in
1577, in the part dealing with finance inveighs against interest-bear-
ing loans, which he designates 'the Ruin of Princes and their Finances.'
He then adds in regard to such loans: 'This financial expedient was in-
troduced into France in the year 1543 by the Cardinal de Toumon, who
was induced by certain Italians to represent to King Francis I that
there was only one way of attracting money capital from all sides to
France; for which purpose the bank must be formed at Lyons and
money borrowed from every man at 8 per cent, interest. In reality,
however, what the Cardinal wished was to find a safe and profitable
investment for 100,000 ecus which he had in his own coffers. His pro-
posal was accepted, and the bank was opened. Every one invested
Francis I owed the Bank of Lyons 500,000 ecus. 1
Three distinct springs of action are to be distinguished in this remark-
able statement: first, the action of the Cardinal; secondly, the participa-
tion of the Italians; thirdly, the organized dealing in capital which re-
sulted. Of these we will here discuss the first two.
In the first place, it is not true that interest-bearing Crown loans were
introduced into France through the Cardinal de Tournon, but it is right
to say that he largely extended their scope. This development dates, not
from 1543, but from 1536, though in 1543 it took on a new character
which Bodin describes correctly as to its general tendency, though with
certain errors in detail. The Cardinal de Tournon was one of the most
important French statesmen of the time. It was he who had carried
through the negotiations in Madrid as to the ransom of the King taken
prisoner at Pavia; and he had been employed on many other diplomatic
missions, most recently in Italy. In 1536 he was governor of the Pro-
vince Lyonnais. In this position, and perhaps even previously, he came
into contact with the great Florentine bankers who had their head-
quarters in Lyons, the Strozzi, Guadagni, Capponi, etc. He managed
to arouse in them the hope that the King of France would free Florence
from the rule of the Medicis and so induced them to be willing to lend to
the King.
When in 1536 the Emperor invaded the South of France, the Cardinal
succeeded in obtaining large floating loans from the Florentine bankers,
at first 30,000 livres and then again 40,000 livres at 3 per cent, per
fair. The details are not clear, but the Cardinal's large share in the busi-
ness is evident. At the request of the bankers he had to act as a co-
Bodin,Lo.ed.ofl683,VI,2.
292 THE AGE OF THE FTJGGER
signatory. 1 Still larger sums, however, were then raised, partly on com-
pulsion and in part voluntarily through loans of the cities and the
clergy. For the second time since the introduction of this method of
raising money large annuity loans were contracted with the cities, to
which the royal revenues were pledged in return. Since the loans were
not repaid, the revenues remained in the possession of the cities. For
example, in 1530 Paris lent 100,000 livres and Lyons 84,733 livres.
The latter transaction was carried out by the Cardinal de Tournon, who
also had charge of the lease of the salt tax for large parts of the country,
a business in which he employed the Florentines.
As warlike operations ceased in 1537, the need for further extra-
ordinary receipts ceased and did not reappear till the renewed outbreak
of the war in 1542. Only in 1541, on the pretext of a coming attack from
the Emperor, the King recruited troops in Germany and raised a loan
from the bankers and merchants of Lyons, which seems to have had
the character of a forced loan.*
We have a Venetian ambassador's report of the year 1542, dealing in
detail with the French finances. The French King, it is said, if he were
economical, could easily lay by a million crowns a year. It is added that
this is not the case and that the 300,000 ecus set apart for his menus
plaisirs did not suffice. Items on the expenditure side are: Pensions, a
million livres. Gifts, half a million. Extraordinary expenses, 400,000
livres, etc. The annuity debt begun in 1522 had accordingly consider-
ably increased. The report distinguishes these funded annuity loans
from the floating loans at interest. The ambassador says that on his
departure the State Treasury was empty and 'people begin to think
already of borrowing money at interest from the merchants, as I ob-
served on my passing through Lyons.' The raising of floating loans at
interest in Lyons was undoubtedly a regular financial expedient of the
French Crown from 1542-3 onwards.
The Period from 1542 to 1547. We are indebted for our first exact
information as to this period to the English envoy Paget, who was then
staying in Lyons. 3 He writes that the King of France has no money and
little credit, as many old debts are still unpaid. He states in contrast the
large loans which the Emperor had raised in a short time in Antwerp,
Augsburg and Genoa. 'Great efforts are made daily to obtain money.
For while here in Lyons and in other markets people who have liquid
..
Invent, generate, Vm, p. 175 ff., NOB. 29, 157; XH, p. 42, No. 81; P&ioaud, Notes et
documents, aa. 1637 [38] 22/1; Heury, Histmre du Cardinal de Tournon, p. 146;
Antes de Francois I, Noa 8661, 8730, 8812, 8824, 8867, 9291, etc., and NOB. 21123,
21186,21290.
Gayangos, Calendar, VI, 1, p. 381.
Oaiidner, Col., voL XVH, Nos.
554 and 589.
LYONS 293
capital, and also widows and orphans, are wont to invest their money in
banks at 5-8 per cent., the King will now take all this and promises for
this purpose 10 per cent, interest.'
The 10 per cent, refers only to natives, the King promised foreigners
16 per cent. Under such conditions he was able, in spite of his bad
credit, to raise 400,000, of which
the Florentines advanced 200,000 francs
the Welser 50,000
the Lucca merchants 100,000
the French merchants 50,000
It is certain, however, that Cardinal de Tournon, who once more
raised this loan for the King, must have exerted more or less heavy pres-
sure on the merchants. The Welser declared later to the Emperor that
they had had to lend the King 12,000 crowns in order to stay in the
country, which otherwise they would not have been allowed to do; the
money was sent from Antwerp to Lyons, in spite of the Emperor's pro-
hibition. Gaspar Ducci and Hieronymus Seiler were also interested.
The Seiler letters show that the Welser and the other merchants were
attracted by the interest, which was unusually high for the period. It is
indisputable, however, that compulsion was also exercised. 1
In 1542 and 1543 further sums were borrowed in Lyons, but we have
no details. We only know that Hans Kleberg, 'the good German,' was
interested himself and brought in other German merchants. At the end
of 1543, however, everything seems to have been repaid. 2
The loans of the Crown so soon became habitual in Lyons that a com-
mercial handbook appearing in Antwerp in 1543 states that the ex-
change rate in Lyons depends, amongst other things, on whether the
King is borrowing much there or not. 8
In the spring of 1544 safe conduct was withdrawn from the Germans
in Lyons because they supported the Emperor. They were hard pressed
and some even were imprisoned. The Tucher agent, who reports this,
adds that the French Court knew well that the 'Germans in Augsburg
had much money to lend to the King.' This they must have done, for
they were soon well treated again, and in June the Ki"g paid their
maturing claims, while those of the Florentines and Lucca merchants
were prolonged. This year and the next the Cardinal de Tournon was
the King's chief representative in all monetary transactions in Lyons. 4
In the year 1545 other agents became more prominent.
1 Actes de Franfois I, t. IV, Nos. 12636, 12642, 12646, 12651, 12742, 22570.
' Ehrenberg, Hans Kleberg (Mitth. d. Ver. f. Gesch. d. Stadt N-urnberg, VIH,
21); Antes de Franyns I, t. IV, Nos. 13340, 13491, 13509.
Jan Impyn, Nieuwe instructie d. looffl. consten d. rekenboecks, Antw.
1543, foL 15.
*4<# de Inmfois I, t. IV, Nos. 14008, 143S7, 14479.
294 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
A Tucher agent reports in 1545 that he had been approached on
'change by Hans Eleberg, who asked him to write to his masters in the
following sense: An official often employed in the financial trans-
actions of the French Crown, Martin de Troyes (also called Maitre
Martin or Sieur Martin), who owned a house in Lyons, had asked
Eleberg to consult his friends as to whether they would lend the King a
sum of money at Easter. Kleberg tried to bring out clearly the profit-
ableness of the business, praising his security and the high rate of
interest, he said that the best South German houses were ready to come
in. He had already raised 40,000 ecus and was ready to let the Tucher
have a share also. He himself wished to invest largely. He had always
carried through his with good repute and without talk. The profit in this
business was 'godly and fitting.' * The Tucher did not, as we know, wish
to undertake this kind of business, but the loan came about, the Germans
advancing 50,000 ecus and the Italians 100,000 ecus, making a total of
340,000 francs.
Later the merchants became very nervous at the report that the King
was mortally ill; if he should die a quite different government was ex-
pected. In short, 'Every man is heavie because the King is so sick and
weakly.' The merchants accordingly desired that the Dauphin should
act as co-signatory, and Kleberg acted as their representative in bring-
ing his wish before the King. He immediately granted this request and
declared solemnly that the 'gifts' which he had made or should make to
Kleberg and the other foreign merchants, as compensation for the loans
they had made to him, were to be regarded as valid bonds without the
merchants needing to trouble themselves on that account. 8
In Antwerp also propaganda for the French loans was carried on
by the Florentines settled in Lyons, especially by the Salviati through
the agency of Gaspar Ducci, and we know that this was not unsuc-
cessful. In August of the same year further loans were concluded in
Antwerp.
In December, 1545, it is reported that the King had paid back
300,000 ecus, 'whereat the Germans who had lent him money were not
pleased.' However, in January, 1546, he once more borrowed 300,000 fr.,
and in March Kleberg was again approached to prepare himself and
the members of his syndicate for further advances; the King, it was
said, would engage himself in what manner the Germans wished. In
September Jakob Sturm came to Lyons from Strasburg, commissioned
by the Schmalkaldian League, in order through Kleberg' s agency to
borrow money for the war against the Emperor. He found Kleberg on
his death-bed and thereupon applied in his need to the King, who at
first declared his readiness to repay the merchants the half million ecus
* Ehrenberg, Hans Kleberg, p. 23 fi. Ibid., p. 26.
which he then owed them in order to help the Schmalkaldians.
Finally, through the agency of Marechal Strozzi the following arrange-
ment was arrived at. The King paid 100,000 crowns to the Marechal,
who paid the same amount to the merchants to whom the King owed
money. The merchants lent it to the Protestants, and the princes en-
gaged themselves to the cities and the cities to the merchants. The
King said everything must be kept very secret because, is it happened,
he was at peace with the Emperor. According to another version, the
King himself borrowed money in Lyons and had it conveyed to the
Protestants. The rate for Crown loans was then 12 per cent, per annum. 1
Shortly afterwards, however, the King again borrowed at 4 per cent, per
fair.
In October, 1546, Sebastian Neidhart and ffieronymus Seiler ordered
that half the capital of the company which they had formed, together
with Alexius Grimel and others, should be lent to the King of France.
Grimel thought that this would be expedient, if no other safe invest-
ment were forthcoming. Good firms in Lyons were ready to pay 3 per
cent, per fair; and it would be best to be content with this. A part of the
capital was, however, lent to the King. The Welser's representative in
the Emperor's camp wrote home in February, 1547, that, considering the
violent and deceitful policy which the Emperor's counsellors had entered
on, it was small wonder that so much money was now withdrawn from
the Netherlands Court and lent to the French Court, 'though mayhap
in time even that investment may be still less fortunate.' We know too
that the Haug in Augsburg at the Easter fair in 1547 lent the French
Crown 36,000 crowns at 4 per cent, per fair.
King Francis I died on 3rd March, 1547. Bodin asserts, and many
authorities have repeated after him, that at the time of his death the
King had in ready money, not only the half million ecus which he owed
'the Bank of Lyons,' but 1,200,000 ecus as well in the Treasury. Others,
on the other hand, say that there were only 800,000 ecus. 2
In June, 1547 -shortly after the King's death -an envoy of the
Emperor's at the French Court reports that 'The French ministers and
others have often said that the late King had left enough money in the
Louvre to pay an army for six months and that this money was not to
be touched. Nevertheless, 200,000 ecus have been taken from it and put
in the hands of the Tresorier de 1'Epargne, who had no money, or rather
who had to pay out 500,000 fr. Moreover, there was less money in the
1 Augsbg. Stadtarohiv, Litteralien und Sielersche Garrespandenz. Of. Ehrenberg,
Kleberg, p. 31, and Kius, D. Finanzwesen d. Ernestin. Houses Sachsen im 16
Jahrh, p. 78.
> Bodin, Lc. pp. 893, 896, 905. Traicte des finance de la France (1581) in den
Archives emieusea de I'Jiistoire de France, 1 ser. t. IX, p. 394. For what follows,
Reave historique, V, 118.
296 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
Louvre than had been reported - 500,000 or 600,000 ecus at most.
Money is still owing to the Lyons merchants, and it is considered import-
ant to pay them their interest in order to be able to have their help
should occasion arise. The present King has recognized as King his
predecessor's debts at the request of the merchants who sent a special
representative to the Court for this purpose. In short, the finances are
not so brilliant as is boasted.'
The tendency to represent the royal finances in too rosy a light was of
long standing in the case of Francis I and his ministers and counsellors.
Bodin, who handed down these boasts as truth, was influenced by the
wish to represent the reign of Francis I as the golden age of French
finance in contrast to the financial mismanagement which reached its
climax for the sixteenth century in his own day. Though he could not
deny that in Francis' last years the debts grew apace, he said that the
money so obtained (at 12 per cent, or 16 per cent, a year) was used by
him, together with his savings, to form a large State treasure. There is a
grain of truth in this. In the last years of Ms reign in peace-time Francis
had collected money in order to be better prepared than formerly in the
event of war. There was, however, no question of such sums as those
quoted by Bodin.
The case is similar to Bodin's other statement which we quoted at the
beginning of the previous section. We now know that Cardinal de
Touron initiated a new era for French Crown loans from 1542 onwards.
Bodin gives as the true inwardness of this movement that the 'Bank of
Lyons' was formed to attract money from all sides and that it succeeded
in the attempt. Bodin used the same expression 'Bank of Lyons'
previously elsewhere, while contemporary writers only speak in general
terms of the introduction of banking through the Italians. 1 Bodin
has often been interpreted as if he meant that a bank was created in
Lyons in 1543. This is, however, an erroneous meaning for the phrase
'Etablir la Banque a Lyon.' Apparently this was meant to designate
all banking and bill business and not a definite public bank, which
certainly did not then exist in Lyons. 2
The following facts are well established. Since 1542 the Crown had
been engaged in a conscious effort to attract monetary capital from all
sides to Lyons in order to be able to employ it there for the Crown loans.
This end was attained by giving high interest and by using as agents the
Italian and German merchants and bankers trading in Lyons. The
Cardinal de Tournon as prime mover had often to apply pressure to
attain his end. Certain specially prominent merchants, the Salviati
i Of. Bodin's Besponeio ad Paradox* Malasfretfi, and his Diteom <rnr
de VExtr&me CherU.
' Cleirac, Commerce des Lettres de Change (1656),
and Hans Kleberg, bad to undertake propaganda for the French, loans,
both in the market and outside. Capital was attracted by the high rates
of interest and the punctuality with which the Grown had the sense to
pay them, as well as by the manifest anxiety of the French Crown to
meet the lenders' wishes. This was the more easily done as the Em-
peror's financiers at this time did their best by their violence and deceit
to scare away capital. Bodin's statement that the innovation was due to
the Italians is confirmed by the fact that at the same time in Antwerp
Caspar Ducci was trying to do the same thing for the Emperor and the
Court of the Netherlands, though at Antwerp methods were uglier and
propaganda less skilful than at Lyons. It is significant, however, that
the English agent Stephen Vaughan reports from Antwerp in February,
1545, that the French King had summoned Gaspar Ducci in order to
organize his loans on the Antwerp model. The aim was similar in both
places and to a certain degree the methods and persons engaged in them
were identical. Bodin's statement that Cardinal de Tournon was only
consulting his private interest is a gross exaggeration, though, of
course, it is probable that he managed to unite his own interests with
those of the Crown.
The Period from 1547 to 1551. According to several independent
authorities, at the time of his death King Francis I owed the merchants
of Lyons at least half a million ecus. This, however, was a trifle com-
pared with what happened under Henry II, who was his father's equal
in his delight in war and his superior in prodigality.
In December, 1547, there began to be talk of large new loans. In
Lyons, floating loans were raised amounting to 300,000 or 400,000
ducats, and at the same time 10 per cent, annuities for 100,000 francs
were sold, and the capital value of these, a million francs, was about
equal to the amount raised in floating loans. 1
In 1548 a Venetian envoy at the French Court reported to his
superiors the following interesting project which was then under con-
sideration: 'I have learnt that the King intends to open in his kingdom
four banks, in Paris, Eouen, Toulouse, and Lyons. Anyone depositing
money in them is to receive 8 per cent, and to receive bonds of the
States General for capital and interest. If the King needs money he will-
use the deposits in the banks, which otherwise will be lent out at 11 per
cent.' 2
It is interesting to find such a scheme under consideration at the
French Court, certainly on the advice of the Italians. It confirms our
criticism of Bodin's statement. Still more important is the fresh light
iDesjardins-Canestrini, Negoc. dipt, de la France avec la Toscane, VI, 219;
Vfihrer, jffwtotre de la Dette publigw en. France (1886), I, 21,
' Pesjardins, l.c. HI, 221.
298 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
it throws on a little understood measure of the Trench Government in
creating bourses in these cities then mentioned as the localities destined
for the creation of banks.
In July, 1549, the King issued an edict declaring that the city of
Toulouse had less trade than its good situation would warrant because,
unlike Lyons, Antwerp, and other great commercial cities, it did not
possess a place known as 'Change, estrade ou Bourse,' where the mer-
chants assembled twice a day to do business: whereby the costly wares
of foreign countries were attracted and home commodities were more
easily converted into money. The citizens of Toulouse had brought all
this to the notice of the King. He accordingly ordained the institution
there of a Bourse Commune on the model of the Change of Lyons, and
he granted all the same privileges enjoyed by the merchants of Lyons,
especially the special commercial jurisdiction. In 1551 further regula-
tions were issued, of which the following may be instanced: The
habitues of the bourse might lend to one another at interest up to 15
per cent, without being liable to be punished as usurers. They were to
use for bills amongst one another the strict shortened form which had
been in use at the Champagne fairs and was still in use in Lyons; they
were to exercise the calling of money changers or bankers without the
necessity of a special concession.
Under similar conditions a bourse was founded in Rouen in 1556, in
Paris in 1563, and in other French cities later. This action, and espec-
ially the general introduction of commercial jurisdiction in France, is
generally ascribed to the Chancellor Michel 1'Hopital, who urged this
step in a speech before the Paris Parliament in 1560. He was, however,
certainly not concerned in the creation of the Bourses of Toulouse and
Rouen, and the legal aspect of the matter in which he was chiefly
interested did not at first become prominent. At first attention was con-
centrated on the bourse as an economic institution from which a mar-
vellous increase in trade activity was expected. The Government
wanted to try to do for other towns what had been so successfully done
at Lyons, with the intention, it must primarily be supposed, of increas-
ing the means of satisfying its own financial requirements. This aim
remained for the time the only place where the Crown could borrow, and
the method of borrowing remained at first much the same as before.
The loans, however, increased in size with an ever widening circle of
For example, in 1549 the only loan made to the King was that of
100,000 crowns from the well-known firm of Neidhart, Seiler and Com-
pany; the greatest part of this was held by Sebastian Neidhart. The
following were also interested: Hieronymus Seiler, Matheus PfLaum,
Georg Muelich, and Wolffgang Langemantel, all of Augsburg. By
September, 1550, the claims had grown to 123,214 crowns. The King
paid in 1549 in Lyons 16 per cent., though the rate for commercial
loans (deposito) was only 10 per cent, to 12 per cent. For the last time
on this occasion some Genoese (Gianbattista and Benedetto Fornari)
seem to have been interested in the French commercial transactions;
this, however, was discovered and severely punished. 1
The South German merchants were already eagerly on the look out for
the French King's bonds with their high rate of interest, as is shown by
a letter sent on 6th February, 1550, by Andreas Imhof in Venice to
Paulus Behaim in Nuremberg. 'I hear that thou wert too late with the
1,000 crowns to lend to the King of France. A piece of good fortune has
been slept away. If a good sum had been lent him at the beginning, it
had already been received back twofold and his money could have been
done without.' This refers to the reluctance of the old Endres Imhof,
father of the writer and head of the Imhof business in regard to financial
transactions of this kind. It would have been better if in this matter he
had never given way to his sons and young kinsmen. Paulus Behaim
was able to carry out his scheme of lending 1,000 crowns to the King of
France in September, 1550. Willibald Imhof sent him the good news
that he had been able to invest the sum under the name of the Cenami,
who gave him J per cent, on the capital. The business was done through
an Italian broker. Imhof adds: 'I could not do better. Before I came
those who wanted to take up the King's bonds were giving 1 J per cent.
But yesterday there was largezza (easy money) and they were not
offering 1 per cent, for a place with the King; but things change very
quickly.' We hear for the first time of the King's bonds being at a dis-
count and of fluctuations in price. In November Imhof writes: 'Had I
tarried longer to invest thy money with the King I had failed altogether,
for the King would have naught. If thou wilt, thou canst have thy
money and l per cent, thereto, but on such terms no one will come
out.'
The rate for the King's loans fell during 1550 to 3 per cent, per
fair = 12 per cent, per annum. Even at this rate, however, capital
flowed in. In October, 1550, we are told that the King's credit was
excellent because he always paid the interest promptly. He owed the
merchants 1J million ducats already, and money was sent daily from
Antwerp to Lyons. A Florentine historian says of the year 1550: 'In
order to rival the Emperor in his loans, the King set up a Monte in his
kingdom, and borrowed from any who would lend. He paid the interest
every four months and restored the capital on demand. Hence so much
money came together from all sides that within six months the King
* Bonfadio, AnnaK d. cose de Gemovesi (1528-50) ed. Ptuachetti, p. 191 fi.
300 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
owed over three million ducats, whereof more than 800,000 were said to
belong to the Florentine merchants.' 1
This was an exaggeration; there are several obvious mistakes. The
state of things described only came to pass some years later. The
statement is important as a proof that the large loans of the French
Crown were gradually creating a new organization for dealing in capital
which excited universal interest and which had as yet no settled designa-
tion. Other steps were soon to follow.
The Period from 1551 to 1557. In February, 1551, it is stated that the
Kg was continuing to pay 3 per cent, per fair and would only pay 4
per cent, if war were renewed. In August it was thought that the King
might well pay 4 per cent, and would do so, if he were seriously pressed,
'but no man will; the Italians are content with 3 per cent.; yet there are
some who would gladly withdraw at a loss of 4 per cent.' Those persons
were well informed. In Italy fighting had already begun between the
Emperor's troops and the French. This was followed in September by a
definite breach and the end of the year saw the treaty between T^"g
Henry II and the German Protestants, especially Maurice of Saxony.
In October, in view of the unfavourable course of the war, the Imhof
also wished to sell their claim on the "King and were ready to lose 5 per
cent. Their representative was only able to get rid of 2,000 crowns at a
loss of 6 \ per cent. Every one wanted to sell and soon no one would buy
even at 7-8 per cent, discount. A fortnight later the Imhof were ready
to sell at 8 per cent, below par; but even at 10-12 per cent, discount
buyers were not forthcoming. In November feeling improved a little;
small parcels of the King's bonds changed hands at 8| per cent, dis-
count. Willibald Imhof could not advise Paulus Behaim as to his hold-
ing, 'for the great lords have it all their own way.' His 1,000 crowns was
sold at a loss of 8-8$ per cent.
At the December settling day the King gave the money market a joy-
ful surprise by repaying 200,000 crowns. This so greatly improved his
credit that he was able temporarily to reduce to 3 per cent, the interest
on his loans, which had risen to 4 per cent, per fair. Those who had sold
at a loss were very sorry for themselves. Paulus Behaim wished once
more to invest 1,000 crowns if 4 per cent, per fair were to be had.
Willibald Imhof answered in January, 1550, that the King was disposed
to pay 4 per cent, per fair to those who would not only extend their
loans but would lend 50 per cent, in addition. The temper of the market
had already gone round again, most people wishing to be relieved of
their holdings. Money was very plentiful. On good commercial paper
* Segni, letor. Fiorent. ed. Gargani, p. 488. Cf. Turnbull, Calendar, Edward VI,
No. 248. Report 21 October, 1550: 'Luge sums come daily from Antwerp to the
bu* of Lyons,'
only 1J per cent, to 1 J per cent, per fair (5 per cent, to 6 per cent, per
annum) was paid. At the beginning of 1552 the market rate had once
more risen to 2| to 3 per cent, per fair (11 per cent, to 12 per cent.) as
the King was once more borrowing largely and paying 15 per cent. 'It is
a fine profit for him who can take it' was the opinion of an agent of the
Tucher in Lyons. This was the time when King Henry II, through his
treaty with the German Protestant princes, took Metz, Toul, and
Verdun. Unfortunately there is no doubt not only that this step was
put in his power by German dissensions, but also that German capital,
in spite of the increased stringency of the Emperor's prohibition, took
part in the loans which he then raised. Authentic information is lack-
ing for the year 1552. For 1553, however, there is a complete statement
of the sums which the King owed the Lyons merchants at the Easter
payment.
The Germans according to this had claims amounting to 700,000
crowns or ecus; 200,000 or more of this amount was, however, held by
the Swiss. The Florentines' holding amounted to more than half a
million; that of the Lucca merchants, Venetians and Portuguese, to more
than 200,000 crowns. The total amounts to 1,463,375 crowns, 'whereof
the interest or "Don," reckoned at 4 per cent, for each fair, amounts to
about 58,535 crowns.'
This is confirmed by a direct statement from Lyons in October, 1553,
which says that in addition to the half million gold which the King
owed at the last fair he borrowed 400,000 fr. 1 This information, un-
questionably correct, shows that at the Easter fair, 1553, the King was
owing the merchants of Lyons about 1 J million crowns; that he was once
more paying 4 per cent, per fair; and that he went gaily on getting into
debt though there was an armistice between him and the Emperor. He
had, however, to defend Corsica, which he had lately taken, against the
Genoese, who were supported both by the Emperor and the Duke of
Florence. Pietro Strozzi was in command of the French troops. Soon
money was to be needed on a different scale.
About this time there began to be complaints in France also that deal-
ing in commodities was declining, while trade in money and bills was
flourishing. This fact is specially striking in a protest made by the
French dealers in commodities against an agreement of the foreign
bankers in Lyons relative to the kinds of money to be taken in exchange
payments. The foreign bankers are here accused of coming to France
only for their own interest, in order to attract to themselves all the specie
in order to export it. The new-fangled deposit business, it is said -
'usury,' to call it by its other name - enriched only the few and ruined
1 Tunibull, Calendar, Queen Mary, No. 57. The ecus or crown was then worth
2J livres tournois or francs.
302 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
solid dealing in commodities so that many commodity merchants now
deal only in money. Dealing in exchange is stigmatized as barren.
These complaints later on were echoed loudly elsewhere and had
momentous consequences. 1
We have little information as to 1554. We hear of a loan of 40,000
ecus, which the King borrowed at the August fair at 4 per cent, per
quarter. According to Bodin's account the Capponi, the Albizzi and
tiie South German merchants must have lent still larger sums, for his
dates are not wholly reliable. He says that the interest in each case
was added to the capital. This, however, was only done later; in the
period 1554 to 1557 the interest was paid each fair time at 4 per
cent.'
Bodin adds the observation that King Henry meant to attract capital
by paying higher interest than the Emperor and the King of England,
but that by so doing he gradually undermined his credit, 'for the best
economists and calculators judged that at the last he would be able to
pay neither capital nor interest since the interest with compound
interest amounted to 18 per cent, at least.'
This was quite true and we know that not only cautious merchants
like Anton Tucher, but also the much less prescient Welser had expressed
this opinion ten years before. In the actual period before us the
financial situation of the French Grown was judged by most capitalists
very optimistically.
The year 1555 is remarkable in the financial history of the sixteenth
century for being the year of the 'Grand Parti.' Any prince's loan was
then called Parti, or in Italian Partite ; the largest loan contracted by
the French Crown in the sixteenth century was accordingly 'Le Grand
Parti.' It was the great or common investment as contrasted with the
later Partiti Particolari. It was formed by a combination of all floating
loans hitherto raised by the French Crown in Lyons, together with new
loans to the amount of a third of the former ones. This transaction was
effected at the Easter fair in 1555, when the war over Siena between
the Duke of Florence and the French under Marechal Strozzi was near-
ing its conclusion, but a general outbreak of war with the Emperor was
At the Easter fair in 1555 the usual market rate was 3 per cent, a
quarter or 12 per cent a year. Money could be easily obtained for this
rate, while 2f per cent, to 2f per cent, was often offered. The Consuls
of the foreign 'Nations' in Lyons were then asked whether the 'Nations'
1 Remonstrances des manhunt contre I' accord des banmiiert (Luon. Arch, municip.
B.H. IX, 629). This is undated, but is undoubtedly of the period 1561-6.
1 Bodin, ed. 1683, p. 893. Of. Lyon, BibL Coste MS. 6932 N. and Ebner. Archives
Contoconent of Qeorg Ebner in Lyons.
LYONS SOS
would grant the King a loan to the extent of a third of what he already
owed them. He would then pay 16 per cent, on the whole, though some
of the older debts only bore interest at 12 per cent. On 7th March an ar-
rangement was effected on these lines. The King received a new advance
from each creditor amounting to a third of his previous debt, and
promised in return 4 per cent, on the whole at each fair, together with a
sinking fund payment of 1 per cent., so that the debt would be repaid
in 41 fairs. 1
The precise amount of the King's floating debt at this time is not
known, but two years earlier it had been 1 million crowns. If we as-
sume an increase of only half a million in the years, which is certainly
not too high, it would amount to 2 millions, or with the new third 2
million crowns, it may possibly have been more. From the side of finan-
cial technique the Grand Parti is interesting as being the first instance
of a royal finance transaction with a sinking fund with compound
interest. This innovation bears the stamp of its Italian origin, but was
soon adopted by all arithmethicians in their textbooks and widely popu-
larized. 2 Next it is important that on this occasion the principle of the
public or subscription loan was first adopted in the case of a great
monarchy. The mediaeval Monti of the Italian republics were also
public loans, and the Florentine chronicler calls the new kind of loans
in the French Bourse Monte since the King borrowed from any that
would lend. This had never happened before north of the Alps, as con-
temporaries clearly recognized.
Kubys says: 'The King made a financial affair in Lyons which was
called "le grand parti" because this loan was open to all kinds of persons,
all whosoever would lend to His Majesty. They paid in their money to
the Eeceiver General of Lyons and received in return bonds. A special
office was created for the payment of the interest and the instalments
of repayment, the Receveur du don Gratuit, who received the whole
amount each fair from the Financial Administration and distributed it
among the persons concerned. God knows how greed for these exces-
sive gains, disguised by designation of a "free gift" (don gratuit), lured
men on. Every one ran to invest his money in "le grand parti", the very
servants brought their savings. Women sold their ornaments and
widows their annuities in order to take shares in "le Grand Parti". In
short people ran for it as if to see a fire.' 8
Bodin speaks elsewhere of the Princes and gentlemen who invested
money 'a la Banque de Lyons' for not only the rich Swiss gentlemen and
1 Sources: Behaim papers in German. Museum; Ebner family archives; Haug
ledgers in the Augsburg Museum.
1 Michel Coquet, Livre fariOan&igue, Anvers, 1673.
Rubys, Histoire de Lyon, p. 378.
304 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
German and other princes took their share, but even the Pashas and
merchants of Turkey invested under the names of their agents more than
500,000 ecus.'
Now we see exactly what Bodin meant by the La Banque de Lyons -
it was the Grand Parti, or as the South Germans called it the 'Gemein-
same Platz' in reference to the fact that the loan was open to all. It is
also clear why the statements as to the introduction of this great inno-
vation are so varied and inexact. What happened in 1555 was the
amalgamation and increase of loans, some of which went back to 1551.
The process we have described continued to widen its scope and perfect
its organization. The Grand Parti is by no means the end of the process
of development. This continued to gain in width rather than depth up
to the time of the financial crisis of 1557. Other large loans were effected,
but up to that moment there was no really important progress in the
system itself. From this point onwards, however, a further development
took place which renders the finances of Lyons an object of increasing
For the year 1555 we have nothing but the receipt of Martin de
Troyes, who had become the King's Beceiver General in Lyons, for the
sum of 99,325 ecus, which had been advanced to the King in Lyons
by Pietro Salviati and Company. The receipt is dated 7th October,
1555, and refers therefore to a transaction subsequent to the Grand
Parti. 1
The fugitive Florentines in Lyons were at this time trying to spur
France on to fresh efforts against Duke Cosimo of Florence, who was in
alliance with Spain. This movement was headed by the Strozzi and the
Altoviti. We are told that on 12th January, 1556, the Florentines lent
the King 400,000 crowns at 16 per cent., and wished to advance a
further 200,000 without interest on condition that the King would use
this money against Florence. On the 27th January we are told that
Bindo Altoviti concluded with the King's representatives a loan con-
tract in the name of the Florentine emigres for the sum of 300,000
crowns at 16 per cent. The matter, however, remained unsettled as the
bonds offered were found unsatisfactory. 2
Towards the end of August Marechal Strozzi arranged a further loan.
The King paid over to Pope Paul IV 300,000 crowns of 'subsidies'
through the Florentine bankers in Venice. They in their turn advanced
120,000 crowns, while the remainder, 180,000 crowns, was taken up by
German merchants under the names of Israel Minckel and George
Obrecht. The terms of the loan were that it was to be repaid in two
yearly instalments and was to bear interest at 16 per cent. It actually
cost the King over 20 per cent., since there was a loss of 6 per cent, in
BibL Coste, Lyon MS. No. 6933. * Brown, Calendar, VI, 314, 330.
LYONS 305
the two years on the exchange on Venice, and moreover the interest was
compound. The reason why the German merchants came in was, as we
learn from Marechal Strozzi that 'the Florentines would not bear the risk
alone,' and the Germans were only too ready to take a part of it from
them. 1 They were strangely optimistic about the state of the French
provinces. There set in, at this time, a blind, senseless rush of fools who
wanted to make money quickly - a phenomenon which has always since
been a feature of epochs of that kind. It is probable that the Florentines
did all they could to lure on the Germans.
When at the end of December Michel Imhof in Lyons wrote to Paulus
Behaim in Nuremburg that through the Welser he had been able to
'place' 1,500 crowns for him with the King and had got a profit of 2 per
cent, on the capital, i.e. bought at 98, Behaim was greatly pleased at
this excellent piece of business, and Hans Imhof wrote from Antwerp
that he had been glad to hear of it 'for the investment is safe and the
interest good and has helped many a good fellow into the saddle.'
The business in which Behaim was interested was what the Germans
called the Sabs Partita (salt loan). On the 1st of November, 1556, a new
loan was concluded, it is said, with George Obrecht, who was at the head
of a large syndicate of Germans and Italians. The amount is put at
900,000 crowns and the interest once more at 16 per cent. On the 16th
December a further loan of 300,000 crowns was concluded at the same
rate. 2 If these facts are correct, the Germans only held a third of these
loans, for according to the Ebner list Israel Minckel, George Obrecht,
and Company lent the King at this time only 400,000 crowns, repayable
within 5| years in quarterly instalments and bearing interest at 4 per
cent, per fair. The loan was secured on the revenue from the salt tax
(Gabelle) in Nantes, Tours and Bourges. Hence the name Salz Partita.
Though the payments of the interest and sinking fund at the subse-
quent fairs was very slow, the faith in the public in the French Crown's
solvency remained for a time unshakeable. At the beginning of May,
1557, Michel Imhof wrote from Lyons that he had no anxiety on
account of the French debt; he would be glad if the Imhof had lent the
King in addition to their other loans half of their claim against the
city of Antwerp. In the early fairs of 1557 money was extraordinarily
plentiful. The market rate fell as low as 1 J per cent, per fair = 5J per
annum. The King's Partito stood at 98-99 and at these rates there were
people anxious to buy than to sell. The King knew well how to keep up
this favourable temper. Eeports were spread of coming financial re-
forms on a larger scale. When at the beginning of August, 1557, it be-
came known that the King of Spain had ceased payment, King Henry
assured the German merchants that they need have no fears on his
1 Brown, VI, 904. * IMd., VI, 764, 869.
306 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
account: he would keep his promise, he knew what was due from a
prince's honour. Hereupon the German merchants who a few days
earlier had lent him 200,000 crowns advanced a further 300,000
crowns at 16 per cent. 1
A short time afterwards the King, in conversation with a Venetian
envoy, boasted that the Lyons merchants competed with each other in
offers of money. They had lately lent him 600,000 crowns, of which
100,000 was without interest. 'To tell the truth,' he added, 1 am myself
amazed at such openhandedness in such a situation. The German
merchants too are no less ready to serve me than the others.' The
situation here mentioned by the King was evidently that created by his
defeat at St. Quentin ten days before. The blind confidence of the Ger-
man merchants might well arouse wonder - Minckel Obrecht and Com-
pany lent, for one instance, 400,000 crowns to the King on the security
of the Lyons customs, though these receipts were already pledged to the
Florentines. Most curious of all, the interest on the loans was only 12
per cent.
Scarcely three months after malting his solemn promise the King fol-
lowed the Spanish example and ceased payment of the interest and sink-
ing fund on the Lyons loan, which then amounted to about 5 million
crowns. The price then fell to 85 per cent., but nevertheless Michel
Imhof wrote on 26th November, 'We (the Lnhof) are with thee
(Behaim) in not wishing to sell out with loss, though things are setting
not towards peace, but towards war. The King of France is not thus to
be driven out and luck may soon turn again. God preserve us from loss.'
Brown, VI, 1238, 1255.
CHAPTEE 3
DEALINGS IN CAPITAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
BOURSES OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
External Development of Antwerp and Lyons. The development of the
two international Bourses of the sixteenth century, in spite of many
important common traits, shows certain decided differences. Both owe
much in the first place to their favourable geographical situation, and
secondly to the help of their respective rulers, who pushed their develop-
ment by the grant of large privileges. While Lyons was almost entirely
a product of this policy, in Antwerp the national development of trade
counted for more. Bruges had played its part and could no longer com-
pete with Antwerp for the fruits of the great discoveries overseas.
In the case of Lyons, on the other hand, the Geneva fairs would cer-
tainly have continued to prosper but for the interference of the French
Crown, and the new discoveries had relatively little importance.
The French Kings recognized earlier than the Hapsburgs how enor-
mously their power was increased by the possession of such a market.
They made Lyons their financial arsenal. Accordingly Lyons had a less
international character and was not a world Bourse of such predomi-
nance as Antwerp. Nevertheless, Lyons also took its stamp as far as
business was concerned from foreigners, chiefly Florentine and South
German merchants, while in the case of Antwerp there were also, besides
these, Spaniards, Portuguese, English, Genoese, and (though these were
less important) merchants from Northern Germany. In both cases these
foreigners were attracted by the practically unlimited freedom of trade
which distinguished the world bourses of the sixteenth century from the
mediaeval Bourses and fairs which were subject to more or less severe
restrictions.
This freedom of trade resulted in the concentration in Antwerp and
Lyons of most of the international trade of Europe and its colonies.
Here again there is a distinction. What was concentrated in Antwerp
was above all a trade in commodities, which was followed by a corre-
sponding trade in bills and means of payments, which in turn produced
trade in liquid money capital. In Lyons, on the other hand, the trade in
bills was from the beginning the chief business, and it is probable that a
real capital market developed from it earlier than in Antwerp. More of
the details later: here we must first give a sketch of the process of
development.
We have seen what forced European princes, more especially those
who were aiming at world power, since the close of the Middle Ages to
resort to ever-increasing loans. This had been so for some time before
Antwerp and Lyons became of chief importance in regard to these loans.
308 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
In the twenties and thirties, and even to a certain extent in the forties,
of the sixteenth century, the largest international financial transactions
were carried out for the Emperor, at any rate, not in Antwerp, but in
Augsburg and Genoa. Lyons attained a decisive influence in regard to
the French Crown somewhat earlier. It is, however, striking that credit
dealings with the Government in the case of both Bourses only became
a regular thing and a really important branch of business from about
1542. The years 1551-2 saw the beginning of a new and important
phase in this development. At this time Augsburg, Genoa, and Flor-
ence lost what had remained of their importance as centres of great
international finance, which henceforward was entirely concentrated in
the Capital Bourses. On both Bourses a credit boom set in which led in
five years' time to the first large financial crisis. Another interval of
five years brought events which led immediately to the ruin of both
markets.
The short period of greatest prosperity in Antwerp and Lyons was the
time when Turkish pashas invested in the French King's loans in Lyons,
when Henry of Rantzau, the statesman and Maecenas of Holstein,
hastened to bring his capital to Antwerp, when the total of dealings in
money transacted in one year on the Antwerp Bourse was put as high as
40 million ducats. We must now try to go more deeply into the real
nature of proceedings which had such great results.
Fairs and Bowses. The development of the international Bourses of
the sixteenth century is only a fragment of the enormous cultural
process which began with the dawn of any form of trade and must con-
tinue as long as trade lasts - the process of local concentration of trade
on the formation of markets.
A market arises from the fact that many dealers meet at the same
time in & given place to exchange commodities and that they compete
with one another for this purpose. In so doing they perform a piece of
productive work. They overcome the hindrances to trade and the
supply of commodities arising from the fact that many goods are not
available at the time and place where they are needed. We need not
deal here with the causes of the latter fact, but only with the difficulties
to be overcome in the future development of markets.
The formation of markets has both natural and artificial hindrances
to contend with. Natural hindrances consist first in the feebleness of
trade itself, and secondly in the imperfection of its tools, the roads,
transport, and the news service. Next comes the hindrance caused by
robberies, by ceaseless wars and feuds, by the never-ending customs
barriers of the olden times, and much else of the same kind. To this
must be added the intentional restriction of competitors by regulations
of the states, municipalities, religious and other confraternities,
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 309
guilds, etc. As long as trade Las to contend step by step with such great
difficulties, the formation of markets also must remain imperfect: to the
greatest degree and for the longest time in the case of goods which have
to be brought to market in order to be dealt in, while in the case of
goods when this is not necessary a market is much more easily formed.
The steady pressure towards trade concentration in the Middle Ages
triumphed over these difficulties sufficiently to form yearly markets or
fairs, i.e. markets which recurred at long intervals from one to at most
four times a year. The extent of the trade, the condition of the roads and
means of transport proved adequate, at any rate, in the case of many
commodities for these markets. Trade in them also enjoyed a certain
amount of freedom: freedom from disturbance through violence as well
as from the influence of the measures to restrict competition imposed
by the Church, the State, the municipalities, and others. Trade concen-
tration in the Middle Ages was really confined to those commodities
which had to be taken to market, i.e. to goods in the narrower sense. It
was then only within the market itself that there were houses for buying
and other appliances, intended not so much in the economic interest as
in that of civil control. On the other hand, in exchange business - as we
have seen in our introductory section - trade-concentration even in the
Middle Ages in certain isolated instances went so far as to produce
Bourses. Exchange business on the Bourse soon had as its appendage
Bourse transactions in loan capital for commercial purposes.
We cannot here enter in detail into the development from fair to
Bourse in the case of trade in commodities properly speaking. Sufficient
to say that the increase of trade, the improvement in communications,
and the grant of complete trade freedom to certain markets helped to
give a Bourse character to trade in commodities in these markets from
the close of the Middle Ages; and the fairs gradually lost their former
importance. Contemporaries at first regarded this as a dangerous
anomaly; but they quickly became accustomed to it, and we soon find
Lodovico Guicciardini calling Antwerp a 'continuous fair.'
The development of exchange business was on rather different lines.
It had been customary from early times to specify a fair as the term for
all large engagements and to discharge these together with any which
had been undertaken during the progress of the fair at its close. This
custom came about from the same causes which produced the fairs.
There was a shortage of ready money, which was practically unobtain-
able except at fair times. It was difficult and dangerous to transport it.
Cash transactions and sending ready money about were to be avoided
as far as possible. Debits were set off against one another at the end of
the fairs. Exchange business, more especially the money changing ren-
dered necessary by the excessively depreciated currency and the in-
310 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
numerable different coinages, was relieved at fair times of the burden-
some restrictions imposed upon it at other seasons. In short, the fair in
the Middle Ages became the usual term for all large payments; and pay-
ment was already effected to a large extent by clearing-house methods,
i.e. without money actually changing hands.
This arrangement soon affected exchange business. Like other en-
gagements Mils were for choice met at fair times. Accordingly, such
bills as matured at fair times were always the easiest to buy and sell;
while, conversely, bills on certain markets were easiest to get and to
dispose of during the fair payments.
The use of bills reduced the amount of specie payments between
different places, just as the clearing-house system at the fairs reduced
them at a given place. The chief intermediaries in both cases were the
The whole system of mediaeval fair payments was a help to credit
transactions in general and, of course, first and foremost that of the
merchants. We have seen in the introduction how the Italians as early
as the thirteenth century found it more profitable to draw bills on a
large fair than to borrow. In the centuries following the bill of exchange
became more and more an instrument of commercial credit, which by
its means began successfully to evade the ban on usury. Indirectly,
that is, through the agency of merchants, such operations on occasions
even relieved the fiscal monetary needs of princes.
It might be thought that fair-time payments, like the fairs themselves,
must gradually have lost their importance at the end of the Middle Ages.
The exact reverse was, however, the case. The amount of specie in cir-
culation increased, but the need of currency increased at least in the
same proportion. The transport of specie was still difficult and danger-
ous, though less so than in mediaeval times. The inconvenience and risk
of sending ready money increased with the amount sent. The restric-
tions which the local authorities imposed on money changing and the
penalties for any infraction of the official valuation of the currency had
almost entirely lost their effect, but the false coining of the princes con-
tinued briskly. The merchant class was now much more sensitive to
these ills, but it learnt more and more how to render them harmless.
For this end it developed money surrogates (bills and clearing-house
payments), and created, in close connection with these, unalterable con-
ventional fair currencies. A belated effect of the ban on usury here
played a considerable part. The ban had, in fact, lost the greater part
of its influence, but the merchants for long held it necessary to protect
themselves against chicanery by giving the forbidden transactions an
unexceptionable form. The fair bill of exchange was recognized as such
a form, and in the sixteeneth century the theory of canon and com-
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 311
mercial law had devised for it a strong ahield of fine-drawn justifications
and distinctions.* Everything, however, turned on the necessity for the
greatest possible trade concentration. While even the fairs at Antwerp
and Lyons lost most of their importance in the sixteenth century, the
fair payments in both markets in the first two-thirds of the century, but
more especially in the second third, acted as clearing houses for the
whole of Europe.
The Antwerp and Lyons fair payments were the usual dates for the
discharge of liabilities. It was usually very difficult to obtain large
amounts of money capital at any other time. The transactions, however,
which gave rise to these payments were now for the most part concluded
outside the fairs. In this respect the development was the same as in the
case of the trade in commodities. The more money and credit business
increased and the more the means of communication improved - and
here it is a question of news rather than transport - the more this trade
could move freely to its centres even apart from fair times, the more
continuous did it become and the more did it assume the character of
Bourse business. We shall see later exactly what we understand by
this. Here we must deal with the external form given to capital transac-
tions by all the influences we have mentioned in the world Bourses of
the sixteenth century.
The Forms of Commercial Capital Transactions. We have dealt fully
with these forms in the two preceding chapters. We know that two
forms were principally used as a modest disguise for the loan at interest.
These were the Eicorsa bill and the Deposition.
The Eicorsa bill, originally Eecambium, a transaction which was only
intended to allow recourse on the drawer of the bill by the holder in case
of default, was certainly not much used before the sixteenth century as
a cloak for loans. This was done at first chiefly in the way which we
come to know in the case of Antwerp from the Eeport of the Paris jurists
in 1530, and in the case of Lyons from Davanzati's description. This
'Eicorsa bill in two Acts' was not only a credit instrument, but also con-
tained a strongly speculative element, as no one could foresee the ex-
change rate at the time of the re-exchange. Accordingly, there was a
possibility of making a profit, not only on the interest, but on the differ-
ence in the exchange rate. This element was only got rid of when later
the two acts of the Eicorsa bill were amalgamated in the Genoese bill
fairs. The same result was meanwhile attained by the second form em-
ployed in the commercial credit business of the two world bourses, the
Bourse deposit.
The Bourse deposit was at bottom nothing other than the loan from
Cf. e.g. Endemann, Studien, I, 157 ff., 278 fi.
312 THE AGE OP THE FUGGEE
fair to fair, which must have been fairly frequent even in the Middle
Ages. Its name 'deposition' arose in the sixteenth century from the
necessity of justifying from the ecclesiastical point of view an indispens-
able kind of business. It was indispensable because of the rapid exten-
sion of capital transactions in the two world bourses. Hence it came
about that Charles V in 1540 imposed a tax on interest in the case of
transactions of this kind, and by tikis act the authority of the state made
a wide breach in the wall of the mediaeval ban on usury.
The Bourse deposit took the form either of a bill or - in the Nether-
lands - of a bearer bond, which for this purpose in 1537 was subject to
the same rigid rules as to form which characterized the bill. Both these
forms were only two different varieties of the fair bill, which, as we have
seen, owed its economic importance to the fact that it provided a form
to commercial credit to which exception could not be taken.
The Importance of the World Bowses for Public Credit. The world
Bourses of the sixteenth century, on the one hand, made it easy for the
South German and Italian merchants to turn their attention to finance
business, and, on the other hand, they helped princes to raise large loans
at interest. The process here carried out was a special case of the forma-
tion of markets.
In the first decades of the sixteenth century large financial dealings
were still chiefly transacted in Augsburg, Genoa, and Florence, where the
business houses, with the most important money capital at their dis-
posal, had their head-quarters. They were concluded after negotiations
with individual firms, without direct competition of one house with
another: thus not in the characteristic market manner. The payments
resulting from such engagements were, for the most part, made in
Lyons or Antwerp, where the whole world in any case had either to
make or to receive payment.
Even in this period, however, it happened on occasion that merchants
in Lyons or Antwerp lent to princes because they had money over after
a fair payment and took the opportunity of profitably employing it till
the next fair with a financial official who might be at the fair. But there
was as yet no regular Bourse business of this kind. The same holds good
of the occasional loans which the princes in the case of a specially press-
ing call for money had raised in Lyons and Antwerp. These loans were
more or less compulsory, and were secured by three or four different
interlocking guarantees, and the pawning of the Crown jewels and what
not. It needed the influence of the most distinguished statesmen as well
as threats of every kind before they at last came painfully into being.
Loans such as these were not really Bourse loans - a fact proved by the
violent and frequent fluctuations in their rate of interest.
The twenties and thirties of the sixteenth century saw a gradual
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 313
change, due to the fact that the Florentines settled in Lyons, and certain
South Germans, like Hans Kleberg and Lazarus Tucher, learnt how to
meet the monetary requirements of the powers struggling for the first
place in the world. The years 1542-3 and 1551-2 were critical in this
process of development.
For once we can time an important stage in economic development
exactly because political forces here came into play to an even greater
extent than economics; and political effects tend to be catastrophic, as
opposed to the slow, almost imperceptible action of economic forces and
interests. The first impulse to the market formation we are here con-
sidering did not count from the side of supply, from capital seeking
investment, but from demand, the princes and their need of money.
We see this in the case of Lyons from the fact that Francis I himself,
after 1542, several times had to resort to indirect measures of confisca-
tion in order to raise loans. The war between Charles V and Francis I,
which began in 1542, demanded armaments on a scale never before seen.
The French King put two armies in the field, and one of these was said
to be eighty to a hundred thousand strong. These were not Swiss and
Germans alone, but Swedish and Danish mercenaries also; for Francis
had made alliances with the Kings of Denmark and Sweden. He had
also allied himself with tibe Turks and so had forced the Hapsburg
brothers on their side to raise several large armies. On sea, too, large
forces were raised on both sides. King Henry VTII of England also pre-
pared for war, and all Europe bristled with arms.
This all required money on such a scale that the princes finally gave
up the last shred of their dislike of floating loans bearing interest, which
now became a regular means of covering extraordinary expenditure and
were soon used for ordinary current expenses as well. Loans both so
frequent and so large could not be raised either compulsorily from the
princes' subjects nor yet voluntarily with the different business houses
who had hitherto helped them out of their difficulties. In this extremity
two men first and foremost recognized the proper method: Gaspar Ducci
in Antwerp, and the Cardinal de Tournon in Lyons. They had recourse,
not to separate merchants, but to the Bourses.
Meanwhile, the supply of money capital in both markets had greatly
increased in consequence of the large changes in world trade, which we
already know. Many South German and Italian merchants had settled
permanently in Antwerp and Lyons, where they greatly helped in bring-
ing in their countrymen into financial dealings which promised much
profit and appeared safe. The same thing was done by the Antwerp and
Lyons agents of the great business houses, which let themselves be
carried away only too easily, till at last the agents had it all their own
way and the factories in the two world Bourses were converted into
314 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
head offices. The trading companies now attracted from every side the
free money capital of the small holders of capital, and for these they paid
a much lower rate than what they were able to get in financial dealings.
On the Bourses themselves the great financiers borrowed more and
more outside capital, which could not else have found employment and
was therefore relatively cheap.
The supply of money capital in liquid form was more and more
concentrated in Lyons and Antwerp, and the princes and their financial
advisers were not slow to profit by this. In France, especially, this was
cleverly done. It was published abroad that anyone taking up the
King's loans would get far higher interest than could be had otherwise
in Lyons on bills or deposits. This meant the beginning of the Public
Subscription Loan, a system which underwent important developments
in Lyons. The South German and Italian financiers here again took an
active part.
In Antwerp also a subscription loan was opened as early as 1542. It
was, however, without interest and was only an occasion for the display
of loyalty in face of the threatened invasion by the French. In Antwerp
it did not become a system. Even Ducci, who then played the chief part
in financial dealings in Antwerp, had to pay a rate far in excess of the
market rate in the case of the large loans he raised for the Emperor and
the Netherlands Government. It was, however, lower than it had been
before -a sure sign that the supply of capital was increasing more
quickly than the demand. This impression is strengthened when we
consider that the city of Antwerp and the King of Portugal at this time
were making demands on the money market much greater than ever
before, and that the English Crown was now beginning for the first time
to borrow largely in Antwerp.
Gaspar Ducci attained his end chiefly by the issue of great masses of
the bonds of the Receivers General. The causes of the favour now ex-
tended by the Antwerp Bourse to a class of investment which it had
before regarded with justifiable suspicion must be the subject of our
investigation later. We cannot discover Ducci's methods in detail; we
may, however, be sure that his intention of selling such bonds was
always known on the Antwerp Bourse generally and at once, and that he
used many artifices, not always of a desirable kind, to increase the
success of these issues. At any rate, the business in bonds of the Re-
ceivers General was done through the market; the demand was directly
competitive.
The ambition to share in the Antwerp and Lyons financial dealings
affected an ever-widening circle, until finally even the most violent in-
crease of the demand did not exhaust the supply, and whole classes of
the European peoples were seized by a regular mania or craze for the
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 315
possession of these magic parchments known on the world Bourses as
King's Bonds, Court Bonds, or Bonds of the Receivers General.
The last great war which Charles V had waged against France and
her allies from 1552 onwards, and which Philip had to continue after his
father's abdication, made claims on the Bourse which hitherto would
have been regarded as unthinkable. The system of employing mercen-
aries now reached its highest point, as may be seen from the fact that
from 1552 onwards there were standing regiments of Swiss in the service
of the French Crown. 1
In 1552 Gaspar Schetz in Antwerp was appointed by the Brussels
Court as the first financial agent proper; and at the same time Thomas
Gresham appeared as the representative of the English Government in
their financial dealings on the English Bourse. This marks a further
stage in the process of development. The princes, when they wished to
raise large loans in Lyons or Antwerp, at first used to send their highest
finance officers; later they more and more frequently made use of the
agency of the merchants resident at the Bourse centres and of brokers.
At the beginning they conferred on these agents only titles and honours,
a sort of semi-official position; now they gave them out and out an
official position, while in Lyons the Governor-General, the King's Gover-
nor, acted as his chief financial agent.
So we find at the close of the development, on the one hand, official
representatives of the most powerful European monarchs permanently
accredited to the world Bourses; and, on the other hand, we note that
the Antwerp and Lyons agents of the great financiers are the real
leaders. It would be hard to conceive a more striking proof of the
irresistible influence of the market.
The Commonalty of the Bourse and Bourse Opinion. The complete free-
dom enjoyed by trade in Antwerp and Lyons in the sixteenth century
was far the most powerful incentive to business concentration, more
important than the improvement in communications, which began to
take the lead in this direction in the nineteenth century. Freedom to
trade took away most of their meaning from the mediaeval privileges of
isolated foreign 'nations' and welded the members of those nations who
crowded into the centres of international business into a merchant class,
more or less homogeneous both as to its rights and its duties. It was this
liberty, in the first place, which made business on commission possible,
and so enormously extended the numbers of those who could share in
the advantages of the market. Finally, it was this that destroyed the
rigid mediaval organization of local trade and created the modern
Bourse. On this last process we must concentrate our attention, restrict-
ing ourselves in the main to dealings in capital.
Max Jahns, Heeresverfaanmeen vnd VSlkerkben, 2nd ed. (1886), p. 266 fi.
316 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
The mediaeval Bourses, as we have seen in our introduction, were
local assemblies of merchants mainly for the purpose of dealing in bills
of exchange and loans of capital for commerce. The transaction of this
business was the common object which brought together merchants of
different kinds who otherwise would have had nothing in common.
The Bourse enabled these different dealers to deal directly with one
another in buying and selling bills and loans of commercial capital.
In the Middle Ages the Italians had control of business of this sort, as
they were the only people who dealt in these on a sufficient scale to form
a market. Accordingly, mediaeval Bourses were permanent assemblies
of Italian merchants, which members of other nations only took part in
when they had to do business in bills or capital on loan. Generally
speaking, they remained in their houses or warehouses or their own
special assemblies, in which Bourse business proper either did not exist
or only came about on occasions.
This was the state of things about 1500 even in Bruges, the city which
in the Middle Ages was the strangers' town par excellence. The different
nations were then held apart by jealously guarded special privileges and
by the vested interests of the natives, who reserved for themselves
certain agency services (innkeeping, brokerage, etc), even if they did
not, as was the custom everywhere else in the Middle Ages, entirely pro-
hibit dealings of the 'visitors' amongst themselves.
Meanwhile, Antwerp created a Bourse for the merchants 'of all
nations,' abolished all restrictions on their trade, brought them into
immediate daily communication, and created what the Paris jurists in
their memorandum of 1530 called the 'Bourse commonalty,' i.e. an as-
sembly of business men of different nations for a common purpose, the
transaction of business of a given kind, an assembly whose members
accordingly had certain interests in common with one another. As to
the kind of business which formed the common end, it is sufficient to
say here that dealing in exchange remained the chief business of the
Within the Bourse there was formed what we call the feeling of the
Bourse, i.e. a common public opinion as to certain important elements
of Bourse business formed from the subjective views of the different
habitues of the Bourse from their immediate contact with one another,
a feeling which soon came to be a most powerful influence in determin-
ing these elements.
These are the credit of those admitted to the Bourse, and the quality
and price of the commodities dealt in. Dealing not organized as a
market knows no public opinion on such matters. Every buyer or seller
is forced to form his independent judgment. He has, of course, certain
clues for his guidance in other similar transactions or in other individual
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 317
views which he has noticed had been held by others before on such
points. He does not, however, know what these are at the moment of
the transaction; and in view of the great difficulty of forming a correct
judgment on such subjects, this is what is finally decisive, especially for
trade whose essence is that its operations must be quickly carried out.
Every market creates a market opinion. Among the traders who visit
the market a general view grows up as to certain important elements
of the business of the market, and this market opinion immediately
acquires an independent meaning for the purpose of this business. In
the case where the market is not yet full-fledged, as in the mediaeval
type of fair, the significance of the market opinion is only imperfectly
developed, first because those who form it are few in number and then
because, generally speaking, it can only come about two or three times a
year. Conditions are quite different in the daily business of the Bourse.
The opinion of the market or the Bourse here becomes a factor of the
first importance.
It seems fitting here to discuss the influence of the Bourses on the
development of the international news service. 1
Long before diplomacy had sufficiently perfected its system to get the
necessary political news on its own, an abundance of political and other
news reached the centres of trade. From early times the merchant, in
order to ply his trade, had had to have accurate information as to cur-
rent events which largely determined such things as the safety of the
roads, the course of commodity prices and the credit-worthiness of other
merchants. The merchants' letters of the earlier period, therefore, regu-
larly contained news of this kind often in great detail. These were the
first 'newsletters,' which at a later time were composed by professionals
and soon were printed - a development which began about the end of
the sixteenth century.
In the mediaeval fairs news of all kinds came in with the merchants
themselves, and passing from one to the other formed the real basis of
public opinion. Where a daily Bourse developed, the news service also
became permanent. Already during the Middle Ages the best informa-
tion as to the course of events in the world was regularly to be obtained
in the fairs and the Bourses.
This statement applies in a far higher degree to the world Bourses of
the sixteenth century. In order to see this we need only look at the
dispatches of the Venetian envoys collected in the Diaries of Marino
Sanuto or the reports of the English diplomatic agents, to notice how
much of their news originated either directly or indirectly from Antwerp
* Of. Ehrenberg, 'Gesohriebene Hamburger Zeitnngen im 16 Jahrhundert' in
Mitih. d. VereiJff. Hambg. Geschichte.&L VI,Heft 1, No. 8. See daoDialogues
Flamen-Frantoys, recueUliz par Gerard de Viyre, Rotterdam, 1607.
318 THE AGE OP THE FUGGER
or Lyons. It is astonishing how much at that time diplomacy was in-
debted to trade for its news service. We have already referred to the
fact that it was Thomas Gresham's close and important connection with
the Antwerp Bourse which caused Queen Elizabeth and her statesmen
regularly to be better informed than any other Government of the
time as to everything that happened in Europe.
It will be evident without more comment that a news service of this
Bourse opinion in the world bourses.
We must now enter in detail into the meaning of this Bourse opinion
in so far as is necessary for our own particular purpose. In so doing we
disregard altogether the large question of speculation in commodities
and its importance for the Bourse business of the sixteenth century and
must once again limit ourselves as we have done before to the traffic
in bills and loan capital.
Bourse Opinion and Commercial Credit Transactions. The Ditto, di
Sorsa. In the case of individual isolated credit transactions, that is, in
those not effected through a market, every person who gives credit has
to form an independent judgment as to the credit-worthiness of the
person to whom he gives it. This is always an extremely difficult task,
and it becomes quite impossible when the persons concerned live in dis-
tant places only to be reached with enormous difficulty when means of
communication were bad. On this account, therefore, the mediaeval
fairs served international credit business as a device for measuring
solvency. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Florentine
merchant Balduci Pegolotti says of the Champagne fairs: 'Anyone who
fails to meet his engagements at the fair settling days is held for bank-
rupt. He completely loses his credit and cannot show his face at the
fairs.' 1 This system for assessing solvency had, however, the important
defect that it acted both too seldom and too late. The Bourse remedied
the defect in so far as that was possible. The Antwerp Continues codi-
fied customary laws, contain regulations as to persons who are 'called
insolvent by public report on the Bourse.'* This, however, was only a
negative criterion, the economic importance of which cannot be rated
very high. The Bourse, on the other hand, was most important for com-
mercial credit transactions because Bourse opinion furnished com-
mercial credit with the idea of the good solvent Bourse firm, or Ditta di
Borsa, as a positive permanent conception which could be turned to
account in business.
The Romanic commercial language of the Middle Ages designated
Pignini, Delia Decima e deBe altre gravezze, etc., TV, 239.
1 'By openbaren ghernohte ter borsse voor insolvent befaemt,' in Coutumes, fates
Impresnae, v. 1582 (Coutumes d'Anvers ed. Long<, II, 412).
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 319
ditto (dica, dicta from dicere) a commercial promise to pay a guarantee
or security, and also the document containing such an engagement or
the signature or trademark which made it valid in law. More especially
the security given by the Eomanic above all the Italian exchange
dealers and bankers for the engagements of their deposit clients was
called by this name. As this security was effected by book entry, by
transfer in the bankers' books from one account to another, book entry
also bore the same name. The modern Italian meaning of the word in
the sense of a business firm appears to have arisen in the sixteenth
century, and this is certainly true of the specific meaning which is in
question here. The South German business correspondents of the six-
teenth century use the word 'ditta' very frequently in the sense of a
commercial borrower in bills or deposit business on the Bourse, and they
use the expression 'Buone ditte' when they wish to designate these
borrowers as credit worthy. Finally, the term 'Ditte di Borsa' is used
to mean those borrowers who are generally accounted solvent on the
The Bourse opinion of the international Bourses of the sixteenth
century held as 'good' beyond all doubt a large number of business
houses of different nationalities, whose representatives did business on
the Bourse every day and borrowed largely. In this way individual
lenders were spared the difficult task of examining the credit-worthiness
of these houses, if they gave them credit. It is obvious that this greatly
facilitated the development on the Bourse of a regular large business in
bills and commercial loan capital. For in this business the fact that
credit-worthiness had been established acted as an authoritative deci-
sion as to the quality of the object dealt in. From now onwards there
was a large mass of commercial claims all similar in quality standard-
ized, and these formed the object of a regular Bourse business. As the
credit-worthiness of a sufficient number of Bourse firms had been con-
sidered as above suspicion (even if this was not so in actual fact), the
parties, disregarding the difficult question of quality, could concentrate
on settling the prices of bills and loan capital, and these prices could
become real Bourse prices.
Bourse Opinion and Public Credit. What we have just said of com-
mercial credit holds good also of public credit. In this case also Bourse
opinion had the effect of levelling or standardizing the differences of
quality between the different debts. Here, however, there were certain
deviations due to the special nature of public credit in early times.
As we have seen, most princes in the 'Age of the Fugger' had origin-
ally very little personal credit. Accordingly, the quality of a debt owed
by a prince was not determined, in the first place, by the credit-worthi-
ness of the debtor, but by the kind of security which he offered the
320 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
creditor, i.e. the nature of the guarantee or the pledged revenues. This
quality was extremely various in the different debts.
The real value of the engagements of the same prince varied in accord-
ance with the amount of authority the creditor was given in regard to
the pledged revenues, and also with the nature of the revenues with
reference to the time and place where they were collected and the will-
ingness and capacity to pay on the part of those liable to taxation. It
varied also with the result of the harvest and also with the political and
other general conditions of the country whose prince was borrowing. In
the same way, when it was a case of a claim secured by a guarantee,
this depended on the personal qualities and credit-worthiness of the
guarantor, whether the surety was one or another of the high nobility,
the Diets or the different cities.
The position was complicated when there were various guarantors,
whose mutual liabilities were not clearly defined. Even the forms of the
notes of hand, the signatures and seals which they bore, particular
phrases in the text and the like were regarded - whether rightly or not -
as bearing on the real value of the claims, and were often in consequence
the subject of long negotiations between the debtor and the creditor.
This leaves out the times when the princely debtor was old or ill and
people feared that his debts would not be recognized by his successor.
It needs no further proof that in view of such disparities in the quality
of debts contracted by princes it was only by exception that there could
be any question of Bourse loans, and that generally the loans were not
raised through the market, but concluded with individual business
houses. Yet it was exceedingly difficult for a single firm to judge of the
quality of the security offered. Even the largest Italian or South Ger-
man Company was unable to find out with certainty the true value of
the security offered; for example, on Spanish revenues, even if they had
permanent representatives in Spain and were kept in close touch with
Spanish conditions, even if they chose their chief agent in Spain with
the greatest care and gave him very wide powers, yet the final decision
had to be made in Italy or South Germany. The true value of a claim
on Spanish revenues had to be assessed in Genoa or Augsburg. This
was impossible, and had it been possible the effect would have been only
momentary. How could Genoa or Augsburg know whether the King of
Spain would not one day see himself compelled by unforeseen circum-
stances to repudiate the claim?
While on the one hand the dissimilarity of the different princely loans
tended to keep princes' loans in the stage of isolated transactions out-
side the market, this was in the long run impossible because the task of
estimating the real value of the different loans was too much even for
the largest isolated firms.
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 321
This situation tended steadily to standardize the business in royal
loans and to concentrate it on the Bourse, a development which we can
follow in sufficient detail in the case of Antwerp and Lyons.
In Antwerp it is most clearly shown in the ever-growing popularity of
the bonds of the Receivers General As we know, these were private
obligations issued by the Receivers General on Government account.
Since the Government gave no special security, the quality of the bonds
was entirely determined by the capacity to pay of the Receivers
General, i.e. of officials who had all been merchants originally and who
continued to be regarded as such on the Antwerp Bourse. They were
treated on the Bourse as Ditte di Borsa, and it was the opinion of the
Bourse as to their capacity to pay which determined the value of the
bonds.
It is necessary, however, to distinguish different stages in this de-
velopment. In the earlier period, i.e. up to about 1542, the opinion of
the Bourse was unfavourable to the bonds of the Receivers General. It
had not yet become habitual to judge their quality merely with regard
to the commercial capacity to pay of those who issued them. There was
a demand for notes of hand of the feudal lord, and if possible a special
additional pledge. The liability of the Receivers was not yet regarded
as a sufficient substitute for other security. After 1542, however, Gaspar
Ducci began to raise very large amounts on the Antwerp Bourse on
bonds of the Receivers General alone, a sure sign that Bourse opinion
had changed in regard to these issues. If we ask what had caused this
change of front there can only be one answer, namely, that Ducci man-
aged to convince Bourse opinion that the Receivers General were Ditte
di Borsa, and the bonds of the Receivers General became in consequence
completely standardized or fungible, were regarded by Bourse opinion
as engagements of an even quality, which could be bought by the public
without special investigation in each case.
Bourse opinion was not wrong in holding that the quality of the
bonds of the Receivers General was alike in each case, its mistake was
merely in regard to the quality itself. The Receivers General were com-
pletely unable to discharge the enormous liabilities they undertook.
The quality of the bonds was not good, but very bad.
This, however, did not become evident till the great financial crisis of
1557. Until then the bonds of the Receivers General had borne the
chief part in the enormous movement of capital concentrated in Ant-
werp, and they owed their importance in the last resort to the fact that
they were perfectly standardized (fungible). It was this which made it
possible to form Bourse opinion as to the quality of the bonds, and so
facilitated the growth of a regular Bourse business.
In the case of other loans of princes and cities in Antwerp - as, for
322 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
example, in the 'Court Bonds,' the obligations of the English Crown, the
Portuguese Crown, the city of Antwerp, etc. - we can point to the same
development, though we cannot refer it to its causes with equal cer-
tainty. We only note the fact that here also Bourse opinion acted more
and more as the factor which determined quality, and that the indi-
vidual capitalists were obviously for the most part led better in their
views and in their action by the opinion of the Bourse and that few
among them were able to escape its influence.
The development in Lyons was analogous. The capitalists who lent
their money to the French Crown through the agency of the Lyons
Bourse, from about 1542 onwards, ceased on account of the high rate of
interest to attach any special consequence to securing their claim by a
special pledge. This was, in fact, usually granted even at a later date;
but from 1550, at any rate, the King's bonds were regarded on the
Lyons Bourse as an investment of more or less even quality throughout,
and the amalgamation of the different Bourse loans into one known as
Le Grand Parti was an important step in the process of standardization.
After this the special pledge, if any, was scarcely taken into considera-
tion by Bourse in assessing the value of the loan. This depended rather
on general considerations, the material for which was taken from the
news service concentrated in the Bourse. This, however, brings us to a
fresh subject which we cannot treat at present.
Bourse Quotations and Bourse Bate of Interest. 'The price at which the
merchants deal in bills they call the Bourse price, for no man ascribes
its establishment to himself, but to the commonalty of the Bourse, i.e.
the commonalty of the place where the merchants assemble.' In this
way the Paris law faculty in the year 1530 rightly defines the function
of the Bourse in settling prices in bill transactions. This settlement of
the price had already acquired a Bourse character in many markets in
the Middle Ages; but even in Bruges the Italians still controlled the
transactions of the exchange Bourse, which was merely the daily Bourse
assembly of the Italian merchants. Subjects of other nations usually
had to apply to them, if they wished to buy or sell bills.
We know how the change came about in Antwerp and Lyons, and
that the Italians lost their monopoly. Exchange dealing in both mar-
kets now assumed the character of world Bourse business, that is to say,
the supply and demand of international exchange dealing was concen-
trated there on such a large scale that daily direct mass transactions
were now possible between the subjects of the different nations.
At the same time, the standardization of commercial credit made such
strides that in normal times there were enough Ditte di Borsa - that is,
enough Bourse firms regarded as solvent beyond question -to make
possible large daily transactions in bills which were considered as being
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 323
all alike of good quality and which therefore needed no further ex-
The manner of making the price each day was built up on this basis.
An accurate description is given of this also in the Paris memorandum,
evidently from information supplied by an Antwerp merchant: 'The
broker who has been commissioned by a merchant to buy a bill on
Spain seeks out on the Bourse one of those "rich and powerful mer-
chants" who no longer deal in "commodities, but in money and exchange.
The broker then asks him whether he will draw a bill, and if so on what
terms? He in his turn answers by asking "What is the Bourse price?"
If he is content with the price the broker names, the business comes to
pass.'
The process was, of course, often different from the one described.
The crucial point is that the making of the price is no longer an indi-
vidual act, but is controlled by the opinion of the Bourse. The price
which Bourse opinion settled as the right price, either once a day or
under certain circumstances several times a day, for the bills of a certain
kind issued by solvent Bourse firms, this price is the Bourse price for
that kind of bill. It is noted in the business letters and the price bulle-
tin. The smaller Bourses followed its lead, and it became the basis for
exchange dealing between the different markets.
As a matter of fact, transactions were often concluded on the Bourse
at rates more or less widely divergent from the general Bourse prices.
These cases, however, were determined by special circumstances, such
as extra risk, inexperience of one of the parties, clumsiness on the part
of the broker, and so on. Transactions of this sort were more or less
individual prices made in the Bourse business, but even they could not
entirely escape the influence of the Bourse price for the standard type of
the kind of bill in question.
The 'Conto,' the official list of quotations which was settled in Lyons
during each fair pay day, was at bottom merely the officially attested
result of an inquiry undertaken four times yearly under the supervision
of the authorities as to Bourse opinion in regards to the price of bills.
The importance of the 'Conto' was, as we have explained in an earlier
chapter, chiefly legal, but the Bourse price itself was an economic
phenomenon of the first order, to which we must give a special discus-
sion later.
The Bourse rate of interest was arrived at in the same way as the
Bourse quotations for bills. In this case also we have to do with a
phenomenon the beginnings of which stretch back a long way into the
Middle Ages. We have shown in the introduction that in the thirteenth
century, in the Champagne fairs, there must have been a sort of market
rate of interest; and that the Italians, in the fifteenth century at any
324 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
rate, had learnt empirically the rules which, produced ebb and flood in
the capital markets. This knowledge became common property of the
European merchant class as a whole in the sixteenth century with the
growth of the practice of borrowing and lending money capital in the
market. The standardization of commercial credit here had the same
effect as in exchange dealing. In Antwerp and Lyons there arose a
Bourse rate of interest for loans of solvent firms from fair to fair, and
this rate was sanctioned by the secular authority in the Netherlands
with the filing of a maximum of 12 per cent.; and it used the trans-
parent veil of the 'Depositum' as a protection against ecclesiastical
attacks. As the interest payable at the time on Bourse deposits was also
notified abroad in the Bulletin of Bourse quotations, the parallel with
the exchange quotations is perfect.
The Bourse rate of interest applied only to the Ditte di Borsa; other
debtors paid higher rates. This is true especially of Bourse loans to
princes, the rate of which regularly was far in excess of the Bourse rate.
This was, however, rather apparent than real. The rate itself was not
higher, but only the insurance against risk. For a long time the fluctua-
tions here were very wide. In the case of these loans, even on the
Bourses, the price was made as an isolated instance. It was only from
1542 onwards that it assumed a Bourse character, and thenceforward
the rate for the princely loans on the Bourse was fairly parallel with the
ordinary Bourse rate. For every kind of princely or other public loan
(Bonds of the Receivers General, Court Bonds, Obligations of the Eng-
lish Crown, etc.) Bourse opinion fixed a rate of insurance against risk
which depended on the view taken of the quality of the kind of loan.
The amount of this premium varied only within bearable limits.
On the other hand, another movement set in which appears to be
exactly contrary, but which in the last resort is to be referred back to
the same causes. There began to be fluctuations in the capital value of
the princely debts already in circulation.
This phenomenon had its roots far back in the Middle Ages. The
shares in the early Italian Monti had been subject to fluctuations in price.
In the case of the world Bourses of the sixteenth century we are able to
give, at any rate an approximate, date for the first scarcely noticeable
beginnings of the price fluctuations which have since characterized
Bourse business. We saw that in the Lyons Bourse in 1530 the 'King's
Bonds' were sold at a slight discount of between J and 1J per cent.,
which increased in the next few years to a discount of between 4-6 per
cent. After the State bankruptcy of 1557, this grew to 15 per cent., and
then increased still further. We cannot follow out this development in
the case of Antwerp, though we know that here too at a later time bonds
of the Receivers (Jeneral could only be sold at a heavy sacrifice. The
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 325
fact, which no one disputes, that it was the fluctuations in price which
first brought about regular Bourse business in the already existing
Bong's Bonds, may at first sight appear astonishing. People might be
inclined to think that claims regarded as possibly doubtful would be
less dealt in than those which Bourse opinion held as sound. A closer
consideration soon shows the reason of this phenomenon.
While the credit of the French Grown was regarded as unimpeachable,
the original creditors who had the 'King's Bonds' on account of their
high rate of interest held them as long as possible; and persons anxious
to invest in these securities had accordingly to apply to the agents of
the French finance administration and take over new bonds at par. In
the year 1550 many well-informed creditors of the Crown did not regard
its credit as entirely unassailable, and accordingly sought to dispose of
their holdings, if not at the face value, then at a small discount. This
is the germ of the 'Baisse' tendency of our present Stock Exchanges.
This discount, on the other hand, produced a widespread inclination to
buy 'King's Bonds,' and thus calledinto being a 'Hausse' tendency (rising
market). The struggle between these two opposing tendencies gave rise
to the Bourse opinion as to market value of the 'King's Bonds,' that is,
their Bourse price. This was reported by the habitues of the Bourse to
their foreign business associates, who were also holders, but the official
Bourse bulletin did not publish it till long after.
Speculation and Arbitrage in Capital Transactions. Bourse prices and
Bourse rates of interest are, as we now know, the product of Bourse
opinion. What, then, is Bourse opinion? The expression 'opinion' might
easily produce misconceptions, especially since we have heard that
Bourse opinion is bound to investigate the quality and also to fix the
price of certain offers of capital on loans, bills, etc., and that in this task
it based itself on the news service concentrated in the Bourse. Hence,
involuntarily we may come to think that the question here is one of
competition in ascertaining the truth, the 'true price,' or the like. The
canonical doctrine of usury had been strongly influenced by such
views, e.g. in its judgment on the fair bill. Even at present such ideas
are not yet completely dispelled, though they are, of course, quite
erroneous.
Bourse opinion is not like perhaps, for instance, scientific opinion,
meant to serve truth, but to serve trade. The Bourse habitues want to
make money. That is their private economic aim. In order to carry out
their private purpose they form a market and so discharge a public
economic duty. The market would not be formed if the habitue^ did
not want to make money. The wish to make money is the indispensable
condition for the performance of the special tasks performed by Bourse
opinion, the settlement of Bourse prices, and so on. The performance of
326 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
a service necessary in the interests of public economy is not necessarily
dependent on the attainment of the individual's private aim, or vice
versa. Experience seems rather to show the contrary. It is an impor-
tant consequence of our economic system which everywhere hands over
economic -that is, social - functions to the egoism of the individual
guided by his own intelligence, because in this case both the common
feeling of the community and a mechanism guided by pure compulsion
are inadequate.
The money-making instinct which Bourse opinion is formed to serve
is guided by intellect. The Bourse habitues try before concluding their
transactions to get clear as to all the points telling for or against the
attainment of their business objective. Such points are, however, only
to a very small extent of such a nature as to allow conclusions to be
drawn which are both sure and instantly realizable. For the most part
they are only of a kind to produce guesses, opinions on which the Bourse
opinion bases itself. This, again, is a necessary consequence of our whole
economic system. The more it rests on exchange of commodities, the
more its uncertainty increases; for on this account the individual is in
conduct of his business dependent on other individuals, often at a great
distance, and on foreign markets; and he is obliged ever increasingly to
bring the future into the circle of his calculations.
Here we reach the point where we can look back on our concrete con-
ditions and can link up with what we have said as to the difficulties
experienced by individual lenders in credit transactions carried on out-
side a market in ascertaining the quality of princes' acknowledgments of
indebtedness.
The change which came about when Bourse opinion took over the
business of valuing quality, was not that these difficulties decreased but
that the whole process was completely revolutionized. Bourse opinion,
generally speaking, no longer troubled much about the special securities
which had given the individual lenders so much anxious thought. What
it considered important was the debtor's general capacity to pay and
good will, rightly judging that in the last resort these points were
decisive in the case of credit to be given to princes. Bourse opinion
could not act otherwise; for the news which reached the Bourses in great
quantity was not of a kind to render easier any special judgment as to
the security of individual princely notes of hand, but rather to help a
general judgment as to the political and economic situation or the
financial condition of princes. Bourse opinion was a better judge of
these general conditions than the individual business house, and this is
specially so in the case of the conclusions to be drawn as to the future.
The Bourses of Antwerp and Lyons foresaw in time the impending
crisis of 1557, but this did not prevent the South German merchants
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 327
from lending right up to the bitter end enormous amounts of capital to
the Kings of France and Spain who had long been really bankrupt.
We must here discuss parenthetically the expression which the six-
teenth century used for the business which aims at the systematic ex-
ploitation of future events, especially future prices. We call this 'specu-
lation,' but in the sixteenth century this idea was confused with that of
'arbitrage,' i.e. the business based on the exploitation of present price
differences between different Bourses. In fact these two ideas could not
be kept entirely distinct, for an arbitrage must be speculation if it aims
at making a profit on rapidly changing differences of price between
centres such as Antwerp and Lyons, when it took a month to get an
answer back from one to the other. Peri therefore is quite right when,
in 1640, he speaks as follows about 'arbitrio.' Profit, he says, is the aim
to all trade. The activity directed to this end is subject to chance, which
mocks at every calculation. Yet there is still ample space for reasonable
calculation in which the possibility of adverse fortunes is never left out
of account. This mental activity engaged in the service of business is
called 'arbitrio, 9 which Peri defines in conclusion as 'una discreta opin-
ione di guadagno, posciache delle cose incerte dassi Popinione e delle
certe la scienza.' He gives it expressly to be understood that speculation
on future price alterations is covered by his statement, and he mentions
in one breath both transactions of this kindandarbitrage proper whether
in exchange, specie, money capital, or commodities. Here we need only
deal with arbitrage and speculation in exchange and borrowed capital.
The business men who engaged in operations of this kind had first of
all to be possessed of what Peri called 'scienza,' i.e. a knowledge based
either on experience or reliable information as to those matters whose
influence either on Bourse prices or rates of interest could be predicted
either with certainty or with a high degree of probability- We know
already that the Italians in the Middle Ages had cultivated this 'science'
with success. Its results were more or less perfectly imparted by the
sixteenth century to business men of other nations. Unfortunately,
however, the upshot was not great, for even in the sixteenth century
the sum of the unknown factors in Bourse business greatly exceeded the
known. These gaps had to be filled as best they might in some other
way, and here we meet once more the ubiquitous activities of Bourse
opinion.
Bourse opinion drew from its continually flowing stream of news cer-
tain general conclusions as to future development and kept these con-
clusions in mind in filing the present Bourse price of exchange or loan
capital, a process which in present Bourse parlance is called discounting
(Bscomptiren) future events. In so doing Bourse opinion was always
liable to serious errors and was sometimes purposely misled. For, in the
328 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
first place, the prices of exchange and loan capital depended to an
extraordinary extent on incalculable factors, e.g. the frequent altera-
tions of the currency, which not only influenced exchange very greatly,
but produced general ease in the money market when expected and a
general tightness after the event. These also make the large field of public
policy even more incalculable in the sixteenth century than now.
Moreover, the number of speculators without any special knowledge
or judgment of their own has always been particularly large in this
class of transaction. For most holders of liquid capital, either small or
large, could at one time or other do business directly or indirectly in
exchange or loan capital and they were often inspired so to do on a con-
siderable scale by the merchants of their acquaintance who were in
relations with Lyons and Antwerp. This mass of persons, being in-
capable of judgment and unversed in affairs, were easily led by the wish
for easy profits, and so obtained a fatal influence on the prices both of
exchange and loan capital.
Finally, in the case of clever conscienceless habitues of the Bourse the
temptation to mislead Bourse opinion was particularly strong. On the
one hand were the risks of continual losses because the course of future
prices was incalculable, and on the other the lack of judgment on the
part of speculators. Above all, however, there was the prospect, not only
of enormous profits, but also of high distinctions, honours and titles, if
they succeeded in catching masses of free capital for the political ends of
powerful monarchs. This temptation was too much for people of the
type of Gaspar Ducci.
From 1552 onwards a real madness or 'mania' for the Bourse loans of
Antwerp and Lyons seized on the masses all over Europe, and the last
vestiges of the science which should be at hand in all speculations was
discarded, and a fever for profiteering rushed like a runner gone mad
through the richest domains of all the old painfully gathered capital to
meet the inevitable crisis.
This, however, is not our final judgment as to the world Bourses of
the sixteenth century. We reserve that to the end of this chapter. We
must first consider a factor which is often put in the forefront of all dis-
cussions as to the Bourse, though we would assign it a more modest
role. We mean what is called 'Mobilization.'
Mobilization of Loan Capital. Mobilization in the widest sense of the
word is the process by which the transfer of economic goods of every
kind is made easier by the creation and development of 'securities'
which can be used in circulation. German economic doctrine, in so far as
it uses the word at all, restricts it to the case of landed property. In all
other cases of fixed capital the process is the same as for landed pro-
perty; and even in the case of circulating capital, including all consump-
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 329
tion goods, the nature of mobilization is the same. Its essence is that it
creates a circulation of values, the only difference being that this is the
only possible form of circulation for fixed capital, while in the case of
circulating capital it goes on alongside of the circulation of commodities.
A landed estate is mobilized by the issue of mortgages, a mortgage by
the issue of sub-mortgages to bearer, a state loan by the issue of divided
bonds, and a trading or commercial undertaking is mobilized by con-
version into a company and the issue of shares; a ship's cargo by the
pledging of the bills of lading; warehoused goods by the issue of war-
rants; a bank balance by the issue of cheques; the bullion reserve of a
note-issuing bank by the issue of bank-notes; a commercial balance
abroad by the drawing of a bill; a bill by its endorsement, and so on.
In each case the value of an economic commodity is put into circula-
tion, by being incorporated in a document, or this same document,
either through some addition or through the issue of new documents,
is given greater currency.
This is, however, not as a rule the usual definition for such documents,
which at the beginning were meant for evidence of title. The general
of circulating value, 'securities.'
We cannot, however, enter into the meaning and nature of the circu-
lation of values in general, but must concentrate our attention on the
mobilization of loan capital. As the name tells us, loan capital belongs
to the great circle of groups of economic goods which do not, like con-
sumption goods, serve to the immediate satisfaction of human needs. It
serves rather to produce new goods, and taken as a whole it may be
designated from the point of view of the individual 'sources of income,'
or from the economic point of view generally as 'capital' in its widest
sense.
Loan capital in order to produce income must be lent out, that is,
must be the object of an exchange for which it is pre-eminently
fitted owing to its nature as money capital. Before this exchange is
completed it is liquid, or free to be lent out for any purpose. Claims
are not so easily exchangeable as monetary capital. The degree to which
claims are exchangeable depends on circumstances present in very
variable degrees. We have already seen what are the two most import-
ant of these circumstances. These are the economic nature, the
standardization (or fungibility) of the claims and the economic organi-
zation of the business done in such claims. There is also a third factor
to be mentioned, the external form of the claims, and in close connection
with this the legal forms in existence for exchange transactions in
Forma and legal principles which facilitate the alienation of claims are
330 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
undoubtedly of great importance in the development of this business.
The business will in one way or another call into being such forms and
legal principles, if it has urgent need of them. On the other hand, the
most favourable forms and legal principles cannot evoke a highly de-
veloped business in loan capital, if the other factors are absent. This is
particularly easy to prove in regard to the international Bourses of the
Let us take first bearer bonds. The bearer clause is very old, but in the
Middle Ages it was not meant to help the selling of the claim, but its
enforcement through a representative. This does not, however, exclude
the possibility that such securities might be transferred; but there was
quite definitely no trade in bearer bonds in the Middle Ages or the
searching investigations into such papers would certainly have revealed
some trace of such documents. 1
On the other hand, it is no less certain that in Antwerp in the first
decades of the sixteenth century there was a regular trade in Bearer
Acknowledgments of Indebtedness. This is evident from the often
quoted order of Charles V of 7th March, 1536 (7). It is here expressly
stated that in the Antwerp fairs goods were often sold against Bearer
Acknowledgments of Indebtedness, and these were often transferred
before they fell due without any formalities to third parties. Thereupon
the drawees often refused payment on maturity and this gave rise to
many lawsuits. This shows also that the habit of giving these bills in
payment was of recent growth, for otherwise either the legal uncer-
tainties due to the debtor's attitude would have been removed or pay-
ment of this kind would have been discontinued. This latter alternative
was not adopted, and the order of Charles V first declared the Bearer
Acknowledgment of Indebtedness for a binding obligation of the same
sort as a bill of exchange. 2
The regular trade in bearer securities remained at first confined to the
Netherlands, while in England bills payable to order, and in France
those where no mention is made of bearer or order came gradually into
use as a means of mobilizing claims. 3
In Antwerp the Bearer Acknowledgment of Indebtedness, as we
know, was used in deposit transactions on the Bourse, and it could either
be pledged before maturity - the fact which originally brought it into
being - or could be sold at a discount. This bearer bond was probably
* Goldsohmidt, Universalgeschidae dea HandebrecMs, I, 390 B. Brunner in
Ztsckr. f, Handdsreckt, XXH, 41 ff.
* Plac. de Brabant, I, 515. Antwerp, 'Gebodboecken' in Bulletin dea archives
d'Anvers, voL I, e.g. p. 276 (1563), p. 326 (1576), p. 344 (1579), etc.
* Cf. for England Malynes, Lex Mercatoria (1622), ch. 11 and 12; Child, A new
discourse of trade (1693), p. 7, 106 ft. 'Billets en blano,' 1601, in Docum. hiietar.
inedits, voL IV, p. zziv. Cf. Goldschmidt, Lc. p. 397.
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 331
the kind of acknowledgment of indebtedness which could be passed
from hand to hand with a discount in regular exchange business. 1 The
Bearer security accordingly first came in as a means of mobilizing loan
capital in the sixteenth century. The bill, on the other hand, still re-
mained frozen in medieval immobility. The first traces of bill endorse-
ments and bill discounting did notappear before theend of the sixteenth
century, and only gradually developed during the seventeenth. We
need not discuss here the economic causes of this development, which
hitherto has only been dealt with by jurists. In short, therefore, dur-
ing the whole time when the international Bourses of the sixteenth
century were most flourishing there was not sufficient need for the
mobilization of claims embodied in bills to call forth the necessary
external forms. When in Antwerp at the beginning of the sixteenth
century the need to mobilize commercial claims was more felt, the
long-established form of the Bearer bond was used and the bill retained
its ancient form.
The correctness of our view is upheld if we consider credit trans-
actions with the Government. All Netherlands bonds of the sixteenth
century which I have ever seen contains the bearer clause. Yet these
bonds, with the possible exception of those of the Receivers General, did
not change hands so often as those of the French Crown, which had no
bearer clause and could only be transferred, may be proved from speci-
ments in the archives of the South German nobles - with an almost
incredible amount of formalities. French transfers were long-winded
documents in an old-fashioned difficult Chancery style drawn up in
the presence of the parties by a notary and witnesses. They contained a
complete recital giving the text of the original bond. If the whole claim
were not transferred, this remained in the hands of the person who in
name was the sole creditor, and all transfers had to be endorsed on the
back of it. The original bond was usually issued in duplicate. Each one
usually carried a whole series of transfers, some referring to capital and
arrears of interest, others to capital without interest, or only a part
of the interest, and others to interest alone.
All this did not prevent a lively business in the 'King's Letters.' In
Lyons, from about 1550, they became in fact the object of large and re-
gular dealings on the Bourse. This business took matters into its own
hands by dispensing often with formal transfers and using letters and
other more or less informal documents till perhaps at last the fifth or
tenth buyer fulfilled the necessary formalities. This naturally gave rise
i Cf. e.g. Tartaglia, Trattaio <K numeri e misure (1556), 1, 193 ff. 'DUoontes ou
Rabats,' Michel Cognet, it'we d'ariihmetique, Antw. 1573. For 'esoompte' in the
seventeenth century, see Cleirac, Usance du negoce ou commerce de la banyue et
des lettres de change (1656), p. 153.
332 TH1 AGE OF THE FUGGER
to many disputes, but the Bourse business continued till the destruction
of Lyons' commercial prosperity brought it to an end.
Conclusion. Our investigation is like climbing a mountain, terrace by
terrace. We here reach a point where we may turn and look for a
moment at the view, but we are still far from the summit.
The mediaeval beginnings of capital Bourses practically did nothing
but help the capital transactions of the merchants in the markets.
They had not as yet the power of attracting to themselves capital
scattered about the world. Such capital, in so far as it was invested at
all, was in part lent direct to different princes and in part had found its
way -also indirectly -into the coffers of the numerous cities, or,
finally, a small proportion had reached the Italian business houses, who
put it out at a great profit.
Through a thousand small channels, small driblets of capital had
flowed through the narrowly fenced-in fields of mediaeval industry,
sometimes fructifying and sometimes getting lost in the sand. A few
larger streams had indeed come into being, but not yet any great central
basins. We know, however, that the need for such large concentrated
masses of capital was growing very rapidly.
We have seen that in the 'Age of the Fugger' this need was at first
satisfied by the great financiers, who at the beginning used chiefly their
own resources and then gradually came to rely more and more on
borrowed capital.
Meanwhile the international transactions of Europe, whether in
commodities or exchange, had quickly concentrated in Antwerp and
Lyons. This brought large masses of capital to both markets, and a
market rate grew up for the best commercial paper Ditte di Borsa, so
comparatively low that the large financiers were able to satisfy their
credit requirements both easily and cheaply.
Princes needing money had in their turn tried in early days to borrow
in the international markets. They, however, had to learn that it was
no simple matter to collect liquid capital for their purposes. They
had at first to pay extraordinarily high rates of interest, and even then
could only collect small sums with great difficulty. For a long time,
therefore, they had to try to satisfy their extraordinary credit require-
ments by other means, an attempt in which they were only partially
A change came about when leading financial experts in their service
began to attract capital from all sides for their loans in the market, and
consciously to increase and turn to account the inclination already pre-
sent in many quarters to wish for a high return on their money without
any effort.
The boom in capital transactions which now began in both markets
CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 383
was certainly of an unhealthy type. Its causes, whether moral or
economic, were equally dubious, and the same is true of its immediate
Tet all the same these capital transactions in the world markets of
the sixteenth century constitute a forward step of enormous importance
in civilization. For the first time business in the different markets had
brought together capital from every side on such a scale as to satisfy
the largest demands of the most important princes, and to reduce by
half the rate of interest on their loans.
This made it possible to raise large masses of capital at moderate
rates for all the modern developments of civilization and for all the
national ends of the different peoples.
This was the first step on the way to reduce the power of the in-
dividual financier within bearable limits. Though the financiers might
successfully avail themselves of the advantages offered by the world
markets and so at first increase their own power, yet the world Bourses
have more than anything else helped to make impossible the state of
things prevailing in the 'Age of the Fugger.' After they arose, it was no
longer possible even for the most powerful individual financier to deter-
mine the course of the world's history.
CONCLUSION
FROM THE TIME OF THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEBTS
NOW that we have got to know about the rise and fall of the
financial powers and the world Bourses of the sixteenth century
we must briefly trace out till the end of the period the form of public
credit in those countries where the South German and Italian financial
magnates succeeded in preserving some of their importance even after
the first crisis. We must add to this a sketch of the further development
down to the present time. Only in this way is it possible for us to form a
final judgment in the historical and industrial significance of the Age of
Spain. We can describe Spanish finance in a few words; it passed
hopelessly from one crisis to another. State bankruptcy and compulsory
intervals of about twenty years -1557, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647.
So far as concerns the compulsory consolidation always connected with
them it is enough to mention an expression of Peri. He characterizes a
new kind of Spanish Juros as a kind of compulsory payment (una sorte
di pagamento data e rieewto da qualch' anni in qua per necessitd). He adds
that they can only be sold at a great loss, since there is such a large
quantity of them, and since they are only paid in copper, although they
purport to represent silver money. Hence it came to pass that at the
beginning of the seventeenth century Spain had a copper standard in
spite of its inexhaustible silver mines in America.
The individual crises are not sufficiently interesting to require a de-
tailed account of them. On the whole they are similar to that of
1575-77. The state bankruptcy of 1596 was put an end to after a
year and a half by a compulsory consolidation. 1 The number of financial
associations affected was again only small. But behind them was an
excessively large number of sub-shareholders who, as in 1577, had also
to accept payment in depreciated Juros. To carry this out the financial
associations distributed the Juros to their shareholders, then again to
theirs, and so on, till the last small capitalist was reached - an operation
which was called 'Tanteo' (settlement). When this at last was finished
the Spanish financial officials declared that the total debt was much
smaller than had been supposed. This naturally gave rise to endless
difficulties and disputes. The credit of the Crown was for a time
* Cf. Conga Arguellee, Diedonario de hazimda v>: Aereedoroa al Estado; Habler,
Die Finamdekrete PMKppt II; Scaccia, Tract, de comma-cut et camWts, 2, GL B,
No.269fi.
FROM THE FUGGEB TO THE PRESENT 335
destroyed, which more than anything else contributed to compel them
to the unprofitable peace of Vervins. The political situation was
similar, only much more unfavourable for Spain than at the time of the
peace of Gateau Cambresis (1559). After making the most powerful
efforts to attain the hegemony of Europe, Spain only succeeded in ruin-
ing itself. 1
When Philip II died he had three times broken his word to his
creditors. Under his successors the business was managed even much
worse. It is related that in 1601 the King's confessor was the actual
manager of the finances, which consequently were in hopeless disorder;
that the Court officials could not be paid, and so on. Four years later
it is said that all the sources of income were mortgaged. If we ask how
it was that in spite of this the Crown could wage war and build costly
palaces, the answer must be that the secret was that almost no one
was paid. Often the money for the King's table was lacking. The most
necessary payment to the troops were provided by the Genoese, who for
this took mortgages on the revenues for 5-10 years in advance. 2
In November, 1607, once againpayments to the creditors of the Crown
were stopped. In this, as was usually the case in these State bank-
ruptcies, the theologians gave a helping hand to justify the breach of
faith. It took a year before the usual agreement was come to. Mean-
while, in spite of the suspension of payments, the Crown was in such
financial difficulties that it could no longer carry on the war in the
Netherlands and had to conclude a twelve years' truce. 8
But in the following year too the Asientos for Flanders and Italy went
their way. The Genoese, as always, had to come to the rescue, to save
their old claims; and the Crown required strong garrisons and many
officials to hold the southern provinces of the Netherlands or Italy. The
confusion of the finances became more and more desperate. "When
shortly before 1613 the celebrated writer Garcilasso de la Vega made a
pressing request to Morales, the King's secretary, to let him know, for
the purpose of his great work on the wars of the Spanish in America,
what was the amount of the royal revenues, Morales said that no human
being, not even the King himself, was in a position to do that; the King
was most anxious to know what his revenues were, but the measures
which he had ordered for this purpose had not yet been taken in hand;
it was, moreover, an almost impossible task. 4
> Ranke, Frz. Geachichte, II, 31. Barozzi e Berehet, Bdaz., ser. I, voL I, p. 70.
See letter of Venetian envoy.
> Cabrera, Belac. de las come swxdidas en la Corte de Evpana desde 1599 hatta
1614, p. 117 fi.; Barozzi e Berohet, Lc. I, p. 329 fi.
> Cabrera, I.e. p. 354; Fugger Archives, 43, 4 and 2, 5, 16.
'From trench edition of the works of Garcilasso de la Vega, Histoire dee
Guenes CivOes des Evpagndle dans Us Indee. Paris, 1658, 1, 18.
336 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
When the war started off again both in Italy and in the Netherlands,
when the German branch of the Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years War
had to be rescued from the heavy straits they were in by means of
large subventions, the Spanish finance degenerated into mere robbery,
which reached its height in the years 1627 to 1632. In 1627 exchequer
payments were again stopped. Further, the Grown repeatedly confis-
cated the silver coming from America for private people, and even con-
templated seizing the deposits of the banks. Copper money was alter-
nately coined and debased. In short the Fugger agent was entirely right
when he wrote to his masters that might went before right. There
was no longer government, but only tyranny. Naturally all credit was
destroyed, the people, impoverished, partly as a result of the terrible rise
in prices due to the bad currency, were straightway abandoned to star-
vation. In Italy the situation was the same. In Genoa, where everybody
had an interest in the Spanish claims, the ruin began to be general.
The great Genoese banks had come to the end of their resources, the
Fugger were completely ruined. 1 It seemed that the end of the Spanish
monarchy had come, and yet things went on just as before. A few ex-
pressions of the Venetian envoys will suffice to show this. In 1647, when
again the assignations of all Assentists, except those of the four largest
financial houses of Genoa, were annulled, the royal revenues were mort-
gaged till 1654. They had not shrunk from mortgaging many of them
twice over to different creditors. A Venetian, telling of these things in
1653, observes with bitter scorn that in order to understand how the
richest country in the world had become the poorest one must first be
convinced that no people in the world were so ignorant of the art of
good government as the Spanish. In 1673 we hear of 40 per cent,
interest which the Grown had to pay, and in 1686 Spanish finance is
depicted as a horrible chaos enveloped in impenetrable darkness. In
1700, when Garlos II, the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs, died, there
was not enough money in the Royal Treasury to defray the cost of the
funeral and the Masses for his soul. 2 In this condition Spain came under
the sway of the Bourbons. They did not save the unhappy country.
This is intelligible enough, because the ruling house was never able to
conduct for any length of time a wise financial and industrial policy in
its own rich and powerful native land. It is unjust to make the Haps-
burg dynasty primarily responsible for the financial ~' J ~
and the other misery which Spain had to endure during their rule. The
* In addition to Peri o Fogger Archives, 2, 6, 17, also M enure Fnmfais, v.
1630 ff.; BaroEzi e Berohet, I, 647, for Italy,*, Cautfi. SuUe star. d. Lomb. del gee.
XVIL (Comment, ai Promessi sposi de i Aless. Maznoni), Milano, 1832, and
MisceU. d. Oar. ital. V, 147 ff.
* Barozzi e Berohet, II, 178, 202 ff., 242, 284, 390, 529 ff., 660, 682. Cf. also
Mignet, Negoc. rOat. a la iuccessim d'Espagne, t. IL
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 337
reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, nominally the golden age of Spain,
began with a State bankruptcy and ended with such a burden of debt
outstanding that Charles I (V) had repeatedly in vain to be reminded to
liquidate them 'to disburden the souls of the Catholic Kings.' Even
in more recent times Spain has kept true to its habit of going bankrupt
about every twenty years; for since 1820 under the Bourbons and the
republic there have been State bankruptcies in the year 1820, 1837,
1851, and 1873. It is plainly an inner necessity which outlives cen-
turies. The comparison can be drawn further. How remarkable it is, for
instance, that the last good security which remained for the Fugger's
claims in Spain was the Almaden quicksilver mines which they worked
themselves, and that there mines in the most recent times again proved
to be the only security which was undoubtedly good to the Spanish
creditors who had the sufficient foresight to obtain a mortgage on them
and to manage the mines themselves! Further, it was the Eothschilds,
the Fugger of the nineteenth century, who took over the working of the
Almaden mines as a result of their financial transactions with the
Spanish Government. In fact the history of Spanish finance is instruc-
tive for anyone who is willing to learn from it.
France. We already know that during the wars of religion French
finances continually went from bad to worse, and that finally, about
1575, in Lyons the Crown could not obtain any more loans. In the next
year part of the dividends on the rentes of the State had to go unpaid.
This aroused the greatest discontent in Paris. Soon after we hear that
in Lyons the obligations of the French Crown were offered at 30 per cent,
of their face value. In the circles of the German creditors of the State
this was attributed to the machinations of individuals, and complaints
were made to the Government and to the Augsburg Council that Oswald
Seng and Christopher Neidhart had depreciated their obligations to the
damage and contempt of the credit of the French Crown. Finally, in
1580, all the assignations given to the creditors were recalled, and even
the officials were no longer paid. 1
This bankruptcy was on a level with that of the Spanish Crown five
years earlier. But, unlike that of Spain, there soon appeared in France
new financiers of Italian origin, like Diaceto, Eucellai, Sardini, Martelli,
Rametti, and others, who again did business with the Crown, which
certainly, as in Spain, got the worst of it. The Chancellor Chiverny,
the Intendant of Finance d' 0, and other highly placed persons took part
in these transactions. It even occurred that a financial syndicate gave
Desjardins, J^fcoc. dipt., IV, 71, 323; Monfaloon, Hist. man. de Lyon, H, 417.
Bodin, 1577: 'A present le pluspart (i.e. of the State creditors) veut quitter 1'inter-
est et le sort principal s'il se trouve qui veuffle donner trente pour Cent une fois
payee.' Of. A^burger St. A. Handel*chen No. 26 (22) and No. 28.
338 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
the King himself a douceur of 25,000 ecus in order to obtain a profitable
lease.
This was the time when the hatred of centuries of the French for the
Italian financiers again burst out, when the estates assembled at Blois
in 1576-7 brought forward to the King the complaint we already know
of against the foreigners. 'They fall upon our country (it runs) with a
pen behind their ear or with a dagger at their side, this is all they possess
when they arrive; but they know how to acquire boundless riches with
it.' In fact they interfered with the foreigners, made it difficult for them
to trade or set up banks, did not allow them to be officials of the State
or the Empire. But their ability and their capital could not be dis-
pensed with. In spite of the empty Treasury they always knew how to
track out new financial methods, which certainly got the dubious nick-
name of 'inventiones sanctae crucis.' To exclude the competition of the
French farmers of taxes Eametti and his syndicate offered in 1584 to
pay off 800,000 ecus of the King's debts, on which the profitable lease
of the Gabelle was made over to him because the French had not
command of such a sum.
This was the time when Bodin and others loudly denounced the con-
tinual borrowing by the Crown, when Nicolas Barnaud, under the
pseudonym of Fromenteau, showed that since Henry II ascended the
throne to the end of 1580 loans of not less than 128 million livres had
been incurred. 1 The Crown perceived that it was necessary to do some-
thing to re-establish its credit and seriously considered liquidating its
debts. This produced comparative quiet at home for a period of some
years, which did not cease till 1586. Then this offer of the Eametti
was a welcome one. The German creditors treated through Marx
Kraffter with some Swiss about the sale of their claims. They were
offered 25 per cent, for them and this would have gone to 40 per
cent. But the Nurembergers would not accept this 'Miseria,' and de-
manded 75 per cent., 'since now there is peace in France and the King
will pay off all his debts.' They had soon to rue their excessive clever-
ness; for the King paid back only 70,000 in all, that is only a few per
cent. The civil war broke out again, and in the last years of Henry III
the mismanagement reached its highest point.
'More than ever before,' a contemporary tells us, 'the Eentes in the
Hdtel de Ville of Paris remain unpaid to the destruction of many poor
widows and orphans.' Unquestionably the irritation of the citizens of
Paris at this was one of the causes of their going over to the camp of the
League which was then fighting against the Crown. Certainly this was
the chief cause of the 'Day of Barricades' (1588). When finally at the
*Le Secret da Finances de la France (1681), I, 13. For what follows, Bee
Scheuerl Archives in Nnremburg.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 339
end of the year the leader of the League, Henri de Guise, was murdered,
when eight months later the King suffered the same fate, it was natur-
ally once more all up with the credit of the Crown; there was no longer
a recognised King. Already after the death of the Due d'Anjou (1584)
the opinion had been correctly expressed in the circles of the German
creditors that it was very risky that 'the debts of the French Crown now
only stood on two eyes.' When these were shut, when an assassin's
dagger struck down the last of the Valois, the creditors of the Crown,
as we see from one of the Fugger letters, lost their credit. This par-
ticularly affected the Florentines. We already know that at that time
the Capponi - the last of the great Florentine banking houses in France
-passed into other hands.
It took about six years after the death of Henry III before the Bour-
bon Henry IV could really feel himself to be King and before the con-
dition in the State had again been got into a certain amount of order and
thus made possible a serious financial reform, which now was taken in
hand by Sully. He has been justly praised for carrying through this
reform; but it cannot be denied that the most important part of it was
a State bankruptcy. A considerable reduction was compulsorily made
in the rate of interest of the State rentes, some down to 4 per cent.; and
many millions of debts were not recognized as legitimate. In vain the
rentiers and other creditors protested; among them some who had been
reduced to great straits by these measures. On the main point Sully
remained inexorable. 1 If we reflect that in 1596 the King had expressly
recognized his liability for his predecessor's debts, from a moral stand-
point the whole measure appears to be hardly any less dubious than
one of the Spanish bankruptcies. Yet it was necessary, and in contrast
with Spain, Sully did not content himself with the inevitable breach
of faith, but took pains to introduce economy, order, and honourable
dealing into the management of the finances.
But this state of affairs vanished again. On the murder of Henry IV
and the fall of Sully a new period of financial mismanagement began;
this lasted till Colbert took office. French finance at that time only
differed in degree, but not in kind, from that of Spain. We cannot here
depict the whole development, and must content ourselves with em-
phasizing a few characteristic details.*
'We have had to use Oeconomies royales, ColL Petitot, ser. II, vols. 1-9,
though Ranke doubts them. Eoth.GteacA. d. Nvrnberger Handels, H, 21. Archiv.
des Nvrnberger Handels Vorstandes.
> Of. Gramont, Le denier royal (1620); Barin, Eistoire de Louis XIII; Mercure
Erancais (1617 fi.}: Barozzi e Berchet, Rdaz., ser. II, vol II; Journal fOrmesson,
ed. CherueL Moreau, Choi* des Massarinader, Bresson, Hist, fi
Defense de Fouquet (1665);Ranke r Prans.fl'*c^
340 THE AGE OP THE PUGGER
The extravagance of the favourites Concini and Luynes was followed
by Richelieu's far more costly Imperialism. Since the financier Herwart
had succeeded in 1630 in inducing the troops of Bernhard of Weimar to
pass over into French service, the Crown had continually to maintain
an army of 100,000 men. This was the first standing army of importance
in Europe. Then came the boundless corruption of Mazarin, whose
finance ministers helped him to plunder the public treasury. The
complaints from which French finance was then suffering, were still the
same as they were in the sixteenth century; on the one side the crushing
burden of military expenditure and the outrageous prodigality of the
Court; on the other side - farming of taxes, bargaining for offices, the
splitting up and dishonesty of the financial administration. This pro-
duced a deficit which increased like an avalanche, and a floating debt
which increased just as fast. There was nothing new in the grievances
of the people which it condensed into criminal charges against the
financiers. For example, in 1661 Fouquet was accused of putting in the
accounts invented and unnecessary payments, of himself lending money
to the Crown at high rates of interest, and having an interest in farm-
ing the taxes, that he allowed himself to be bribed by the farmers of
taxes, that he mixed up the monies of the State with his own, that he
had bought up worthless State debts and put them down at their full
value, and generally that his administration was bad. Fouquet was
entirely in the right when in his defence he declared those were mostly
old-established abuses and he had only obeyed the orders of Mazarin who
took each year 25 to 30 millions for secret expenses. Fouquet had to
advance them and justly observed, 'It was my money when it left my
chest and became the King's money when it passed into the hands of
his Eminence.' Here we get to a development, which, it is true, was then
by no means new, but which took on in France a quite different charac-
ter: we refer to the nature of the relation between the minister who
directed the finances and the people with money who supported him.
At all times, at any rate since Francois I er , there were two classes of
moneyed people which could satisfy the needs of the Crown for loans.
There were the well-to-do bourgeois (aises) and the professional money-
lenders, who now were usually called 'partisans' because they had
'partis' (monetary transactions) with the Government. The means of
the former class were utilized partly by compulsory loans (taxes des
aises), partly by issuing rentes; those of the partisans by the farming of
taxes and the anticipations always connected with this. 1 Of these two
classes the partisans were by far the most influential, because the
Government had the most pressing need of them. So long as the taxes
* Journal d'Ormesam, ed. Ch6ruel, I, 214, 415.
PROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 341
tion could be carried on without their help and credit. But on the other
hand the partisans were dependent on the financial administration,
which gave them the opportunity of making very great profits, and
which could leave their claims unpaid it they refused further assist-
ance. Prom this gradually the minister who directed the finances had
his own retinue of financiers. By the sixteenth century, both in Spain
and France, there were important tendencies to this. Under Sully,
who tried to avoid anticipations, the partisans for a time retired to the
background. In return Sully was the chief of a family clan which was
politically important. On the other hand, under his successors the train
of followers depending on financial interests developed more and more,
this finally, under Mazarin and Fouquet, acquired political import-
ance. At this time the expression 'partisan' took on a new meaning,
which it has retained to the present time; meanwhile the original mean-
ing was lost. The word was used as a common expression for 'uncon-
ditional adherent.' This means that the finance minister domineered
over his partisans, owing to the fact that he himself more and more
became the chief banker of the State and that his credit was decisive
for the Grown. Sometimes this had been the case earlier; yet as a rule the
person who directed the finances of the State played a tolerably insigni-
ficant role compared to the financial magnates. But now he became
their chief; yet he could not make himself independent of the Crown and
the chief minister. Fouquet was accused of trying to do this and it
caused his fall. But a serious political danger could scarcely be avoided.
The change which at that period came over that class of professional
financiers is of profound significance; first the foreigners were gradually
replaced by Frenchmen. What the hatred of centuries of the French for
the Italian moneylenders could not do, was now brought about by their
own exhaustion in combination with the increasing ability of the home
competitors. The end of the Italian financial business in France is
marked by the unrest of the Fronde and the State bankruptcy of 1648.
The last foreigner who played a conspicuous part in French finance was
the South German banker Herwart-who certainly was already con-
siderably gallicized and who was active at the beginning of Colbert's
time. On the other hand, at the end of Mazarin's time the great
majority of the Partisans were French. They were almost entirely
people of the lower classes, creatures of the Finance minister, partly
even lackeys and the like, who associated together and in the main
worked with the money of private people, to whom they paid relatively
high rates of interest. They themselves charged the Crown at least 15
per cent., but under some circumstances this went up to 50 per cent, or
60 per cent. This is the humble origin of the Parisian world of finance.
It is obvious that such people had to be unconditionally attached to
342 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
their protectors the Finance ministers, who therefore as a rule treated
them kindly, helped them in money difficulties and often kept them
from bankruptcy. 1 On the other hand, there were among them people
like that Giradin who at Fouquet's request made advances to the Crown
up to 3, 4, or 5 millions, and apparently without any profit to himself,
in view of the interest which he himself had to pay, and without any
security except Fouquet's promise to pay. He directed a large financial
syndicate which in 1655 took over the lease of the Gabelle.
The people got no advantage from the fact that the Italians were
replaced by French Partisans. They were just as oppressive as farmers
of the taxes; as creditors of the State they took at least as much interest
and as satellites of the influential courtiers they belonged to a class
which the people was more and more accustomed to regard as parasites.
They were hated as arrant bloodsuckers. Through their position, as we
saw, they had a great advantage over the other class of creditors - the
rentiers; for as a rule the State treated them much better than the
rentiers, who not infrequently had to complain that their dividends were
not paid in full. In addition the Partisans carried on an extensive trade
in offices and liked to remember their friends and relatives with the
fattest places. This naturally again gave occasion for more oppression.
So it is not surprising that by 1615 the name Partisan was hated
throughout France. This again led to lively complaints of the estates
and Parliament against the financiers and to the repeated appointment
of commissioners of investigation as there had been before. They could
call individuals to account, but could make no change in the system.
The revolt of the rentier of Paris in 1638 and the unrest of the Fronde in
1 649 had just as little success,but we must delay a moment over the latter.
In 1648 the financial position was as bad as could be imagined. The
revenues of the Crown were anticipated three years in advance. There-
upon the Parliament obtained the institution of a chambre de justice
against the Partisans, and in October there resulted a general suspension
of all money orders which had been given to them. It was a State bank-
ruptcy quite in the style that was usual in Spain. Payment of the
dividends should not be stopped, but should have priority over the
claims of the Partisans. Yet the rentiers soon had to complain agaia^and
this was easily made use of by the discontented nobles of the Fronde to
stir up Paris against Mazarin's Government. At this critical moment
the Crown had absolutely no credit; the Partisans neither would nor
could help. Every possible suggestion for getting money was made.
Taxes which had been imposed and compulsory loans were not paid.
Turenne's army got no pay and threatened to go over to Che Fronders.
1 See Catalogue des Partisans, or Moreau, Choix des Mazarinades, I, 113, 179,
287; Defence de Fonqnet, II, 98, 133, 207, 236, 246, 296, 312 ff.
FROM THE FUGGEE TO THE PRESENT 343
The Court sent off the banker Herwart to appease Turenne and satisfy
his troops. He failed in the first; to the extreme horror of the Court
Turenne set out on his march to Paris. But he soon found himself
deserted Toy his troops, whom Herwart had alienated by paying their
arrears of pay. Voltaire was right in saying that this event showed that
only the man who has money is the lord. This was the last occasion
when a financial magnate, quite the dramatic style of Jakob and Anton
Fugger, interfered in the course of the history of the world. The praise
too which Mazarin lavished on him in the presence of the King before
the assembled Court is also in the style of the heroic age of capitalism
which we have called the age of the Fugger. Mazarin declared that
Herwart had rescued France and preserved the King his crown; that
this service ought never to be forgotten. In fact Herwart, as we have
already related, though he was half a foreigner, and a Protestant into the
bargain, advanced to one of the highest positions in the financial admin-
istration and later still higher, till Colbert made an end of his career.
Just as Herwart was the last French financier of the old stamp, so
Turenne was the last French general, who, at any rate in his earlier days,
had a good deal of the Condottiere in him. Only after Mazarin's death
did he become exclusively a faithful servant of his lord. Now came the
time when Louvois got the army completely out of the hands of the
war speculators into those of the King, 1 as Colbert had tried to do with
the finances and the financiers. Colbert's aim was to reform the whole
financial administration; he wished to centralize it and by doing so to
increase the revenues of the Crown and at the same time to bring them
into harmony with the expenditure, so that anticipations would no
longer be needed. He further intended to liquidate the funded debt
entirely: partly because it was charged on the best and most certain
revenues, and also because whenever the payment of the rentes in bad
times got in arrear, this gave the agitators an occasion for stirring up
the rentier against the Government. He called the rentiers idlers who
consumed the fruits of their fellow-citizens' labour. Bodin a century
earlier held the same opinion; the great theorist was a hundred y>ars in
advance of the great man of action.
But Colbert himself had soon to abandon such wide aims and make it
his chief object to suppress the power of the Partisans more and more.
He could not get on without them; but he turned them into pliant tools.
He said once, 'A financier should behave towards the finance ministe
like a soldier towards Ms general; he should never leave him so long as he
lives.' He tried with all the means in his power to cany this principle
into financial practice. 8
* Jains, Heeresverfaumngen und VSOzrleben (1885), p. 261.
Clement, Lettrea at memoires de Colbert, H, p. cxcix.
344 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
What Colbert achieved is a matter of history. Above all, by raising
and consolidating the duties he greatly increased the revenues of the
Crown; so he changed France into an uniform huge economic area and
began to replace the predatory and short-sighted fiscalism of earlier
times by a consideration for the people's welfare based on a broader
outlook. By this he, at any rate on the Continent, became the pioneer
of a new economic system. That his object was primarily fiscal in no way
detracts from the great reformer's services. But, as every one knows, his
economic and financial policy had soon to stop, because it was thwarted
by the unbridled imperialistic policy of his master. This is best seen by
following out the development of the public debt. One of Colbert's first
measures was to reduce the rentes, in which he followed in Sully's foot-
steps except that he proceeded in a much more inconsiderate way. In
1660 he at first kept back a third of the rentes then due on the Hotel de
Ville at Paris. Further reductions followed, till it was finally appointed
that all the rentes created under Fouquet, whose present holders had
bought them considerably under par, should be compulsorily repaid at
a rate which left the holders almost nothing over, and Colbert even
wanted to bring into account against the capital the rentes already paid.
The rentiers protested; there were riots in Paris; there was a slight
mitigation, so far as in determining the rate at which the rentes were
to be paid off, the procedure had some fairness. A commission, in con-
junction with the Paris magistracy and taking into account the changes
since 1st January, 1639, fixed the rate. That occurred in 1664. In the
next year Colbert reduced the legal rate of interest to 5 percent., and
amongst others gave as his reason for this measure that the high rate of
interest introduced by the money changers ('le change et rechange de
1'agent') and the exorbitant profits of the rentiers'promoted idleness and
hindered the development of Trade, Industry, and Agriculture. 1
In this way Colbert at first succeeded in disburdening the Treasury.
Yet his proceedings were just as much a State bankruptcy as Sully's
were and they excited the same hatred of those affected by it. What
was worse was that in the long run he could not get on without new
enormous loans, especially since the disastrous war of 1672 - a land-
mark in the industrial and financial history of the seventeenth cen-
cury - and with a heavy heart must again enter on iihe precipitous path
of borrowing. 2 Before he decided to do this, he had not hesitated to
resume the traffic in offices on a large scale, and incited the financiers
by placing the offices at their disposal at 16 per cent, below their
nominal selling value. But as the many millions which the war required
were not to be got in this way, Colbert in 1672 had to proceed to an
* Ctonent, II, introd. xlix. and 756.
. BaSlly, 1, 462 ff.; Viihrer, I, 96; Clement, voL H.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 343
issue of rentes, and in the next year to floating loans and anticipations.
During the ten years of Ms administration lie often had to turn again to
credit. But MB procedure was essentially different from that of the
former Finance minister; and here again he appears to us as the pioneer
of a new epoch. To avoid the costly intervention of the financiers, Col-
bert in 1674 formed a State central savings bank {Caisse des Emprunts),
into wMch anyone could pay money. The State paid 5 per cent, interest
and promised to repay the capital on demand, wMch was secured on the
rents from the tax-farming. In this way it became possible for the State
to obtain at a low rate of interest considerable floating loans - usually
14 millions, but later as much as 20 million livres. Colbert also re-
formed the method of getting money as a funded debt, by applying to
the rentes the principle of publicity which he had formerly only used
in connection with floating debts. Since 1679 Colbert issued the rentes
for public subscription and attained brilliant results. Earlier Paris
had been the chief market for the rentes issued by the State; now the
provinces and foreign countries were drawn in, and Colbert even knew
how to manage skilfully the modern technique of oversubscribing. In
1679 in 18 days 2 million rentes (= 34 million capital) were issued, on
wMch he then offered for issue a further 5| million rentes and repaid old
debts wMch carried a higher rate of interest.
There were similar operations in 1682 and 1683. Pressure and dodges
were used to induce the holders of rentes announced for repayment to
accept rentes at a lower rate of interest instead of cash. 1
By 1680 Colbert had represented to the Ring that credit had already
produced 40 millions; he dared not strain it any further, otherwise the
deposits would be withdrawn from the Caisse des Emprunts and they
would be on the verge of bankruptcy. In the next year he pointed out
emphatically the misery of the people due to the pressure of taxation
and that the new outbreak of war must cause an enormous increase in
the burden of interest. He continued his warnings, but without success,
and when he died in 1683 the budget was again disorganized. Under
Ms successors French finance again took the devious path which had
led Spain to economic ruin. They led France to the Revolution. 8
England in the Seventeenth Century. Where France and Spain re-
tained the mediaeval character of their financial arrangements down to
the threshold of modem times, in England a successful attempt was
made in the sixteenth century to reform the financial administration
fundamentally. Gresham had given it a strongly national character,
and had endeavoured to permeate it with the commercial principles of
1 Bailly, 1, 465, 477; Vuhrer, 1, 103 fi.; dement, voL H, introd. and pp. 102, 372.
' a. Boisguillebert,Ze Detail de la France (1697) in Daire,p. 236; also Faetom
de to France (Lc. p. 296).
346 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
honour, order, and economy. This succeeded to a remarkable extent.
The foreign moneylenders gradually vanished from England, whose
capital proved to be sufficient to satisfy the needs of the Grown in many
difficult situations. On the Continent too its credit remained unshaken
during the most severe crises, because Queen Elizabeth differed from
other monarchs, by never breaking her word to her creditors, as she
justly boasted in 1576. 1
But in the long run Gresham's financial programme did not prove
suitable for all contingencies. As a rule Elizabeth could not raise a loan
without using compulsion. In the later years of Elizabeth, Privy Council
loans (compulsory loans) were the most common way of meeting tem-
porary extraordinary financial needs. But after Gresham's death she
was so economical that she left only an insignificant burden of debt for
her successor, but as a set-off a valuable treasure in jewels, which she
partly had received as presents; for, as soon after a Venetian envoy
pointedly remarked, 'Her Majesty liked getting more than giving.' 2
Under Elizabeth's successor James I, and still more under Charles, the
finances again fell into terrible confusion, and the burden of debt in-
creased noticeably. At the death of James many salaries were in arrear.
The absolute amount of the floating debt there was no funded one
appears moderate in comparison with that of France and Spain; but it
was much too big for the English people, especially as the Crown con-
tinued its practice of forced loans. 8
But what Elizabeth could presume to do, called forth general in-
dignation if attempted by her successors. The first compulsory loan
which Charles I wished to raise (1626-7) led to the Petition of Eight,
and the King promised that he would never again exact compulsory
loans. In fact there were no more of the old kind. Certainly the "King
more than once put more or less strong pressure on the City of London,
to induce them to consent to loans in which anyone could participate
at his pleasure. These loans bore a certain resemblance to those which
the French Crown raised in Paris. But they were not sufficient for the
financial needs of the Crown. Especially in 1640, after the conflict with
Parliament had begun and he had against their wishes decided on the
Scottish war, his financial position was so gloomy that he was com-
pelled to embark in the sort of business that only half bankrupt mer-
chants do. He bought 2,310 sacks of pepper from the East India Com-
1 Nares, Memoirs of BurgJdey, II, 64.
* Green, Calendar of State Papers, 1547-80, p. 531 F.; 1581-90, pp. 471, 554,
576 ff., 580, 585 etc.; 1598-1 601, p. 538 ff. Of. Joumaal van An th. Dwycked. Mulder,
HI, 23; Barozzi e Berchet, Bdaz. d. ambasc. venet., ser. IV, vol. I, p. 106.
1 Very various figures are given for the Floating Debt. Cf. Parliam. Debates, 1610
(Camden Soo.), introd. ix, xv; 1626, p. 102, Calendar of State P avert, 1619-23,
p. 110; Ranke, Engl. QesMchte, II, 194 3.; Sinclair, H, 42.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 347
pany on long credit for 63,283 and sold them at once for 50,626 cash.
This cost him nearly 17 per cent, in interest. He seized for 120,000
silver which had been delivered by Spanish and other merchants at the
mint to be coined, and, to the annoyance of the owners, retained one-
third as a compulsory loan which later was duly repaid with interest.
The King also tried, but without success, to obtain money in Spain,
France, and Genoa. On the other hand, Harrison, a tax farmer, ad-
vanced him 50,000 at 8 per cent., which was then the usual rate. 1 But
when in 1642 the war broke out Parliament issued an appeal for gold
and precious metals and promised 8 per cent, interest. There was a
threat of punishment for non-compliance, so that it was a kind of com-
pulsory loan. In fact, although the King naturally forbade it, large sums,
nominally several millions, of gold and precious metals came out of the
whole country. On that the Bong turned to the Universities, which had
remained faithful to him, and got from them equally large quantities of
money and gold and silver plate, although Parliament tried to prevent
it. During the Revolution recourse was several times had to such
Cromwell too could not dispense with floating loans. In his time it
was the goldsmiths, who already had been bankers for decades and now
were the bankers of the Government, who regularly granted advances on
the revenues. 8 In this way these first professional credit brokers which
the English have produced, obtained in the State finance an important
position, which was enhanced under the Restoration.
When in 1660 Charles II negotiated with General Monk about the
restoration of the monarchy, the first step was to raise money from the
English Royalists and in Amsterdam to cover the arrears of pay of the
former revolutionary army and take it into his own service. To secure
his rule Parliament granted him 1,260,000 to pay his debts. But he
soon got involved in new ones which increased like an avalanche
through his extravagance and the great demands of the war against
the Dutch. The advances made by the city were totally insufficient.
The attempt in 1665, at the outbreak of the unfortunate first war against
Holland, to raise a loan by direct subscription was a failure. It became
more and more often necessary to call in aid the expensive assistance of
the goldsmiths, among whom Sir Robert Vyner was the chief financier
of the Crown. The goldsmiths procured the money at 4-6 per cent, and
charged the Crown 8-10 per cent. Repayment was to be made out of
* Calendar of State Papers, dom. ser., 1640-1, p. 622; Ending, Annals of
Courage, 1, 392; Gardiner, Fall of the Monarchy of Charles I, voL 1, 347, 377; H, 44.
Ending, I, 396 fi.; Sinclair, I, 171.
It is a mistake to pnt the beginning of the goldsmiths' business as bankers
later. Malynes speaks of it in his Lex Mercatoria, 1622. Of. the pamphlet, The
Mystery of the new-fashioned QoMsmtOu or Bankers discovered (1676).
348 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
the taxes which had been granted as soon as the Exchequer received
them. 1
But soon here, too, the whole danger of the sort of finance became
evident. In 1672, when the floating debt had grown to 1,328,526, the
notorious 'shutting up the Exchequer' ensued. The Crown had to sus-
pend payment. This was the first State bankruptcy of England since
1339, and it was the last,"
Charles II did just what the Kings of France and Spain had often
done. The bankruptcy was settled in the same way. The King had
simply taken away from his creditors the special revenues on which they
had a charge. In place of this he burdened the total revenues of the
Crown with a perpetual annuity of 79,711 (interest at 6 per cent, on the
floating debt) in favour of the creditors. That is he compulsorily re-
duced the interest to an average rate of 6 per cent, and converted the
floating debt into a funded debt of perpetual annuities - the first that
England had had.
To be sure, after 1684 this annuity was not paid, because the Crown
had got into worse and worse straits. Its credit was destroyed, especi-
ally since Parliament in 1681 had expressly forbidden the raising of
floating loans on the revenues of the Crown, and even threatened with
punishment the sale or acceptance of tallies and anticipations on these
revenues. 3 The Crown might dissolve Parliament and at first suppress
the Whigs politically, yet they had the capital in their hands. They
could not prevent the Crown from once again stopping payment of
interest; on the other hand, they could prevent new loans being
authorized, and the age of compulsory loans was long past.
In one of its main points Gresham's financial programme had been
carried out. The nationalization of the money capital available for the
objects of the State had been permanently attained; but not under
economy and honourable dealing.
England's development in financial policy had not prospered better
than that of France. If we reflect that at the time when England went
bankrupt, France, thanks to Colbert's activities, enjoyed good credit,
and farther that it was out of that bankruptcy that there was the be-
ginnings of a funded debt, which France had already had for 150 years,
we come to the conclusion that France was at a higher stage of financial
development than England. It was the Revolution of 1688 which
brought about the decisive change. But before we occupy ourselves with
1 Calendar of State Popart, dom. 1660-1, p. 69; 1664-6, p. 43 ff., 73; 1667,
pp. 266, 288, 319, 371, etc.; Ranke, Engl. Getckichte, IV, 282. Calendar, 1667,
p. 204.
Sinclair, I, 195; II, 44 ft.
Chandler, Debvtee.U, 97.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT &9
that we must turn to the country which exhibits the highest point of
development in the seventeenth century.
The Netherlands. If we wish to pay due admiration to the eighty
years' fight for freedom of the little Netherlands against Spain, a world
power, we must not forget that a good part of it belongs to the State
credit of the Netherlands. AJ1 honour to the steadfastness of the people
and the genius of the House of Orange; but these alone had not sufficed
to attain victory. Here, more than anywhere else, pecunia nervus betti.
The Dutch navy at first brought in more money than it cost; but the
war on land had to be conducted with mercenaries, and to equip and
maintain them the Dutch could no more get on without credit than the
Spaniards. 1 Scarcely had the final peace with Spain been concluded,
when the costly naval wars against England and then the desperate
struggle against Louis XIV followed on. This caused the Dutch national
debt to increase more and more; and although it is not possible to
reconcile the very different accounts of its size, yet there is no doubt that
in proportion to the population it was sufficiently large. Nevertheless
during 1640-55 they succeeded in reducing the rate of interest on the
funded debt from 6$ to 4 per cent.; and even at the worse times, when
the existence of the Republic hung on a hair, as in 1585 and 1672, it was
ultimately possible to borrow the money necessary to defend the coun-
try. The Republic had always kept faith with its creditors, which could
not be said of any of its mighty enemies. In 1672, when the French had
conquered the greater part of the country, it is plain that without its
credit the Republic would have been lost. For the breaking of the dams
-a desperate expedient -could only bring momentary deliverance. It
was the agreement for subsidies with the Emperor, the Elector of
Brandenburg, etc., that secured the permanent existence of the
Republic.
What made it possible for the Netherlands to do this? The short
answer is -by means of those facts which in the introduction we
adduced as the foundations of the credit of the medieval cities. The
Republic of the United Netherlands was pre-eminently an association
of towns. Its credit in the first place rested on that of the individual
provinces, and this again on that of the towns. Every town and every
province formed a corporation whose members the burghers were
associated together for their benefit, even if they were no longer (like
the burghers of earlier times) liable both in their persons and their goods
as sureties for the debts of the community.
Further, the Netherlands was a mercantile State. From the beginning
1 Material for the economic history of the United Netherlands is very scanty
till the eighteenth century. Of. the newspaper -De Koopman,' IH (1771), 169 ff.,
and a still shorter account by Weereringh, Qeachied. d. Staattschuldm (1865).
350 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
its burghers were on the average very rich, and thanks to their spirit of
enterprise and times being favourable, they quickly acquired new great
riches far in excess of the capital wanted for their undertakings. 1
Hence as a rule in the Netherlands there was much more capital seek-
ing investment than trustworthy people willing to borrow it; but their
native town and their native country unquestionably belonged to this
class.
In 1620 a Venetian ambassador reports: 'The province of Holland
alone has a debt of 40 million gulden, on which it pays 6 per cent,
interest. They could easily pay it off if they raised the taxes, but the
creditors do not want this. I hear that the merchants, especially in
Amsterdam, have so much liquid capital that the State can always
borrow as much as it wants from them.' The report of Sir William
Temple, who knew the Netherlands well, half a century Liter on the
usefulness of the rentiers for the Republic is well known. Among this
class, above all, were the regents of the States, the provinces and the
towns. Their interests were therefore very permanently united with
that of the common weal, for which they devoted not only their capital,
but also their intelligence and power of work. There were then scarcely
any idlers among the Netherlands rentiers. Investment in home securi-
ties was then so popular that it was often considered a favour to be
allowed to invest in them; and repayment was a source of regret and
even called forth tearful remonstrances from the creditors, because in
no other place could the money be put out so quickly and safely. 2
About the same time the Dutch Mercury stated that in the province of
Holland alone there were 65,500 who had or were able to invest money
in annuities. It is just this large number of would-be investors that is
the most powerful force with which we have to do here. For once this
had made it possible for the Netherlands, not only to borrow in their
own country, but also to purchase foreign assistance. This made it
possible to treat the State debt from the beginning as a funded one, to
employ the old plan of the sale of annuities, and in this way to ensure
that the creditors had no right of calling in as well as the low rate of
interest.
Two other circumstances made this the easier. One was the old habit
of the Dutch to make provision for their old age by buying life annui-
ties and perpetual annuities as a provision for their widows and sur-
viving children; this tendency, which later degenerated into a propensity
to do as little work as possible and live on unearned income, which in its
' Guicciardini, Ducritt. d. PaeaiBasri (1666). Van der Ghys, GescMed. d. SticMng
v.d. Vereaugdeo 0. J.Compagnie, 1867. Journ. v, Anth. Duyck ed. Mulder, m, 296.
* Observations u-po^i the United Provinces, French edn. v. 1674, p. 211 8., 327 ff.
Cf. Laspeyres, Geschichte d. vdkaw. Anochauungen d. Niederlander, p. 216 S.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 351
turn produced new consequences of far-reaching importance. 1 The
other, which favoured the development of the funded debt, was on the
part of the borrowing State. Its need for capital differed from that
of other States. It only comparatively seldom was called forth by a
sudden transitory deficit, but chiefly by the long-drawn-out strife for
the freedom of their country. What in the main caused the incessant
need of credit for the Spanish Crown - the great distance of the country
where specie money was needed from that where it was at their disposal -
did not come into the consideration of the Netherlands. Here both lay
close together. The financial administration also worked much more
quickly. So it was only comparatively seldom that the Government had
to obtain large floating loans, and naturally so far as possible avoided a
financial expedient, by using which their enemies bled to death.
Certainly since 1672, in addition to the long period or perpetual
annuities, obligations for a shorter period - usually a few years - were
more or less frequently issued. But this was not a proper floating debt,
of the kind we have come to know in France, Spain, and England; this
is clearly shown by the fact that the rate of interest was often the same
as that of the annuities. But it was a floating debt when borrowed on
the Bourse at J per cent, per month, or when the Treasurer in the old
manner obtained money on his own responsibility to cover up a temp-
orary deficit in the Exchequer; but the country was not liable for this. *
In general, not only did the financial officials preserve a great deal of
their half -mediaeval character, but also for a considerable period there
were many elements in the methods of the financial administration
which were scarcely compatible with the character of a modern State.
Thus, in spite of many complaints and several popular risings, farming
the taxes was not abolished till about the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, while the traffic in offices was little in vogue. 8
But the former peculiar complication of the public credit of the
Netherlands lasted on. There were debts of the State on its own account
and on account of individual provinces, and, vice versa, debts of the pro-
vinces on their own account and on account of the State, and in addi-
tion debts of the separate towns, many of which equally served to pro-
vide the needs of the State. The debts of the State and the provinces
were again subdivided territorially according to the 'Comptoiren' where
they were taken up. For - and this is again a quite modern feature -
as a rule the loans were not issued through 'Negociatie,' but advertised,
and it was left to those who wished to invest to subscribe directly at the
Cf. Laspeyres, p. 248 ff., 254 ft.
> 'De Koopman,' ILL, 178; Or. Place. Boeck, 1, 1606. Grossman, Die
Borse vor 200 Jahren, Haag, 1876.
Laspeyres, pp. 231 and 238.
352 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
'Comptoiren' of the State. This was always the case with the regular
annuities, but particularly in later times the borrowing on bonds was
often arranged by negotiation with wealthy brokers. But they had
nothing like the same importance in public finance as the contemporary
financiers in Spain, France, and England.
The motley picture of the public debt was reinforced by the many
kinds of annuities (life annuities, annuities for 30 or 32 years, etc.),
bonds and lottery loans. On the other hand, that fatal splitting up
which persistently underlay the borrowing of foreign States, because
most of the loans were charged on definite services, is almost com-
pletely absent. Even in situations of danger and need it was only neces-
sary for State, provinces or town to pledge their 'Corpus.' Confidence in
their capacity to pay only faltered in certain specially critical moments
and then was always soon restored. Confidence in the honesty of their
financial administration also remained unshaken, at any rate during the
flourishing time of the Netherlands. In the eighteenth century, how-
ever, this was not so. As soon as the hated farming of the taxes was
abolished, there was general complaints that the financial administra-
tion was dishonest and corrupt. The chief cause was, unquestionably,
the secrecy which surrounded all the methods of public finance. To
the end the Republic had never published its budget, nor had the pro-
vinces and towns published theirs. The amount of the debt could as a
rule only be guessed at. The anonymous writer who refers to this in the
newspaper De Koopman (1771) compares with it the publicity of the
affairs of the English debt and observes ironically: 'The British will
know too much, their statesmen say too much, and display what they
know in all the public gazettes.' 1
But in spite of this deficiency the management of the debt of the
Netherlands in the seventeenth century approximates most closely to
that of the modern State. It forms the most important link between
the national modem State and the city States of the Middle Ages.
The Netherlands were the first European State for which the financial
magnates had no longer the importance characteristic of the 'Age of
the Fugger.' This development did not depend only on the character
of the State, but also prevented the development of Amsterdam into a
money market of world importance. "We shall later have to go into
details of this side of the development.
England in the Eighteenth Century. Although since the reign of Eliza-
beth there had been a remarkable increase in the prosperity of the
English people, when the Stuarts were finally expelled the finances of
igome facts were published even in the Netherlands. Cf. Rapporten ende
Memorien over de finantien van Holland: der Extract nit het Register der secreete
utien, van de Heeren Stouten van Holland en Westvriesland, 25 Nov., 1678.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 353
England were in the most deplorable condition. The Stuarts were not
merely bad managers, but by their thoughtless absolutism they forfeited
the willingness of the English people to make sacrifices which was readily
forthcoming after the Restoration. 1
We already know how bad was the situation of the finances of the
English Crown, especially since the bankruptcy of 1672. After the
revolution their position was in no way better, but worse than ever.
For while the expenses increased enormously as a result of the war with
Prance, Parliament, which had just succeeded in getting financial con-
trol, showed itself, under the influence of long and bitter experience,
niggardly in its grants. It took some time before the English decided
to make the necessary sacrifice to protect its national interests. When
at last the grants flowed more copiously, the demand increased still
more and compelled the nation to shift a great part of it on to posterity.
The eighteenth century, which elevated England to a world power, also
imposed on it the most gigantic national debt in the world. Only by
its credit was it possible for England to become a world power. But the
new English debt was essentially different from those of the older world
powers.
At the outbreak of the revolution England had no funded debt, except
the floating debt compulsorily funded after the bankruptcy of 1672, on
which the interest, however, was not paid. No change was made in the
first years after the revolution. Meanwhile floating debts of the old
land were contracted. Parliament went back to its old practice of insert-
ing a 'borrowing clause' in its grants. On the strength of these grants
the Exchequer gave tallies and the interest on these, and if possible
the capital was paid back out of the supplies granted. The main money-
lenders after, as they had been before, the revolution were the gold-
smiths, by now mostly already called 'bankers.' They paid up to 6 per
cent, interest, the legal puttrinmnn on the deposits piling up with them
in increasing amounts, while the Government had to pay them up to
10 and 12 per cent. Further tallies were given to the purveyors of the
Government in payment. Since, however, the revenues out of which
the interest and redemption money should come were often paid only
very incompletely, and often did not amount to so much as the tallies
charged on them, and since, further, on account of the novelty and un-
certainty of the political situation capital for the most part kept away
from Government loans, the creditors of the Crown, when they wished
to dispose of their tallies, often lost 20-30 per cent.*
* Macaulay, History of England (IV, 319), and Sinclair (History of ike jnMic
revenue of the British Empire, H, 12 ff., 57) are very inadequate as to the origin of
the English Public Debt. See G. Cohn, Finannmssenechaft, p. 683.
Locke, Consequences of the Loweringof lnterest(1681); Child, New Discourse on
Trade (1692); Godfrey, Short Account of &e Bank of England (1695).
354 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
This was still a method of finance at a lower stage oi development than
that of France at the time. But now there came a fundamental change.
The first decisive step towards financial reform was the introduction
of the 'funding system' after 1693. Bolingbroke asserted later that it
was occasioned by the wish of the aristocracy, who had attained to
power, to interest as many people as possible together with their pro-
perty in the new regime. 1 It is possible that this had had something to
do in the motive again reappearing in the history of finance, but un-
questionably the financial need combined with the new Government
was decisive. When the way was once found, the need of the English
people for capital (or for investing their capital) followed on.
Macaulay has expressed surprise that England was so late in follow-
ing the example of France and the Netherlands in the matter of funded
loans. This surprise only again shows how difficult it is for great
historians to judge simple economic events. A funded debt could not be
formed so long as the King and Parliament were fighting for the mas-
tery. It was only after the revolution that the English State became
what the Dutch Republic had long been -a real corporation of in-
dividuals firmly associated together, a permanent organism. It was
only after this that a proper national credit could develop in England,
as, on the other hand, in France it was due to the fact that the mere
word of the monarch could make his subjects liable for his debts. But
there was this important difference between the national credit of
England and that of France and the United Netherlands - it was
public. England was the first country to introduce this great funda-
mental principle; as we have seen, its importance was early recognized
in the Netherlands. To form a correct estimate of it we have only
to think of the uninterrupted disappointments which, if business is
secret, must necessarily be the fate of every attempt to find out the
financial position of the State. A financial system such as has since
that time developed in England could only gain by the light of pub-
licity, while in most other lands there must have been a well-justified
fear of the opposite effect.
Certainly it was a long time before the English State without great
exertions could get funded loans of very considerable size - a sure sign
that at first the need for an opportunity of investment cannot have
played an important part in the whole development. But then it went
so much the faster. In a little over a century there had been formed
the largest national debt in the world. The nominal amount was
900,000,000.
Sinclair, II, 56. Ci Ranke, Franz. Geschichte, IV, 267.
Cf. Greffier, The Terms of aU Loans raited for AePvbKe Service (3rd ed. 1806),
and Redington, Calendar of Treasury Papers, veto. I, It Barter, National Debts.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 355
Meanwhile there had been some activity in reforming the floating
debt, which perhaps had an even wider bearing than the introduction
of the funding system. The most important methods were - the found-
ing of the Bank of England in 1694 and the introduction of Exchequer
bills in 1696.1 ^
The financial distress of the English State had a good deal to do with
the founding of the Bank of England. The whole capital of the Bank was
lent to the State and since then has formed an essential part of the
national debt. Properly speaking the procedure was the reverse. All
these people, who together lent the State 1,200,000, were incorporated
under the name of 'The Governor and Company of the Bank of Eng-
land.' Just as in the case of the old Italian Monte here are closely con-
nected together the three great institutions - the funded debt, the joint
stock company, and the Bank - which then after that began to develop
separately. But the immediate financial advantage which the State
derived from the foundation of the Bank was of considerable practical
importance only because the Bank from the outset was serviceable to
the State. On the other hand, the proper permanent use which it
afforded only gradually developed to its enormous importance of the
present day.
At first the Bank began to discount the Exchequer tallies as it did
short-term merchants' bills. Till then, as we know, these could only be
disposed of at a heavy loss, which amounted to 30 per cent, for tallies
on revenues in the far future. For a short time the Bank succeeded in
causing the tallies to circulate like money at or only a little below par.
Yet as the financial distress continued, and in connection with this there
were great differences in the quality of the individual revenues on
which the tallies were charged, soon there were more or less consider-
able fluctuations in the price of these notched sticks, and their old-
fashioned form made them inconvenient for circulation.
These disadvantages, and that of a deficiency of a good circulating
medium due to deterioration of the coinage, were removed by the issue
of Exchequer bills, which had a far-reaching effect on the development
of the financial system. Just as annuities represent the modern type of
the funded debt, so the Exchequer bill does that of the floating debt.
The main way in which Exchequer bills differed from the tallies
(which still continued) and from the former assignations of other coun-
tries, was that they very soon were charged, not on separate, but on the
total revenues of the Crown, except at first the land tax and the malt
tax, which were added later, so that there was no longer any particular
* v. Philoppovich, Die Bank von England im Dienste der Finanzverwaltung des
Staates, Vienna, 1886. Rogers, The First Nine Tears of the Bank of England,
Oxford, 1887.
366 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
test of their quality, and their value depended merely on the confidence
in the nation's capacity to pay. This confidence was so well founded
that the Exchequer bills soon circulated as money at par or a little
below, while at the same time the tallies charged on particular funds
were again 25-30 per cent, below par. Certainly everthing possible had
been done to make the Exchequer bills a circulating medium. 1
The old notched sticks for arbitrary disparate amounts were replaced
by endorsable paper bills for definite round sums of 5 and upwards. The
State undertook to accept these bills in payment of taxes, while it did not
compel anyone to take them, but offered them for public subscription.
Further particular places for the redemption of Exchequer bills were
instituted, and since 1707 the Bank of England was charged with this;
at the same time the obligation of the State to accept the bills in pay-
ment of taxes remained. Much later the issuing of the Exchequer bills
was handed over to the Bank. But meanwhile the Bank gradually took
over the whole management of the State's Exchequer business proper.
This again had far-reaching consequences.
From early times the receipt of monies from the Crown and the keep-
ing of the accounts was centralized in the Exchequer, while in the six-
teenth century the Treasury developed for the financial administration
proper. But in England this centralization was also strongly biased by
that independent, half-business position of the individual financial
officials, as we found was the case with the Dutch Receivers General
(Rentmeisters) in the seventeenth century, and it was mostly completely
destroyed by the fact that each separate branch of the revenue formed
a separate fund, on which particular outgoings were charged, without
any adjustment between the many funds.
This remnant of the financial system of the Middle Ages was gradually
got rid of in the eighteenth century and partly in the nineteenth cen-
tury. We cannot follow out this development in detail. It is enough that
the accounts became more and more centralized at the Bank of Eng-
land, till finally the Bank received all the national revenues, held all
the cash balances of the State, and made all payments on its account.
The Bank, thanks to its central position in the financial system, could
do this almost without using any cash.
In this way the accounts of the English State are kept in a way that
leaves nothing to be desired in the way of order, economy, and integrity,
and which at the same time continually performs the greatest services
by making available enormous quantities of capital which otherwise
would have remained idle.
Although all these advances in the financial system were requisite
to make possible the gigantic achievements of the English national
1 Bedington, Treasury Papers, I, 645, 552; H, 36 fif.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 357
credit, yet the organization of a free market for capital has contri-
buted just as much. Now, in conclusion, we must return to this.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEALING IN SECURITIES
Amsterdam. The business of the Antwerp Exchange after its decline
was at first distributed among a whole series of towns; but about the
beginning of the seventeenth century it became evident that Amster-
dam was the chief successor of Antwerp and that the Amsterdam Ex-
change, which was then held in the open air on the New Bridge and only
after 1613 in its own building, had developed into a true world ex-
change. 1 Unfortunately we cannot here depict this process in greater
detail or enter upon the progress of the technique of dealing in goods
and bills in conformity with exchange regulations in Amsterdam. We
must confine ourselves to relating the development of the business of
the Amsterdam Exchange in what are called funds, stocks, or stock
exchange securities (fonds, effecten, effets publics, fonds publics).
It is above all things important to establish that in Amsterdam it
was not Government securities, but shares which earliest became the
objects of regular stock exchange dealings of the modern kind.
As we saw during the flourishing time of the Republic, the credit of
the States General and of the separate provinces and towns was so well
established, and the number of would-be investors so large, that the
annuity loans of the former could be raised by direct subscription.
Presumably also at any time it was easy to find purchasers at par.
Floating loans for a long time seem only to have been raised in moderate
amounts, and what business there was moved on the old lines. In any
case, we are not told of regular stock exchange dealings in Dutch
Government securities before 1672-3. But shares in the East India
Company were dealt in as soon as it was founded in 1602.
The Dutch East India Company arose from the need of concentrat-
ing large amounts of capital to carry on the trade with the East Indies.
As in the Middle Ages the Italians had founded 'Monte' for the loans
of their Republic, and had also used them for commercial undertakings,
and as the same had occurred at the great world exchanges of the six-
teenth century for the large loans of the European monarchs uncon-
nected with business undertakings, now at first in the Netherlands,
very soon after in England, and soon in the other countries of Europe,
similar aggregates of capital were formed, which had no fiscal aims.
In the Netherlands the collection of a large capital stock was made
essentially easier by the fact that it was an undertaking of the greatest
1 Cf. B. Wagenaar, Amsterdam in eyne opkonut (1765), IV, 89.
358 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
national importance, and therfore supported by the Government to the
extent of its power. Bat this alone would not have been enough to bring
together the millions required; the desire for profit must be stimulated
to take on itself the unavoidably high risk. For this reason the company
obtained the majority of the East Indian trade, which gave a prospect
of a high return on the capital which flowed into it; since all citizens of
the United Netherlands could subscribe, this had the desired result.
The founders of the East India Company had no further intentions.
Nothing has yet come to light which indicates that from the outset
they had drawn the Amsterdam Bourse into the circle of their interests
and aims. But it fell out at once that the Bourse and the Company
were each of the greatest importance to the other.
The first impulse to dealing in the company's shares on the exchange
was due to the favourable 'opinion' of the prospects of the company
when the subscription lists were closed. This caused the numerous
persons who had not subscribed to seek to buy shares on the exchange,
and since this could not be done at par, they offered a premium which
within a few days rose to 14-16 per cent. Probably there were many
stages. Anyhow, there were bulls and stock exchange opinion of the
value of the shares. This rose higher and higher till bears came on the
scene. In the struggle between bulls and bears, which from the be-
ginning brought with it the use of dubious methods for influencing the
course of exchange, there arose gradually regular stock exchange deal-
ings. This became possible partly because the importance of the
Amsterdam Exchange increased greatly, partly because the share
capital of the East India Company was very considerable and easily
subdivided into quantities of any size in terms of similar (fungible) parts.
There was probably from the outset a business advantage in dealing in
round sums, and a natural striving to have the objects dealt in as com-
pletely fungible as possible finally led to the result that in business there
was a fixed unit of 500 71. or 3,000 fl., and this unit finally counted as
a 'share.'
From the beginning the speculation in shares was preferably in
futures. This brought a new element into the development. The nature
of the speculation as a means of gain depending on taking advantage of
future price changes, made it appear extremely desirable to postpone
the fulfilment of the bargains. In the case of bears, who had sold shares
which they did not possess, this was an absolute necessity.
Speculative future dealings made possible a twofold simplification
of the technique of dealing. First, speculative dealings could be realized
before the date of delivery. Secondly, settling days made it possible to
use the same procedure that had done so much in methods of payment,
namely, set oft. Both together resulted in an incalculable increase in
FBOM THE FUGGEB TO THE PRESENT 359
turnover, since now only a little ready money and stock were required
for very large dealings.
The development of futures was only possible in such goods as had
reached a high degree of standardization or could reach it by a develop-
ment just described. Forward dealings involve the possibility of replac-
ing any individual amount dealt in by any other of the same commodity
at the same future time. This preliminary condition was, with an im-
portant exception, promised by the East and West India shares.
The companies were divided into chambers: the East India into 6,
the West India into 5. This divisions had been of great importance in
raising the capital. Each chamber had a definite quota. The Amster-
dam chamber alone held half of the East India and four-ninths of the
West India capital. Each chamber had further a corresponding share in
directing the undertaking and in the profits. This also applied to the
shares of the different chambers. In spite of this, from the outset their
price differed considerably. This, as was reported in 1609, and often
subsequently, was merely due to the fact that there was not a regular
stock market for the shares of all the chambers. At first there was only
a large market at all times for the Amsterdam and Zeeland shares (later
on only for the former). For this reason, when the East India shares had
risen to 600 per cent, and more, they stood 30-150 per cent, higher than
those of the other chambers.
The regular dealings on the exchange with the shares of the Amster-
dam Chamber could not have arisen because this or that shareholder
had to dispose of his shares on a given occasion and that some one
bought them to enjoy the dividends; for in neither respect was there any
difference between the shares of the different chambers. It was the fact
that from the beginning speculation was concentrated on the Amster-
dam shares, since the first and largest speculators resorted daily to the
Amsterdam Bourse. This shows that it was speculation which made the
first modern stock exchange.
The peculiar technique of modern stock and share dealing owes its
development to the Amsterdam speculation.
While the dealing in shares at Amsterdam quite early took on a
modern stamp, thisappears to have been thecase comparatively late with
dealings in Government securities. At any rate the earliest information
we have about it comes from the critical years 1672 and 1673, which were
epoch-making for the development of dealings in Government securities.
The earlier funded debt of the Netherlands was chiefly due to the
great war of liberation, which made it necessary to have a standing
army. After the peace of Westphalia the army and the influence of the
statholder of the House of Orange which rested on it was more and more
diminished by the ruling oligarchy, and the force for expansion became
360 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
concentrated more and more on sea power. This development reached
its highest point under Pensionary de Witt (1653-72).
But while by this the Netherlands lost their powers of defending
themselves on land, their increasing sea power made the English more
and more jealous, when de Witt with the help of Sir William Temple
succeeded in 1668 in stirring up England and Sweden to conclude the
Triple Alliance with the Netherlands and to carry through the peace of
Aix la Chapelle in the face of France and Spain. This again excited the
scorn of Louis XIV, who by gaining England and Sweden broke up the
Triple Alliance and completely isolated the Netherlands, which in May,
1672, was simultaneously attacked by England at sea and France on
land: the first military power of Europe united with the first (after
Holland) sea power against the first trade and money power of the
world at that time. 1
The French quickly conquered half the land, while the other half was
only with difficulty saved for the moment by opening the dykes. The
State lost the greater part of its services; at the same time the naval
forces of England and France brought trade to a standstill. Credit was
destroyed, and the general panic was so great that many rich merchants
brought their families and what property they could take with them
into safety abroad, especially to Hamburg.
The defenceless land must have fallen to the French after the first
hard frost of winter if it could not succeed in getting allies, and this
required large payments of subsidies. In April, 1672, before the invasion
of the French, a subsidy agreement was concluded with the Elector of
Brandenburg, and in September there was another with the Emperor,
thanks to the indefatigible efforts of his ambassador Lisola. But the
States General had no ready money to pay subsidies and their credit
ties could be bought at the Amsterdam Exchange at 30 per cent. In
September after the alliance with the Emperor and an imperial
Brandenburg army advanced to help, the rate rose again to 60, 75, even
to 95 per cent., and then adjusted itself accurately according to the
course of the war. For example, in the following winter when the French
pressed forward over the ice to Amsterdam, it sank again to 50 per cent.,
but as soon as the thaw came rose again to 75 per cent. So it went on.
Netherlands Government securities which before the war had led a
quiet, unnoticed existence at par were now a speculative security whose
course was the barometer of European politics.
As already mentioned, the States General could not arrange to pay
1 CL Grossmann, Die Amsterdam* Boroe vor zweihundert Jahren (1876), p. 7,
nd a)so his Der Kaiserliche Gesandte Franz von Lisola im Haag (1873),
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 361
subsidies in cash and they only had credit so far as their allies obtained
military successes. But things were not very rosy. The imperial
Brandenburg auxiliary troops under Montecuccoli wandered about un-
decidedly in the neighbourhood of the Rhine. He wanted to make use
of the Dutch subsidies to maintain a standing army; while the great
Elector certainly wished honourably to help the Dutch, but he was not
in a position to do it alone, and grumbled bitterly that the subsidies
were not paid. The States General wanted to make it palpable to their
allies that the amount of their subsidies depended on their successes, so
they did not borrow the necessary money, but placed bonds at the dis-
posal of the Emperor and the Electors, so that they had to bear the loss
on exchange due to their dilatory methods of making war. But neither
in Berlin nor in Vienna had people any idea of the nature of stock
exchange securities. They thought that Netherlands bonds (apochae,
appochen, assignationes, actiones, axionen, i.e. aestimationen) had at any
time their par value. But the imperial ambassador Lisola had to soon
inform them that this was impossible, and that it was difficult to find
buyers at a much lower rate, because the whole world was scared at the
dismal way the war was conducted. If the army would march on in
force, the money would stream in. But he preached to dumb ears.
The Emperor and the Electors indignantly asked: what was the good of
the bonds if they could not be realized?
Lisola tried first to raise the 'inner value' of the bonds. For months
he busied himself to make them desirable for buyers, by inserting very
advantageous clauses in them. When this produced only a partial re-
sult - his bonds stood higher than the others - he tried other means.
Finally the states of the province of Holland declared themselves ready
to sell a part of their domains if Lisola could find buyers. But it was all
in vain. For lack of money the great Elector had to withdraw for a
time from the coalition, as for the same reason the King of Denmark
had already done, though he was ready to perform something if a sub-
sidy agreement was concluded. The Emperor concluded a new sub-
sidy agreement in which it was stipulated that the states should in-
crease their subsidies to make up for the loss on exchange of the bonds.
Thus the Amsterdam Exchange had once more justified the saying
'pecunia nervus belli,' and Montecuccoli, the Emperor's general, the
eager advocate of a standing army, had leamt by experience that
Triwdzio's bon mot - three things were required for war: money, money,
money -hit the nail on the head. But the 'money' which had such a
mighty effect no longer had the form it had in the 'Age of the Fugger.'
It was no longer a single financier, but the whole Amsterdam Ex-
change, which affected the course of history, and, as Grossmann has
truly said, the general interest was represented in opposition to the
362 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
self-interested cunning of the Emperor, who was compelled to follow
suit. Thus it became possible to found a new effective coalition against
Louis XIV.
The Netherlands bonds were in form little suited for stock exchange
dealings. Each bond had to be written, and its tenor was just as little
fixed as the amount of the separate bonds. All the same they were
speculated in. The bonds of the States General in the critical times we
have depicted were quoted considerably lower than those of the in-
dividual provinces, among which those of Holland were the favourites.
In December, 1762, they stood at 30 per cent, higher than those of the
State.
In the following decade Amsterdam slowly developed into an inter-
national stock exchange. One of the first foreign loans to be brought
out there was that of l million gulden, which the Emperor Leopold I
borrowed in Amsterdam in 1695. The great Amsterdam firm of Dentz
was then entrusted with the sale of the quicksilver from the imperial
mines at Adria. Over a 1,000 barrels of it were warehoused with them.
These the Emperor pledged and Dentz undertook to pay the interest out
of the proceeds of sale. But the States General were the real agents who
issued the invitation for subscriptions. Their Eeceiver General guaran-
teed the payment of interest. This was a new hybrid form between the
simple payment of subsidies and the independent loan - a rather more
complete one than that we have learnt of in the year 1672. The first
stock exchange list that has come to light from Amsterdam dates from
the year 1747. It already exhibits 25 different kinds of home State and
Provincial bonds, 3 home shares, 3 English shares, 4 English Govern-
ment securities, 6 German loans, and 3 securities, whose character is
not clear, in all 44 kinds of securities. By the end of the century the
number increased to some 80 home and 30 German securities.
The rate of interest on the Amsterdam Exchange, which at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century had fallen to 2, or even If per cent.,
rose gradually, as a result of the many foreign loans to 2 J, 3 and 4 per
cent, in the course of a century. The author of the able Becherches swr k
Commerce (which appeared in 1779), to whom we owe this information,
estimates the total of foreign loans borrowed in Amsterdam up to 1770
at about 250 million gulden.
Paris in (he Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. In the Middle Ages
Paris was already a place of exchange of some importance; it was then
thrust into the background by Lyons, and did not begin to flourish again
till the last third of the sixteenth century, when Lyons had declined.*
1 See Diet, de Jean de Garlande, and Gerand, Paris sotw PhUippe-le-Bd, p. 594,
and Aetes de Lwis VII, No. 84, etc. Cf. Ordinances dot row de. France XV,
206, and Lacombe, Histoire de la Bourgeoisie de Paris, 1, 127.
FEOM THE FUGGEB TO THE PRESENT 563
The Venetian ambassador Lippomano briefly alludes to the Paris
Exchange in a report to his Government of 1557. This contains a
description of the 'Parais,' that venerable mighty building which under
the ancien regime was the seat of justice, administration and finance.
There in the centre of the machinery of State, not far from the centre of
Commerce, the Pont au Change, Lippomano tells us, numerous business
people of all sorts used to collect together in the morning and afternoon. 1
The Exchange is again found there on a plan of 1652, whose super-
scription contains the observation that in addition to two galleries with
many brilliant shops there is also in the Court of the Palais 'the mer-
chants' exchange, or the place where they come together every midday
to conclude exchange business.' It is very similar on a plan of 1714, 'La
place du change, where the exchange brokers assemble, is in the Court
of tiie Palais by the conciergerie.' To-day the brokers on the Paris
Bourse are still called 'Agents de change,' since originally their main
business was acting as agents in exchange transactions. 2
In that comer of the Court of the old Palace there was also from quite
early times carried on other financial transactions, such as those in
bonds of the Crown. If Sully denounced the buying and selling of royal
bonds at low prices, this traffic must have been partly concentrated in
the Paris Exchange. Since 1639 the State annuities had a changing
price. In 1661 there is mention of a business in 'Billets de 1'Epargne,'
and somewhat later in various kinds of State bonds. 8 But this was
not regular stock exchange dealings. This is shown first by the fact
that such is never mentioned, but also positively that Hautchamp, the
contemporary chronicler of the Law period, expressly places the be-
ginning of a regular speculative dealing in securities in the beginning of
the eighteenth century.
The shares in the trading companies which had arisen in France in the
seventeenth century were similarly not regularly dealt in. A whole
series of such companies were formed from the first East India Com-
pany in 1604 to the St. Domingo Company in 1698, and amongst others
the two large East and West India Companies founded by the Govern-
ment in 1664. * But none of these companies had vitality, and there is
no trace that their shares were dealt in on the Bourses like those of the
Dutch Companies. In short, even in the seventeenth century France
did not possess a proper stock exchange.
iRdaz. d. Ambasc. Venet. ed. Tommaseo, n, 596.
' OL Histoire generate de Paris, also Evelyn's Diary, ed. Bray, p. 46.
Forbonnais, I, 223, 243, 246; Bresson, I, 266; Journal d'Ormeason, H, 4;
Clement, Colbert, EC, introd. ly., 755 and 766; Barozzi and Berohet, Bdaz., H,
p. 529.
See Savary the younger, Diet. Univ. de Commerce (1741), under the article
Compagnie.'
364 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
London to the Revolution of 1688. The shares of the East India Com-
pany were in a different position; we know their price from time to time.
In the years 1617-34, when the business of the Company was going
badly, the shares were sold at 30 per cent., 40 per cent., and more, below
par. In 1664 they were dealt in at 70 per cent., though the 'inner value'
of the shares was estimated at 130 per cent. But in 1677 the price rose
to 245 per cent., in 1680-3 to 300, or even 500 per cent. 1 Manifestly the
increasing prosperity of the Company animated the dealings in its
shares. Yet it is not possible that at that time there was a regular
market; for in 1677-81 there were increasing complaints that only a
very few people got the benefit of the enormous increasing profits of the
East India trade. A petition of the ablest merchants on the Exchange of
London to the King in 1681 is very instructive.
From it we learn that the number of shareholders was 550, but that
the greater part of the shares were held by about 40 persons. In 1666,
when the East India trade began to flourish, no one held more than
4,000 shares, but in 1681 there were several holdings of 50,000 and
one of over 100,000. Since the number of shares was very small and
the profits very high, shares seldom came on the market, and tended
more and more to get into the hands of a few individuals. The high price
operated in the same way. The Company, which in its reply did all that
was possible to represent the situation favourably, made no attempt to
deny those interesting assertions of the London merchants, and we can
therefore take it as established that in 1681 there were no regular deal-
ings in East India shares. Things do not seem to have altered until the
revolution. There was a general lively desire to buy East India shares,
but it was not satisfied.
London after the Revolution of 1688. In London as in Amsterdam it
was not Government securities but shares in companies which gave rise
to regular stock exchange dealings. Macaulay describes what happened
as follows. He starts from the fact that during 1661-88, thanks to the
brilliant industrial development in England, large amounts of capital
were ready to be invested, which could not be used because of the high
price of land and houses and the lack of other ways of laying it out. This
of natural necessity caused the formation of many joint stock companies
after the revolution.
Macaulay has made use of an interesting weekly called A Collection
for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade, issued by a certain Houghton
from 1692 to 1701. This contains a true chronicle of the business
iMalynes, Lex Mercatoria (1622), I, ch. 19, mentions Joint Stock Companies.
Cf. Anderson, History of Commerce, II, 89, 126, 165, 170, 173, 178 fi.; and in the
Discourse of Trade, Goyn, and Paper Credit (1697) there is a copy of a petition
which 'the ablest merchants on the Exchange of London' handed to Charles
Pin 1681,
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 385
in stocks and shares. But Houghton describes the rise of this some-
what differently from Macaulay. He said that the war against France
since the Revolution had brought the trade by sea to a standstill.
So the owners of capital bethought themselves how they could use
their capital profitably in such a way that it would be possible for them
again to have it available at any time in case of need, and that this was
more easily achieved by investing in shares than in buying land, houses,
or goods. He shows how extraordinarily English industry was advanced
by this. Macaulay quite rightly has amplified this view, which clings
too much to a direct immediate cause for the outburst of a long pre-
pared industrial development. But he forgot to investigate why the
outburst in this development occurred just then, directly after the
Revolution. Further, like Houghton, he has overlooked the fact that
from the beginning the general wish to make capital profits was more
operative than the need for investment to get interest. Finally and
most of all, Macaulay has left unnoticed a very important factor,
which Houghton had touched on - the increasing demand for capital in
trade and industry.
In the century before the Revolution of 1688, but particularly during
the Restoration except the very last years, trade and commerce in
England had begun to develop vigorously and still was far from having
reached its zenith. The English nation, who under Queen Elizabeth
had been a people of sheep breeders and cloth makers and dealers and
whose ships had only just begun to go farther than the neighbouring
seas and coasts, by the time of the fall of the Stuarts possessed a diversi-
fied industry on a large scale and a world-wide trade. In all spheres there
arose a versatile and bold spirit of enterprise, always seeking to appro-
priate new territories, and at home there was an astonishing increase in
inventions of all kinds, helped by the zeal for science. There was a good
deal of immature vague adventurousness and not a few fraudulent
captains of industry. Yet this seething flood of enterprises and projects
was a necessary element for the creation of the Great Britain of to-day.
The shaking off a hated dynasty, the security and peace which fol-
lowed, the establishment of a government of freedom corresponduig to
the wishes of the people, which was guaranteed by the conspicuous
influence of the acquisitive middle classes - all this must have had an
active influence on the spirit of enterprise. The growth of industry was
checked by the political disputes during the last years before the Revo-
lution and by the uncertainty of the new conditions during the first
years after. But about 1691 it went forward with redoubled strength.
Then came the war with France. At first certainly English shipping
suffered severely from the French privateers, in 1693 at one time 300
English ships destined for the Levant were lost. But, as Houghton
366 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
observed, this stopping of sea trading had a favourable effect, so far as
the spirit of enterprise was diverted for the moment to more industrial
undertaking at home. Then the war compelled the English to become
independent of many French articles and this, and receiving many fugi-
tives from religious persecution, gave a great impetus to the develop-
ment of the English manufacture of linen, glass, hats, knives, silks, etc. 1
All this required large amounts of capital to be concentrated, and the '
easiest and possibly the only -way to get it was to promote joint stock
companies. On the other hand, the English people were much more in-
clined to invest in such conditions. Some time before the Revolution the
difficulty of obtaining shares in the East India Company had given rise
to lively complaints. Since then the position of the business had become
much less favourable and the price of the shares had fallen again to 150
per cent. Nevertheless in 1691 there was a general movement for
doubling the capital of the Company, and as the Company refused the
proposal of founding a new company arose. In 1694 the capital was
doubled, and yet four years later a second company was founded.
Before 1691 there were only three large joint stock companies in
England. The others which from time to time had been formed had
vanished again. These three were the East India Company, the Africa
or Guinea Company, and the Hudson Bay Company. The capital of the
first was 740,000, of the second 111,000, and of the third 110,000.
But in 1691, or perhaps in 1692, there all at once came into existence
about a dozen new companies for making paper, glass, linen, and silk
goods, two copper mining companies, and several diving and salvage
companies to get up lost treasure. By 1694 the number was at least 53,
among which were 5 copper and 3 lead works, 4 machine works, 5
saltpetre works, 4 water works, 2 coal mining, 4 diving, and 3 salvage
companies, 3 paper works, 4 linen factories, and so forth. The shares of
the Bank of England were first dealt with in on 24th August, 1694. 8
The fluctuations of price were very considerable and the whole stock
exchange technique, which had already been so precisely formed in
Amsterdam, was introduced into London ready made by skilful dealers.
But the English were very apt scholars. With fiery zeal they mastered
the new kind of business, anglicized all the stock exchange terms and
added many more. English names, and some of persons of high position,
became preponderant among the large speculators.
1 Anderson, History of Commerce, H, 198.
* Cf. Honghton, A Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade (1691);
Angliaj Tutamen (1696), Hatton Merchant's Magazine (3 ed. 1699); Kedington,
Treat. Pap. H, 39; The Anatomy of Exchange Alley or a System of Stockjobbing
(1719, reprinted in Francis, Chronicle* and Character of the Stock Exchange,
T. 369ft.); Mortimer, Every Man hie aim Bi ' '" '
. Coon's JaM. f. Nat.-Ok. u. Statutik, v. 1
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PEESENT 367
At first stock jobbing was carried on at the Koyal Exchange; but
since this aroused irritation, it was transferred to Exchange Alley, close
by, and which it completely occupied, as well as the coffee-houses there
and in the neighbourhood.
About the same time there was dealing in the various kinds of
floating debt, Tallies, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, Malt Tickets, etc.,
which was not essentially different from stock jobbing proper, i.e. deal-
ing in stocks and shares. But we do not hear of regular dealings in
annuities, or funded Government annuities, which generally at first
did not play a prominent part.
This state of affairs lasted till 1711. At that time the floating debt
amounted to 10,000,000. It was at such a large discount that the Lord
Treasurer the Earl of Oxford decided on a much condemned method of
getting rid of the floating debt. He made use of the widespread in-
clination of the public to take shares in undertakings which promised to
be profitable, especially those for realizing the fabulous hoards of the
precious metals in Spanish South America, as well as the popularity en-
joyed by the deep sea fishery as nursery of English sea power. So in
171 1 he founded the South Sea Company (South Sea was the sea on each
side of South America), with a capital of 10,000,000, which the Com-
pany was to lend to the State for funding its floating debt. 1
The South Sea Company was to trade with the Spanish colonies in
South America and engage in fishing. These ostensible objects it only
partially fulfilled; on the one hand, it caused untold harm, through
giving rise to unlimited speculation. On the other, it did great service
to the State, and the period it introduced of the notorious South Sea
Bubble gave a great impetus to English industry.
We can only point to a few outstanding facts for the reason for this
view. It was with the finding of that 10,000,000 by founding the South
Sea Company that the English Government entered vigorously on the
path of raising funded loans and found the right way of placing the
largest loans. No one before had ventured on a financial operation of
such magnitude. Now they knew it was quite possible, if the requisite
bait was used. For decades such bait was required to obtain the enor-
mous sums which the kingdom needed for its position in the world.
Only the nature of the bait was changed, and there was no repetition of
the unprincipled encouragement of the gambling spirit as at the time of
the South Sea Bubble. Yet this forms an important section in the
history of the national debt.
As regards the importance of the South Sea Bubble for English
industry it is enough to notice that Manchester and Birmingham, the
* .Anderson, History of Commerce, U, 254 ff.; also v. Philippovich, Die Bank v.
England im Dienste der Finanzverwallung dee Staates, p. 58.
368 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
seats of the cotton and iron industries, made their first great progress
during this period. No doubt the foolish excesses of the period of mania
reacted terribly on industry. But what was left was so valuable that
the final judgment of the time should not be so disapproving as it mostly
has been hitherto.
From the very first stock jobbing in England was the target of the
loudest complaints, much more so than in Amsterdam. There was no-
enormity of which stockjobbers were not guilty, no national disaster for
which they were not answerable. Change Alley was called a den of
thieves, people spoke of the 'vile infamous practice of speculating in the
funds.' The stockjobbers, it was said, had ruined the credit of the
nation, they had betrayed the country to the French, etc. But was the
horrible corruption of the time of Marlborough, Bolingbroke, and
Walpole, the rotten men of English society, as we see it in Hogarth's
pictures, really a result of stock exchange speculation? Or was not the
unusually devasting effects of the dealing in Change Alley merely a
symptom of the unusual demoralization, credulity, and unlimited
avarice of the English at that date?
The State interfered in 1697 with speculation by prohibiting any-
one who was not a sworn broker to act as agent in stock and share deal-
ings. All futures in shares and Government securities were forbidden.
But this Act had just as little effect as Sir John Barnard's Act of 1733. 1
In 1719 a speculator, threatened with legal interference, replied:
'There is only one way to get rid of us - pay off the national debt and
wind up all joint stock companies. Then they need not hang the stock-
jobbers, but themselves.'
He was not so far wrong. England would not have been the Great
Britain of to-day, it would not have conquered half the world, if it had
not incurred a national debt of 900,000,000 between 1693 and 1815. It
would not have become the richest country in the world without the 30
to 40 thousand joint stock companies with a capital of at least 4
milliards which have arisen in Great Britain. Neither the national debt
nor the joint stock companies would have been possible without a
strong stock exchange.
Paris in the Eighteenth Century. In spite of a good deal of outward
similarity the origin of the Paris dealings in securities is essentially
different from the English development we have just described. What
in England was called 'stockjobbing' was called 'agiotage' in France:
it means the business of making a profit from the rise and fall of certain
securities. But while in England the dealing was in shares, the French
agiotage was at first dealing in something between Treasury notes and
Cf. Ehrenberg, Die Fandsspeculation und die Gesekgebung (1883), p. 13.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 369
The Caisse des Emprunts, founded by Colbert, had issued 'Billets,' not
charged on particular revenues, whose value depended solely on the
unlimited responsibility of the General Tax Farmer. These billets were
always promptly paid, and the Caisse des Emprunts, which was dis-
continued again, left a good name behind it.
So in 1702 an office was established with the same name, but of an
essentially different nature. In 1700 all French coins were called in for
recoinage. The directors of the mint had given tickets for the coins de-
livered to them until the new kinds of money were issued; these tickets
were equally promptly redeemed and were gladly taken in payment like
good paper money. So they were called 'Billets de Monnaie.' At that
time of the most pressing financial needs - it was the beginning of the
war of the Spanish Succession - the process must have operated in a
remarkable seductive way on the Finance Minister Chamillart, who lived
from hand to mouth. In 1702 he again founded a Caisse des Emprunts,
ordered a general recoinage, and had increasing quantities of new 'billets'
issued through the new office. They carried interest and were not, it ap-
pears, meant to be paid off within a short period. In any case the pur-
veyors of the State were soon paid in these; as they tried to dispose of
them as quickly as possible and enormous quantities of the billets came
into circulation, the billets gradually fell to the extent of 50, 60, 75 per
cent. There were regular dealings called agiotage in them, concentrated
in the Eue Quincampoix, where most of the Paris bankers had their
offices. Soon other Government securities were dealt in, but it was a
long time before there was dealing in the State annuities. 1
When now Law in 1716 to 1719 founded his various great undertak-
ings, the dealings in the Eue Quincampoix developed with fevered
rapidity. The first chronicler describes the 'syst&ne' well in a few words:
'Formerly the dealings in the Rue Quincampoix were carried on in the
houses, without a great concourse of people. But when the system had
begun to cause general wonder the Mississippi Agioteurs collected in the
streets. After the first progress of the system had aroused opinion for
and against it, information was given them and offers were made like
those on the exchanges of London and Amsterdam, where the business-
men came together regularly every day. The numbers increased with
the growing popularity of the West India (Mississippi) shares.' 2
The Law mania is so well known that we need not go into further
details. The place for dealings was shifted from the Hue Quincampoix
to the Place Vend6me, then to the H6tel de Soissons, then to the Rue
1 du Hautchamp Histoire du Syst&me des Finances sous la Minorite de Louis
XV (1739), 1, 184. Cf .Melon, Essai -pMt. ur le commerce (1734), quoted in Daire,
p. 791 ff.; Ranke, Franz. Geschichte, IV, 264, 332.
> du Hautchamp, Lo., I, p. 191.
370 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
St. Martin, till finally, in 1724, the King decreed that an official exchange
should be established, under special regulations. It was meant for deal-
ings in bills of exchange, commercial documents, goods, and public
secutities. Exchange dealing in Paris thus obtained legal existence and
a home. 1
At the same time the sworn brokers - the agents de change - obtained
a new organization, whose main features are preserved to the present
day. The place of their activities was henceforth the official Bourse,
which till the Revolution was in the Hue Vivienne, close by the Palais
Royal. There they had a special room -the Parquet -for business.
The unauthorized brokers and the small speculators set up in the
neighbourhood, at first in the Palais Royal. This is the origin of the
'Coulisse.'
The rise of stockjobbing in Paris had unquestionably at first over-
whelmingly disastrous consequences. It encouraged the gambling in-
stincts of the people, and the extravagance and megalomaniac of the
French Court, and for a long time only enriched a parasitic class of
financiers. In the eighteenth century it only gave passing assistance to
the State finances, and trade and commerce obtained very little per-
manent advantage. 8 But there was a fundamental change in the nine-
teenth century.
Externally, then, from many points of view English and French
stockjobbing developed similarly in the eighteenth century; on
second thoughts, their nature and methods are quite different.
The German Exchanges. Long before there arose stockjobbing on an
exchange, Germany possessed a tolerable number of Bourses, some of
ancient growth, others established ad hoc. In the first half of the six-
teenth century there were already Bourses in Augsburg and Nurem-
berg, in the second half in Hamburg and Cologne. They are first men-
tioned in Liibeck in 1605, Konigsberg in 1613, Bremen 1614, Frankfurt
am Main 1615, Leipzig 1635, etc. We have exchange lists of prices for
Hamburg of 1592, Frankfurt of 1654, Leipzig of 1711, Breslau and
Nuremberg of 1715.
At all these places bills of exchange was the main business, which,
however, also included different kinds of money loan capital for mer-
chants, and at the seaports many kinds of goods, marine insurances and
freights. But stockjobbing did not begin in Germany till the eighteenth
The Law period of gambling affected Hamburg, where some insur-
ance companies were founded in 1720 and gave rise to speculation in
their shares for some months; but this and the companies vanished
Histoire du Visa (1743), H, 112 ff.
1 Ct Ehrenberg, Die fmtdsepeaOaHon und die Guetegebumg, p. 24.
PROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 371
again. 1 Then for nearly a century there was no further regular stock-
jobbing in Hamburg, but about 1810 the shares of the Insurance Com-
pany founded after 1765, the only joint stock company there, were
offered for sale by public auction in considerable quantities several
times a year. But in Vienna there was a genuine stock exchange which
may be regarded as the earliest in Germany.
We know how difficult it was for the Emperor's envoys to the States
General to make his Court understand the working of the dealings in
securities at Amsterdam. The loans which the Emperor since 1695
raised in Amsterdam, at first with the guarantee of the States General
and afterwards without it, might have gradually taught the Court of
Vienna the use of a Bourse for the credit of the State. But, on the other
hand, they made the unpleasant observation that the bonds of States
that were continually over-indebted, and those of the Vienna State Bank
at hand were often sold at low rates, which was considered as usury.*
Both these facts together finally determined the Government to take in
hand the establishment of a public stock exchange. The contents of the
Patents of 1771, which we shall shortly mention, show that they had
before their eyes the Paris procedure of 1724. 3
In 1761 there appeared an ordinance 'that a public exchange be
established in Vienna and place fixed where buyers and sellers of public
securities can meet and conclude their sales and purchases by means of
sworn brokers, and to learn from an official list the price at which all
public securities stood on the previous day.' But it was ten years before
(by a Patent of 1st August, 1771) the Vienna Exchange was really estab-
lished.
The Exchange was meant only for dealings in bills of exchange and
securities. In 1783 brokers for goods were appointed to be there, but
this was given up after three years.
Anyone who had business could enter, until (following the French
example) a decree of 27th November, 1810, directed that entrance
tickets should be issued, to be delivered only to 'Austrian manufacturers
and wholesale and retail dealers belonging to a public guild.' After that
foreign merchants only had 'complimentary tickets,' without the right
of dealing on the Exchange. Nevertheless, in 1817 Cibbini complained
1 Amrinck, Die ersten Hamburgischen Assecuranz-Compagnien and der Aotien-
hflndel im Johre 1720 (Ztsckr^d. Ver. f. lambg. GeachiclOe, IX, 465 ff.}.
> v. Mensi, Die Finanzen Otterreidu von 1701-40, Vienna, 1890, pp. 48, 57,
Ot Hilbai, Dtu'erste JahrJumdertder Wiener Barse, Vienna, 1871; Sammlung
der osterr. Verordnungen und Gesetze 1740-80; Cibbini, Untenwchung uber die
Bestimmung einer Bone und ihren nuttlichen, oder sch&dlicUn Einfluss auf den
off entlichen Credit, Vienna, 1817; Liebhold,ZWe Barsen-OrdnungenderStadte Wien
und Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, 1826.
372 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEK
of the 'violent admixture of the unauthorized' in the business of the
Exchange, whereby 'the quiet merchant is disturbed in his intended
course of business and becomes confused.' Procul este profemi would be a
very suitable inscription at the entrance of the Exchange! People who
were not merchants should only be admitted twice a week.
Unauthorized exchanges were strictly prohibited; yet there is scarcely
any place where dealings in the streets, cafes, etc., have sprung up
more luxuriantly than in Vienna. These dealings were chiefly concen-
trated in the Stephansplatze, later at the corner of the Weihburg and
Bauhensteingasse, and then at the Listner coffee-house in the Griinanger-
gasse. They were not only strictly prohibited, but had no legal validity.
But in the course of time these dealers on the kerb made a formal
association and expelled any member who wished under cover of the
law to get out of his business obligations. Finally the present 'Effeck-
tensocietat' or 'Abend borse' developed out of it.
Shouting down the quotations was strictly prohibited, but that only
means the attempt to influence the price a la baisse by calling out loud,
etc., and not, as was ordered in France in 1724, all negotiation which was
too noisy. Neither the one nor the other had any effect and Cibbini in
1817 complained that they were impracticable.
One characteristic of the Vienna Bourse is that since the Patent of
1771 a Government official was there to look after the business. This
was copied from the French, since in Paris the policing of the Bourse
was handed over to a royal official, and not, as in other markets, to the
merchants themselves, and at the present day the policing inside the
Paris Bourse is done by a Police Commissary. But the Commissary of
the Bourse in Vienna had apparently more extensive powers and duties.
To him was assigned 'the careful inspection of all business that went on
at the Bourse,' i.e. besides turning out unauthorized persons, hammer-
ing defaulters, he had to give the sign for the close of j business and see
that prices were not forced down, and also to see that the chief object of
the Government in establishing the Bourse was attained, namely 'taxing
the harmful money monopoly and usury.' Yet the Patent for this pur-
pose only provided in Section 30 that at the close of business the brokers
should assemble before the Commissary to settle the mean prices for bills
and securities. This provision is not in the Paris regulation. But there
was no result, and it could hardly have been seriously expected because
a semi-invalid subaltern called Schweinsgruber was appointed the first
Imperial Royal Bourse Commissary.
In 1817 Cibbini had great hopes from a suitable choice of the Com-
missary of the Bourse, and his observations are sufficiently interesting to
be given in full. 'The more difficult the conditions ruling on the Bourse
are, the more important is the election for this post, the more remark-
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 373
able are the qualities of temper and mind necessary for a man who is to
manage it profitably for the common good. This would be the place
for Manlius Curius Dentatus, who, when the Samnites laden with gold
surprised him roasting turnips, was so far from being ashamed at his
moderation that he had the pride to say: Malo haec in fictilibilibus
meis esse, et aurum habentibus imperare. Yet he is allowed to get rid
of this antique coarseness by a little modern polishing of the rough-
ness of the exterior. Firmness of character, power of observation, and
facility for utilizing every occurrence, are more necessary for Tiim than
wide knowledge of business. For in this respect it would be very ad-
vantageous if the Commissary had associated with him two experienced
traders of staid disposition who would help Trim with advice in the
various cases and share the oversight with him.'
But if we ask what tasks Cibbini will attribute to this man of re-
markable qualities, except being a censor of the manners of the Bourse
and presiding over the giving of the list of prices by the brokers, we
get a very inadequate answer. He should, Cibbini thinks, 'as often as on
the exchange there is an unusual fall or rise in public securities, make a
report, with the assistance of the two Bourse Councillors, to the pro-
vincial government in which he should give the certain or conjectural
fundamental causes, or at least the occasions for this change.'
Among the many Bourse Commissaries in Vienna since 1771 there
must presumably have been at least one or more who, if he was not
Curius Dentatus, yet zealously tried to do his duty. It would be very
interesting to know what such a man did.
At first the Vienna price list contained 16 Mnds of securities, bonds
of the State, of the Vienna City Bank and of the individual Austrian
provinces. Yet there was little regular dealing in them. In 1799 the num-
ber had risen to 24, and in 1805 to 27. The Bourse had a humble existence
in hired rooms on the Minoritenplatz, and later on the Coal Market.
The subsequent period of defeat, State bankruptcy and pegged prices
enlivened the stock exchange dealings. But the life which gradually
sprang up after the peace of 1815 was not a healthy one. In 1818
the first shares, those of the Austrian National Bank, appeared on the
list; till 1842 they were the only ones. In the 'fifties the Bourse had
an enlivening influence on business in the Brack era, which on llth
July, 1854, introduced more freedom into the organization of the
In Berlin there was a Bourse for dealing in bills in the first decades of
the eighteenth century. The industrial policy of Frederick the Great and
Frederick Wilhelm I promoted it. This is also shown by the fact that
the Crown granted it a house close by the Royal Schloss, a position
which is almost the same to-day. The Berlin Bourse is the only one in
374 THE AGE OF THE FUGGER
Europe in which the direct interest of the monarchy for the good of
business found a permanent expression in the position of the building
used by the Bourse.
Frederick the Great also manifested his interest by founding a series
of trading companies, whose shares could at any rate to some extent be
bought on the Bourse, long before Government securities were dealt in
there. We know that the shares of the Emden Herring Fishery Com-
pany, founded in 1769, and of the Maritime Trading Company, founded
in 1772, were dealt in on the Bourse soon after they came into existence,
but it is questionable whether this happened regularly. 1 The exchange
prices of Prussian Bonds were published from Amsterdam and Frank-
furt from 1794-6, and from Berlin from 1806. The Berlin stock market
did not become of considerable importance till 1820-5, and did not
become of international importance until the founding of the German
Empire.*
The oldest Eegulations of the Berlin Bourse in 1739, before securities
were dealt in, allowed anyone to go there, but contained many other
restrictions which were not got rid of until the regulations issued after
stock exchange dealings had become part of it.
This is seen most clearly in the treatment of Jews. In 1739 they could
only enter if they had to speak with Christian merchants, but they were
not allowed to act as brokers except one whom they were to propose and
who was sworn by the head of the merchants' guild. The Eegulations of
1805 gave them the right of joining the corporation of the Bourse and
to choose one of the four overseers of the Bourse. There was no dis-
tinction between Christians and Jews as regards visiting the Bourse and
acting as brokers. In the Eegulations of 1820 Jews are no longer men-
tioned. This is not the place to go into other developments: it is enough
to say that they were in the direction of greater freedom and self-
The first years after the Treaty of Vienna were epoch-making for the
dealings of the German Bourses, which did not before 1817 possess
speculative dealings and a developed technique as had existed in
Amsterdam for 200 and in London and Paris for 100 years. 8
The main cause of this development was without doubt the krge
loans which most States had to borrow after the conclusion of peace.
But another cause, which hitherto has not been sufficiently observed,
1 Nicolai, Beachreibung de Kanigl. Besidenzstadte Berlin und Potsdam, 1786,
I, 464, 467; Metri, II Mentore Perfetto de Negozianti (1794), II, 235.
Krug, GeacMchte d. Preuss. Stooisachvlden, pp. 32, 60, 80, 109-10, 233, 245;
Weeveringh, Homdkiding tot de GesMedenis der StaaUachuldtn, II, 848.
Bender, fiber den Verkehr mit Staatspapieren, 1825 (2, A. 1830); v. Conner,
Von SttaatoschvMen, deren TUgungsansUdtm und vom Handel mit Staattpapieren
(1826). Cf. Ehrenberg, FtmdupeJadatim und. Geeetzgdmng, p. 63 S.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 375
had also been active. Since the decline of Amsterdam after the French
conquest of Holland, Frankfurt am Main developed into an important
centre for international stock exchange dealings. But how that came
and what effects it had is for the moment not completely clear, but the
Books of the Rothschilds contain the main material for it. All that
concerns the Rothschilds belongs to a new section in the history of
finance. So we must stop here.
We have arrived at the highest point of a period of world history.
We will try to stay there a short while. Our starting-point was the
increased demand for capital for war purposes towards the end of the
Middle Ages; at first this was an exclusively economic event, a part of
that industrial development which, as regards exchange, is called
'Transition from barter to money and credit,' and as regards produc-
tion as 'The rise of capitalism.'
As the savage's club remains the same instrument whether used for
killing beasts or men, so capital is a store of goods available for human
activity whether this is production of goods or carrying on war. Under
some conditions war is a business. It is as a rule merely destructive
as a means of dynastic policy. Such were the wars of Charles V.
Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon I. But it was not quite the case
with the wars of Frederick the Great, and not at all with the Nether-
lands war of liberation, and England's naval wars in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. These acted like expensive improvements
which make it possible to attain a higher degree of industrial civiliza-
tion. Yet whatever the aim of the war was, it had to go through the same
process of development as industry, only some centuries in advance.
We have already worked out in the introduction that military ser-
vice which had become a profession through feudalism, in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries became a trade through the pay system, and
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a heavy industry through
muskets and camions. But the princes who were conducting the war
could not' carry it on either on the technical or economic side. So the
technical side had to be given over to the Condottieri, professional
war speculators, and the business side to private undertakers, the
Financiers (traitants, asentistas, partisans). From Maximilian I to
Louis XIV European wars were almost entirely carried on by the
troops and credit of private undertakers. That is the most important
characteristic of the 'Age of the Fugger.' The German and Italian
financial magnates, who owed their development to this, obtained an
extraordinary influence over princes and nations, even on the whole
376 THE AGE OF THE FUGGEB
course of the history of the world - the only point in the develop-
ment which by outside business. But the more they poured their
capital and fellow-countrymen into the Danaides' sieve of those dynastic
wars, the more they became dependent on the princes whom they
served with their credit. This ultimately caused their ruin. Long be-
fore this happened the isolated financial magnates had been unable to
satisfy the growing demands of the princes for capital. So the Bourses
of Antwerp and Lyons were utilized. Thanks to the free trade on this
Bourse, an important traffic in capital was concentrated there, a Bourse
rate of interest arose, and also a Bourse opinion of the credit which
could be given to the merchants frequenting it, and of the princes who
asked for credit there. For the first time in this way they got credit
proper and the possibility of raising large loans. Such loans were made
fungibles and objects of speculation. This formed a Bourse price, and
strengthened extraordinarily the power of the Bourse to attract capital.
The overstraining of credit led to severe repercussions, the bankruptcy
of princes and many trading houses. When the former with their own
hands again completely ruined the world exchanges by religious and
fiscal oppression, new and terrible crises resulted. At last what re-
mained of financial dealings in this world which was industrially going
to pieces became concentrated in the Genoese fairs, where it was given
an excellent organization. But its continuance rested on the credit of
the great Genoese financiers and finally on the hopelessly deranged
finances of Spain; so at last the whole system had to collapse. The final
result was that on the one hand there was an increasing demand for
available capital, on the other the possibility of concentration of great
quantities of capital with individual intermediaries on the exchanges,
and a new technique for this, but one which needed further development
to deal with the increasing number of new problems.
The conditions, out of which the development we have described
arose, had again gradually undergone important changes. The power of
princes had in individual countries developed into a real power of the
State. It had become possible for them to tax their subjects without
their consent and make them responsible for the debts of the Grown.
Louis XIV, who carried this to the farthest point, could now take the
decisive step which made him independent of the 'war speculation.'
He formed a standing army. His finance minister Colbert also tried to
make him independent of the financier. That miscarried owing to the
enormous increase of the financial demands consequent on the main-
tenance of a standing army to serve a dynastic policy that knew no
bounds. Nevertheless, the importance of the financiers was consider-
ably lessened. This was made essentially easier by the complete
nationalizing of finance which had taken place shortly befoie.
FROM THE FUGGER TO THE PRESENT 377
The end which the absolute monarchy in France approached was
pursued in England under Elizabeth by Gresham on the basis of Ms
commercial experience and ideas. He had made possible a consider-
able development of sea power founded on the national power of capital,
and had also achieved what in France (except for short periods under
Sully and Colbert) was always lacking, namely order and honesty in
the financial administration. But under Elizabeth's successors these
achievements were mostly lost again in the struggle between the
people and the Crown.
Among modem States it was a citizen State, the Republic of the
United Netherlands, which first succeeded in getting a genuine State
credit, and so independence as a necessary condition of its brilliant
prosperity. England followed suit when the final victory of Parliament
put an end to the civil war. In both countries the State, after the
pattern of the mediaeval cities, took on the form of a corporation whose
members were responsible for the engagements of the State.
In this way the Netherlands and England were able to raise large
funded loans at a low rate of interest, to keep a large navy and utilize
the armies of military States by paying them subsidies. These sub-
sidies are an interesting link between the period of the Condottieri and
that of a standing army. The Netherlands and England could very well
themselves have maintained large armies, but they did not want to,
because they feared it would endanger popular freedom. So they con-
fined themselves to maintaining large fleets, and when they wanted a
large army, particularly in the wars against France, they bought Ger-
man help, or at any rate German troops, as in the war against the United
States. On the other hand, the subsidies for the German States, in
particular for Brandenburg Prussia, but also for Austria, were at first
a very important method of supporting a standing army and thereby
attaining their own ends. But these were only transition phenomena,
and only to be regarded as exceptions to the regular development of
militarism. The regular method was for the States to form and organize
the necessary forces for their own interest. War changed from being a
large-scale industry into a business of the State.
The standing armies and large navies of the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries required capital far in excess of that wanted for war in
the age of the Fugger. If then the credit of the individual financial
magnates had proved insufficient to supply the necessary capital, so
now that was completely the case. The army and navy required the
credit of the State, and this in its turn required the stock exchanges.
In the sixteenth century the Bourses had showed their central
significance for dealing in credit, and especially public credit, which
finally almost remained alone and had produced severe crises through
Absolutism, 36
Baros, Francisco de, 224
Adler, the, in Augsburg, 162: Philip,
Bartolini, the, 209
to Antwerp, 162
Basinger, Mint master, 65
Adrian VI, Pope, 91, 92, 207, 283
Bayr, Conrad, 147, 149
Afiaitado, G. F., 229, 230, 272
Bearer Bonds, 248, 330, 331
Africa Company, the, 366
Behaim, Paulus, 147, 148, 299, 305
Ahlefeld, the, 189, 191
Bernard of Weimar, 188
Aigues-Mortes, 203
Berne, 140
Alba, Duke of, 100, 117
Berthout, Jan, 178
Albert, Duke of Bavaria, 121
Besold, Bodinus, 25
Albizzi, Ruberto, 209, 210
Bills, traffic in, 244
Albrecht of Brandenburg, 73
Bini, Gian Francesco, 214
Almaden, mines of, 32
Birague, Cardinal, 220
Alsace, 188
Bodeck, the, 192
Altoviti, Bindo, 195, 217
Bodin, Jean, 39, 291, 296, 303, 304,
Alum, 196, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224, 229
339,343
Ambachts-Luyde, 53
Bombelli, Tommaso, 261
Ammirato, 25
Bonds, 247, 250, 264, 314, 315 ; of the
Amsterdam, 89, 350, 357-62
English Crown at Antwerp, 249, 250.
Annuities, 41, 43, 44, 53, 59, 261
See oho Bearer Bonds. Court Bonds
Antinori, the, 209
Bonfodio, 299
Antwerp, 89, 98, 233 ff., 332 ; growth
Bonvisi, the, 201, 226, 227
of in sixteenth century, 112 ; trade
Bordeaux, Florentine property seized
with, 67, 173, 228 ; trade restrictions
in, 207
in, 316 ; sack of, 127
Bosch, Ambrosy, 174
Antwerp Bourse, 98, 112, 113, 118, 222,
Botero, 25, 36
238, 307
Bourgefl, 282
Arbitrage, 245, 327
Bourse, or Exchange, 54 ff., 237;
Armies, cost of, 28
Bourse prices, 246 ; reaction to, 264 ;
Annstorffer, Paul Ton, 76
politics, 250, 254, 267, 272, 277, 313 ;
Arnoffini, Jacopo, 222, 228
Bourse of Antwerp fails Government,
Art patronage, 221
Augsburg, 64, 99, 107, 134, 148 ; in
280; and fairs in Lyons, 284-7;
Bourse Commonalty, 315 ff. ; medisa-
sixteenth century, 308 ; traders of,
val, 316
133, 142-4, 162, 163
Bozen, 89
Augsburg Council, and city interests, 99
Brandenburg, war with Nuremberg, 77
Augsburg, Diet of, 93
Brandon, Jean, 251
AusseeTm
Breslau, 89
Avignon, 203
Brockdorff, the, 189
Bruges, Medici business in, 196 ; centre
Balbani, the, 228
of trade, 233, 236 ; the Bourse, 237,
Bandello, Matteo, 200
307, 316
Bank of England, founded, 355 ; status
Bucher, Wolfgang, 177
of, 356
Bulletins, 285
Bank of Lyons, 296
Banking introduced in France, 296, 297
Buoninsegni,the,285
Burgau, Mark of, taken over by Fugget,
Banking in Florence, 51 ; in Italy, 62 ;
93
in Rome, 195
Bankruptcy, 318 ; of England (1672),
348; of France (1648), 341; of
Calle, Saravia della, 246
Cambrai, Peace of, 90, 211, 290
Italy, 336 ; of Spain, 125, 334, 337
Campeggio, Cardinal, 200
Cantarini, 230
Capital, 21 ft., demand for, in sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, 28, 29,
366 ; investment of, 47 ; needed for
War, 25 ff., 29-32; power of, 133;
trade in, in Lyons, 287, 288, 296;
18,307-333
Capponi, the, 203, 291 ; failure of, 339
Capponi,Niccolo,209,212
Capponi, 204
Carinthia, 67
Cartularies, 47
Cash transactions, 309
Castile, loans in, 62, 95
Cavaloanti, Giovanni, 199
Cavallari,the,200
Cavallis, Antonio de, 66
Cenami, the, 228, 229
Centurione, Octavio, 130
Certini, Tommaso, 217
Champagne, Counts of, 51
Champagne fairs, 220, 281, 323
Charles the Bold, 197
Charles V, Emperor, 30, 60; as prince,
71,72; helped by HallerandFugger,
74; king of the Romans, 77, 78;
loses Metz, Toul and Verdun, 79 ;
unable to pay debts, 79; and the
Genoese, 82 ; credit in Venice and
Genoa lost, 86; and sale of Toledo,
90; and Turks, 91, 92; war with
France (1636), 95; orders Philip to
raise money, 98 ; master of S. Ger-
many, 100 ; cunning policy, 101 ;
his difficulty in raising funds, 106,
107 ; sends for Fugger, 107 ; flees
toViIlaeh,108; and Henry II, 108 ;
king in 8. America, 142 ; offended
byWelser,144; king of Spain, 175 ;
and Francis I, 313
Charles VII, king of France, 28, 281
Charles Vm, king of France, 203, 204,
Charles I, king of England, 346
Charles H, king of England, 348
Chigi, Agostino, 195, 220, 221
Chiverny, Chancellor, 337
Church, action taken by, 22, 31, 42
Cibbini, 371, 372, 373
Cinnabar, as loan to Government, 154
Cities, credit and liabilities of, 33, 44,
46,349
Clearing-houses, 310
Clement VH, Pope, 86, 208, 210
Clerk, English envoy in Paris, 210
Cloth trade, 203, 233, 236, 237, 239
Clough, Bichard, 191
Cloves, 242
Cocquiel, Nicolas, 177
Cceur, Jacques, 51
Cognac, Holy Alliance of, 86
Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 339, 343, 344,
345
Cologne, 10, 163, 164
Commercial language, 318, 319
Commercial loans, 247
Commines, Philippe de, 30, 196
Commodities, trade in, 241, 242, 301,
307 ; legality of, questioned, 242, 243
Communications, effect of, 309
Companies, formation of, 47
Comuneros, rebellion of, 297
Concini, 230, 340
Condottieri, 27
Conto, defined, 323
Copper, 67, 68, 103, 143, 236, 251
Copper Standard, in Spain, 334
Corsini,203
Cosimo, Duke, of Florence, 109, 112
Cossa, Balthasar. See John X^II,
Pope.
Coulisse, origin of, 370
Court Bonds, 322
Courtbook of the Fugger, 88, 96, 103
Cracow, 104
Credit, and credit system, 26, 32, 35, 39.
44, 56, 69, 114, 120, 336
Credit transactions, 112, 318 ff.
Creditors, title of, in Middle Ages, 38
Crises, financial, 114ff., 125, 134, 147 ff.,
227
Cromwell, Thomas, 200, 347
Crown Agents, 250
Crown Lands, sale of, 31, 32
Croy, Philippe de, 224, 260
Cruzada, the, 91, 92
Curia, bankers of the, 195
Curiel della Torre, Juan de, 120, 247
Customs, and Customs leases, 29 ff., 198,
199, 261
Dalbene, family of, 217
Dale, Art van, 276
Dansell, William, 105, 180, 251, 270
Danzig, 104, 140
INDEX 383
Dauntsey, Christopher, 105, 180, 275
Erfurt, 104
Davanzati, 23, 287
Erkel, Ulrich, 134
Debtors' liabilities, 32, 33
Decree, state bankruptcy, 127
Dei, Benedetto, 196
Fairs, 54, 55, 57, 202, 207, 218, 220,
233,236,237,239,246,268 281 282
Denmark, 84, 89
307, 308-11, 317, 318, 323, 324
Dentz, 362
Deodati, the, 228
Ferdinand, Archduke of Tuscany, 219,
220
Deposit business, in Antwerp, 246 ; in
Lyons, 301
Deposition, the, 311 ff.
Diaceto, Lodovico, 218, 229, 337
Ferdinand of Austria, 83, 88, 90, 92,
93, 95, 97, 103, 104, 112, 134, 173
Ferdinand and Isabella, of Spain, 30, 63
Fernandez, Diego, 251
Ditte di Borsa, 247, 318, 321, 322, 332
Dominicans, the, 68
Fernandez, Buy, 251
Ferrante, King, 196
Doria, Andrea, 90
Ferrere, Dismes, 266
Doria, Lazaro, 42
Fiesco, Tommaso, 124, 125
Douane, 218
Figueroa, 98
Ducci, Gaspar, 146, 158, 159, 160, 179,
210, 222, 224, 225, 250, 267, 270, 271,
Financial dealings, great, 134, 248, 260,
256ff.,312ff.
294, 328
Dutch East India Company, 357 ff.
Financier, defined by Colbert, 38
Fire-arms, 44
East India Company, 366
East India Company, Dutch, 357 ff.
Fischer, Caspar and Christopher, 174
Flanders, and Florentine trade, 209
Fleckhamer, the, 173
East Indian products, 235, 239
Floating loans, 63, 346, 347
East Indian trade, 251
Florence, 45, 104 ; a free city, 205 ;
East Indies, 198, 199 ; expedition to
banking in, 51, 53 ; bill fair, 126
(1505), 138 ; sea route to, effect of,
Florentines, the, 23, 193-231, in six-
233
Ebner, the, 174
teenth century, 308 ; their trade in
coins, 282 ; in Lyons, 289, 304, 313 ;
Ebner, Christopher, 187
Ebner, Hans, 143
affected by French finance, 334
Fluctuations in prices, 324, 325
Ecorcheurs, 27
FondacodeiTedeschi,65
Edward VI, King of England, 179, 253 ;
Fontayne, Jan de, 177
his credit in Antwerp, 275
Forced loans, 33, 35, 36, 45, 61
Ehinger, Heinrich, 76
Foreigners, 48, 234
Elizabeth, Queen of England, 36;
borrows from Fugger, 116 ; and
Fornari, Agostino, 75
Fornari, Benedetto, 299
Rantzau loans, 190, 346
Fornari, Gianbattista, 299
Emden Fishing Company, 374
Fouquet, Nicolas, 340 ; and Colbert, 189
England, Customs rates of, 30 ; funded
debt of, 41, 348; Florentine trade
France, war taxes in, 30 ; money-rais-
ing in, 31 ; Florentines in, 194, 203,
with, 193 ; Altoviti trade with, 195 ;
217 ; traffic with S. Germany, 282 ;
Medici business in, 196; foreign mer-
crown loans, 291 ; finance in, 337 ;
chants in, 253; and the Antwerp
bankruptcy of 1648, 341
Bourse, 280 ; in eighteenth century,
Frankfort-on-Main, 89, 107, 128
352-7 ; State bankruptcy of, 348 ;
Frederick HI, Emperor, 30, 69, 60
her National Debt, 348
Frederick the Great, 374
English Crown Agents in Antwerp, 251
Freibourg, 140
English, the, in Antwerp, 234
Freihamer, Christopher, 187
English trade, 233 ; in Antwerp, 263
Frescobaldi, the, 63, 71, 198-201, 228
Erasso, Francisco, 107, 110, 112, 114,
Friesland debt, 131 ; garrison paid by
116, 120, 145, 275, 278
Fagger.72
384 INI
Frundsberg, Georg, 87
Fugger, growing importance of, 71 ;
bank in Borne, 72 ; and Charles V.,
79 ft. ; and Spain, 81 ; and Haps-
burgs, 81 ff.; and Naples, 82 ff. ;
accused of delivering base metal, 83 ;
business branches, 89 j and Spanish
payments, 92; claims on Ferdinand
in 1530, 93; balance sheets of 1533
and 1536, 94; of 1539, 96; and
John m of Portugal, 96; and Queen
Maria, 96, 97 ; and Hapsburgs in
1546, 99; balance sheet of 1546,
101-3 ; new branches, 104 ; balance
sheets of 1553, 111 ; proposed liqui-
dation, 105, 109; and European
trade, 114 ; and Maximillian II, 117 ;
decline inevitable, 119 ; and leases
of the Maestrazgos, 120; and
Spanish Court debts, 120; credit
falling, 120; balance sheets, 120-3 ;
and D. William of Bavaria, 128;
balance sheets of 1577, 128, 129;
soundness re-established, 129; mora-
torium in favour of, 131 ; loss on
claims against the Hapsburgs, 131 ;
and Gossembrot, 136 ; average pro-
fits of, 139 ; and Emperor's oppo-
nents, 146 ; copper syndicate, 156 ;
business with Ligsak, 174 ; business
in Antwerp, 247, 269, 274, 280;
their ruin, 336
Fugger and Welser compared, 138,
139
Fugger Bills, 104
Fugger Bonds, 116, 120
Fugger vom Beh, 64, 65
Fugger of the Lilies, 65
Fugger, Andreas, 64
Fugger, Anton, 65, 83, 85, 86 ff., 92,
100, 101, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112,
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 138, 147, 181,
276,280
Fugger, Carl, 128
Fugger, Christopher, 117, 124
Fugger, George (I), 65, 117
Fugger, George (H), 124
Fugger, George Christopher, 97
Fugger, George Thurso, 84
Fugger, Hans, 64, 97, 115
Fugger, Hans Jakob, 66, 116, 117, 119,
124
Fugger, Hieronymus, 65, 85, 92, 97
Fugger, Jakob (I), 64, 66, 70, 76, 78 .
80, 83, 84, 85, 97, 118
Fugger, Jakob (II), 65, 66
Fugger, Lucas, 64
Fugger, Marcus, 65
Fugger, Marx (I), 117, 119, 124
Fugger, Marx (II), 124
Fugger, Peter, 65
Fugger, Raymond, 65, 85, 92, 97, 124
Fugger, Ulrich, 65, 66
Funding system, 40, 41, 354
Furnberger, Hans and Augustine, 174
Furtenbach, the, 174
Fustian, 103, 104, 163, 235
Futterer, Hans, 140
Futterer, Hieronymus, 140
Gabelle, the, 219, 230, 292, 305, 338
Gallo, Juan Lopez, 252
Garnica (Contador), 126
Gassner, Lucas, 135, 136
Geneva, 202, 281
Genoa and the Genoese, 75, 119, 130,
140, 193, 308, 335
German Exchanges, 370
German financial powers other than the
Fugger, 133-92
Giron, Alvarez Juan, 127
Gold, trade in, 282
Goldsmiths, English, 347, 353
Gondi, Antonio, 219
Gondi, Cardinal, 203
Gondi, Girolamo, 219, 220
Gondi, Magdalena, 220
Gondicini, Bartolomeo, 222
Gossembrot, George, 68, 135
Gossembrot, the, 136, 156
Grand Parti, the, of 1555, 302, 303
Granvella, Cardinal, 35
Gresham, John, 222
Greaham, Richard, 153, 222
Gresham, Sir Thomas, 105, 112, 120,
149, 180, 182, 252-5, 272, 273, 274,
275, 316, 346
Grimaldi, Nicolo de, 75
Grimel, Alexius, 143, 144, 168, 169,
222, 223, 225, 272
Guadagni, the, 209, 217, 291
Guadalcanal, mines of, 82, 114
Gualterotti, the, 63, 198-201
Gualterotti, Filippo, 76, 166
Guicciardini, Francesco, 24, 25, 63, 118,
226, 245, 246, 247, 266
IffDEX 386
Guicciardini, Lodovico, 309
Herwart, Hans, 157
Guidetti, the, 52, 193
Herwart, Hans Heinrioh, 167
Guidetti, Tommaso, 196, 197
Herwart, Hans Paul, 167
Guilds of Augsburg, 64
Herwart, Johann Heinrich, 188
Herwart, Marcus, 167
Hacket, John, 86
Herwart, Ulrich, 158
Haller von Hallerstein, Wolff, 148, 176,
Hesse, Landgrave of, 100
183
Heymer, Paul, 134
Haller, Wolff, 74, 137, 175, 176
Haller zum Ziegelstein, Wolff, 175
Hochstetter, the, 87, 161-6, 263, 264
Hochstetter, Ambrosius, 161
Hannibal, Welser's creditor, 151
Hochstetter, Daniel, 156
Hansa towns, 233, 255
Hochstetter, Joachim, 153; founds
Hansa trade with England, ruined,
branch in England, 156
166
Hapsburgs, the, 32; and Valois,
straggle, 74 ; and the Fugger, 81 fi. ;
Holtzapfel, Dr., 118
Holy Alliance of Cognac, 86
Holzfeld,Herrvon, 191
their policy and finances, 87;
Holzschuher, George, 134
decline of relations with the Fugger,
107 ; evidence of close links with,
Hooohstraten, 76
Hopperus, President, 127
117 ; Imperial Hapsburgs and the
House purchase, in Antwerp, 179
and the Fugger, 131 ; and the Welser,
143; and the Hochstetter, 151; and
Hudson Bay Company, 366
Hungary, 67 ; defeated by Turks, 86 ;
importance of business with the
the Medici, overthrow Florence, 194
Fugger, 102, 103
Harsdorfer, the, 174
Hyrus, Andreas, 130, 131
Harstorfer, Wolff, 140, 166
Haug, the, 137 ; and Imperial finance,
Usnng, George, 135
158 ; balance sheets, 163 ; of Augs-
Imhof, the, 134, 186, 271
burg, 163 ; their claims in Antwerp,
268, 269, 271
Imhof, Andreas, 299
Imhof, Conrad, 140, 175
Heirs, liabilities, 35
Imhof, Cunz, 134
Henry Il.of France, allied with Maurice
Imhof, Michel, 306
jy, 107 ; prepares to invade Impyn, Jan, 245
the Empire, 108 ; claims against, India, gold and silver from, 95, 114
227 ; and finance, 297, 299 ; and Indulgences, 91
Maurice of Saxony, 300; and Le Industry, English, 365, 366, 367
Grand Parti, 302, 303 ; loans to, 305, Ingold, the, 174
306 Ingoldstadt, taken (1546), 119
Henry in, of France, 338, 339 Innocent Vni, Pope, 195
Henry IV, of France, 213, 339
Henry IV, of Spain, 62
Henry VII, of England, 30, 62, 198
Henry VHI, 30, 36, 99, 100; and
,
Innsbruck, 107
Interest, and interest rates, 16, 23, 34,
62, 73, 245, 247, 261, 264 ff., 269, 270,
272, 280, 293, 295, 322 fi.
mining industry, 155, 166, 199 ; his International Bills, 193
agents in Antwerp, 251 ; money International Bourse of the sixteenth
* century,307fi.
borrowed for, 268 ; prepares for war,
313
Herbrot, Jakob, 99
Herwart, the, 99, 156-9, 262, 340, 343
Herwart, Bartholomew, 188
Herwart, Christopher, 157
Herwart, Erasmus, 157
Herwart, George, 157
International finance, 158, 194, 195
Investment, need for, 44, 47
ron works, 134
sabella, Queen of Spain, 62
Italians, 23, 135
Italy, Florentine trade with, 194;
bankruptcy of, 336
Jager, Jacob, 187
James I, King of England, 36, 346
Jews, 48 ff.; and the German Bourse,
Louis XI, King of France, 30, 61, 62,
202, 281, 282, 288
Louis XII, King of France, 24, 30, 289
374
Lucca, merchants of, 226-30
Joachimsthal mines, 93
Johann Ferdinand, Elector of Saxony,
Ludwig, King of Hungary, 83, 86
99
Luynes', Duke of, 203, 340
John HI, King of Portugal, 96
Lyons, Bill fair, 126 ; loan to Henry II
John XXH, Pope, 61
Juliani, Francisco, 224
of France, 134 ; Welser in, 140 ; the
Great Loan, 146 ; merchants, 184 ff . ;
Julius II, Pope, 30
financiers, 187-9; markets and
fairs, 202, 207, 284 ; banks in, 203 ;
Kaltenhofer, 271
Ketzel, Sebald, 134
Khevenhuller, Hans, 129
Florentines in, 203, 207 ; Customs,
219 ; payments made in, 239, 281-
306 ; international bourse of, 307 ff .,
King's Letters, 325, 331
Kleberg, Hans, 157, 184, 210, 293, 294,
Macchiavelli, Niccolo, 13, 24, 25, 28, 205
Krafit, Hans Dlrich, 162
Maestrazgos, 82, 88, 98, 103, 120
Mainz, Archbishop of, 79
Kremmtz, 104
Mair, Jakob, 125
Kress, Hans, 134
Manlich, the, 154, 161
Ku^,' Sebastian, e il6
Manlich, Mathias, 161
Manlich, Melchior, 161, 165
Mansfeld, Count, 191
Labour and Capital, 25
Marcelis, Jean, 155
La Fontaine, Jean de, 189
Margaretha, daughter of Maximilian,
Landaur, Matthias, 134
68, 77, 91, 96, 97
Landed property, 103, 117, 132
Markets, origin of, 54, 308, 325
Langemantel, Matthew, 99
Marseilles, siege of, 81, 203
Langemantel, Wolffgang, 299
Martelli, 337
Langnauer, Hans, 163, 164
Lauginger, Marcus, 165
Martin V, Pope, 51
Martin de Troyes (Maitre Martin), 294,
Law, John, 369, 370
304
Leo X, Pope, 88
Martini, Alonso, 251
Letters of safe conduct, 223
Mary I, Queen of England, 180, 181, 182,
Levant, Florentine trade with, 194
253, 276
L'H6pital, Michel, 298
Mattstedt, Andreas, 73
Ligsalz, the, 173, 174, 271, 277
Maurice, Duke, of Saxony, 100, 107,
Link, Ulrich, 163
108, 272, 300
Lisbon, 71. 126, 138, 198, 229
M ft7r intjli ft n I, Emperor, 30, 60, 61, 67,
Lisola, 361
69, 70, 74, 76
Loans, 31; to Princes, 33, 35 ff. ;
Maximilian II, Emperor, 117, 134, 135,
guarantees, 37, 58; on Antwerp
Bourse, 248, 259; loan capital,
151
May, Bartholomew, 148
mobilized, 328-33
Mayr, Ulrioh, 133
LodovicoilMoro.135,204
Mazarin, Cardinal, 188, 340, 343
London, 104, 364
Medici, the, 45, 193, 202
Lopez, Albert, 251
Medici, Alessandro de', 212
Lopez, Martin, 272
Medici, Bicci de', 61
Lopez, Thomas, 251
Medici, Catherine de', 203, 213
Lorenzo the Magnificent, 194, 204
Medici, Cosimo de', 61
Medici, Giovanni de', 51
Medici, Lorenzo de', 62
Medici, Lorenzo (the Magnificent) de',
52,194,204 ^^
Medici, Maria de', 203
Medici, Piero de', 52
Memmingen, 69
Mendez, Diego, 264
Mercantile system, 21
Mercenaries, 24, 26, 27, 44
Merchant Adventurers, 156, 249, 251
Merchants' Guilds, 64
Metz, 79, 107
Meuting, the, 99, 133
Meuting, Bernhard, 134
Meuting, George, 157, 175
Meuting, Jakob, 134
Meuting, Jorgs, 250
Meuting, Ludwig, 133
Milan, 140
Military Service, degradation of, 28
Minckel, Israel, 187, 304
Mines and mining, 82, 88, 134, 156, 166
Mohacs, battle of, 86
Mois, Jan, 251
Money, 21, 23; grants, 40; influence
on history, 98; passion for, 105,106;
power of, 106. See also Capital
Money-lending, 31, 48 ff., 60, 263, 353,
340,341
Monopolies, 151, 152, 245
Montecuccoli, 24
Monti, 46, 58, 303, 324
Montpellier, 203
Morales, 335
Mortgages, 39
Moxiea, Francesco de, 260
Muelich, George, 299
Mnller, Thomas, 126, 127, 251
Naples, Fugger trade in, 82 ff., 96, 109,
110 ; Florentine trade in, 194-, 209
National Debts, 334 ff., 350 ff.
Navagero, Andrea, 283
Navy Bills, 367
Neidhart, the, 99, 160, 161
Neidhart, Christopher, 160
Neidhart, Gabriel, 160
Neidhart, Sebastian, 158, 160, 223, 225,
298
Netherlands loans and debts, 37, 63, 71,
72, 79, 81, 112, 113 ; troubles in, 127,
195 ; struggle with Spain, 349
)BX 387
Neusohl, 67, 89
News service of Europe, 283, 317, 318
Nioolai, Nicolas, 268
Nori, Francesco, 202
Nuremberg, 68, 77, 89, 134, 138, 163
Obrecht, George, 45, 187, 304
Oertel, Matthew, 105, 109, 110, 112,
113, 114, 115, 118, 148, 175, 181
Olivarez, Count of, 130
Optimates, 205, 208, 209, 210, 211
Osterlings, the, 234
Pacioli, Luca, 58
Paris, Florentine property seized,
207 ; Bourse 298 ; in sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, 362-4; in
eighteenth century, 368-70
Partisans, 340, 341, 343
Parturas, 244
Paul III, Pope, 98
Paumgartner, the, 87, 99, 156, 176
Paumgartner, Hans (I), 78, 135
Paumgartner, Hans (II), 137
Pavia, battle of, 81
Pazzi, the, 52, 203
Pazzi, Francesco de', 195
Pazzi, Jacopo de', 195
Pecori, Simon, 225
Pegolotti, Balduci, 318
Pepper, 71, 150, 198, 239
Permute, 63
Pesoa, Francesco, 251
Peutinger, Christopher, 101, 144, 145,
146
Peutinger, Conrad, 69
Pflaum, Matheus, 298
Philip H, King of Spain, 30, 33, 98, 113,
114, 116, 124, 277, 279
Pimel, the, 87, 157
Pimel, Hans, 165
Pirkhehner, Vincenz, 287
Pirkheimer, Willibald, 184
Poland, 83
Politics, effect of, on finance, 194, 250,
254, 267, 272, 277, 313
P5mer, the, 174
Popes, attitude of, concerning fairs, 284
Portinari, the, 52, 193, 198
Portinari, Tonunaso, 196, 197
Portugal, 139, 234, 249, 251, 280
Poschinger, Wolff, 182 ff., 271
Prechter, the, 174
243
Prices, 239, 240, 246, 322 ff., 366
Princes, debts, personal credit, etc., 26,
53, 319, 320, 324
Pruen, Christopher, 276
Prays, Jaspar, 175
Quarter Days, 246, 264
Quicksilver, 82, 154, 162
Babatta, 197
BabeUo,Joao,251,268
Bametti, of Turin, 230, 337
Bantzau, the, 189
Real Estate, 40, 68, 133
Receivers General, of the Netherlands,
113, 116, 223, 248, 249, 321
Reformation, the, Fugger and, 72 ff. ;
Welser and, 143
Behlinger, the, 173
Bern, the, 139, 162
139
Bern; Bartholomew, 1!
Bern, Lucas, 80, 139, 163
62
283
Betondeurs, 27
Betz, Due de, 203
Bibauds, 27
Bidoffi, Cardinal, 215
Binnucoini, Tommaso, 217
Roads, 29, 56
Rogiers, Daniel, 235
Borne, Sack of, 87, 208 ; Fugger bank
in, 72; Welser in, 140; Florentine
trade with, 194-6, 209
Rossi, Lionetto de, 203
Both, the, 173
Rothschilds, the, 337, 375
Rouen Bourse, 298
Boutiers, 27
Bubys, 286, 303
Rucellai, Orazio, 218, 219, 229, 337
Bummel, Peter, 134
Saffron, 141, 230, 241
Salt tax, 219, 292, 305, 338
Salt works, 221
Salviati, the, 160, 198, 207
Salviati, Cardinal, 210, 215
Salviati, Jacopo, 206, 208
Salviati, Pier, 209, 210
8ak Partita, 305
Salzburg, gold from, 282
Samples, use of, 237
Sander, Clemens, 83, 151
Sanuto, Marias, 317
Saragossa, 140
Sardini,the,229,337
Sassetti, the, 52
Sassetti, Francesco, 203
Saxony, mining in, 134 ff.
Schauer, Engelbert, 73
Schetz, family of, 148
Schetz, Erasmus, 180
Schetz, Gaspar, 247, 250, 272, 315
Schetz, Melchior, 226
Scheuerl, Christopher, 28, 72, 90
Scheufielin, Hans, 174
Sohlackenwald, mining at, 141
Schmalkaldian League, the, 99, 187,
277
Schmalkaldian War, the, 65, 97, 98, 99,
134, 137, 186, 295
Schoonabeke, Gillebert van, 133, 222,
224
Sohopel, Sebastian, 75
Schutze, Gregory, 134
Schutze, Hans, 134
Schwatz, silver and copper mines, 66,
70, 89, 138, 163
Secret Book of Honour, 117
Securities, 357 ff.
Seiler, Hieronymus, 143, 144, 158, 159,
222, 267, 293, 298
Seiler, Michel, 160
Seitz, Simon, 138
Sender, Lucas, 134
Seng, Oswald, 161
Serantoni, 230
Sertini, Tommaso, 288
Settling Days, 207, 284
Sf orza, Galeazza Maria, 30
Shares, company, 47
Shipping, English, 356
Sickingen, Franz von, 78, 162
Siena, traders of, 57, 220 ff.
Sigmund of Tyrol, 133, 136
Silver and copper, trade in, 68, 135 ;
"from India," 95; American, 272,
277
Sixtus IV, Pope, 195
Smith, Adam, 21, 26
Smut, Andreas, 156
Soderini, the, 205, 209
Sorbrucque, Gilles de, 251, 266
South Germany, affairs in, 100, 108,
110, 120
South Sea Company, 367
Spain, funded debt in, 41 ; finance in,
63 ; money raised by Charles V, 78,
80, 81 ; and Fngger, 81, 82, 89, 102,
103, 109 ; her war debts, 112 ; busi-
ness, 123, 125, 129, 131, 148; State
Bankruptcy, 130, 334; pools finances
with England, 277 ; money famine,
279 ; and Antwerp Bourse, 280
Spaniards in Antwerp, 234; system of
Spanocchi, the, of Siena, 221
Specie, transport of, 318
Speculation (in Antwerp), 239, 240,
325-8, 358 ff., 367, (in Germany) 374
Spices, 151, 129, 233, 239
Spini, the, 210, 289
Spinola, Bartolomeo, 131
Steoher, Bernhard, 71, 72, 175, 199,
260
Stercke, Gerard, 179, 250
Stetten, Hans von, 135, 136
Stetten, Lucas von, 156
Stock-jobbing, 367, 370
Straten, Pieter van der, 179, 250, 260
Strozzi, the, 195, 196, 206, 208, 209,
212-16, 291, 304
Sturm, Jakob, 216, 294
Sully, Duo de, 339, 341
Snriano, 209
Swabian League, 76, 77, 78
Swiss Confederacy, 26
Switzerland, war with, 67, 68
Taille, 28
Tallies, 353, 355, 356
Tax-farmers, 37, 38
Taxes, 28, 29, 30, 36, 45, 46, 61
Tetzel, the Pardoner, 73
Thurmer, Hans, 140
Tiepolo,90
Toledo, 90
Tolfa, 221
Tolomei, the, 57
Tornabuoni, the, 193
Tool, 107
Toulouse, 297, 298
Tournon, Cardinal de, 215, 291
Trade, 47, 64 ff., 114, 133, 195
Trade, restriction of, 316
Tiivalzio,24
Tncher, Lazarus, 146, 148, 154, 177 ff.,
183, 186, 210, 223, 241, 250, 266, 267,
270, 271, 275, 294, 313
Turenne, Vicomte de, 342
Turks, the, 86, 91, 92, 95, 194
Tyrol, mining and trade of, 65, 66, 67,
89, 133, 153, 282
Him, 149, 163
Usury, 25, 41, 42, 43, 49, 58, 59, 249,
287, 301, 325
Uzzano, Giovanni da, 57
Vaffle, Francesco de, 260
Validity of debts, 247
Valois struggle with the Hapsburgs,
74
Vanelli, 230
Varchi, 193, 210
Vaughan, Stephen, 251, 265, 268
Venezuela, 142
Venice and the Venetians, 65, 89, 140,
163, 193 ff., 209, 234
Verdun, 109
Vidiville, 230
Vienna, 89, 117
Villach, loan, 109, 113, 114
Villalon, Christoval de, 243
Vivaldi, Lorenzo, 76
V6hlin, Conrad, 138
Vohlin, Hans, 138
Was
s,244
War, needs of, 25 fi.
Weavers, Guild, 64
Weikman, George, 187
Welser, the, 72, 78, 90, 92; (Augsburg),
137 ff., 142-4 ; articles of partner-
ship, 139; branches, 140; (Nurem-
berg), 140-2; and bonds of Receivers
General, 141 ; capital in Spain, 144 ;
Venezuela enterprise, 144; (Ulm),
149 ; and Schmalkaldian War, 144-
9; status of, 148; business with
Spain, 148 ; claims on France, 148 ;
failure, 149, 150, 151, 263, 271;
and Lyons business, 293
Welser, Anton, 75, 138
Welser, Bartholomew, 99, 142
Welser, Christopher, 148, 149
Welser Hans, 99, 140, 148, 149
Welser, Jacob, 138
Weber, Leonard, 148, 149 Wolff, Heinrich, 134, 135
Welser, Lucas, 134, 138 Wolsey, Thomas, 199, 200
Weber, Marcus, 149 Wool, 196, 198
Welser, Marx, 148 Worms, Diet of, 79
Welser, Matthew, 149, 160
Welser, Paul, 160, 151 Zametti, the, of Lucca, 218, 229
Welser, Sebastian, 140 Zametti, Gondi, 228
Wiedt, Count Jbhann zu, 192 Zangmeister, the, 173
William, Duke, of Bavaria, 128 Zapolya, 86
Woad, 178 Zeeland, 261
Wolff, Balthasar, 135 Zurich, 140
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